Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

by Martin van Creveld (Author)

110 ratings

ISBN-13: 978-0521297936

ISBN-10: 0521297931

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Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the last two centuries.

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Editorial Reviews

Review

'Military buffs, even those who disagree with the author's conclusions, will find this original and stimulating.' Business Week

'I recommend this work for every professional army officer, but particularly those in the operations field who are used to moving units with the stroke of a grease pencil.' Major Michael D. Krause, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

'Impeccable scholarship and major new interpretations characterize this work destined to become a classic in military history.' Technology and Culture

'This slim volume, unique of its kind, not only iterates the value of the study of logistics to the understanding of any war, any campaign, or any battle, but presents significant historical re-interpretations and revisions on practically every page.' The American Historical Review

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Cambridge (December 12, 1979)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Paperback ‏ : ‎ 284 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0521297931
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0521297936
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 12.3 ounces
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 5.5 x 1 x 8.25 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #1,621,409 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,673 in Historical Study Reference (Books)
- #2,065 in History Encyclopedias
- #3,180 in European History (Books)

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110 ratings

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3 star		7%
2 star		3%
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safhhk

It Is A Second Edition

Reviewed in the United States on July 27, 2020

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I compared this Second Edition paperback to my well-worn, thoroughly tattered, and desparately in need of replacement First Edition paperback. The only obvious difference was the postscript at the end of the Second Edition paperback. There were no obvious changes to the text, but I did not check it word for word either.

This book is a classic on logistics in warfare. It should be required reading for all officers in all branches of all services even though it's focus is on ground warfare. Logistics is that important to the successful practice of The Art of Warfare.

3 people found this helpful

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Chuck

Very interesting

Reviewed in the United States on June 27, 2021

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The discussion of logistics in the Napoleonic wars and before isn't going to be equally interesting to all readers. I was very interested in reading about the supply difficulties the Germans had in 1914 France and 1941 Russia, but by far the most fascinating part of the book was about Allied logistics in 1944 France, and the possibility of crossing the Rhine on a narrow front, seizing the Ruhr industrial region. This discussion alone is easily worth the price of the book.

3 people found this helpful

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Leroy Klasko

an excellent book on war from a different perspective

Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2020

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Friends had been telling me to read this book for some time now, but I never got around to it. Finally ordered it and read it. It is a great read on a subject that most histories on war seem to leave out or just gloss over. I would recommend it to anyone serious about studying military history.

3 people found this helpful

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Tom Munro

Great Book

Reviewed in the United States on March 9, 2001

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This is really a number of books in one. It is not very long some 240 pages but it is easy to read and challenging. It is the first book that I have ever seen published on logistics and it is fascinating.
First and foremost it is a picture of the changing pattern of war. It describes in the first chapter the sorts of campaigns which were run until the time of Napoleon. In those days ammunition would be the most minor problem for an army. Most soldiers could carry enough ammunition in their back pack for a campaign and in a major battle they would fire perhaps twenty or thirty times. In a siege a cannon might fire four or five times a day. The major problem was the provision of food for men and horses. Generally an army could take from the country enough to feed itself. Problems arose if an army stayed in place for any time. A siege would have the power to destroy an area of country by stripping it of everything edible. For these reason there developed a system of magazine storage for siege campaigns.
The next chapter discusses the Napoleonic period and the failure to set up a logistics system in Russia despite careful planning. This led to enormous French casualties and the collapse of the campaign.
The rest of the book looks at the Franco-Prussian War, the Schlieffen Plan , the German operations on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, the African Campaign and the operations in France following the break out from the initial beach heads. In discussing these campaigns the author charts the gradual change in logistics. The development of railway systems and integrating them into providing supplies. The development of modern weapons and the increase in the demand for ammunition and for fuel. The importance of motorised transport and the problems created in providing oil and spare parts.
Each of the campaigns discussed is done so in a way that brings new light onto the mechanics of the campaign and in our ability to understand what happened. The Russian campaign is fascinating as it shows how tough was the problem faced by the Germans. They were able to cobble together large numbers of trucks to supply their troops but were never in the position to replace them once they began to wear out. The amount of ammunition stockpiled was also barely enough for a campaign of four weeks. The German effort in doing as well as they did was incredible but once the Soviets were able to hang on through the initial period then the odds started to swing their way. Germany's supply problems were shown by their in ability to supply winter uniforms and this led to massive casualties from frost bite.
One of the most fascinating chapters is on Rommel and his campaigns. The material in the book has been quoted elsewhere. In previous times it has been thought that Rommel failed in Africa because of the allies intercepted supply conveys and sunk material on route. The book shows that supplies to Africa were not the problem. The problem in supplying Rommel related moving those supplies the enormous distances to the front. The book suggests that the German High Command knew that this would be a problem and they ordered Rommel to restrict any advances. As we know he disobeyed these orders and won a number of significant victories against the British. What the book shows is that although a tactical genius he had little grasp of strategy.
The book is fascinating and everyone who is interested in the subject of military history should read it.

34 people found this helpful

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Treetown

Supply for longer campaigns and wars...

Reviewed in the United States on October 22, 2000

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An excellent work - hard to improve on the comments of the other reviewers who note many of the fine qualities of this work.
One point not previously made was that the period of time chosen was not accidental. From Wallenstein on, we began to see what we conceive of as relatively modern armies (that is armies with a command component, teeth or the sharp fighting end, and a tail or supporting component) which had to fight over more than one season. Van Creveld, an excellent historian, covers all of these notions carefully with copious notes. A great work for the serious and specialist reader but should also appeal to the military history buff.
I wish that the work were revised in light of Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli War, The Falklands War, and most of all, the Iraqi War. These were relatively shorter wars, and the problems were not one of production or foraging but using the already accumulated stocks effectively. The contraction of time means that choosing wrong (wrong weapons, wrong fuel stocks, wrong plan of distribution) are more profound. There may not be time politically to correct mistakes.

12 people found this helpful

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Jacob Howard

Important for everyone to understand

Reviewed in the United States on March 27, 2020

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Great book, helps dispel the brain washing from moronic public schooling. An American public education is such a tragic inadequacy.

One person found this helpful

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SHOEMEISTER

Logistics is very important!

Reviewed in the United States on September 27, 2020

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Extremely informative of a little studied subject.

One person found this helpful

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keithjohnson

Changes the way one thinks about war and strategy

Reviewed in the United States on December 23, 2013

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Yes, van Creveld has stirred up years of debate with this book. Yes, there are plenty of military historians who quibble over his sweeping conclusions. And yes, it is laser-focused on European land campaigns.
Nevertheless, this book is indispensable for clear thinking about what armies actually did, how they did it, and what the logistics requirements were. Every time i see a casual reference to 18th-century warfare and the tyranny of supply lines, which supposedly dictated strategy, I think back to van Creveld's analysis showing that there was no such thing. He makes clear that the real revolution in warfare came in 1914 -- not trench warfare, but the rise of permanent supply operations rather than fluid logistics.

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Tecumseh

Extremely disappointing

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 5, 2021

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I had great expectations from reading some of the comments so I decided to risk it and buy it, even though it's definitely not a cheap book. Well...it's not worth the cost of the paint in the printing. Almost no new concepts. Subjective statements or just plain historical descriptions without any strong pedagogical value or captivating writing style. I was expecting to actually learn something about war logistics. No Sir. You can't fill even half a page with solid knowledge from the 275 pages this book has. I would never have bought it if I knew how bad it was.

One person found this helpful

Overseas Reviewer

As much a revisionist history, as a study of military logistics

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 10, 2007

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As described by the reviewer below, this book deals with logistics at the strategic level and uses seven relatively modern campaigns (up to and including WW2) to chart the development of military logistics since the seventeenth century. Notable omissions include a discussion of how armies dealt with the issue prior to this period and the logistics of naval or air warfare.

A particularly interesting and unexpected aspect of this book is that it draws a number of conclusions about the campaigns and leaders covered that successfully challenge the prevailing wisdom in this area. For example, the failings of Rommel in North Africa are laid bare, as is the impracticability of the Schlieffen plan and the fact that the German railway system contributed little by way of advantage to the army in its defeat of France in 1870. The book also refutes the misnomer that Napoleon was ill-prepared for the disastrous advance on Russia in 1812. The new edition contains an interesting, if brief, discussion of modern military logistics and the increased profile recently associated with the subject.

In summary, this book is very readable and provides coverage of a subject much neglected by the popular literature. Supplying war also contains a wealth of information about seven key military campaigns viewed from a perspective that seeks to determine what outcomes were achievable, rather than simply intended.

3 people found this helpful

O. G. M. Morgan

A recommendable study of the role of logistics in warfare

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on October 25, 2001

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Martin Van Creveld explodes a number of myths and provides much food for thought in this assessment of the importance of logistics in warfare. It is not a general account of the subject. The author provides an introductory description of the way in which the generals of the Thirty Years War and subsequent campaigns handled the question of supply and of the way in which considerations of supply dictated strategy. After this, he concentrates on specific campaigns: Austerlitz and the Russian campaign of 1812, the Franco-German war of 1870, the Schlieffen Plan and its modified execution in 1914, Rommel's North African campaign, Operation Barbarossa and the Allied campaign in North-Western Europe, 1944-5. Van Creveld takes pleasure in puncturing time-honoured misconceptions, especially in the context of the Russian campaigns of Napoleon and Nazi Germany, although his best sections are those concerned with the Schlieffen Plan and the Allied campaign in the West from Normandy onwards. In the latter chapter, the author shows how the Allied planners, numbered in thousands, consistently found themselves wrong-footed by events, even to the extent of declaring that actual developments at the front were "impossible". The campaigns under consideration are well-chosen, but one might wish that other campaigns had not been overlooked. It seems perverse for an analysis of military supply effectively to ignore the experiences of the French and of the Allied forces in the Peninsular War, where considerations of supply were absolutely paramount, but which Van Creveld mentions only in an aside. A chapter on the American Civil War would surely have been informative, too, with any number of campaigns providing suitable material for this sort of study. Otherwise, the only quibbles I have are with one questionable statement and a couple of outright errors. To suggest that Napoleon's planned invasion of Great Britain was only a "feint", as Van Creveld implies, seems unsustainable today, but this is merely tangential to his thesis. On the other hand, I can't imagine where Van Creveld gets the idea that Normandy is "a peninsula jutting westward into the Atlantic" (is he thinking of Brittany?). An even stranger error, since it does impinge on Van Creveld's argument, is crediting Frederick the Great with victory at the Battle of Minden in 1759. The victor of Minden was Ferdinand of Brunswick; Frederick wasn't even present. I think these mistakes and the omissions mentioned previously shave a star off a maximum recommendation, but this is still a very good book.

15 people found this helpful

Tony Scott

A classic

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on October 3, 2015

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A classic. Thank God for online second hand book sellers.

One person found this helpful

Ramones 16

Ohne Mampf kein Kampf!

Reviewed in Germany on January 22, 2021

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Ein absoluter Klassiker der Militärfachliteratur, ursprünglich bereits 1977 erschienen, hier in einer Neuausgabe von 2004. Der renommierte israelische Militärhistoriker Martin Van Creveld war damit einer der ersten, der speziell die Logistik großer Feldzüge penibel untersuchte, und dabei mit einer Menge an Vorurteilen und historisch falschen Mythen aufräumte. Besonders interessant fand ich, wie er den legendären Schlieffen-Plan ("macht mir den rechten Flügel stark!") zerlegt. Crevelds Studien weisen deutlich darauf hin, dass dieser Angriffsplan des Deutschen Reiches gegen Frankreich 1914 von Anfang an zum Scheitern verurteilt war. Auch ganz ohne "Wunder an der Marne". Von Napoleon über den Ersten Weltkrieg, Hitlers Angriff auf Sowjetrussland und das Afrikakorps, bis zum D-Day und den Kampf in der Normandie spannt sich der Bogen. Am Ende folgt ein Ausblick auf die Logistik zukünftiger Kriege.

"Supplying War" ist eine teilweise trockene, aber immer hochinteressante Studie über die Wichtigkeit der militärischen Logistik als Basis strategischer Siege. Sowohl im Ersten wie auch im Zweiten Weltkrieg sieht hier Deutschland ziemlich schlecht aus, Dauerimprovisation und logistisch unmöglich zu erreichende Ziele überforderten die Truppe. In Stalingrad erreichte dies dann den grausamen Höhepunkt des Horrors. Ausbaden mussten es wie immer die Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Soldaten. Denn ohne Munition, adäquate Bekleidung und ohne Mampf - kein Kampf. Ein bis heute nach wie vor hochaktuelles Werk, sehr schade, dass es niemals zu einer deutschen Übersetzung kam.

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