This book gets off to a good start. I first offers a vision of where the US and the world would have stood in 2009 if all had turned out according to the neocons plan. It then goes on to present the three competing master narratives about the neoconservatives: they are considered by some as heroes of a just cause, spearheading the fight against all forms of totalitarianism; they are viewed by others as renegades who have abandoned their Trotskyist faith to join the conservative mainstream; and they are seen still by others as threatening outsiders who gave infiltrated the GOP to smuggle in dangerous heresies on both the domestic and the foreign policy fronts.
The last contention is best expressed by the following quote from an old-school conservative describing the neoconservatism menace: "It has always struck me as odd, even perverse, that former Marxists have been permitted, yes invited, to play such a leading role in the Conservative movement of the twentieth century. It is splendid when the town whore gets religion and joins the church. Now and then she makes a good choir director, but when she begins to tell the minister what he ought to say in his Sunday sermons, matters have been carried too far."
Jacob Heilbrunn then offers his own, provocative interpretation of the movement as "an uneasy, controversial, and tempestuous drama of Jewish immigrant assimilation (...), an unresolved civil war between a belligerent, upstart ethnic group and a staid, cautious American foreign policy establishment that lost its way after the Vietnam war." For the author, neoconservatism is as much a reflection of Jewish immigrant social resentments and status anxiety as a legitimate movement of ideas. Stating that "the neoconservatives are less intellectuals than prophets", he introduces an ingenious ploy to order his narrative along biblical lines, following the neocons tribe from exodus to the wilderness years and to redemption leading to the promised land, followed by a return to exile.
Then suddenly, after only fifteen pages, the story turns into confession, and the book loses track. "I myself was once attracted to neoconservatism", testifies the author, who then goes through a long list of deeds, encounters and publications that proclaim his erstwhile affiliation to the movement. Self-described as a "baby neocon", he doesn't describe how he became estranged from the neoconservative creed. Neither claiming nor denying for himself the labels applied to the neocons--heroes, renegades, or traitors--, he poses as the dispassionate chronicler of the movement, but lacks the critical distance and intellectual rigor of a professional historian.
His main criticism focuses on the neocons' belief in the rightness of their own ideas, as well as on their inherent need to be in opposition in order to proclaim the purity of their dogma. The neocon temperament betrays the origins of the movement in Trotskyism. A combative temperament, a penchant for sweeping assertions and grandiose ideas, and a tendency to split into factions or to turn against one's former friends: these are all traits inherited from the radical left, echoing the "slugfests that took place at the City College cafeteria between the Trotskyists in the horseshoe-shaped Alcove 1 and the Stalinists in Alcove 2." For while they became ostensibly anticommunists and ex-radicals, the neoconservatives never really ceased to be radicals in temperament and style. They remained zealots.
Neoconservatism was turned into an actual movement by Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. Even today, the neoconservative phenomenon is best described as an extended family based largely on the informal social networks patiently forged by these two patriarchs. The neoconservatism movement itself became professionalized in the 1990s, forming a self-sustaining network of think tanks, magazines, and foundations that is now part of the Washington establishment. The book therefore concludes that neoconservatism is here to stay, and that it will remain an enduring force in the American political landscape.
Heilbrunn's neoconservatism saga is more legend than history, and lacks the depth that a social science perspective would have provided. The challenge of immigrant integration, the transition from one generation to the next, the institutionalization of charisma, the unresolved tension between participating in government and commenting from the outside, the condemnation of a culture of relativism that rejects the Western canon as inherently racist and corrupt, the maintenance of intellectual social networks: these are all issues that are best addressed by sociologists or social historians, who have a long tradition of studying intellectual movements.
Indeed, it would have been interesting to draw a parallel between those young Jewish radicals who sought their fortune in politics by challenging the establishment, and the cohort of Jewish writers--Saul Bellow, Bernard Malamud, Philip Roth--originating from the same places, New York City College and the University of Chicago, who went on to recreate the great American novel. Although Heilbrunn gave it a good shot, the definitive history of neoconservatism remains to be written.
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They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons Hardcover – January 15, 2008
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Jacob Heilbrunn
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Jacob Heilbrunn
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Print length336 pages
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PublisherDoubleday
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Publication dateJanuary 15, 2008
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Dimensions6.54 x 1.16 x 9.54 inches
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ISBN-100385511817
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ISBN-13978-0385511810
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
News of neoconservatism's demise has been greatly exaggerated, according to prolific journalist Heilbrunn, who profiles the largely (though by no means exclusively) Jewish makeup of the movement. Heilbrunn roots his interpretation of neoconservatism's Jewish character in the American immigrant experience, the persistent memory of the Holocaust and Western appeasement of Hitler, among other phenomena. Charting the movement's philosophy from its inception through the foreign policy vision crafted in the 1970s and the culture wars of the 1980s and '90s, Heilbrunn employs a quasi-biblical spin echoed in Old Testament-inspired chapter headings. With the exception of his grasp of neoconservatism's right-wing Christian contingent, Heilbrunn displays an innate understanding of the movement. He argues persuasively that though these self-styled prophets embrace an outsider stance, and though he believes they are happiest when viewed as the opposition, they will remain a formidable influence for the foreseeable future. Heilbrunn's analysis lacks rigor concerning foreign policy assumptions and ideological and economic motives, thus unintentionally leaving his subjects more historically isolated than they really are. His proximity to the conservative movement brings benefits and limitations to this historical analysis. (Jan.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
About the Author
Jacob Heilbrunn writes regularly for the New York Times, Washington Monthly, and National Interest. He is a former member of the Los Angeles Times editorial board and was a senior editor at the New Republic. He lives in Washington, DC.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Exodus
And you, stand here by Me and I shall speak to you all the commands and the statutes and the laws that you will teach them, and they will do them in the land that I am about to give them to take hold of it.
—Deuteronomy 5:28
It's the same with all you comfortable, insular, Anglo–Saxon anti–Communists. You hate our Cassandra cries and resent us as allies—but, when all is said, we ex-Communists are the only people on your side who know what it's all about.
—Arthur Koestler, The God That Failed
I call them utopians…I don’t care whether utopians are Vladimir Lenin in a sealed train going to Moscow or Paul Wolfowitz. Utopians, I don’t like. You're never going to bring utopia, and you're going to hurt a lot of people in the process of trying to do it.
—Lawrence B. Wilkerson, chief of staff to former secretary of state Colin Powell in GQ
In the spring of 2003, shortly after the liberation of Iraq, Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb attended a party in Washington, D.C., for Melvin Lasky. They hadn’t seen one another since a conference in Berlin in 1992 celebrating the end of the cold war. Now they were enjoying a sentimental reunion at which these eighty–year–olds reminisced about their years at the City College of New York in the 1930s. As Lasky held forth, Kristol waspishly intervened to tell the room that “none of you know what the first magazine” was that he had published an article in—an obscure Trotskyist publication called the Chronicle. After Kristol observed that the then–eighteen–year–old Lasky “rewrote every sentence in the piece,” Lasky responded, “That was the last recorded moment your prose needed help.”
It was a telling moment. For all the joviality, their reminiscences weren’t about going out for sports or their old professors. Instead, they were about the intensely political sectarianism of the left. Decades later, the passions that had first impelled them into politics had hardly dimmed; as Lasky later recounted to me, “The memories are very sharp, it’s not like an old man who says, ‘Who? What college were you in?’ ”
Their saga began in Russia. At the turn of the twentieth century, Jews, overrepresented in left–wing and revolutionary movements, intent on creating a utopia, went on the attack against capitalism and imperialism. As one Yiddish newspaper put it, “With hatred, with a three–fold curse, we must weave the shroud for the Russian autocratic government, for the entire anti–Semitic criminal gang, for the entire capitalist world.” (1)
So pronounced was this phenomenon that in a 1927 study titled “The Jew as Radical,” the Russian historian (and apologist for Stalin) Maurice Hindus maintained that Jews had an innate propensity to radicalism dating back to their biblical origins. Indeed, the Menshevik exile Simeon Strunsky, who would end up on the editorial board of the New York Times, sardonically recalled the intensity of Marxist debates that had been transported from Europe to the United States: “I remember quite well those pioneer Yiddish labor papers of the ’90s with their learned editorialettes of six or seven columns and five thousand words about what Werner Sombart thought of what Boehm–Bauwerk said about how Karl Marx slipped up in a footnote on page 879.” (2)
Of the avatars of world revolution, no one beckoned more alluringly to a new generation of young Jewish radicals than the Russian exile Leon Trotsky. As Jews, they were deeply influenced by their parents’ flight from czarist oppression and the rise of fascism in the 1930s, but they also sought to transcend the religiosity of their elders. Some joined the American Communist Party, at least until the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop pact dividing up Poland and the Baltic States between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. A much smaller segment became Trotskyists, attacking both Stalinism as a perverted form of communism and New Deal liberalism. The Trotskyist intellectuals saw themselves as martyrs, a kind of aristocratic intelligentsia.
According to their own prolific writings, they started out purely as an intellectual response to events such as the Spanish civil war, the Moscow show trials, the Hitler–Stalin pact, and the New Deal. Frequently scanted, or even missing altogether from this tale of brilliant and ambitious young intellectuals, is their Jewishness, which enters into the story as an over–the–shoulder glance at the vanishing “world of their fathers.” In their seemingly inexhaustible stream of memoirs and autobiographical essays, the Jewish intellectuals who became the core of the neoconservative movement present themselves as fully secularized, their ideas and attitudes bearing little, if any, relation to the Jewish past or, in some cases, even to the immigrant milieu of their youth. Their Trotskyist past appears as a minor episode, paling in comparison to the supposed real emergence of neoconservatism in the late 1960s. One exegete of neoconservatism says that “despite its current popularity, the ‘Trotskyist neocon’ assertion contributes nothing to our understanding of the origins, or nature, of neoconservatism.” (3) Another, Joshua Muravchik, maintains that hardly any neoconservatives have been interested in Trotskyism, let alone sincere believers.
But as the sons of Jewish immigrants, they undoubtedly had a special perspective, one torn between tradition and assimilation, buffeted by radical winds, in love with ideas, consumed with ambition to participate in the great doings of the world outside the immigrant ghetto. Contrary to some of their critics, the neoconservatives hardly remain political Trotskyists in any meaningful sense. Their fling with Trotskyism did, however, endow them with a temperament as well as a set of intellectual tools that many never completely abandoned—a combative temper and a penchant for sweeping assertions and grandiose ideas.
Some of that grandiosity was rooted in the generational tensions between Jewish immigrant fathers and their Americanizing sons, which often took the form of disagreements about religion and politics. Put otherwise: the religiosity of the fathers was sublimated by the sons in radical politics. Trotsky, as a literary critic, a historian, a politician, and a warrior, captured their youthful imaginations. But on a deeper, unconscious level, they appear to have identified with Trotsky as a way of breaking with the paternal religion while maintaining the radical faith of their parents. They saw Trotsky as a kind of secular Jewish prophet who had been betrayed by the murderous “bureaucrat” Stalin.
The young radicals could hardly have grown up in a more intensely Jewish world. Yiddish theater, journalism, and literature flourished on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The social reformer Jacob Riis dubbed it “Jewtown,” while Henry James referred to it more delicately as “The New Jerusalem.” Whatever Lower East Side Jewish life was called, the children, desperate to Americanize, sought first to escape it, then to memorialize it. According to Irving Howe, the Jewish socialist intellectual who did more than anyone to re–create it in World of Our Fathers, “Often enough it was the purity of their vision—the moral firmness induced by religion or set free by radicalism—that provided the energies for realizing their personal ambitions.” (4) The literary critic Alfred Kazin recalled in his own memoir that he was expected to shine by his immigrant parents: “I was the first American child, their offering to the strange new God; I was to be the monument of their liberation from the shame of being—what they were.” (5)
Though the parents hoped for careers in medicine, law, and business for their sons, or as musical and intellectual prodigies, Marxist radicalism was the most common route of escape. As teenagers, they would stand on soapboxes in New York—known as the most interesting city in the Soviet Union—and demand a more just society. They didn’t have to be told about the grinding, carking poverty created by capitalism; they saw people living in hovels all around them and foraged themselves for fruits and vegetables on the Lower East Side docks. As a sixteen–year–old freshman at City College, for example, Sidney Hook helped create the Social Problems Club, an organization made up of socialists, syndicalists, and communists that saw itself as part of the world revolution emanating from Moscow. In a number of stories and novels Saul Bellow, who grew up in a working–class milieu in Chicago and traveled to Mexico in August 1940 to meet Trotsky, captured the febrile intellectualism of the young immigrant Jews lecturing their elders on the fine points of Hegel and Marx while still in their knickers.
In America the Jews would no longer be downtrodden and contemned. But for a number of radical children, this was not enough. They didn’t want in. They wanted out. They saw themselves as the avatars of a secular movement that would overturn the old order in America as well. After all, no matter how hard they worked, there were still quotas at the Ivy League universities. Then there were the fancy clubs, the legal and financial firms that saw Jews as interlopers who would soil their proud escutcheons and were to be kept at bay. Smarting with unsuppressed social resentment, the young Jews viewed themselves as liberators, proclaiming a new faith. They embraced a cosmopolitan creed that supposedly left behind the stifling religious customs of their elders as well as the warring nationalisms that perpetually dragged Europe into strife and combat.
Even as they nursed these illusions, however, the radical generation of intellectuals serenely ignor...
And you, stand here by Me and I shall speak to you all the commands and the statutes and the laws that you will teach them, and they will do them in the land that I am about to give them to take hold of it.
—Deuteronomy 5:28
It's the same with all you comfortable, insular, Anglo–Saxon anti–Communists. You hate our Cassandra cries and resent us as allies—but, when all is said, we ex-Communists are the only people on your side who know what it's all about.
—Arthur Koestler, The God That Failed
I call them utopians…I don’t care whether utopians are Vladimir Lenin in a sealed train going to Moscow or Paul Wolfowitz. Utopians, I don’t like. You're never going to bring utopia, and you're going to hurt a lot of people in the process of trying to do it.
—Lawrence B. Wilkerson, chief of staff to former secretary of state Colin Powell in GQ
In the spring of 2003, shortly after the liberation of Iraq, Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb attended a party in Washington, D.C., for Melvin Lasky. They hadn’t seen one another since a conference in Berlin in 1992 celebrating the end of the cold war. Now they were enjoying a sentimental reunion at which these eighty–year–olds reminisced about their years at the City College of New York in the 1930s. As Lasky held forth, Kristol waspishly intervened to tell the room that “none of you know what the first magazine” was that he had published an article in—an obscure Trotskyist publication called the Chronicle. After Kristol observed that the then–eighteen–year–old Lasky “rewrote every sentence in the piece,” Lasky responded, “That was the last recorded moment your prose needed help.”
It was a telling moment. For all the joviality, their reminiscences weren’t about going out for sports or their old professors. Instead, they were about the intensely political sectarianism of the left. Decades later, the passions that had first impelled them into politics had hardly dimmed; as Lasky later recounted to me, “The memories are very sharp, it’s not like an old man who says, ‘Who? What college were you in?’ ”
Their saga began in Russia. At the turn of the twentieth century, Jews, overrepresented in left–wing and revolutionary movements, intent on creating a utopia, went on the attack against capitalism and imperialism. As one Yiddish newspaper put it, “With hatred, with a three–fold curse, we must weave the shroud for the Russian autocratic government, for the entire anti–Semitic criminal gang, for the entire capitalist world.” (1)
So pronounced was this phenomenon that in a 1927 study titled “The Jew as Radical,” the Russian historian (and apologist for Stalin) Maurice Hindus maintained that Jews had an innate propensity to radicalism dating back to their biblical origins. Indeed, the Menshevik exile Simeon Strunsky, who would end up on the editorial board of the New York Times, sardonically recalled the intensity of Marxist debates that had been transported from Europe to the United States: “I remember quite well those pioneer Yiddish labor papers of the ’90s with their learned editorialettes of six or seven columns and five thousand words about what Werner Sombart thought of what Boehm–Bauwerk said about how Karl Marx slipped up in a footnote on page 879.” (2)
Of the avatars of world revolution, no one beckoned more alluringly to a new generation of young Jewish radicals than the Russian exile Leon Trotsky. As Jews, they were deeply influenced by their parents’ flight from czarist oppression and the rise of fascism in the 1930s, but they also sought to transcend the religiosity of their elders. Some joined the American Communist Party, at least until the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop pact dividing up Poland and the Baltic States between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. A much smaller segment became Trotskyists, attacking both Stalinism as a perverted form of communism and New Deal liberalism. The Trotskyist intellectuals saw themselves as martyrs, a kind of aristocratic intelligentsia.
According to their own prolific writings, they started out purely as an intellectual response to events such as the Spanish civil war, the Moscow show trials, the Hitler–Stalin pact, and the New Deal. Frequently scanted, or even missing altogether from this tale of brilliant and ambitious young intellectuals, is their Jewishness, which enters into the story as an over–the–shoulder glance at the vanishing “world of their fathers.” In their seemingly inexhaustible stream of memoirs and autobiographical essays, the Jewish intellectuals who became the core of the neoconservative movement present themselves as fully secularized, their ideas and attitudes bearing little, if any, relation to the Jewish past or, in some cases, even to the immigrant milieu of their youth. Their Trotskyist past appears as a minor episode, paling in comparison to the supposed real emergence of neoconservatism in the late 1960s. One exegete of neoconservatism says that “despite its current popularity, the ‘Trotskyist neocon’ assertion contributes nothing to our understanding of the origins, or nature, of neoconservatism.” (3) Another, Joshua Muravchik, maintains that hardly any neoconservatives have been interested in Trotskyism, let alone sincere believers.
But as the sons of Jewish immigrants, they undoubtedly had a special perspective, one torn between tradition and assimilation, buffeted by radical winds, in love with ideas, consumed with ambition to participate in the great doings of the world outside the immigrant ghetto. Contrary to some of their critics, the neoconservatives hardly remain political Trotskyists in any meaningful sense. Their fling with Trotskyism did, however, endow them with a temperament as well as a set of intellectual tools that many never completely abandoned—a combative temper and a penchant for sweeping assertions and grandiose ideas.
Some of that grandiosity was rooted in the generational tensions between Jewish immigrant fathers and their Americanizing sons, which often took the form of disagreements about religion and politics. Put otherwise: the religiosity of the fathers was sublimated by the sons in radical politics. Trotsky, as a literary critic, a historian, a politician, and a warrior, captured their youthful imaginations. But on a deeper, unconscious level, they appear to have identified with Trotsky as a way of breaking with the paternal religion while maintaining the radical faith of their parents. They saw Trotsky as a kind of secular Jewish prophet who had been betrayed by the murderous “bureaucrat” Stalin.
The young radicals could hardly have grown up in a more intensely Jewish world. Yiddish theater, journalism, and literature flourished on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The social reformer Jacob Riis dubbed it “Jewtown,” while Henry James referred to it more delicately as “The New Jerusalem.” Whatever Lower East Side Jewish life was called, the children, desperate to Americanize, sought first to escape it, then to memorialize it. According to Irving Howe, the Jewish socialist intellectual who did more than anyone to re–create it in World of Our Fathers, “Often enough it was the purity of their vision—the moral firmness induced by religion or set free by radicalism—that provided the energies for realizing their personal ambitions.” (4) The literary critic Alfred Kazin recalled in his own memoir that he was expected to shine by his immigrant parents: “I was the first American child, their offering to the strange new God; I was to be the monument of their liberation from the shame of being—what they were.” (5)
Though the parents hoped for careers in medicine, law, and business for their sons, or as musical and intellectual prodigies, Marxist radicalism was the most common route of escape. As teenagers, they would stand on soapboxes in New York—known as the most interesting city in the Soviet Union—and demand a more just society. They didn’t have to be told about the grinding, carking poverty created by capitalism; they saw people living in hovels all around them and foraged themselves for fruits and vegetables on the Lower East Side docks. As a sixteen–year–old freshman at City College, for example, Sidney Hook helped create the Social Problems Club, an organization made up of socialists, syndicalists, and communists that saw itself as part of the world revolution emanating from Moscow. In a number of stories and novels Saul Bellow, who grew up in a working–class milieu in Chicago and traveled to Mexico in August 1940 to meet Trotsky, captured the febrile intellectualism of the young immigrant Jews lecturing their elders on the fine points of Hegel and Marx while still in their knickers.
In America the Jews would no longer be downtrodden and contemned. But for a number of radical children, this was not enough. They didn’t want in. They wanted out. They saw themselves as the avatars of a secular movement that would overturn the old order in America as well. After all, no matter how hard they worked, there were still quotas at the Ivy League universities. Then there were the fancy clubs, the legal and financial firms that saw Jews as interlopers who would soil their proud escutcheons and were to be kept at bay. Smarting with unsuppressed social resentment, the young Jews viewed themselves as liberators, proclaiming a new faith. They embraced a cosmopolitan creed that supposedly left behind the stifling religious customs of their elders as well as the warring nationalisms that perpetually dragged Europe into strife and combat.
Even as they nursed these illusions, however, the radical generation of intellectuals serenely ignor...
Product details
- Publisher : Doubleday; First Edition (January 15, 2008)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 336 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0385511817
- ISBN-13 : 978-0385511810
- Item Weight : 1.39 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.54 x 1.16 x 9.54 inches
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Reviewed in the United States on February 6, 2009
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Reviewed in the United States on April 28, 2014
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An in-depth history and analysis of the neo-conservatives; the men who secured the ear of President George W. Bush and led the United States into invading another country and starting the last Iraq War. Something of which our economy and our military are still suffering the effects.
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Reviewed in the United States on March 14, 2008
Heilbrunn provides a biography of the neoconservative movement that has created the "biggest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam" (Iraq War II), and may lead us to another in Iran. He tells us the movement originated in the 1930s, reflects a subset of Jewish concerns, and because of the Allies slowness to react to Hitler, "sees new Munichs everywhere." By the 1980s neocons welcomed the evangelicals into the group for their backing of Israel.
"They Knew They Were Right" identifies early and current leaders of the group. One of the most notable early leaders was Leo Strauss - author of "noble lies," myths used by political leaders seeking to maintain a cohesive society and seemingly the justification for the Bush administration's disdain for reality and the truth.
Most of the themes pounded home by neocons were adopted by Bush-Cheney - unproven ties to Al-Qaeda, demonization of domestic critics, claiming that no time could be lost toppling Saddam (eg. forcing him to step down), the U.S. would be greeted as liberators, and the fantasy that the Middle East would (aka the 1970s "domino theory") be liberated from tyranny once Baghdad fell and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would then accelerate.
Though disgraced in the second Bush term and now with lessened power, Heilbrunn cautions readers not to count neocons out. They now see Iraq either as a delusional success, or the failure of Iraqi people to take advantage of the opportunities handed them. Neocons also continue to undermine contacts with other nations in the area, push for another crusade against Iran, and have pushed Bush to reject the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. Those criticizing Israel are bullied into silence as "anti-Semitics."
Heilbrunn's conclusion: "These reckless minds aren't going away." His concern is reinforced by a 4/10/08 New York Times article citing a number of neocons functioning as advisers to McCain.
"They Knew They Were Right" identifies early and current leaders of the group. One of the most notable early leaders was Leo Strauss - author of "noble lies," myths used by political leaders seeking to maintain a cohesive society and seemingly the justification for the Bush administration's disdain for reality and the truth.
Most of the themes pounded home by neocons were adopted by Bush-Cheney - unproven ties to Al-Qaeda, demonization of domestic critics, claiming that no time could be lost toppling Saddam (eg. forcing him to step down), the U.S. would be greeted as liberators, and the fantasy that the Middle East would (aka the 1970s "domino theory") be liberated from tyranny once Baghdad fell and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would then accelerate.
Though disgraced in the second Bush term and now with lessened power, Heilbrunn cautions readers not to count neocons out. They now see Iraq either as a delusional success, or the failure of Iraqi people to take advantage of the opportunities handed them. Neocons also continue to undermine contacts with other nations in the area, push for another crusade against Iran, and have pushed Bush to reject the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. Those criticizing Israel are bullied into silence as "anti-Semitics."
Heilbrunn's conclusion: "These reckless minds aren't going away." His concern is reinforced by a 4/10/08 New York Times article citing a number of neocons functioning as advisers to McCain.
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Reviewed in the United States on April 27, 2008
Heilbrunn knows his subject, and writes with insight into what makes the neocon movement tick. He has had access to many of the major players, and he generally treats them fairly.
The primary problem with this book is the lack of rigor, as noted in the Publisher's Weekly review (on this Amazon page). I have no doubt that Heilbrunn is very familiar with what he's writing about, but often the book ends up just being one journalist's long thoughts on the subject, rather than a well-crafted argument. Obviously this book is not supposed to be an academic monograph, but more documented sources would have helped immensely. Too often I just had to take Heilbrunn's word for claims he was making, which meant that for much of the book I wasn't sure how much to believe. At other points, the author fails to develop important arguments, giving more space to the personalities and mind-set of his subjects. Finally, I don't think Heilbrunn gives enough space to key arguments of critics outside the neocon movement (as opposed to critics who were former friends or associates of key neocons - we do get to hear from them).
So, read the book for Heilbrunn's insights, gained from extensive face-to-face exposure with the key players, but don't expect this to be a rigorous book of political analysis.
The primary problem with this book is the lack of rigor, as noted in the Publisher's Weekly review (on this Amazon page). I have no doubt that Heilbrunn is very familiar with what he's writing about, but often the book ends up just being one journalist's long thoughts on the subject, rather than a well-crafted argument. Obviously this book is not supposed to be an academic monograph, but more documented sources would have helped immensely. Too often I just had to take Heilbrunn's word for claims he was making, which meant that for much of the book I wasn't sure how much to believe. At other points, the author fails to develop important arguments, giving more space to the personalities and mind-set of his subjects. Finally, I don't think Heilbrunn gives enough space to key arguments of critics outside the neocon movement (as opposed to critics who were former friends or associates of key neocons - we do get to hear from them).
So, read the book for Heilbrunn's insights, gained from extensive face-to-face exposure with the key players, but don't expect this to be a rigorous book of political analysis.
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