From Library Journal
In answer to the question "Under what conditions is it rational for someone to believe a claim?", Foley proposes to abandon the traditional conception of epistemology that aims at providing roles or methods that guarantee acquiring mostly correct beliefs. He advocates instead a foundationalist account of epistemic rationality according to which the subjective persuasiveness of a proposition vis-a-vis a person's perspective is what makes the proposition basic to his or her beliefs. This subjectivism is not license to believe whatever one wants, for Foley hedges with requirements for reflectively examining arguments, for the uncontroversiality of propositions, and for what allows a proposition to threaten or to defeat otherwise acceptable arguments. Extremely abstract but well worth the attention of specialists. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Dept., York Coll., CUNY
Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From the Back Cover
The author gives a novel and provocative account of the nature of epistemic rationality.
--This text refers to an alternate