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Lights Out: Pride, Delusion, and the Fall of General Electric Hardcover – July 21, 2020
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"If you’re in any kind of leadership role—whether at a company, a non-profit, or somewhere else—there’s a lot you can learn here."—Bill Gates, Gates Notes
How could General Electric—perhaps America’s most iconic corporation—suffer such a swift and sudden fall from grace?
This is the definitive history of General Electric’s epic decline, as told by the two Wall Street Journal reporters who covered its fall.
Since its founding in 1892, GE has been more than just a corporation. For generations, it was job security, a solidly safe investment, and an elite business education for top managers.
GE electrified America, powering everything from lightbulbs to turbines, and became fully integrated into the American societal mindset as few companies ever had. And after two decades of leadership under legendary CEO Jack Welch, GE entered the twenty-first century as America’s most valuable corporation. Yet, fewer than two decades later, the GE of old was gone.
Lights Out examines how Welch’s handpicked successor, Jeff Immelt, tried to fix flaws in Welch’s profit machine, while stumbling headlong into mistakes of his own. In the end, GE’s traditional win-at-all-costs driven culture seemed to lose its direction, which ultimately caused the company’s decline on both a personal and organizational scale. Lights Out details how one of America’s all-time great companies has been reduced to a cautionary tale for our times.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherMariner Books
- Publication dateJuly 21, 2020
- Dimensions6 x 1.2 x 9 inches
- ISBN-100358250412
- ISBN-13978-0358250418
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As one GE board member said, “The worst thing to happen to Jeff wasn’t 9/11. It was Sarbanes-Oxley.”Highlighted by 612 Kindle readers
“What is the role of a GE board member?” “Applause,” the older director answered.Highlighted by 494 Kindle readers
Flannery had taken to uttering a new mantra around the company’s shiny new offices in Boston: “No more success theater.”Highlighted by 407 Kindle readers
Editorial Reviews
Review
"How could a company as big and successful as GE fail? I’ve been thinking about that question for several years, and Lights Out finally gave me many of the answers I was seeking. The authors give you an unflinching look at the mistakes and missteps made by GE’s leadership. If you’re in any kind of leadership role—whether at a company, a non-profit, or somewhere else—there’s a lot you can learn here."—Bill Gates, Gates Notes "5 Ideas for Summer Reading" “A gripping and deeply reported account of the devastating disintegration of one of the most iconic firms ever to exist. To all of us shocked by GE’s seemingly abrupt fall from grace, this book lays out in painful detail how such a thing could have happened.” —Rita McGrath, Columbia Business School, author of Seeing Around Corners: How to Spot Inflection Points in Business Before They Happen “Gryta and Mann tell a bracing tale of corporate venality, incompetence, and shortsighted deal-making. It’s a parable with no heroes but many lessons for anyone who wants to know how twenty-first century corporate management, which venerates stock price above all other measures of value, has gone so disastrously awry.” —Andrew Rice, New York Magazine “Lights Out is the definitive story of an American business powerhouse losing its way. Gryta and Mann’s meticulous reporting puts us in the rooms—and on the private jets—where GE’s leaders struggled over the company’s fate, with billions of dollars in the balance. More than just an intimate profile of one company, this book is a captivating tale of human complexity, greed, and hubris.” —Evan Ratliff, author of The Mastermind: Drugs. Murder. Empire. Betrayal “This vital history of an American institution warns us of what happens when a company pursues growth for growth’s sake, and its leaders struggle to understand what they can and cannot control.” —David Gura, anchor and correspondent, MSNBC “Possessing all the suspense of a true-crime account, Gryta and Mann’s riveting look at GE’s previous two decades underlines the harsh facts of survival in twenty-first-century business.” —Publishers Weekly “Gryta and Mann expand on their Wall Street Journal reporting to create a compelling narrative of a giant’s spectacular fall in this powerful and fascinating read.” —Booklist “This revealing and accessible postmortem of GE’s downward spiral will be important reading for a wide audience, including customers, employees, former employees, and investors, as well as anyone interested in twenty-first-century corporate management.” —Library Journal —
About the Author
TED MANN is a reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Washington Bureau, where he is part of a team covering business and government. He was the beat reporter covering General Electric and other industrial conglomerates for the Journal's corporate bureau in New York from 2014 to 2017, and previously covered transportation for the Greater New York section, where he broke the George Washington Bridge scandal that ensnared former governor Chris Christie and his aides. He is a graduate of New York University.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
1
Off a Cliff
Schenectady, New York, 2017
JOHN FLANNERY PULLED into the little city on the Mohawk River in late July with numbers on his mind, passing beneath what had once been the largest electrified sign in the world. The storied logo had been surpassed by taller structures long ago, but it still glowed from atop the mammoth brick shoebox of Building 37 as Flannery passed through the gates and into the birthplace and spiritual home of the General Electric Company.
Schenectady'the electric city'had been home to the Edison Machine Works. It was there that GE was incorporated in 1892, assembled by bankers out of the nonperforming attempts of inventors to translate their brightest ideas into business.
What had blossomed in Schenectady was the stuff of cultural legend'inventions, manufacture, mass production, unstoppable growth'but there was a sense of cavity now to the giant old industrial grounds. More than forty thousand men and women had worked there at GE's peak. It was a tenth of that size by 2017.
History, however, wasn't Flannery's mission. His focus was inside. Schenectady now was the headquarters of GE Power, the largest and oldest division of what had long been America's most famous conglomerate.
And John Flannery, just weeks away from taking over leadership of the most famous C-suite in American business, had come to see GE Power leaders on their home turf and to take stock of the heart of the company he was about to lead.
Flannery was like a president-elect, the incoming chief executive officer of one of the most famous and well-respected companies on earth. Just ten other men had held the job he was preparing to take on. With the formal and official announcement made, Flannery was organizing his team and girding himself to take on the hardest challenge of his professional life.
To an outside eye, nothing more than another orderly and carefully planned corporate succession was under way, one as smooth as those GE had prided itself on in the past. Flannery's predecessor, Jeff Immelt, was overseeing a peaceful transfer of power before making way for a new manager to rise up from GE's ranks and carry on the company's traditions for another decade or so.
But appearances were deceiving. What was actually unfolding behind the scenes at GE was dysfunction tending toward chaos and a confrontation with the past that was mere weeks from spilling into public view. Beneath the placid surface, GE was in total disarray.
Flannery had barely had a moment to reflect after the company's board tapped him to be the new CEO. That whirlwind weekend opened into a week of press conferences, media interviews, internal town hall'style meetings, and multiple executive briefings'all compulsory steps in the process of preparing Flannery to take the reins of one of the world's biggest and most closely watched companies.
And prepare he would. Flannery was a voracious reader, his wide-ranging tastes reflected in his conversations, but he didn't ooze arrogance as some corporate chieftains do. He was a man constantly reexamining himself, his curiosity often reflecting inward as he reviewed his past calculations and decisions like an analyst poring over a slide of film.
That same banker's instinct to endlessly search for new angles and to weigh his options, to crunch and recrunch every number, flowed from the same quietly adventurous source that led him to venture down dirt roads with his wife in exotic locales. He was a hunter'for killer deals and hidden risks, for undiscovered roadside taverns serving lunch.
Flannery stood a little under six feet tall. He was slightly stout and usually wore dark suits that reflected his finance roots. He wasn't shy, but he wasn't one to work a room either, in contrast to some of those he had outmaneuvered to win the new job. Some GE executives glad-handed as aggressively as candidates for Congress. Flannery was self-deprecating, though possessed of a disarming confidence. At company events for investors and the press, a wry smile often played at the corners of his mouth, a contrast with the brand of GE earnestness exuded by his colleagues.
He would have to adjust to his new stature, however, as he took on a kinglike role in a company that took itself just as seriously as a kingdom. But he hadn't yet. Like a world leader, Flannery would need to get used to being whisked from one place to another, having a full security detail, and constantly having a car, plane, or helicopter waiting to deliver him to the next stop. In the hours before his predecessor, Immelt, arrived for one of his innumerable visits to GE facilities all over the world, telltale trappings would begin to appear at his destination: hard candies and a plentiful supply of his favorite diet soda appeared on shelves in conference rooms, always there before anyone in Immelt's entourage even had to ask. Rumor among stock analysts held that he flew with his own treadmill, lest the hotel gym prove insufficient. No one knew yet what soda John Flannery liked. And Flannery certainly wasn't used to any of this.
When he walked to the elevator bank in GE's Boston office, an assistant immediately scrambled over to hit the Down button, apologizing that the elevator hadn't been waiting for him. Flannery appreciated the effort, but the royal treatment seemed a bit overboard and he told people so.
Working closely with Immelt, he had seen these trappings before, but now, Flannery told people, he found them slightly suffocating, and occasionally a little silly. Nevertheless, this was the job. With its vastness came complexity, the crammed agenda, the aides and meetings, the planes and guards. Although he wasn't going to be able to ditch the entourage anytime soon, at least he had a good excuse to get away from headquarters on trips like this one to Schenectady. No one challenged his need to get acquainted with the details of the business.
A road trip was also good for clearing the head. John Flannery had been announced as the new CEO on June 12. His father, John, a retired banker in West Hartford, Connecticut, had died just twelve days later. It was some comfort to the younger Flannery that he had been able to share the news of his promotion, and that his father had lived to see his son tapped to land one of the most prominent jobs in American business. Still, his dad's passing hurt. Loss shaded his satisfaction and pride.
Flannery had outperformed three rival GE executives to win the contest to succeed Immelt. The latter had served sixteen years as CEO, but had shown very little outward sign that he was ready to retire, even to those aiming to succeed him, until just before his departure was announced.
Flannery was a finance whiz, a veteran of GE's large lending business, which made him a dark horse at first in the race for CEO, given the company's traditional reverence for its industrial businesses and their leaders. But the board knew that GE needed a fresh assessment. Immelt's strategy was stuck in the mud, and his supremely optimistic mantras simply weren't falling to the bottom line.
Even from his first moments on the job, Flannery wanted his tenure to be defined not just by what he would do but by what he wouldn't do. He wouldn't just kick the can down the road. Instead, he would rip off Band-Aids and expose some of the festering ailments within the company to fresh air and sunshine. That meant dealing with the truth, no matter how harsh it might be and no matter the consequences. Flannery would be brutally honest, even though, as he was well aware, that would mean changing the company's tone. Under Immelt, there had been a buzzy, vague, optimistic spin that not only often failed to hold up under scrutiny but had eroded GE's credibility with Wall Street and its workers alike.
Flannery knew that his tenure as CEO would last at least a few years. The GE board of directors would give him some time. But he also had to set a new tone from the start and get started right away on changing what needed changing, even purging where needed. And he knew there was plenty to purge.
Flannery had taken to uttering a new mantra around the company's shiny new offices in Boston: 'No more success theater."
Now, with just weeks to go before officially starting his new job, he was working around the clock to assess the company. Like any CEO, Flannery wanted to survey his new territory so that he could make decisions on strategy and assess performance based on his own firsthand observations of the company'its factories, its offices, its profit-and-loss statements, its debts. He had already met with more than one hundred investors and financial analysts in the previous weeks. Now he was visiting the GE Power division, before heading to the GE Aviation facility in Cincinnati.
He wasn't alone, physically or emotionally. In fact, finding a way to be alone in order to think was sometimes difficult. And it was also sometimes difficult to see what he needed to see. GE was a siloed organization, in contrast to the image it presented to outsiders. By the standards of a normal business career, Flannery had been all over the GE corporate map, making stops in financial services, running operations in Asia, India, and Latin America. He had run the business development team when it bought one of GE Power's biggest global competitors.
But that wasn't the same as having worked at Power itself.
He didn't know the intricacies of the markets, the products, the cycles, or the people. He didn't know the myriad ways in which executives in that unit had adjusted accounting, calculated estimates, or weighed risks before they reported their figures up to the places in the company where an executive like Flannery could have seen them. Even for a GE lifer, the only way to know what the Power unit was actually up to was just to show up at its headquarters and look around.
So there they were: Sitting in a conference room in the heart of the Power business. Flannery and his team sitting on one side of a long table with the Power management group facing them. As they discussed the business, the expressions of the two sides began to look vastly different.
Flannery was comfortable with numbers, especially financial statements, and that was where he began his search in Schenectady. It didn't take long to see the problem: as Flannery paged through the financials, he realized that GE Power had somehow run out of cash. This discovery wasn't just shocking'it was unthinkable. GE's largest industrial business was stretched thin. Its profits, on close examination, seemed to exist mostly on paper. Years of pro forma adjustments had given the appearance of a business that was turning decent profits selling power turbines and the services that kept them running, but in fact there was relatively little actual money coming in the door from customers. Even worse, Power was building inventory'making more of its huge, expensive machines'even as the global market for turbines was slowing. "It was like they drove off a cliff," Flannery later told an observer, 'and there were no skid marks."
The gas turbines that made up the core of GE's business were essentially cousins of their aircraft engines: enormous spinning rotors moving equally titanic generators not that different from those first installed in the early days of Edison in Lower Manhattan. And no one made more turbines'the massive machines at the center of power plants'than General Electric, whose equipment still generates about one-third of the world's electrical power.
The GE Power unit that Flannery inspected in 2017 was under new management. Its leader of the past dozen years, another GE lifer named Steve Bolze, had put in for his retirement soon after losing out to Flannery in the contest to be GE's next CEO.
Bolze's exit wasn't surprising once the succession contest had ended. But the decision to deprive him of the GE crown was shocking for some'primarily for Bolze himself. He had the tall, square-jawed looks and charisma of an Ivy League quarterback or TV weatherman and had been telling people he had the job just days before the GE board made its decision.
On paper, Bolze had looked like an obvious candidate to succeed Immelt. He ran the biggest division and had helped close GE's biggest-ever takeover, and his résumé looked like a decades-long campaign for the job. Like most ambitious GE executives, Bolze had made stops at other businesses across the conglomerate. He had run GE Healthcare's overseas operations. He had worked out of headquarters on the deals team that did mergers and acquisitions. He had allies on the board. And Bolze had presided over enough growth in his twelve years running Power to justify a place on the short list for CEO.
But Flannery's review of the GE Power books now raised the question of just how real that growth had been. Had Bolze thought that the condition of this business was sustainable? Did he think that the power market could come around? Or was he planning to deal with GE Power once he was GE's CEO and not beforehand, when reporting bad news'especially to a CEO like Jeff Immelt'would have killed his chances at the top job?
Or was he unaware of the true condition of the division, hardly a forgivable offense, until it was too late? The pressure to perform inside GE is omnipresent, and missed goals can be fatal, a tradition true at all levels of the company. Even as head of the division, Bolze didn't necessarily know how his underlings got to the finish line and it didn't really matter. Such details are fixable at GE, but missing the financial target for your business causes irreparable damage.
In any event, with Bolze now gone, Flannery needed to get his arms around the Power business and fast. He needed Jeff Bornstein, who came along for the trip. The chief financial officer was in some respects Bolze's opposite: short, punchy, funny, and ensconced at the top of an intracompany network of financial chiefs that pervaded every last tentacle of the corporation. Like Bolze, Bornstein was another of the finalists Flannery had beaten out to become CEO. Unlike Bolze, Bornstein had stayed on, pledging to help the new CEO get GE back into shape.
Sitting in Schenectady, surrounded by newly crunched copies of Power's numbers, Flannery's mind reeled. The more he dug into the numbers, the more the problems grew and worsened as they built on each other. Not only was the Power business poorly positioned for any turn that might happen in the market, but it didn't have the cash to fix itself. To GE investors, Power seemed to have been making its numbers and putting up solid profits. But those were illusory. The accounting tricks that looked like profits were actually just borrowing from the company's future earnings to cover up problems in the present.
Power had sold service guarantees to many of its customers that extended out for decades. By tweaking its estimate of the future cost of fulfilling those contracts, it could report boosts to its profit as needed. Flannery shook his head; he couldn't believe that a major GE division had dug itself such a deep hole.
The world wasn't going green overnight, but as more alternative power sources came online, natural gas turbines were used less and needed less frequent service, which was the real cash cow of the Power division.
In the coming weeks and months, demand continued to drop for gas-fired power turbines. Competition from wind and solar had been growing for years and was only getting fiercer. Meanwhile, the division was sitting on too much unsold inventory, which was just capital that the company couldn't access without selling the equipment. And selling it wouldn't be an option as the market continued to sour. Somehow a potentially fatal spiral in GE's biggest business had been gathering force out of sight of GE's generously paid board of directors and many of its top executives, save a small circle that included Bolze and Immelt himself.
Now, just weeks before becoming CEO of the General Electric Company, John Flannery sat in Schenectady watching disaster approach on the horizon. Combing through the books of the sprawling conglomerate in preparation for taking on the job of his life, Flannery looked into the biggest and most important industrial business of them all'the unit that was the reason for GE's existence'and found a deep, empty hole where there should have been cash.
The reported profits were aspirational, if not fraudulent. And the accounting devices that had hidden this disarray from the public were beginning to fail. Thirty years into a career at America's most iconic company, John Flannery had reached the pinnacle. But now the whole corporation was about to plunge into the abyss.
Flannery was understated, even in panic. Still, a palm upturned, an eyebrow raised, made the incoming CEO's thought clear to anyone in the room as he turned from the charts to the financial chief he had known for two decades.
'Did you fucking know about this?'
Product details
- Publisher : Mariner Books; First Edition (July 21, 2020)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 368 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0358250412
- ISBN-13 : 978-0358250418
- Item Weight : 1.11 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.2 x 9 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #225,586 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #29 in Industrial Manufacturing
- #370 in Economic History (Books)
- #1,564 in Business Management (Books)
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Twenty years later GE is a shell of its former self. Literally hundreds of thousands of employees have been laid off and the company’s market valuation has cratered as low as $50 billion. So what the hell happened? That is a question I had been asking myself as I watched the once invincible corporation struggle for relevance and even survival. Bill Gates had been asking himself the same question, too, and on his fantastic blog, “Gates Notes,” he strongly recommended “Lights Out: Pride, Delusion, and the Fall of General Electric” by Thomas Gryta and Ted Mann.
I enjoyed this book quite a bit and learned a lot. However, it wasn’t exactly what I was expecting, which was an expose on the failures at GE over the past few years. Rather, “Lights Out” is a critical assessment of Jeffery Immelt’s 16-year run as Chief Executive Officer from 2001 to 2017.
To say that Immelt had big shoes to fill in 2001 is a dramatic understatement. The 44-year-old Immelt was taking the reigns from arguably the most celebrated executive in history. His job was simple: Don’t screw it up. Gryta and Mann clearly view Immelt’s tenure as an unmitigated failure. They point out a lot of things Immelt did wrong, but provide little suggestions as to what he might have done better or differently. I actually came away from “Lights Out” with a somewhat sympathetic view of Immelt and the incredibly challenging circumstances of his time at the helm.
Here is how I read the story. Jack Welch benefited from having a strong economic wind at his back for the full 20 years of his reign. He never had to deal with anything like the 9/11 attacks or the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, he had several tricks at his disposal that would be denied to Immelt. For instance, as Gryta and Mann concede, “Welch cultivated an environment of pressure that incentivized people to [bend the rules].” In order to make quarterly numbers and deliver to Wall Street the smooth and predictable results that Welch demanded, GE executives resorted to all sorts of questionable but legal accounting legerdemain. After the scandals at Enron and Worldcomm, the federal government tightened the screws on corporate accounting practices. According to one GE board member, “The worst thing to happen to Jeff wasn’t 9/11. It was Sarbanes-Oxley.”
Next, Welch benefited from the profit-making machine that was GE Capital. By the time he stepped down in 2001, GE Capital was contributing over 40% of GE’s profits. The operation was so expansive that GE would technically qualify as the seventh largest bank in the country. But Wall Street still valued GE as an industrial manufacturer, applying a more favorable price to earnings ratio to its stock. By the time of the financial crisis, this was no longer true. Wall Street was valuing GE as a financial services firm. Even as Immelt and the leaders at GE worked diligently to shed GE Capital assets while growing the core industrial manufacturing base of its operations, the company stock was saddled with an unfavorable price to earnings ratio.
It seems to me that the authors don’t fully acknowledge the fundamentally different circumstances that Immelt was forced to operate under. Is there any legitimate reason to believe that Welch would have done things better?
So what did Immelt get wrong? Several things, according to Gryta and Mann. First, Immelt had a tendency to overpay for acquisitions. The M&A machine was whirring almost non-stop during Immelt’s tenure and, as the authors tell it, the company lost financial discipline when it came to closing deals, primarily because the Chief Executive Officer refused to let go of a deal once the process started. The massive acquisition of French industrial manufacturer Altsom is a notable case in point, they say. The French government and EU regulators kept layering on concessions that ultimately undermined the strategic rationale for the deal, but Immelt refused to walk away.
Second, Immelt made disastrous forays into oil & gas and information technology. The argument was that Immelt was trying to pivot GE away from Capital and back to its industrial roots, all in the hopes of retaining a better price to earnings ratio. The creation of GE Digital would also theoretically boost the stock by capturing the high multiples associated with information technology companies.
Third, Immelt was a reckless steward of GE’s cash flow. He poured nearly $150 billion in stock buyback programs and stubbornly maintained GE’s pricey dividend in the face of serious challenges.
Finally, Immelt was an eternally optimistic cheerleader who interpreted dissent as disloyalty. The authors claim that GE executives were afraid to question any part of Immelt’s strategy for fear of losing their influence if not their jobs.
The only truly tragic figure in “Lights Out” is John Flannery, who lasted just 14 months as CEO after Immelt’s resignation in 2017. As Gryta and Mann tell it, “Flannery exposed the major problems that went unchecked by his predecessor and put GE on the long, painful road to recovery. For those offenses, he was fired.”
“Lights Out” is a quick and captivating read. I learned a lot about GE during the Immelt years, but ultimately walked away with almost as many questions as I had when I started. One thing is for certain: The GE of the Jack Welch era is dead, and that’s too bad. A powerful and enviable GE was good for America, I think. As the authors note, “[GE] has represented a capitalistic meritocracy, a locus not just of success but of a certain version of virtue – the virtue of targets made, goals surpassed, earnings earned, markets won. And it has stood for a vague but well-marketed notion that, in unapologetic pursuit of a company’s fortunes, and one’s own, there is a certain uprightness – and a lesson for others.”
I'm not very optimistic about GE’s future after reading “Light’s Out.” The latest CEO is former Danaher chief executive and GE board member Larry Culp. Gryta and Mann don’t say much about Culp’s time at the helm, but by the looks of the stock price it hasn’t been great. My main reason for doubting GE’s future is its human capital. The company once attracted the smartest and most ambitious graduates on this country’s leading business schools. That is no longer the case. After all, who would want to work at GE these days? Without a steady funnel of talented men and women to lead and grow GE’s diversified businesses, how can the company hope to survive, let alone thrive?
Apparently, GE’s in-house lawyers were nowhere to be found during GE’s fall from grace. The company’s in-house legal function was practically canonized by the legal press yet no GE in-house lawyer is mentioned other than GC Brackett Denniston III. And he is mentioned only a handful of times and never as a key player but as a bystander. It is possible that Welch and Immelt simply chose to ignore GE’s in-house legal team as the company’s problems multiplied. If that was the case, that does not reflect well on what many were led to believe was the best in-house legal team in the country.
The notion that CEOs have outsized egos is hardly novel - Immelt had an empty company plane follow the plane he was actually traveling in to ensure that he would never be late for a meeting. If his plane had a problem, there was another right behind him. Nor is it news that CEOs often take advantage of their positions to their financial benefit over and above their generous (to put it mildly) compensation arrangements - Welch’s divorce proceedings revealed so many embarrassing details about his GE exit package that he abandoned many of the perks he was granted. But GE, the company of Edison, was supposed to be different. It was part of the fabric of the country. It had a management team, and a management philosophy, that was better than that of any other company. Well, maybe for a long time, but not for that last 30 years or so. it turns out that during this period GE wasn’t really different. It was just another company whose leaders made an awful lot of bad decisions, decisions that have left it today a shadow of what it once was.
My main issue with the book, like Bob Woodward’s books for example, is that there are only relatively few people quoted by name. I understand why that’s the case, but I do think it’s a flaw worth noting. That said, it’s a terrific read, especially for anyone with some degree of familiarity with how corporations function.
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Identificar o segredo de tal sucesso e o transcrever num livro é um a tarefa complicada e o autor conseguiu mostrar um pouco do que aconteceu.
A GE é uma empresa centenária e teve o Thomas Edison participando de sua criação. Com isto, sempre gozou de prestigio e seus papeis financeiros tinham baixíssima classificação de riso. Com esta situação, o Welch pegava dinheiro emprestado com juros baixos e o emprestava com juros maiores. A GE tornou-se uma financeira que fazia equipamentos de tecnologia.
Com a entrada do novo CEO (Inmelt), escolhido pelo Welch, houve problemas como sempre ocorrem no mundo de negócios. E o autor direciona a piora no desempenho como incapacidade do Inmelt. Analise um pouco simplista.
Há alguns clichês também:
- “ Inmelt had no problem trusting his gut.”
- “We listened to everyone. But in the end, we overruled them” (Comstock, chefe de marketing)
- “If he wanted something, he got it and it was best not to question too much” (comentario sobre Inmelt)
- “ But Garden trusted no one – he wanted to see results”
Ha algumas avaliações interessantes:
- “Campaigns were not won by the best character or product, but by the one with the simplest and most clearly told story”
- “Strategy is a story well told”
- “America’s great industrial company was in fact a massive bank with a couple of turbine businesses bolted on the sides”
肥大化したコングロマリッド、すなわち大企業病に侵された古い体質の企業には一定数のフリーライダーがいるため、このやりかたでバッサリ切ることで確実に経営効率はよくなる。これがJack Welchの成功要因のひとつ。しかし、このやり方も数年経てば必要な人間も解雇せざるを得ないこともあり、従業員モラルの低下や足の引っ張り合いを促進することに。もうひとつのWelchの成功要因はGE Capitalの経理操作であった。金融のEasy Moneyでうまく補填し、右肩上がりの予測にぴったり合った業績を上げ、株主の絶大な信頼を得ることができた。
しかし、後継者のJeff Immeltは金融危機後の規制が強化された中でGE Capitalマジックを使えなくなった。収益における金融比率を下げるため、専門外の事業を高額で買収し、シリコンバレーのスタートアップ企業のような世界にイノベーションを起こし、急成長を遂げるミラクルな変貌を遂げようと夢を見るも、そもそもが違うので全然思い通りにならない。Immeltの有無を言わさないトップダウンの企業文化の中、役員は異議を申し立てることもなく、「右肩上がり神話」を死守すべく、帳尻合わせの工作がそこかしこと蔓延る。そんな中でもJeff Immeltは在任期間、工場閉鎖などの血を流す一方、計168百万ドル(約180億円)を超える報酬、プライベートジェット、会社支給の自家用車などの恩恵を享受する貴族のような日々を送る。後任のJohn Flanneryの役目はImmelt時代の膿を出し切ることであり、これが公になることでGEの株価は急落し、巨大な額が泡と消えた。株価がCEOの評価基準であることから、Flanneryは史上最短の任期を終えた。
では、今はというと、ダナハーの創始者のLarry Culpが社外からCEOとなった。ダナハーはトヨタ式のLean Managementに基づき多くのビジネスを回復させた経験がある。Culpはトップダウンからボトムアップの企業文化に転換させ、Welch以降役に立たたなかったリーダーシッププロブラムを廃止し、地に足がついた重工業の企業として再生に臨んでいる。
結局、元GEの人たちが自慢していたものは何だったんだろうか?GEのヒエラルキーでの相対的優位性が多くのCapitalistic Meritocracy(資本主義的能力主義)を信奉する貴族意識を持ったエリート主義者を大量に生産していったのではないか。結局、彼らのプライドを支えていたのはGE Capitalの経理操作とコストカットであって彼ら自身の貢献によるものではない。数字のみを重視し、現場を軽視したHubris(うぬぼれ)により、アメリカの繁栄を支えた偉大な企業の一つが終焉を迎える結果になったのではないかと思わざるを得ない。
日本ではGE帝国の崩壊さえ知らずに、いまだにGEがもたらしたRank and Yank (Stack ranking)、すなわち、毎年下位10%の人員を削減する方法やシックスシグマなどが、最善の経営方法だといまだに思い込んでいる経営者もいる。そんなやり方日本の文化に合うわけがない。早く邦訳が出て、多くの人に読んでもらいたいと思う。











