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The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War Paperback – January 15, 2015
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In The Triumph of Improvisation, James Graham Wilson takes a long view of the end of the Cold War, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Drawing on deep archival research and recently declassified papers, Wilson argues that adaptation, improvisation, and engagement by individuals in positions of power ended the specter of a nuclear holocaust. Amid ambivalence and uncertainty, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, and George H. W. Bush―and a host of other actors―engaged with adversaries and adapted to a rapidly changing international environment and information age in which global capitalism recovered as command economies failed.
Eschewing the notion of a coherent grand strategy to end the Cold War, Wilson paints a vivid portrait of how leaders made choices; some made poor choices while others reacted prudently, imaginatively, and courageously to events they did not foresee. A book about the burdens of responsibility, the obstacles of domestic politics, and the human qualities of leadership, The Triumph of Improvisation concludes with a chapter describing how George H. W. Bush oversaw the construction of a new configuration of power after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one that resolved the fundamental components of the Cold War on Washington’s terms.
- Print length280 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherCornell University Press
- Publication dateJanuary 15, 2015
- Reading age18 years and up
- Dimensions6.12 x 0.75 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-100801456835
- ISBN-13978-0801456831
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Editorial Reviews
Review
If John Kerry ever gets to spend a day back home, the US secretary of state might wish to meet James Graham Wilson, a young scholar in his department's Office of the Historian. Wilson’s recent book, The Triumph of Improvisation, offers a fresh and valuable look at the end of the cold war.
-- Robert Zoellick ― The Financial TimesOverall, The Triumph of Improvisation is a solid account of the culmination of the Cold War.... It is a well-researched and well-written piece that gives a solid account of the decisions and actions that led to the end of the decades-long conflict. Wilson's emphasis on the contributions of so many players and their willingness to try unconventional means make this book a worthwhile read, as many of these topics have not recieved the attention that they deserve.
-- Chris Booth ― H-WarWilson focuses on a quartet of actors, including George Shultz and George H. W. Bush along with Reagan and Gorbachev. His compact narrative―just 204 pages of text―proceeds in disciplined chronological order, which restrains the sort of sweeping and dubious generalizations that often mar other treatments of the Cold War's last decade.
-- Steven F. Hayward ― National ReviewWilson's real contribution, and the part that scholars of this period will find most interesting, is his coverage of Reagan and Schultz. White House policy making during the Reagan years can be a difficult and puzzling process for historians to describe, but Wilson accomplishes it with grace and impressive analysis as he chronicles the shift from confrontation to cooperation with the Soviet Union. This is an excellent book with the broad goal of explaining the end of the Cold War based on the actions of individual leaders. Wilson's lively prose and clear analysis of superpower relations will appeal to the general reader, and the illuminating sections on Reagan and Schultz will be of special interest to Cold War scholars.
-- Christopher Maynard ― Journal of American HistoryWhat is surprising is his thesis, which is original in its approach, that these men brought an end to the great Soviet-American rivalry through unscripted actions. In this and in other ways, including its provocative argument, The Triumph of Improvisation is a useful and welcome addition to the literature on the subject.
-- Joseph M. Siracusa ― American Historical ReviewReview
I can think of few if any books that so comprehensively describe White House policymaking toward the Soviets, with an eye toward Reagan's confounding leadership style, as The Triumph of Improvisation. James Graham Wilson's impressive archival work really shines through in his analysis of the Reagan years.
-- Jeffrey A. Engel, Southern Methodist University, author of The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global PresidentAbout the Author
James Graham Wilson is a Historian at the U.S. Department of State.
Product details
- Publisher : Cornell University Press; 1st edition (January 15, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 280 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0801456835
- ISBN-13 : 978-0801456831
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 14.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 6.12 x 0.75 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,556,065 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,113 in International Diplomacy (Books)
- #3,803 in Russian History (Books)
- #6,456 in History & Theory of Politics
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

James Graham Wilson received his Ph.D. in diplomatic history from the University of Virginia in 2011. He is currently a Historian at the U.S. Department of State, and has compiled five volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.
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Modern popular interpretation of the end of the Cold War credits Ronald Reagan almost exclusively for the final results, but this author shows the contributions of many of Reagan's cabinet members, Gorbachev and his cohorts, and George Bush and his cabinet. The book spans politics, economics, military strategy, the influence of middle east strategy, and philosophical perspectives of all the players. By the time I was through I had a very clear picture of the many complexities, and while I may not understand all the intricate details I did find the author gave me a much broader understanding of what led to the end of the Soviet Union as the other major world power.
This book did give a good explanation of the internal and external issues that led to Gorbachev's rise to power, and to the confluence of events that led to the amazing arms reduction agreements and the calming of Cold War tensions. The description of the severe economic problems facing the Soviet Union was fascinating and the impact of weapons buildup on those economic issues was made very clear by the author.
I did take issue with some of the interpretations of Reagan's handling of his cabinet members, and his strategy in handling the Soviet Union in general. I'll admit to being a Reagan fan. That said, Mr. Wilson's perspective on Reagan and what he seemed to feel was essentially a rudderless leadership style is, in my opinion, flawed. He makes the case that Reagan didn't provide strong leadership. i would argue from reading this book that Reagan was an amazingly strong leader and that leadership, which included a cabinet full of widely diverse opinions and philosophies, was what enabled him and his staff to navigate the very uncertain waters of the Cold War and the rush to arms based on MAD. I think far too much credit was given to George Bush and his staff for the events already set in place, but I also think that Mr. Wilson did an excellent job of providing credit for the results to Gorbachev and his staff in easing tension and bringing calm to a tense world situation.
Overall - an excellent book - well written, easy to follow, and something anyone who wants a good understanding of the Cold War and the relationship between communism and capitalism should read.
Thatcher and he were there just as it was possible to create opportunity to lead Gorbachov out of his kremlin hell hole.
It is also an antidote for anyone who thinks that the United States had a master plan for winning the Cold War and destroying the Soviet Union. Hardliners in Reagan's cabinet consistenstly overstated the Soviet threat and misread Soviet intentions. They endorsed steady pressure on Moscow but had no "end game" for ending the Cold War because they feared that negotiations would undermine public support for bloated defense budgets. Their alarmism was mirrored by fears circulating among the top Soviet leadership: they believed that Reagan's defense buildup presaged an American nuclear attack on the USSR. The early 1980s were dire.
Things improved in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Moscow. He wanted to end economic stagnation by cutting defense spending and reallocating resources to civilian production. In the U.S., Secretary of State Shultz sidelined the hawks and pressed ahead with negotiations that transformed relations with Moscow. It's hard to say what Reagan's role was. He dreamed of victory over communism yet also of abolishing nuclear weapons. In the end, he was a weak leader whose cabinet was a snake pit of infighting because he never gave clear instructions and was loathe to resolve disputes between his subordinates. He was probably senile by his second term.
No one in Washington really understood the significance of Gorbachev; as late as 1989, the CIA still wasn't sure whether he was sincere about transforming the USSR. Under Bush, American diplomacy was tactically surefooted, yet DC was always catching up with and reacting to events. It was caught off guard when Gorbachev allowed Eastern Europe to break free in 1989; a year later, Washington was still hoping that Gorbachev would stay in power even as the USSR was flying apart. Once the USSR imploded, DC took credit for an event it had not foreseen let alone planned for.
All that can be said for the Americans is that the Soviets were almost as clueless. From fearing a nuclear attack in the early 1980s, they later believed naively that Washington would bail them out with cheap loans if they only abandoned the Cold War. Gorbachev meant well but he had no idea of the forces he was unleashing within the Soviet Union and its empire. He also never understood that Washington would never treat Moscow as an equal partner.
"The Triumph of Improvisation" is brisk, well-written, and based on deep research in U.S. archives. Secretary of State George Shultz comes off as the main hero: a clear-thinking pragmatist, he won Reagan's confidence (Nancy's, too), and led the U.S. onto a path of engagement with Moscow that paid dividends in the form of arms control agreements and relaxed tensions. The book is essential reading for students of diplomatic history. Ironists will enjoy it, too.
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