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Martin Klimke

Trust, but Verify: The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969-1991 (Cold War International History Project) Hardcover – November 1, 2016

by Martin Klimke (Editor), Reinhild Kreis (Editor), Christian F. Ostermann (Editor)

1 rating

Trust, but Verify uses trust―with its emotional and predictive aspects―to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The contributors to this volume look at how the "emotional" side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.

Print length

272 pages
Publisher

Stanford University Press
Publication date

November 1, 2016
ISBN-10

0804798095
See all details

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Editorial Reviews

Review

"This book offers an insightful explanation for one of the great puzzles of recent history: how the Cold War, a seemingly indestructible international regime, came to an end. And it will also make waves because the essays take seriously the mission of relating the political, economic, and cultural factors to emotions history." -- Frank Costigliola, University of Connecticut

"In an abundance of 'trust talk' in international relations, finally a scholarly analysis of how and why trust really matters: how it facilitated cooperation, enabled risk-taking, and helped to establish confidence-building politics, under the highly unlikely auspices of the Cold War." -- Ute Frevert, Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development

About the Author

Martin Klimke is Associate Dean of Humanities and Associate Professor of History at New York University, Abu Dhabi and formerly a research fellow at the German Historical Institute. Reinhild Kreis is Assistant Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Mannheim. Christian F. Ostermann is the Director of the HIstory and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, which includes the Cold War International History Project.

Product details

Publisher : Stanford University Press; 1st edition (November 1, 2016)
Hardcover : 272 pages
ISBN-10 : 0804798095
Item Weight : 1.4 pounds

Best Sellers Rank: #3,717,985 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #1,045 in Arms Control (Books)
- #2,548 in War & Peace (Books)
- #3,551 in International Diplomacy (Books)

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H. Campbell

Is There Such a Thing as Trust??

Reviewed in the United States on November 27, 2020

Verified Purchase

The title of this book probably should have been something like "Trust AND Verify" or "MIStrust and Verify" or perhaps, better yet, "Verifying Trust." But on the whole, as much as I enjoyed the individual essays on interstate relations, I do not think the main theme of the book, i.e, that trust was an integral part in establishing agreements during the Cold War, was convincingly demonstrated. Quite the contrary, in fact. I took from these tales of debate, denial, disagreement and compromise that there really is no such thing as trust in social, political or military relations. Indeed, looking at today's chaotic and divided USA, one could argue that the distrust the average American citizen's has in their own government created a creature like Donald Trump who otherwise could never have gotten even a tourist visit to the White House in the last century. The book juggles numerous definitions of trust, though one I have most faith in posits that trust is an emotion founded on either the evidentiary proof and/or aspired hope that the trusted will observe the truster's best interests generally or under specific circumstances. As such, one can argue that no state should ever trust any other state regardless of shared values, histories, ethnicities, etc., simply because of the potential for the infringement of national interests, either inadvertently or through malice. In fact, we know that so called "allies" like Israel have and still routinely spy on its US protector, and the UK is historically notorious for its spying on its "friends". In the context of this book, the various essay authors attempted to show how trust was developed between US and Soviet interlocutors in the SALT I, CSCE/Helsinki Accords, 1987 INF and dissident release negotiations. But in all these cases it is not so much trust that is the cement bonding these erstwhile foes but political expediency, political and economic opportunism and a certain sense of desperation on the other side that is the primary motivation. Gorbachev was eager if not frantic to get the US and Europe behind his reforms, and the only way he could do that was to make enormous concessions, at considerable political cost to himself, to persuade the West that he was sincere. Was the West's willingness to secure such concessions evidence of trust or just opportunism at collecting a windfall profit with little investment? Mind you, ten years earlier when SALT II was debated in the US Congress, even trivial "violation" incidents under the SALT I treaty were magnified by the right wingers into proof positive that the USSR could not be trusted to uphold its treaty obligations, regardless of the level or security of the verification procedures agreed to in the treaty. Though these incidents were not sufficient to question the verification-backed "trust", for ideological purposes, no level of verified trust was going to be adequate. But ten years later, a desperate Gorbachev's concessions convinced even the right wingers that the US had the USSR over a barrel and were going to profit from that desperation. "Trust" of Reagan's Evil Empire was not created because of Gorbachev or his soothing words of pace and a new detente, but an opportunity arose that made the nebulous issue of trust irrelevant or at best, secondary to the red meat eating far right of the GOP. The book addresses other Cold War situations, such as the GDR's so called trust in Willi Brandt, the GDR's uneasy relationship with brother socialist Poland, the convening of informal interleadership meetings of the G7, the propaganda used between the FRG and the US to combat growing disillusionment among youth about their government's policies, Switzerland's mid 70s decision to seek better relationships in an expanded definition of Swiss neutrality (the Swiss did not agree to join the UN until 2002!) and the divisive maneuvers of the Greeks and Dames within NATO to draw attention to their fears of being marginalized in NATO's war plans. In many of these cases, the issue of trust seems peripheral if not non-applicable. The Swiss did not decide to seek a new relationship with the world out of any renewed or diminished trust with the US or NATO but because they saw themselves being left behind in dynamic times (I'm sure profit came in somewhere in their calculus). On the other hand, Greece and Denmark did have suspicions and doubts about the US commitment to their defense in the event of WW3, but is that a question of trust or just an a awareness that in the grand scheme of things they would always take a backseat to central Europe? My concluding opinion is that there is really no such thing as trust anywhere. Rather, it is part of an emotional wish-list of desiderata in life, a relief from having to be a canine in a dog-eat-dog world. Unfortunately, in the Darwinian perspective of survival trust is a luxury no species can afford. The same logic applies to nation states. A good read for foreign policy, Cold War and political wonks.

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