Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Modern War Studies) Hardcover – April 21, 2009

An outstanding summary of the entire American experience in Vietnam.

Good book

Prados makes his slant clear from the beginning...he was involved in anti-war movements during the 1960s. Which is fine, and I suspect that he could have written a very captivating memoir about that, or a nice history of the anti-war movement in general. But he really overreached by trying to combine that with a general history of the Vietnam War. This trend is echoed in his endnotes, which read more like "I talked to this person at a conference" and "I was here and saw that." His use of balanced secondary sources is weak, and at times his grasp of the battlefield history of the war appears weak. This isn't a reliable general history, but does have a place if you're looking at the historiography of the War.

Discussions of the Vietnam war typically provoke strong reactions in all who lived during the time, both by those who served in the war and those whose lives were deeply affected by it. The subtitle of this book is a dead giveaway to how the author feels about the conflict, and it may dissuade the serious reader into taking the time to read it. The author however discusses his bias in the first pages of the book, and this may help motivate such readers to study it, sizable as it is. It is well-written, focused, and informative, with many surprises throughout its pages. Many references can be found at the end of the book for skeptical readers who do not want to take the author's word for everything.

Some of the interesting facts/surprises one can find in the book include:
1. The United States was forking out 40% of the cost of the French war against Vietnam by the time the Eisenhower administration began. Amazingly, (tactical) nuclear weapons were proposed by the this administration to assist the French in the conflict.
2. It was Eisenhower, and not Nixon, who first initiated counterintelligence programs to "identify and discredit" American citizens who were against the conflict.
3. 80% of the South Vietnamese were Buddhists, but Catholics played a supportive role in the South Vietnamese government under Diem.
4. Michigan State University was involved in a "population control" strategy in South Vietnam. The author omits the details of this strategy however.
5. The National Security Agency now supports the notion that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was completely false.
6. Norman Schwarzkopf was a senior adviser of ARVN paratroops.
7. Great Britain had an embassy in Hanoi throughout the conflict, and traded actively with the North Vietnamese (this is very surprising to read). France also maintained diplomatic ties with North Vietnam during the conflict.
8. The decision to not invade North Vietnam was due to fears about instigating a wider war with the Soviet Union or China.
9. Truman set up a Psychological Strategy Board to manipulate public opinion on the Cold War, which was later used by Walt Rostow to manipulate opinion on the Vietnam conflict.
10. Johnson instructed the FBI to find out which student protestors obtained federal scholarship money.
11. There were apparently mutinies in the U.S. Army towards the later years of the war, one being the "Route 9" mutiny.
12. An actual U.S combat division was deployed in Washington several times to handle protests against the conflict.

The role of technology in the Vietnam conflict is also brought out in the book:
1. Helicopters quickly transferred soldiers from one place to another, which explains the difference in actual "fighting hours" in Vietnam versus say World War II.
2. The first use of laser guided munitions from aircraft.
3. The seeding of clouds to flood Vietnamese rivers.
4. The use of defoliants to clear dense forests in order to better observe North Vietnamese troop movements.

Opinions or statements by the author that should have been left out of the book:
1. That the press were frequently "paper soldiers" in support of the conflict.
2. That Johnson ordered intelligence agencies to "stimulate" events that he thought would divert the attention of war protestors. The author gives no evidence for this.
3. That the Army Security Service monitored U.S. civilian communications along with disrupting them. No evidence for this is given.

'Tho many of my peers served in 'Nam, I was one of those who received a deferment. For most of the war years, however, I was in Okinawa and the Philippines as a DOD employee, teaching the kids of those off fighting the war. Prados' work came highly recommended to me by two long-time friends who WERE there--one Navy, one Army. Unfortunately, we have yet to compare notes. I had read one other VietNam history (S. Karnow's, VIETNAM: A History...) written in the early 1980's and referenced by Prados. To me, each book has its advantages as to the time it was written--immediacy vs.long-term. Prados is obviously a scholar and excellent researcher. I was fascinated by the revelations, many only recently learned or de-classified, of the war-time machinations of both the US and the North Vietnamese governments. Fear and ignorance, among other factors, drove our (US) government to make some pretty dumb mistakes and Prados exposes these grand faux pas in a well-researched, articulate manner. His comparisons of the Vietnam debacle with our current one in Iraq is both cogent and alarming. For me, there was an over-attention to detail as to the varied locations where various military units (both US, ARVN and the NVA) were deployed. On the other hand, I recognize that this discussion could be significant information for those who were there. Many tout the maxim of "learning the lessons of history," and Prados' work is a classic of this genre. The sobering question remains, "Are the 'lessons' ever really laerned?"

A little intimidating at first due to size, but it is a quick read. Very glad that I had a chance to read it for my class. Learned a ton of new information. Recommend for Vietnam buffs or as a secondary source for research projects.