The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King - The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea
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The Admirals tells the story of how history's only five-star admirals triumphed in World War II and made the United States the world's dominant sea power.
Only four men in American history have been promoted to the five-star rank of Admiral of the Fleet: William Leahy, Ernest King, Chester Nimitz, and William Halsey. These four men were the best and the brightest the navy produced, and together they led the U.S. Navy to victory in World War II, establishing the United States as the world's greatest fleet.
In The Admirals, award-winning historian Walter R. Borneman tells their story in full detail for the first time. Drawing upon journals, ship logs, and other primary sources, he brings an incredible historical moment to life, showing us how the four admirals revolutionized naval warfare forever with submarines and aircraft carriers, and how these men - who were both friends and rivals - worked together to ensure that the Axis fleets lay destroyed on the ocean floor at the end of World War II.
- Listening Length17 hours and 9 minutes
- Audible release dateMay 1, 2012
- LanguageEnglish
- ASINB007Z96440
- VersionUnabridged
- Program TypeAudiobook
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Product details
| Listening Length | 17 hours and 9 minutes |
|---|---|
| Author | Walter Borneman |
| Narrator | Brian Troxell |
| Whispersync for Voice | Ready |
| Audible.com Release Date | May 01, 2012 |
| Publisher | Hachette Audio |
| Program Type | Audiobook |
| Version | Unabridged |
| Language | English |
| ASIN | B007Z96440 |
| Best Sellers Rank | #23,915 in Audible Books & Originals (See Top 100 in Audible Books & Originals) #20 in Naval Forces Military History #27 in World War II Biographies #92 in Naval Military History |
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The book is very readable. It contains just the right mix of background information, foreshadowing, and interesting side notes. The author ably captures the nature of the four men without engaging in gratuitous hero worship. He paints them as four men with their strengths and drawbacks who left incredible marks on the US Navy, and by proxy, the world.
Loved the book and the care and detail put into it. Highly recommend to those with an interest in naval operations during the first half of the 20th century and World War II in particular.
My only real gripe with the book is that it cycles between perspectives for each of the admirals, making it hard to me to keep track of each one in my head effectively. I probably would have got more out of it if I read Nimitz’s biography first, or one of the other admiral’s.
Walter R. Borneman, THE ADMIRALS, Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King--The 5-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea, Little Brown and Company, New York, 2012
This is an excellent book that I highly recommend with but one observation--the author's "ultimate test" opinion of Admiral Kimmel's accountability for the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is at odds with opinions expressed by his subjects. He wrote:
"The ultimate test of any military commander, however, is that he rises or falls with whatever glories or misfortunes befall his command. Sometimes he is responsible, sometimes he is not, but as the commander he is always accountable nonetheless . . . . Having been caught flat-footed, [he] got the blame."
There never has been any question of Kimmel's accountability or responsibility--the important question is, Should Kimmel be blamed and punished forever?
Three of the author's principal subjects--Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, and King--expressed themselves clearly on the subject, as did other important subjects discussed by the author at length--Admirals Spruance, Richardson, Kinkaid, Standley, and Burke. It seems fair to ask, in view of the author's "ultimate test" opinion applied to Kimmel, "What were the opinions of his subjects on the matter?" Admiral Leahy never expressed an opinion to this reviewer's knowledge, but the others did.
Nimitz said and wrote:
"Frank Knox was wrong in blaming Kimmel. . . It could have happened to anyone." (E. B. Potter, Nimitz, 1976, p.13.)
"Admiral Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training schedule." (Nimitz & Potter, SEAPOWER, 1960, p.650.)
Halsey wrote:
"I don't believe there was a flag officer in the Pacific Fleet who did not feel that Kimmel was an ideal man for the job. Unfortunately, even an ideal man can't do the job without proper tools, and Kimmel did not have them. "
Concerning Kimmel's decision to save his [36 available] aircraft for future combat and not to engage in token long-range reconnaissance without more threat information than was contained in the Nov 27th War Warning Message--"Any Admiral worth his stars would have made the same choice . . . ."
"Even then, I think everyone present knew that the disaster would be formally investigated, but I'll take my oath that not one of us would have guessed that the blame would fall on Kimmel, because not one of us thought he deserved it--any part of it. I want to emphasize my next statement. In all my experience, I have never known a Commander in Chief of any United States Fleet who worked harder, and under more adverse circumstances, to increase its efficiency and to prepare it for war; further, I know of no officer who might have been in command at that time who could have done more than Kimmel did. I also want to repeat and reemphasize the answer I made when the Roberts Commission asked me how I happened to be ready for the Japanese attack. I told them, `Because of one man: Admiral Kimmel.'"
(Admiral William F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story, McGraw Hill, Inc., New York, 1947, pp. 70, 71, 82.)
King wrote:
"The evidence adduced [against Kimmel] warrants neither trial by general court-martial nor punishment in any form [emphasis added]. . . ." (King letter to Secretary of the Navy Sullivan, 7/14/48.)
Kimmel was the only qualified flag officer not to be advanced to his highest held wartime rank in accordance with The Officer Personnel Act of 1947--certainly to an honorable man, a form of punishment.
Borneman discusses King's role in the Pearl Harbor story extensively, without mentioning his most important contribution, which follows:
Kimmel's Naval Court of Inquiry (NCI) counsel asked for permission to examine MAGIC intelligence described by Captain Safford before the Hart Investigation with a view to its authentication and presentation to the NCI. It so happened that Admiral King was acting Secretary of the Navy on the day of the request, and he authorized the inspection. Counsel, having the numbers of the intercepts from Captain Safford, was able to inspect and to describe the forty-three messages, which he wished authenticated. The very next day, General Marshall's Deputy Chief of Staff, called the Director of Naval Communications to protest the inspection, but King's authorization prevailed.
It was one thing to have the intercepts segregated and authenticated; it was quite another problem to get them before the NCI, but that's another story. Suffice it to say that, without King's inspection authorization the Pearl Harbor story would have remained buried in Navy Department files.
The men were: Leahy, King, Nimitz, Halsey and Spruance. William Leahy was hardly a familiar name even during the war. He served as the original chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, before either the chairmanship or his staff had been created by Congress. More a diplomat than a fighter, he was perhaps Roosevelt's closest advisor after Harry Hopkins. His most important contribution was probably preventing open warfare among our own Chiefs as well as with Britain's Imperial General Staff. While the imperious Marshall, the volatile King and the flamboyant Arnold ran the war, Leahy kept the wheels on, the slides greased and everyone's eyes on the final goal.
Ernest King too has been eclipsed by time. In his day, he was courageous, arrogant, defiant, demanding and, in his own daughter's recollection, always enraged. For King, every defeat, every ship sunk, every sailor lost was a personal insult. Despite the official Allied policy of Europe First, King would have his naval war of vengeance in the Pacific theater, if he had to steal every ship, plane, sailor and Marine to do it. With a little help from Leahy and Marshall, he pulled it off.
Chester Nimitz eventually became one of the more recognized personalities of World War II, but not in the dark days of 1941. He was quiet, taciturn and determined, but he wasn't King's man, he wasn't Leahy's man, he wasn't even favored by Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy. Nimitz was Rossevelt's hand-picked choice to lead the Navy in the Pacific. "Tell Nimitz", Roosevelt said to Knox, "To get the hell out there to the Pacific and not come back until the war is won". Nobody knew what to expect of Nimitz. King considered him a personnel man, little more than a clerk, but then came the Coral Sea and Midway, the slog through the jungles of Guadalcanal, the race across the Central Pacific with the fast carriers, and the ultimate destruction of the Japanese Fleet off the Philippines. It is I think, to Nimitz' great credit that as the war progressed, he seemed to drift further into the background to permit other heroes to emerge.
William Halsey was America's first great naval hero of World War II. He transported the Doolittle Raiders to Japan's doorstep in the early days of the war. He was pugnacious, defiant, accessible to the media and oh-so quotable. He led the Navy and Marines through jungles of Guadalcanal, when it appeared that the U.S. had neither ships, planes nor men enough to go toe-to-toe with Japanese empire so far from home. Halsey was a hero before any of the rest, but Borneman is honest. Halsey's later missteps at Leyte Gulf and with two typhoons suggests that the technology of war, if not its spirit, may have passed Halsey by.
Finally, we speak of the man, who didn't receive the star, Raymond Spruance. When Halsey was incapacitated with shingles, following the Doolittle Raid, Spruance, a battleship Admiral, effortlessly replaced Halsey at Midway, Americas' first great victory in a carrier-battle. It was Spruance who led the race across the Pacific with the fast carriers. It was Spruance, who protected the Marines first, then went after the Japanese Navy at the Marianas Turkey Shoot. Perhaps, no higher praise can be given Spruance than Ernest King's assessment, "He's the smartest man in the Navy, after me".
Perhaps the glory of war is the ability of disparate with often conflicting personalities to yoke their individual ambitions and ideas to a common goal and thereby achieve more than the sum of their parts. This marvelous book explores the nature of military leadership formed in the crucuible of a desperate war. I wish Spruance had gotten his fifth star. He certainly deserved it; maybe more than some of the others. I would not, however, want to choose the one to give it up.
Top reviews from other countries
The book tells us of the careers of the only American 5-Star Admirals, all of whom served with great distinction in the Second World War. They are wrapped together into a story that, despite the need to cover four different people, is still cohesive, showing the reader not only how the individuals developed but also how naval technology and tactics evolved during their four careers and how the war in the Pacific was won.
Several of the key battles in the Pacific have generated many books in their own right, and Borneman skilfully balances giving the reader enough of an understanding of the controversies over some of the battles without getting mired too much into the details. Chances are you will be reaching for the internet or the bookshelf to find out more about the particular controversies which most interest you when reading the book - and triggering that level of further interest is a sign of an author succeeding. Borneman's copious notes and bibliography help with that, with the notes also including some interesting side-stories to the main narrative, such as on the efforts to end segregation in the navy.
What is missing then? Well, pretty much all of the naval operations by the US outside the Pacific. In particular, the battle against German submarines in the Atlantic gets only brief mentions despite its crucial importance to the outcome of the Second World War. Two important related questions are implied rather than discussed head-on. A range of US naval commanders were at various times criticised for not being aggressive enough in the search for a decisive naval victory over the Japanese. Individual cases are discussed by Borneman. What we don't get is much discussion of the strategic context: with the long-run clearly favouring the US over Japan, especially giving the two nation's comparative ship building rates, would caution not have been the strategically smart strategy? As with the British navy at Jutland in the First World War, draws were really successes given that it was the opponent who needed to land a knock-out blow. Related to that, what impact did the frequent media demands have on the judgements of senior naval officers - did that help tempt them to seek risk and short-term glory? Given Borenman's range of understanding, it would have been great to hear more from him on this.
No book, however, can cover everything - and it's a sign of the book's strengths that it leaves you both informed and wanting to know more.














