
The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values
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Sam Harris’s first book, The End of Faith, ignited a worldwide debate about the validity of religion. In the aftermath, Harris discovered that most people—from religious fundamentalists to nonbelieving scientists—agree on one point: science has nothing to say on the subject of human values. Indeed, our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science has now become the most common justification for religious faith. It is also the primary reason why so many secularists and religious moderates feel obligated to "respect" the hardened superstitions of their more devout neighbors.
In this explosive new book, Sam Harris tears down the wall between scientific facts and human values, arguing that most people are simply mistaken about the relationship between morality and the rest of human knowledge. Harris urges us to think about morality in terms of human and animal well-being, viewing the experiences of conscious creatures as peaks and valleys on a "moral landscape". Because there are definite facts to be known about where we fall on this landscape, Harris foresees a time when science will no longer limit itself to merely describing what people do in the name of "morality"; in principle, science should be able to tell us what we ought to do to live the best lives possible.
Bringing a fresh perspective to age-old questions of right and wrong and good and evil, Harris demonstrates that we already know enough about the human brain and its relationship to events in the world to say that there are right and wrong answers to the most pressing questions of human life. Because such answers exist, moral relativism is simply false—and comes at increasing cost to humanity. And the intrusions of religion into the sphere of human values can be finally repelled: for just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality.
- Listening Length6 hours and 48 minutes
- Audible release dateOctober 5, 2010
- LanguageEnglish
- ASINB0045XWQ32
- VersionUnabridged
- Program TypeAudiobook
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Product details
Listening Length | 6 hours and 48 minutes |
---|---|
Author | Sam Harris |
Narrator | Sam Harris |
Whispersync for Voice | Ready |
Audible.com Release Date | October 05, 2010 |
Publisher | Simon & Schuster Audio |
Program Type | Audiobook |
Version | Unabridged |
Language | English |
ASIN | B0045XWQ32 |
Best Sellers Rank | #7,193 in Audible Books & Originals (See Top 100 in Audible Books & Originals) #2 in Religious Ethics (Audible Books & Originals) #5 in Religious Ethics (Books) #6 in Religion & Sociology |
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I do agree with several points Harris makes, or at least points in the direction of:
The basic facts of human flourishing transcend culture.
Our world faces pressing moral concerns, such as the violent subjugation of women and the sexual exploitation of children, not to mention persistent global poverty and pervasive environmental destruction.
To a great extent, unconscious processes shaped by natural selection underlie human psychology, including our moral tendencies to decry sexual infidelity, punish cheaters, and value cooperation.
"Human beings may be genetically predisposed to superstition: for natural selection should favor rampant belief formation as long as the benefits of the occasional, correct belief are great enough."(and, I would add, the survival and reproductive costs of the much more numerous incorrect beliefs are not too great.)
"[P]eople often acquire their beliefs about the world for reasons that are more emotional and social than strictly cognitive."
"[R]eligion cannot be reduced to a mere concatenation of religious beliefs. Every religion consists of rites, rituals, prayers, social institutions, holidays, etc., and these serve a wide variety of purposes, conscious and otherwise."
"[R]eligion is largely a matter of what people teach their children to believe about the nature of reality."
"[R]eligion will have geopolitical consequences for a long time to come."
"The pious uncoupling of moral concern from the reality of human and animal suffering has caused tremendous harm." For example, "a belief in souls leaves people indifferent to the suffering of creatures thought not to possess them." (Note: this has included other human beings at times.)
"[V]ery few scientific truths are self-evident and many are deeply counterintuitive. It is by no means obvious that empty space has structure or that we share a common ancestor with both the housefly and the banana. It can be difficult to think like a scientist (even, we have begun to see, when one is a scientist)."
"[S]cientific validity is not the result of scientists abstaining from making value judgments; rather scientific validity is the result of scientists making their best effort to value principles of reasoning that link their beliefs to reality, through reliable chains of evidence and argument."
Cooperation is a demonstrably preferable strategy to narrow self-interestedness, where circumstances permit, and creating circumstances that foster cooperation is a good goal.
There is nothing irrational "about seeking the states of mind that lie at the core of many of the world's religions. Compassion, awe, devotion, and feelings of oneness are surely among the most valuable experiences a person can have." (How to cultivate these states of mind without the benefit of tradition, ritual or community is an important question for atheists and to that end, I have created a blog at wordpress, "The Spiritual Life of An Atheist".)
With all these points of agreement, I still cannot recommend Harris's book. First, his subtitle, "How Science Can Determine Human Values," is a misnomer. Harris provides his operative definition of "science" in his footnotes: "`[S]cience,' broadly construed as our best effort to form a rational account of empirical reality." So what Harris means is "reason" and his book is more properly subtitled "How Reason Can Determine Human Values." That being such an unexceptional proposition in legal/moral philosophy, it must not have screen-tested well in Free Press's marketing department.
And Harris is a naïve (if I were to be ungenerous, lazy) philosopher so he does not have much to add to the centuries-old discussion about defining and prioritizing moral values. He states, "My goal is to convince you that human knowledge and human values can no longer be kept apart." Well, that is a pretty modest goal considering that we live in a pluralist, secular democracy in the 21st century that still does have a separation of church and state, despite the ongoing assault from the religious right. Every day we are inundated with news stories about studies of the efficacy or harmfulness of this or that behavior or item which influence attitudes and shape both our personal and policy choices. To suggest that "human knowledge and values" have long been kept apart in the United States is silly, at best.
Harris also fails to meaningfully deal with the inevitable conflicts between individual's interests as well as between values themselves. As a result, a totalizing bent reveals itself in his arguments. He asserts, "[S]cience can, in principle, help us understand what we should do and should want--and, therefore, what other people should do and should want in order to live the best possible lives." Scientists are going to tell me what I should want and do to live my life the "best" way possible? What happens if I disagree with this scientific board of moral authority?
For example, Harris talks about variability in the definition of physical health itself. Today, the health norm in the developed world is to live a few decades longer than before. Harris is hopeful that we can extend the average lifespan even further. Personally, I have no interest in living past 100. If it were up to me, all research on further extending the already long average lifespan would stop tomorrow. I do not see aging and death as a disease but a fact of organic existence, and I'm sure I could come up with some coherent and possibly persuasive arguments for why further extension of our lifespans is a very bad societal resource allocation decision. Does Harris claim the authority to tell me that I should want an even longer life expectancy and should live my life toward that goal? Can I claim the authority to ban such research?
With respect to the indisputable diversity of interests and preferences of individuals, Harris has this to say: "if there is real diversity in how people can be deeply fulfilled in this life, such diversity can be accounted for and honored in the context of science." What does Harris mean if here? That he questions the fact of human diversity is shocking, frankly.
For those of us who do experience deep fulfillment in our lives in a different manner than Harris approves, Harris provides the following limitation: "I'm not suggesting that we will necessarily discover one right answer to every moral question or a single best way human beings live. Some questions may admit of many answers, each more or less equivalent." How generous of Harris to allow that one right answer to every possible moral question and one single best way to live might not necessarily exist. Again, what does Harris mean not necessarily here? That he could entertain such an absolutist possibility shocks once more.
Harris continues: "The world's profusion of foods never tempts us to say that there are no facts to be known about human nutrition or that all culinary styles must be equally healthy in principle." Quite true. But there are many more ways to evaluate food other than nutrition and health---taste and enjoyment come quickly to mind. Are there facts to be established as truths about taste and enjoyment of food? And how is one to weigh interests in/preferences for taste and enjoyment against the values of nutrition and health, from a perspective of moral truth? This example brings to mind Twain's saying, "The only way to keep your health is to eat what you don't want, drink what you don't like, and do what you'd rather not."
Harris faults "liberal doubt" and criticizes "secular liberals" who tolerate plurality of opinion on matters that Harris deems important: "[N]ot knowing what is right--or that anything can ever be truly right--often leads secular liberals to surrender their intellectual standards and political freedoms with both hands."
At this point, Harris might dismiss me as one of those "moral relativists" he can't abide. But unlike the female speaker who Harris reports would not condemn the Taliban's practice of forcing women to wear burqas, I have no hesitation in denouncing such a practice. But my ready condemnation rests on a principle Harris barely mentions--individual liberty. No woman anywhere should be forced to wear a burqa. Choosing to wear a burqa is another question altogether. And to be clear, no girl anywhere should undergo female circumcision. In the latter case, since the girl, by definition, cannot consent, such a painful, invasive and injurious procedure simply must not be done. If, on the other hand, a grown woman were to seek out the procedure without pressure from her family or community, that would be her choice. In making this moral pronouncement, I am not suggesting that the United States has some type of moral authority to conduct a war against another nation to stop these practices. But I am absolutely willing to speak out unequivocally against these practices and to financially support peaceful efforts to encourage and persuade those who practice them to end them.
The issue of individual choice becomes ever more pressing with this next example: "The temptation to start each day with several glazed donuts and to end it with an extramarital affair might be difficult for some people to resist, for reasons that are understood in evolutionary terms, but there are surely better ways to maximize one's long-term well-being." Yes, that would be my judgment as well. But starting each day with several glazed donuts is (not to put too fine a point on it) stupid, not immoral---unless Mr. Harris would like to revive that old cardinal sin of gluttony. The extramarital affair does rise to the level of morality, but a very personal morality, not a civil morality that society need concern itself with. By using such personal examples, Harris paints himself as a moral busybody---a kind of 21st century throwback to 19th century moral crusaders.
But in Harris's world, I may not qualify as a "genuine moral expert" with the authority to make such judgments. Harris sets up the acceptability (perhaps necessity) of "moral experts": "[T]hose who do not share our scientific goals have no influence on scientific discourse whatsoever; but, for some reason, people who do not share our moral goals render us incapable of even speaking about moral truth." He continues, "How have we convinced ourselves that, on the most important questions in human life, all views must count equally?" Harris again, "I am arguing that everyone also has an intuitive `morality,' but much of our intuitive morality is clearly wrong (with respect to the goal of maximizing personal and collective well-being). And only genuine moral experts would have a deep understanding of the causes and conditions of human and animal well-being."
Who is the "our" in "our moral goals" in the first instance? Do I qualify? Do you? What are the minimum qualifications to require a person's opinions to have even some influence on moral discourse? To count equally? To constitute authoritative moral expertise? Harris does not pose, never mind answer, any of these questions. I am a little concerned that Harris himself is angling for the position of Plato's Philosopher King---to lord over all of us morally gold, silver, or bronze people.
Regarding the various moral interests that compete with each other for priority--such as equality v. liberty (to give just one basic, well-known example of competing general principles)--Harris has this brilliant insight: "[I]n order to fulfill our deepest interests in this life, both personally and collectively, we must first admit that some interests are more defensible than others. Indeed some interests are so compelling that they need no defense at all." Since Harris does not identify these no-defense-necessary-interests, apparently some interests are so compelling they need not even be named. Harris holds these truths to be self-evident: [blank]. Truly, if I had not bought an ebook, in my frustration I would have launched it across the room.
Harris cannot even decide on his actual thesis. As noted above, he claims that science has the authority to tell us what we should want out of life altogether and that "science should increasingly enable us to answer specific moral questions." At a later point, he presents this moral problem: Scientists predict that an unusual disease is about to breakout which may kill up to 600 people. Response Program A will almost certainly result in saving 200 lives, but losing 400. Response Program B has a one-third chance to save all 600 lives, but a two-thirds chance to lose all 600 lives. Which is the morally correct program? Harris does not posit an answer. All he does is tell us that, based on our cognitive bias against uncertainty, a majority of people answer Program A when the problem is presented one way and Program B when the problem is presented another.
Is this "unusual disease outbreak" a moral problem for which there is a provably correct answer? For which Harris believes there may be a provably correct answer in the future? Or is this just a fundamentally painful judgment call with no right or wrong answer, i.e., dilemma? If no right answer is objectively discernible, what is the right process for answering this question? Again, Harris fails to even present, much less address, the most interesting moral questions.
Despite his thesis, for all his scientific knowledge, Harris for the most part does not have "scientific" answers to specific moral questions. He concedes at one point, "Science cannot tell us why, scientifically, we should value health. But once we admit that health is the proper concern of medicine we can then study and promote it through science." If science cannot tell us scientifically why we should value health, it cannot tell us scientifically why we should value liberty or equality or well-being overall. Science provides answers after we decide how we should define and prioritize our various values and interests. I do agree that our decisions of where to go values-wise are preferably made through some rational process based on a mostly rational understanding of the human condition and that once we make that decision where to go values-wise, science can tell us a great deal about how to get there.
The more we understand ourselves at the level of the brain, the more we will see that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human values. 70
I value the human capacity for induction to create knowledge. As Hume put it there is no causality; only "constant concomitance". There is no absolute fact, only opinion and attitudes and emotions and uncertain knowledge. This is a basic limitation of the scientific method and its greatest strength. And it applies equally to the world of values and morality. As Sam Harris so fluently exposes in this solid book, values cannot be separated from facts, and both are the happy products of science.
As the Greek rhetoricians used to say, " The only measure of mankind is mankind itself." We are the standard for the facts of science and of morality, and so understanding and advancing psychology should be a primary goal of all societies. Harris, instead of asking the Socratic question about what is the good life, asks about human well-being. There is not much difference, but science has given us much more food for thought than Aristotle ever had, and especially in the scientific field of psychology, there is much new understanding that impinges on our insights into the morality of human well-being. Harris provides a thoroughgoing synopsis of this new knowledge and it is the fundament for his thesis that a science of morality is not only possible but urgently needed to improve the general lot of mankind. He makes a convincing case. In fact, as an experimental psychologist, I agree with him completely throughout this book. Never have I read as lucid an account of the many twists and turns in people's rejection of a scientific approach to morality, and while his arguments are not always thoroughly convincing they are clear and analytic and unblurred by dogma. What can one ask more of a scientist? Nowhere does he make his case more clearly than his attack on the fundamentalist and religionist Francis Collins, who has a vision and religious conversion experience when he encounters a mystical frozen waterfall divided into a triune deity. The superstition of religion is a clear antagonist of science, and this conflict cannot be restrained without basic inconsistencies of reasoning.
Here is our situation: if the basic claims of religion are true, the scientific worldview is so blinkered and susceptible to supernatural modification as to be rendered nearly ridiculous;455
For instance, the moral stigma that still surrounds disorders of mood and cognition seems largely the result of viewing the mind as distinct from the brain.1853
The fact that religious belief is both a cultural universal and appears to be tethered to the genome has led scientists like Burton to conclude that there is simply no getting rid of faith-based thinking.2154
Historically, a preoccupation with witchcraft has been a cultural universal. And yet belief in magic is now in disrepute almost everywhere in the developed world.2165
What is surprising, from a scientific point of view, is that 42 percent of Americans believe that life has existed in its present form since the beginning of the world, and another 21 percent believe that while life may have evolved, its evolution has been guided by the hand of God (only 26 percent believe in evolution through natural selection).2502
I am not suggesting that we are guaranteed to resolve every moral controversy through science. Differences of opinion will remain--but opinions will be increasingly constrained by facts.82
To say that the behavior of Muslim jihadists has nothing to do with their religious beliefs is like saying that honor killings have nothing to do with what their perpetrators believe about women, sexuality, and male honor.2630
If there are objective truths to be known about human well-being--if kindness, for instance, is generally more conducive to happiness than cruelty is--then science should one day be able to make very precise claims about which of our behaviors and uses of attention are morally good, which are neutral, and which are worth abandoning. While it is too early180
It is possible to be wrong and to not know it (we call this "ignorance").2961
It is possible to be wrong and to know it, but to be reluctant to incur the social cost of admitting this publicly (we call this "hypocrisy").2961
And it may also be possible to be wrong, to dimly glimpse this fact, but to allow the fear of being wrong to increase one's commitment to one's erroneous beliefs (we call this "self-deception"). It seems clear that these frames of mind do an unusual amount of work in the service of religion.2962
Similarly, anyone truly interested in morality--in the principles of behavior that allow people to flourish--should be open to new evidence and new arguments that bear upon questions of happiness and suffering.412
There may be nothing more important than human cooperation. Whenever more pressing concerns seem to arise--like the threat of a deadly pandemic, an asteroid impact, or some other global catastrophe--human cooperation is the only remedy (if a remedy exists). Cooperation is the stuff of which meaningful human lives and viable societies are made. Consequently, few topics will be more relevant to a maturing science of human well-being.920
Students of philosophy will notice that this commits me to some form of moral realism (viz. moral claims can really be true or false) and some form of consequentialism (viz. the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures).1036
Tomasello has found that even twelve-month old children will follow a person's gaze, while chimpanzees tend to be interested only in head movements. He suggests that our unique sensitivity to gaze direction facilitated human cooperation and language development.959
It is not by accident that our most widely accepted moral phrase is "do unto others as you would have them do unto you ..." because our most essential intellectual competence is understanding others; whether through communication or modeling others' minds and awareness, later elaborated into the study of psychology. Edit
Moral view A is truer than moral view B, if A entails a more accurate understanding of the connections between human thoughts/intentions/behavior and human well-being.1081
The one crucial exception, however, is that psychopaths are often unable to recognize expressions of fear and sadness in others, And this may be the difference that makes all the difference.1660
Blair points out, parenting strategies that increase empathy tend to successfully mitigate antisocial behavior in healthy children;1668
Territorial violence might have even been necessary for the development of altruism. The economist Samuel Bowles has argued that lethal, "out-group" hostility and "in-group" altruism are two sides of the same coin.1701
Sometimes our knowledge of psychology conflicts with itself, as in our undertstanding of revenge and compassion, and a resolution needs to be worked out:" the tragic experience of his late father-in-law, who had the opportunity to kill the man who murdered his family during the Holocaust but opted instead to turn him over to the police. After spending only a year in jail, the killer was released, and Diamond's father-in-law spent the last sixty years of his life "tormented by regret and guilt." While there is much to be said against the vendetta culture of the New Guinea Highlands, it is clear that the practice of taking vengeance answers to a common psychological need".1860
In fact, mathematical belief (e.g., "2 + 6 + 8 = 16") showed a similar pattern of activity to ethical belief (e.g., "It is good to let your children know that you love them"), and these were perhaps the most dissimilar sets of stimuli used in our experiment. This suggests that the physiology of belief may be the same regardless of a proposition's content. It also suggests that the division between facts and values does not make much sense in terms of underlying brain function. 2032
And we can traverse the boundary between facts and values in other ways. As we are about to see, the norms of reasoning seem to apply equally to beliefs about facts and to beliefs about values. In both spheres, evidence of inconsistency and bias is always unflattering. Similarities of this kind suggest that there is a deep analogy, if not identity, between the two domains.2043
Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds--and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, of course, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.3259
Top reviews from other countries

Along the way he makes a number of interesting points and observations; he's clearly striving to be perfectly rational and unbiased, & comes across (as he does on his fine podcast) as a morally upstanding guy with a sensible approach. I gather most of his writing is attacks on people who aren't even trying to be rational, so I hope he keeps it up and attracts a good readership in general.
I ought also (though you may question from where does this "ought" come ??) to say a little about his moral system. The better world with more and higher peaks on the moral landscape (not nieve, utopian world of perfect morality, just the best we can do) is not uncontroversial. Nothing is said - though I'll concede I didn't force myself to read every page so perhaps I've just missed this - on the clash between intrinsically immoral and consequentially immoral. He comes out on the latter side but I'm not sure if he was trying to leave some scope for both - or if he'd just not thought about it. Or mqaybe he just doesn't think there's any grounds for non-consequentialist ethics.
For the general reader it's alright, could be better structured, I certainly didn't find it arduous reading but not everybody would find it light reading, partly because it is a little frenetic in it's lay-out. Though there's subdivisions and section headings and chapters, just the points are a bit all over the place. It's certainly not some mad steam of consciousness. Just a little fragmentary.
Apologies for any typos & muspellungs, writing this on the Kindle



