The Possibility of Altruism Paperback – March 21, 1979

This book is a must for anyone who's serious about metaethics. In this short volume Nagel attempts to resolve the following problem:

It seems right to say that if we have reason to do something, we necessarily have a motivation to do it, insofar as we are rational. Of course, that motivation might not be very strong, and I might override that motivation in persuing something else, but as long as there is a reason to perform a certain action, and as long as I am being rational, that reason should provide me with (or constitute?) a motivation for performing that action. Moreover, it seems as though morality should apply to everyone, and morality implies a certain amount of altruism. To give one plausible altruistic principle as an example, it seems plausible that everyone ought not harm others when they can easily avoid it. And that seems to mean that everyone has reason not to harm others when they can easily avoid it.

However, if the claims of the above paragraph are correct, then everyone who is rational has the motivations to be altruistic. But why should we think that everyone has the motivations to be altruistic? Isn't that an empirical claim, one that would need to be verified by extensive psychological research, rather than by the a priori argument given in the above paragraph? And even if everyone rational did have the motivation to be altruistic, wouldn't that just be a contingent fact? Isn't it possible for there to be rational people who lack this motivation?

Nagel's book offers a resounding "no" to all of these questions. He argues that motivations are not just brute elements of our psychology and that some motivations can arise from the structure of rationality itself. As a result, anyone who is rational must also have the motivation to be altruistic. Nagel develops his argument first by reference by deriving from the structure of rationality a motivation to be prudent (a motivation to act on reasons that one's future self will have), and then by analogy derives a motivation to be altruistic (a motivation to act on the reasons of others).

There are many arguments in this book, some more compelling than others, and it has generated a literature of response. The chief problem with this book is that it is, by today's lights, highly unclear. Nagel uses his terminology without much precision, and it's sometimes hard to pin down exactly what he's trying to say. The book certainly rewards careful reading, but Nagel's somewhat sloppy writing leaves much of the work to the reader, who will in some cases discover deep insights and in others come up empty-handed. Newcomers to philosophy will be deceived into thinking it's relatively clear, for the overall picture is very clear, but the devil is in the details.

For all its flaws, Nagel's book remains a classic and is well-worth the time for those with a deep interest in metaethics.

A contemporary philosophical classic.

It is fun and insightful. But be warned this book is extremely short and dense for the amount of material it goes through. So some readers may encounter problems understanding exactly what Nagel is really talking about. If you are a student of philosophy, then use any close professors as resources. To those who are philosophers outside of academia, then I recommend using the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( an online data base ) for further explanations of the material.

Too difficult to understand, even for one with three degrees.
There are many other books regarding altruism that tell of it in understandable language.

Thomas Nagel (born 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. He has written many other books, such as What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy,The View From Nowhere,Mortal Questions,Equality and Partiality,The Last Word, etc.

He wrote in the Postscript to the Preface of this 1970 book, “This book defends the claim that only objective reasons are acceptable, and that subjective reasons are legitimate only if they can be derived from objective ones. I now think that the argument actually establishes a different conclusion: That there are objective reasons corresponding to all subjective ones. This by itself does not imply that all reasons are objective. It remains possible that the original subjective reasons from which the others are generated retain some independent force and are n may continue to exert a legitimate independent influence in the lives of those who acknowledge parallel objective reasons as well, for the personal standpoint may retain its power after the claims of the impersonal have been acknowledged.”

He says in the first chapter, “the suggestion that there must be motivational requirements on which to base ethical requirements … seems to demand a priori reasoning in motivation theory---something rather unexpected. This is the possibility which I propose to explore. Human motivation possesses features which are susceptible to metaphysical investigation and which carry some kind of necessity… The need to find sufficiently firm psychological ground for ethics has prompted the search for such features, but fortunately there is independent support for their existence.” (Pg. 5-6)

He explains, “The position which I shall defend… provides an account of ethical motivation which does not rely on the assumption that a motivational factor is already present among the CONDITIONS of any moral requirement. On this view the possibility of appropriate motivation must be guaranteed by the truth of the moral claim itself---but NOT because the existence of such motivation is included in advance among the independently comprehensible truth conditions for every moral claim. There are reasons for action which are specifically moral; it is because they represent moral requirements that they can motivate, and not vice versa. If this is correct, ethics must yield discoveries about human motivation.” (Pg. 13)

He points out, “rationality can be defined only in terms of adherence to rational requirements. One cannot discover or justify the principles which specify those requirements which define the concept, and they must be rendered plausible as requirements independently.” (Pg. 20)

He states, “two questions must be answered: how does the motivation operate; and what provides the conditions for the presence of a reason? I shall propose a single answer to both questions. Reasons are transmitted across the relation between ends and means, and that is also the commonest and simplest way that motivational influence is transmitted. No further desires are needed to explain this phenomenon, and moreover, attempts to explain it in such terms are bound to fail.” (Pg. 33)

He observes, “The belief that a reason provides me with sufficient justification for a present course of action does not necessarily imply a desire or a willingness to undertake that action; it is not a sufficient condition of the act or desire. But it is sufficient, in the absence of contrary influences, to EXPLAIN the appropriate action, or the desire or willingness to perform it. That is the motivational content of a judgment about what one presently has reason to do.” (Pg. 67)

He defines altruism as: “not abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives.” (Pg. 79) He continues, “The problem at this stage is not how the interests of others can motivate us to some specific policy of altruistic conduct, but how they can motivate us at all… Even if the required social behavior does not include serious self-sacrifice, it will almost certainly include cases in which no obviously self-interested motive is present, and in which some inconvenience or at least no benefit to the agent is likely to result.” (Pg. 79)

He concludes, “a concern for the interests of others depends on a full recognition of their reality. That recognition is possible only if one can view oneself impersonally; but it will be incomplete unless one’s practical principles are objective, for only objective principles permit practical judgments from the impersonal standpoint. And it is through the acknowledgement of objective reasons that one can arrive at a justified concern for the interest of others, independent of one’s relation to them.” (Pg. 124) He adds, “the conclusion reached so far, while extremely general, is nevertheless limited; it only places a formal condition on reasons of whatever kind---the condition of objectivity. No restrictions have yet been placed on the content of those reasons and principles which may satisfy this formal condition.” (Pg. 125)

He states, “The possibility of simple altruism depends on acknowledgment of a special type of subjective reason, and its submission to the procedure of objectification. The relevant subjective reasons are those which attach to the satisfaction of certain of one’s needs and interests per se, without too much concern over the source of that satisfaction.” (Pg. 127)

He summarizes, “To accord proper weight to the needs, desires and interests of every individual, one must require that the choice of an interpersonal weighting principle be made under the condition that the chooser expects to lead ALL of the lives in question, not as a single super-life but as a set of distinct individual lives… I believe that the conditions of choice can be understood metaphysically, for we can imagine a person splitting into several persons, each of whom bears to the original… the kind of relation that constitutes trans-temporal personal identity for the ordinary individual… This provides a sense in which an individual might expect to become EACH of a number of different persons… so that EACH of their lives would in a sense be his unique life…” (Pg. 141)

He goes on, “The requirement of objectivity demands that full weight be accorded to the distinction between persons, and to the irreducible significance of individual human lives, when the interests of different individuals are to be weighed against one another in a calculus of objective reasons. That is true even though we cannot specify the weighting system which embodies such a respect for individuals.” (Pg. 142) He adds, “The argument does not offer a justification for being moral, but it attempts to explain why typically moral justifications are capable of persuading us. And it shows that certain replies to moral arguments… are inadequate because those arguments do not presuppose interest of sentiment. Their grip on us is due to something deeper.” (Pg. 143)

He concludes, “I have tried to show that altruism and related motives do not depend on taste, sentiment, or an arbitrary and ultimate choice. They depend instead on the fact that our reasons for action are subject to the formal condition of objectivity, which depends in urn on our ability to view ourselves from both the personal and impersonal standpoints, and to engage in reasoning to practical conclusions from both of these standpoints.” (Pg. 144)

This book will be of great interest to anyone studying contemporary ethical theories, or Nagel’s philosophy.