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Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 Hardcover – September 10, 1999

4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars 12 ratings

Complementing Confederate Tide Rising, which covers the origins of the Maryland campaign, Taken at the Flood is a detailed account of the military campaign itself. It focuses on military policy and strategy and the context necessary to understand that strategy. A fair appraisal of the campaign requires a full appraisal of the circumstances under which the two commanders, Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan, labored. Harsh attempts to discover what they believed their responsibilities were and what they tried to accomplish; to evaluate the human and logistical resources at their disposal; and to determine what they knew and when the learned it.

Antietam has languished in the long, obscuring shadow cast by Gettysburg. Harsh advocates rethinking the Maryland campaign and promotes the argument that Antietam was one of the most interesting, critical, and potentially enlightening episodes in U.S. history.

Editorial Reviews

Review

This is a tour de force challenging much of the conventional wisdom, both pro- and anti-Lee. Mr. Harsh's signal contribution to understanding this campaign, and by extension to the war as a whole, is to transcend issues of personality--"Robert the Bold vs. George the Timid"--in order to focus on strategic considerations. -- The Washington Times, November 13, 1999

About the Author

Joseph L. Harsh is a professor and former chair of history at George Mason University in Virginia. He is founding president of the Northern Virginia Association of Historians.

Joseph L. Harsh is a professor and former chair of history at George Mason University. He is the author of Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (The Kent State University Press, 1998).

Product details

  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Kent State Univ Pr; 2nd Printing edition (September 10, 1999)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 649 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0873386310
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0873386319
  • Lexile measure ‏ : ‎ 1460L
  • Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 8.1 ounces
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.5 x 2 x 9.5 inches
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars 12 ratings

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Joseph L. Harsh
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4.6 out of 5 stars
4.6 out of 5
12 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Reviewed in the United States on June 28, 2016
A classic that will inform and allow students to understand what happened at this important battle.
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Reviewed in the United States on October 1, 2012
The author manages marvelously at what is being seen as more and more essential in Civil War writing - describing WHAT it was like to conduct military operations, rather than repeating platitudes; "Grant knew this, Lee knew that, etc."
We hear much more of what Lee actually said.
Interesting details emerge: Stuart was lax in scouting the Federal army, there is the on-going lack of cohesion in Confederate operations due to poor staffing protocols, Lee, finally hits the tone that he never dropped; 'I (we) were beaten by numbers that became ever larger,' certainly not by a more and more savvy set of Union commanders, by a better trained and equally well led cavalry service, by more and more intelligent strategy. Left only touched on is Lee's on-going refusal to grant any consideration to initiative or skill by Union commanders, much less any aggressive instinct of its soldiery. In this case, if Harper's Ferry is such a prize, Lee must hold the South Mountain line, then proceed.
He hopes to turn the Union right at the end of the day's fighting at Antietam? Expose the immediate and entire flank and rear of his army to a pursuit by McClellan? Its as if the other side is merely a prop that will always perform as expected.
However, the flood tide moment did indeed extend beyond September 1862, the author downplays the degree of collapse of the army of the Potomac after the Fredericksburg Campaign. Emancipation created an on-going crisis in the North. Read 'Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant' by Piston to hear Longstreet's ideas of how to proceed after 1862.
We see Lee here at the peak of his generalship that he matched at Spotsylvania, hands-on, in sight of his men, steel nerves when the army is threatened. But the haziness of thought when on the offensive, the love of the 'Hail-Mary,' essential details left to the guesses of subordinates, all shown in spades in this campaign AND Gettysburg: part tactical genius and yes, part warlord swinging his sword wildly above his head.
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Reviewed in the United States on November 5, 2007
Far from the glossy perspectives of some history books, Harsh's Taken at the Flood takes excruciating effort to analyze the correspondence of Lee, President Jefferson Davis, and the multitude of Confederate officers involved in the fights at South Mountain, Harper's Ferry, and Antietam. What he uncovers is a strong argument that Lee's foray into Maryland--the South's first incursion into Union territory--was not about trying to obtain foreign recognition, attack cities such as Baltimore or Philadelphia, or even occupy Union lands. Lee's invasion of the North was conducted to relieve the pressure on Richmond and grant the lands of Virginia some respite from constant ravaging. By moving into northern land, Lee hoped to panic the Lincoln administration and force the Union army--heavily demoralized and fractured after three months of defeat at Lee's hands--to leave the confines of D.C. and give battle. Lee would then maneuver and destroy the weakened Union army. Lee acknowledged that the South's manpower and resources were already starting to dwindle. Riding the crest of multiple victories since taking over the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee felt that time was running out and that potentially the penultimate opportunity to end the war with one final campaign now presented itself. This campaign could complete the demoralization of the Union army and the northern public and force peace overtures by the Lincoln administration. Harsh reveals Lee's campaign plan, however, was far from well thought out. Lee made dangerous assumptions that the Union armies at Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah Valley, where Lee wanted to establish his supply chain while campaigning in Maryland, would be vacated by the Union soldiers when they discovered Lee maneuvering northwards. The Union armies in the Valley elected to stand and fight, completely disrupting Lee's plans, forcing him to divide his army. George McClellan also departed the protective confines of D.C. much earlier than Lee predicted, resulting in heavy fighting at the gaps of South Mountain, where Lee's divided army took casualties it couldn't afford. Forced to wait for reunification with his army, Lee relinquished the initiative to McClellan. Pushing his soldiers too much over three months of campaigning resulted in broken and exhausted men, regardless of their high morale. Massive straggling culminated and Lee conceded that it directly contributed to his rebuke at Antietam. Indeed, Harsh pointedly states that Lee's obvious offensive mindedness blinded him to crafting a flexible campaign, one that also failed to properly utilize cavalry. After withdrawing from Antietam, Lee boldly maneuvered to resume the offensive by invading Maryland again, this time via Williamsport near Hagerstown. Only McClellan's probing at Lee's rear jostled the southern commander's realization that his time was up and his campaign was over. His campaign resulted in 31% casualties and the loss of over 50% of his line commanders. One cannot ignore Harsh's intriguing assessment of a very aggressive, and not always very tactically brilliant, Robert E. Lee.
10 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on August 18, 2007
Joseph Harsh brings a very different but logical view to the Antietam Campaign in this book. This is NOT your first book on Antietam; you need to have an understanding of this critical event to really understand this book. In a very logical, systematic manner, we walk thru the campaign not as history but as the events take place. This approach puts the reader in the position of Lee or McClellan making decision with imperfect knowledge.

Starting with a full review of the CSA position after Pope's army escapes into the Washington forts to the return to Virginia on the 21st, the author display an astounding knowledge of this campaign. What he has to say about the Lee and McClellan will challenge many of the historical assumptions and make you think.

This is not an "easy read" BUT it is one that every student of the Civil War needs to read.
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