War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age (Praeger Security International) Illustrated Edition
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Thomas Rid
(Author)
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Clear and pleasant to read in an elevated American style, War 2.0 will probably establish itself as indispensable not only for all students of the transformation that warfare will continue undergoing in coming years but also to the armies themselves, for whom the adaptation process will be long and arduous."
―Défense et Sécurité Internationale
"This book is excellent."
―ICSR.com
"This book traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents use novel media platforms in irregular conflict. In three case studies based on government and policy reports and interviews, the public affairs policies of US, British, and Israeli conventional forces are examined, and their media-related counterinsurgency methods are compared with the Web-based methods devised by al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah to advertise their political agenda, influence public opinion, and put violent ideas into action. A chronology overviews landmarks in the recent history of telecommunications and irregular warfare. The book is written for a general audience as well as for scholars of modern armed conflict, political advisors, officers, and journalists."
―Reference & Research Book News
"Timely, evidence-driven, clear and concise, War 2.0 challenges the ideas and protocols of the 20th century, dragging us into the modern reality inhabited by 'digital natives', and is recommended reading for all, young and old, involved in or studying the conduct of irregular warfare. And along with their doctrinal notes from staff college, public affairs officer should now add one more book to their compulsory reading list."
―CB3Blog
"This is an interesting and provocative work. . . . This is a well written and researched piece. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Graduate, research, and professional collections."
―Choice
" . . . worthwhile . . . Rid and Hecker's War 2.0 is clearly a must read. . ."
―Parameters
Review
"Since war flows from society as a whole, it is constantly evolving. Winning wars requires understanding the changing environment and adapting faster than the enemy. Rid and Hecker provide powerful case studies on how our primary enemies have understood and adapted to the changes Web 2.0 is driving. It would behoove professionals to read and understand this remarkable book."
--T.X. Hammes
Colonel (Ret), U.S. Marine Corps
Author of The Sling and the Stone
About the Author
Thomas Rid is a research fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Previously he worked at the RAND Corporation, the Institut français des relations internationales, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. He is author of War and Media Operations and co-editor of Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare.
Marc Hecker is a research fellow at the Security Studies Center of the Institut français des relations internationales in Paris. Among his publications are La presse française et la première guerre du Golfe, La défense des intérêts de l'Etat d'Israël en France, and Une vie d'Afghanistan.
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Product details
- ASIN : 0313364702
- Publisher : Praeger; Illustrated edition (May 14, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 280 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0313364710
- ISBN-13 : 978-0313364716
- Item Weight : 1.3 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.14 x 0.69 x 9.21 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#2,599,435 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #910 in Military Sciences
- #3,487 in Law Enforcement Politics
- #3,574 in Law Enforcement (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Top reviews from other countries
One key thesis the authors examine throughout their book is the fact that the costs and necessary resources to attain and use new technologies have been significantly lowered in recent years, empowering irregular forces to utilize technology formerly only available to governments. But while this development makes the struggle against irregular forces harder and less predictable the same development allegedly empowered government forces better control over resources and the population and made it more resilient against irregular attacks. The ensuing stalemate thus resulted in prolonged struggles of low intensity in which complete defeat of the opponent has become less likely.
The authors examine different examples of the use of information technology by government forces to influence public perception and public opinion circumventing media channels and communicating via social media directly, looking at the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. Here different national doctrines and different styles are identified and the effects on public opinion assessed. In contrast to this the media efforts of Hezbollah, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are also analyzed in comparison. Here again different styles and strategies can be identified with Hezbollah being able to utilize many conventional media outlets to completely engulf the Palestinian population in place and in exile with its propaganda. In comparison the Taliban had to develop media channels largely to address their international support base, whereas Al-Qaeda does not have a defined support base but tries to attract followers internationally with a variety of means.
The decentralized communications means of the internet do provide insurgent forces with a much more resilient means of internal communication as well as external propaganda channels. Although this allows for a greater operational tempo and more dislocated organization it also becomes harder for the organization’s leaders to control content and organizational quarrels. Al-Qaeda adapted to this with its wide array of semi-aligned cells, whereas Hezbollah and the Taliban still try to overcome these problems conventionally.
A second major thesis of the authors is the changing role of the population in an insurgency. As the insurgents are able to specifically address their desired target audience to recruit supporters and fighters, the need for widespread influence and control of the population has diminished. This will in turn support the development from classic population based insurgencies toward cell based terrorist organizations. But as these cells become more radical and have no need to appeal to the wider population they themselves limit their chances of success although becoming harder to defeat.
In summary this study of the interactions of modern information technology and insurgents and counterinsurgents is of great relevance and interest for the average reader as well as the professional, as it is clearly written, analytically sound and relates the known information infrastructure of social media well to current practices of insurgents and countersinsurgents.




