Add to List

Added to

Unable to add item to List. Please try again.

Share <Embed>

Have one to sell?

Sell on Amazon

Flip to back Flip to front

Listen Playing... Paused You're listening to a sample of the Audible audio edition.
Learn more

See all 2 images

Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (Modern War Studies) Hardcover – May 1, 2002

by Merle L. Pribbenow (Translator)

10 ratings

Part of: Modern War Studies (121 books)

See all formats and editions

Price

New from

Used from

Kindle

"Please retry"

$37.99

—

Hardcover

"Please retry"

—

$78.00

Paperback

"Please retry"

$50.00

$45.91

$58.56

What was for the United States a struggle against creeping Communism in Southeast Asia was for the people of North Vietnam a "great patriotic war" that saw its eventual victory against a military Goliath. The story of that conflict as seen through the eyes—and the ideology—of the North Vietnamese military offers readers a view of that era never before seen.

Victory in Vietnam is the People's Army of Vietnam's own account of two decades of struggle, now available for the first time in English. It is a definitive statement of the Vietnamese point of view concerning foreign intrusion in their country since before American involvement—and it reveals that many of the accepted truths in our own histories of the war are simply wrong.

This detailed account describes the ebb and flow of the war as seen from Hanoi. It discloses particularly difficult times in the PAVN's struggle: 1955-59, when Diem almost destroyed the Communist movement in the South; 1961-62, when American helicopter assaults and M-113 armored personnel carriers inflicted serious losses on their forces; and 1966, when U.S. troop strength and air power increased dramatically. It also elaborates on the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Communist effort, confirming its crucial importance and telling how the United States came close to shutting the supply line down on several occasions.

The book confirms the extent to which the North orchestrated events in the South and also reveals much about Communist infiltration—accompanied by statistics—from 1959 until the end of the war. While many Americans believed that North Vietnam only began sending regular units south after the U.S. commitment of ground forces in 1965, this account reveals that by the time Marines landed in Da Nang in April 1965 there were already at least four North Vietnamese regiments in the South.

Translator Merle Pribbenow, who spent several years in Saigon during the war, has sought to render as accurately as possible the voice of the PAVN authors, retaining much of the triumphant flavor of the text in order to provide an uncensored feel for the Vietnamese viewpoint. A foreword by William J. Duiker, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Life and other books on Vietnam, puts both the tone and content of the text in historical perspective.

Print length

520 pages
Language

English
Publisher

University Press of Kansas
Publication date

May 1, 2002
Dimensions

6.25 x 1.5 x 9.25 inches
ISBN-10

0700611754
ISBN-13

978-0700611751
See all details

Products related to this item
Sponsored Hide feedback

Page 1 of 1Start overPage 1 of 1

Editorial Reviews

Review

"An important . . . book . . . well worth reading. A unique addition to the history of the war. . . . While heavily laced with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and Socialist propaganda, the book offers unique, often surprising insights."--Military Review

"A significant addition to the historiography of the Vietnam War. . . . The importance of this book is that it provides the viewpoint of our enemy during our longest and probably most controversial war."--Armor

"This book is important and will serve as an essential source for those writing about the Vietnam War. If for no other reason, scholars and students will be able to refer to it to discover the official Hanoi position on various aspects of the war."--The Historian

"This translation offers Asian specialists of all disciplines, military and political historians, and students of revolutionary movements a wealth of information, much of it previously unavailable in any language, and a critical perspective that are certain to stimulate controversy and suggest new avenues of research for decades to come. As such, Victory in Vietnam is essential reading."--Journal of Asian Studies

"This book, the definitive statement of the Vietnamese communist point of view, reveals that many of the accepted truths in our own histories of the war are simply wrong."--Air & Space Power Journal

"Merle Pribbenow's fine translation of this important PAVN official history of the war from 1954 to 1975 contains much detail never before available in English. . . . A valuable resource for serious students of the Vietnam War."--Edwin E. Moïse, author of Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

"Pribbenow's skillful and graceful translation provides valuable insights into many aspects of the Vietnam War from the North Vietnamese perspective, which is often surprisingly candid. He deserves our thanks for making this important volume accessible to a wider audience."--Lewis Sorley, author of A Better War

"Fills a yawning gap in the growing literature on the Vietnam War."--William J. Duiker, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Life

From the Back Cover

"Merle Pribbenow's fine translation of this important PAVN official history of the war from 1954 to 1975 contains much detail never before available in English. . . . A valuable resource for serious students of the Vietnam War."- -Edwin E. Moise, author of Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

"Pribbenow's skillful and graceful translation provides valuable insights into many aspects of the Vietnam War from the North Vietnamese perspective, which is often surprisingly candid. He deserves our thanks for making this important volume accessible to a wider audience."--Lewis Sorley, author of A Better War

"Fills a yawning gap in the growing literature on the Vietnam War."--William J. Duiker, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Life

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ University Press of Kansas; First edition (May 1, 2002)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 520 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0700611754
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0700611751
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.25 x 1.5 x 9.25 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #3,329,139 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #5,779 in Vietnam War History (Books)
- #34,811 in Asian History (Books)

Customer Reviews:
10 ratings

Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.

Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

Help others learn more about this product by uploading a video!

Upload video

Products related to this item
Sponsored Hide feedback

Page 1 of 1Start overPage 1 of 1

Customer reviews

5 star		65%
4 star		28%
3 star 0% (0%)		0%
2 star		7%
1 star 0% (0%)		0%

How customer reviews and ratings work

Top reviews from the United States

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Prof. Bob Turner

Tremendously important book for those who wish to understand the Vietnam War

Reviewed in the United States on December 19, 2016

Verified Purchase

This may be the most important single book about the Vietnam War. For it resolves the single most important issue that divided America for more than a decade. The State Department issued a major "white paper" in February 1975 entitled "Aggression from the North" and including photographs of captured Soviet and Chinese weapons. The anti-war movement claimed that was a "lie" and the conflict in Vietnam was but a "civil war" in South Vietnam between oppressive, U.S.-supported governments and the "National Liberation Front" that merely wanted peace, human rights, and an end to foreign occupation. In this book, Hanoi admits that the Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam ("Workers" or Communist Party of Vietnam) made a decision on May 19, 1959--more than 5 years before Congress enacted an AUMF authorizing the President to use U.S. armed forces to defend South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos from Communist aggression--to open the Ho Chi Minh Trail and start sending troops, weapons, and supplied through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam to overthrow its government by force. Put simply, thanks to Hanoi, we now know our Government was correct and the so-called "peace" movement (everyone wanted "peace," the issue was whether it would best be achieved by upholding the non-aggression provisions of the UN Charter and SEATO Treaty or by allowing aggression to go unchallenged) was wrong.

To be sure, there were other issues. Protesters said cutting off American aid and withdrawing our troops would "stop the killing" and promote human rights. The answer to those questions came from the behavior of Communist leaders in North Vietnam and Cambodia (where the Yale sdsdUniversity Cambodian Genocide Program concluded that the Khmer Rough ("Red Cambodians") killed more than 20% of the population of Cambodia in the first three years following"liberation"). Under pressure from the anti-Vietnam movement, Congress in May 1973 made it unlawful for the President to spend treasury funds on combat operations by U.S. military forces in the air, on the ground, or off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia--snatching defeat from the jaws of victory and consigning millions of people America had pledged its honor to protect to death and tens of millions to Stalinist tyranny. (At one point, in their annual human rights assessment Freedom House described the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam as being less free than China, about the same as North Korea. So much for promoting "human rights.")

I've been teaching seminars on the war for more than 25 years at the University of Virginia, and highly recommend this volume for anyone who wants to sort through the claims and counter-claims that so divided the nation 40-50 years ago. It is not an easy read and it is filled with Communist propaganda, but it definitively answers the most fundamental question underlying the debate. While Hanoi's aggression was covert and accompanied by a brilliant propaganda campaign that deceived large numbers of gullible Americans to undermine their government's efforts, America's efforts to protect South Vietnam were every bit as legal and noble as our commitments to stop armed aggression in Korea and World War II.

10 people found this helpful

Helpful

Robert

well documented

Reviewed in the United States on July 23, 2021

Verified Purchase

great book

One person found this helpful

Helpful

Michael J. Brown

Great Translation--Historically Significant

Reviewed in the United States on April 12, 2016

Merle Pribbenow has done an incredible and masterful job in translating what is purported to be “The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975.” Translating from one language to another is a special skill that goes far beyond simply substituting words in one language for words in another. Beyond providing a structure for verbal communications, language also provides a framework upon which thoughts are constructed. It is possible to provide perfect literal translation between languages while failing to convey the meaning of the thoughts behind the expression. The task is magnified when translating from Asian languages, which don't even share parts of speech, to English. Mr. Pribbenow masters this task in providing a smooth, flowing, and eminently readable work of historical importance.

With respect to the content of the book, I'm quite surprised. The Vietnamese have been surprisingly honest in their recounting of the war. Of course, there was the usual ideologically shaped rhetoric that one often encounters while reading communist prose...sloganeering such as "war against the Americans to save the nation," for example. Americans were always “imperialist” or “neo-colonial,” while South Vietnamese were always “puppets.” Several times I found myself pondering how to calculate the number of Americans that would have to have been in Vietnam to support the numbers which the Vietnamese claim to have killed (they did leave room for interpretation..."killed" was invariably accompanied by qualifiers such as "or dispersed" and "or taken out of action").

My two tours in Vietnam were August 1967--August 1968 and October 1971--September 1972, both periods of significant action (TET Offensive and 1972 Spring Offensive) which provided much of the narrative in the book. I found that the North Vietnamese accounts of locations, timing, sequencing, and results were remarkably consistent with my own recollections. They are surprisingly frank, if unspecific, about their successes and failures. With respect to TET, their account was, I think, a little less than honest....they allude to "uprisings" in and around Saigon, which I don't recall seeing. I literally walked on patrols from Thu Duc (about 20-30 kilometers, I think, outside the city to the edges of Saigon proper, and I saw no evidence of communist sympathy or support--indeed GVN flags were being proudly displayed on many houses, and families greeted us warmly as we passed). They are a bit more frank in their accounts of the battles at Loc Ninh and An Loc. Again, without being specific, they admit failure, and they do a fairly honest job of accounting for the reasons for their failure.

Something missing from the book was any reference to the conduct of their troops. There is no mention, for example, of the atrocities committed during the occupation of Hue during TET 1968. At the same time, there was no propagandizing, factual or otherwise, about the conduct of American or South Vietnamese troops. There was no mention of My Lai.

This book should be a required read for anyone who projects themselves as knowledgeable about the history of the Vietnam War. Obviously, one must apply one's filters as one does when one reads a historical account that draws only from the resources of one side of the historical narrative.

5 people found this helpful

Helpful

Kevin M. Boylan

IDEOLOGICAL BUT VERY USEFUL

Reviewed in the United States on August 21, 2011

Victory in Vietnam has all the flaws that one would expect in an official history, compounded by the strong ideological bias of its Communist authors and publishers. Yet, histories of the war written by Americans and other Westerners have hardly been free of ideological bias -- whether the older, leftist, anti-war perspectives of Lloyd Gardiner, Gabriel Kolko, et al, or the more recent, revisionist works of right-wing ideologues such as Mark Moyar, etc. If one is willing to read between the lines of the propaganda, the reader of Victory in Vietnam will be rewarded with many facts and insights that are unavailable in any other work published in the English-language. Americans are accustomed to looking at the war as a catastrophic defeat, and most of our Vietam historiography searches for the causes -- and often, scapegoats -- for that defeat. This book, on the other hand, is the chronicle of a victory won against long odds -- a fresh perspective that has long been badly needed. Therefore, Victory in Vietnam is a valuable work that should be in the library of every serious student of the Vietnam War.

16 people found this helpful

Helpful

Top reviews from other countries

Translate all reviews to English

S.M.

La guerre du Viêtnam vue par Hanoï

Reviewed in France on May 18, 2012

Verified Purchase

Pour qui s'intéresse à la guerre du Viêtnam, il est un obstacle que l'on a parfois du mal à franchir : celui de prendre en compte le côté nord-viêtnamien et du Vietcong, surtout en raison de la barrière de la langue. L'historiographie du sujet est en effet dominée, en Occident, par nombre de travaux américains qui n'ont pas forcément un parti pris affiché, mais qui se servent souvent de sources exclusivement occidentales, négligeant un camp entier de la guerre (sans parler de la distinction Nord-Viêtnam/Vietcong, on peut aussi mentionner le gouvernement du Sud-Viêtnam et l'ARVN, régulièrement minorés). En 2002, les éditions de l'université du Kansas ont publié, pour combler en partie cette lacune, l'histoire officielle de la guerre du Viêtnam écrite par l'Institut d'Histoire Militaire de Hanoï. Le traducteur, Merle L. Pribbenow, a passé plusieurs années au Viêtnam à la fin de la guerre dans son service à la CIA, en tant qu'officier et interprète (1970-1975).

Ce qui manquait peut-être, ce n'était pas tant la description de la formation et du développement de l'armée nord-viêtnamienne qu'une analyse détaillée de la guerre menée au Sud-Viêtnam par cette institution. C'est ce que fournit cet ouvrage officiel publié, pour sa seconde édition, en 1994 au Viêtnam, et initialement publié en 1988. C'est en fait le second volume de l'histoire officielle de l'armée nord-viêtnamienne. Il est intéressant de constater que les Nord-Viêtnamiens dressent la chronologie du conflit entre 1954 et 1975 : autrement dit, dès la signature des accords de Genève et la partition du Viêtnam en deux Etats, le nord communiste, selon son historiographie officielle, se trouve en guerre contre Saïgon et ses soutiens américains.

Le livre est encore écrit dans un pays aux mains des vainqueurs communistes, qui n'hésitent donc pas à masquer leurs erreurs ou à faire preuve d'une bonne dose de triomphalisme. Il est d'ailleurs assez dense et parfois, il faut bien le reconnaître, un peu indigeste. Il faut relever, également, que les Nord-Viêtnamiens mentionnent très rarement leurs pertes chiffrées et surestiment parfois grossièrement celles de l'adversaire. Les longues descriptions des opérations, réalisées par secteur géographique le plus souvent deviennent vite fastidieuses et on préfère les considérations, plus intéressantes, sur les changements organisationnels ou de structure (créations de divisions, puis de corps d'armée, endoctrinement politique au sein de l'armée nord-viêtnamienne, etc). Un bon exemple des limites de l'histoire officielle peut être trouvé dès les premières pages : rien n'est dit du féroce débat interne qui eut lieu alors au sein du Parti Communiste nord-viêtnamien pour savoir ce qu'il convenait de faire après la partition et la victoire contre la France. Faut-il reconstruire et moderniser le nord ou favoriser la réunification nationale en menant la guerre au sud ?

Le débat est tranché en 1959 alors que Diêm, le dirigeant sud-viêtnamien, a décimé les maquis ayant survécu à la partition de 1954 -ce que les auteurs admettent cette fois franchement. C'est alors qu'Hanoï décide de relancer la guerre au sud, en expédiant d'abord des hommes et du personnel pour reconstruire l'infrastructure clandestine. C'est la naissance de la fameuse piste Hô Chi Minh, qui voit d'abord passer les sudistes réfugiés au nord après l'accord de 1954. A la fin de 1963, ce sont plus de 40 000 hommes, en majorité natifs du sud, qui ont rejoint ce qui est devenu le Vietcong. Cette construction logistique est ce qui fait pencher la balance en faveur des insurgés dès 1963 : auparavant, le Vietcong est mis en difficulté par le choix des "hameaux stratégiques" (regroupement des populations dans des villages sous protection armée) et par les nouvelles tactiques mobiles de l'ARVN utilisées grâce au matériel américain (blindés, hélicoptères), en 1961-1962. Mais une fois les renforts acheminés et les leçons des premiers revers tirés, le déséquilibre s'inverse. La bataille d'Ap Bac, en janvier 1963, en est l'illustration. C'est peut-être un des apports les plus intéressants, du point de vue nord-viêtnamien, que de montrer la véritable importance de la piste Hô Chi Minh, au coeur de la guerre, et surtout le contrôle très étroit des opérations au sud par le Nord-Viêtnam.

Profitant de l'affaiblissement du régime sud-viêtnamien après l'assassinat de Diêm, en novembre 1963, Hanoï renforce le dispositif de la piste Hô Chi Minh et s'attend à s'emparer du sud assez rapidement -ce qui n'est pas, là encore, sans provoquer d'intenses débats au sein du PC nord-viêtnamien, que passent sous silence les auteurs. L'intervention américaine directe sur le terrain à partir du printemps 1965 est ainsi un sérieux revers pour Hanoï. Celle-ci relève le défi et accroît la guérilla au sud et son armée régulière au nord : la majorité des 50 000 combattants expédiés cette année-là au sud sont d'ailleurs, en majorité, des septentrionaux.

Le général Nguyen Chi Tanh, qui commande la guérilla au sud, doit maintenant prouver qu'il peut l'emporter. Tanh est un adepte de la doctrine maoïste selon laquelle "'la volonté" est supérieure à la puissance de feu, et reste convaincu que l'armée du Nord-Viêtnam peut venir à bout de la supériorité technologique américaine. Tanh attire ainsi les unités de la 1st Cavalry dans la vallée de Ia Drang pour tester ses présomptions. La stratégie se révèle en fait coûteuse pour les deux camps. Hanoï continue cependant d'augmenter son potentiel humain : fin 1966, l'armée nord-viêtnamienne compte 700 000 hommes dont un tiers combat au Sud-Viêtnam. Cependant, les pertes augmentent encore en 1967, menant à une crise morale, disciplinaire et provoquant de plus en plus de désertions.

Au printemps 1967, les dirigeants du Nord commencent donc à mettre au point ce qui va devenir "l'offensive du Têt". Le but est, dans un premier temps, d'attirer les unités américaines en dehors de la zone côtière peuplée pour frapper plus facilement les troupes de l'ARVN. Cet assaut frontal se combine avec des soulèvements prévus à Saïgon et dans d'autres grandes villes. Les dirigeants nord-viêtnamiens tablent aux mieux sur une victoire totale et un effondrement du sud, mais envisagent également une solution négociée en cas de résultat moindre. Les auteurs reprennent la thèse officielle de la victoire stratégique de première importance que constitue le Têt. En fait, ils reconnaissent à demi-mot qu'ils ont sous-estimé le potentiel militaire de l'ennemi et que la population du Sud ne s'est pas soulevée, tout comme les unités de l'ARVN, qui ne se sont pas débandées, bien au contraire.

Le résultat du Têt se traduit en 1969 par une perte de l'emprise de l'armée nord-viêtnamienne sur la majorité des zones tenues avant l'offensive. Les troupes américaines isolent l'ennemi dans certains secteurs confinés : la forêt U Minh dans la péninsule de Ca Mau, la Plaine des Roseaux près de la frontière cambodgienne, et quelques secteurs des Hauts Plateaux. Il faut attendre 1970 pour voir la situation militaire -et logistique- se rétablir, avec le coup d'Etat au Cambodge et l'intervention américaine dans ce pays qui relance la guerre révolutionnaire sur place. En 1971, la tentative de destruction de la piste Hô Chi Minh par l'invasion du Sud-Laos (opération Lam Son 719) confirme les faiblesses structurelles de l'ARVN. Surtout, les Nord-Viêtnamiens ont profité de l'arrêt des bombardement sur le Nord en 1968 pour accroître encore la piste Hô Chi Minh, qui comprend alors plus de 6000 km de routes et de pistes, avec un pipeline en construction pour acheminer le carburant.

Les Nord-Viêtnamiens commencent alors à créer des corps d'armée pour faire face à l'ARVN. L'offensive de Pâques 1972 correspond à l'année présidentielle américaine et se concentre au nord, près de la zone démilitarisée, là où la proximité du Nord-Viêtnam garantit un soutien logistique plus facile. Les auteurs reconnaissent cependant avoir rencontré des difficultés de par l'action de l'aviation américaine et par des coupures de ravitaillement, pourtant. Les accords de Paris de janvier 1973 aboutissent au retrait américain du Sud-Viêtnam mais les Nord-Viêtnamiens restent au sud, et vont profiter de ce statu-quo pour renforcer leur dispositif. Fin 1974, les dirigeants de Hanoï planifient une grande offensive pour emporter la décision -baptisée ensuite offensive Hô Chi Minh, le fondateur du Parti Communiste nord-viêtnamien étant décédé en septembre 1969, avant la fin de la guerre. Une opération rapide menée et conduite par des Nordistes, avec des troupes nordistes.

Comment les Nord-Viêtnamiens expliquent-ils leur victoire contre les Américains ? Par un moral à toute épreuve, par une décennie d'expérience glanée contre les Français, par la direction ferme du Parti Communiste et le soutien du peuple viêtnamien. Curieusement (ou pas), le soutien des deux "grands frères" communistes est oublié : l'URSS assiste pourtant militairement le Nord-Viêtnam dès 1965 contre les raids aériens américains, quant à la Chine, elle fournit des millions de dollars de matériel et 500 000 conseillers militaires, techniciens et soldats pour assister Hanoï. Rien n'est dit aussi des tensions entre le Nord-Viêtnam et les chefs de la guérilla au Sud. Ce qui montre bien que c'est une histoire officielle, les dirigeants actuels du Viêtnam basant leur légitimité sur la victoire remportée contre les Américains. Pour le Nord-Viêtnam, c'est en quelque sorte leur "Grande Guerre Patriotique" (sic). La différence entre l'armée nord-viêtnamienne et la guérilla sudiste est d'ailleurs gommée au profit d'une division tripartite de la première : forces principales, forces locales, et guérilla/milices.

Par ailleurs, les Nord-Viêtnamiens ne considèrent pas que le combat au Viêtnam diffère de ceux au Laos ou au Cambodge à la même période. Ces affrontements sont vus comme un tout, même s'ils y expédient des "volontaires". Dans le livre, d'ailleurs, les Nord-Viêtnamiens insistent sur quelques moments de la guerre en particulier : la phase de renforcement de la guérilla et de naissance du Vietcong avec la création de la piste Hô Chi Minh (1959-1963), la reprise après l'offensive du Têt (1969-1971) et enfin la campagne ultime menant à la défaite du sud (1974-1975). On l'aura compris, ce sont des moments plutôt à l'avantage d'Hanoï : mais il faut bien reconnaître que l'armée nord-viêtnamienne a été l'instrument de la victoire communiste, et en ce sens, le régime a le droit d'en faire l'histoire. Ce livre n'apporte donc rien de révolutionnaire à l'interprétation du conflit, mais il est pourtant indispensable à qui s'intéresse aussi à "l'autre bord" et pas seulement qu'à la vulgate (dans tous les sens du terme) américaine.

Translate review to English

redrx7

Excellent contribution.

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on January 20, 2013

Verified Purchase

Basically a work of synthesis from the many post-war studies by the historians of the various Military Regions and theaters of the 21 year struggle against the United States and its attempts to prevent Vietnamese self-determination. Indeed, the need for precisely such a work is amply demonstrated in the Introduction to the work by William Duiker who adheres to the Party Line in continuimg the usual absurd American distortions,namely: that the Vietnamese were guilty of "invading" their own country;that South Vietnam was an "independent nation" which "invited" the US to assist it against "external" aggression....ho hum,the usual deluded nonsense from the apologists for the American interference,intervention and invasion of someone else's country.
Duiker even "reveals" that the southern based insurgency was in fact led and controlled by the Lao Dong based in Hanoi. Shock,horror!!...imagine having the temerity to regard their country,their people and their armed forces as one! Is there no end to Communist duplicity...?
I could further labour the point but really that would only give creedence to the US revisionist perspective which the rest of the world views with complete derision.
The historical significance of the great struggle documented by this work is fortunately immune to the rantings of those US authors who lack any familiarity with Vietnamese and other sources and perspectives.

2 people found this helpful

See all reviews

Sorry, there was a problem.

Sorry, there was a problem.

Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (Modern War Studies) Hardcover – May 1, 2002

Editorial Reviews

Review

From the Back Cover

About the Author

Product details

Videos

Customer reviews

Top reviews from the United States

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Top reviews from other countries