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War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory Kindle Edition
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With respect to the current wars in which the U.S. continues to be engaged after nearly 16 years, Dr. Schadlow points out how both the Bush and the Obama administrations failed to address the critical ongoing requirements for stabilization strategies. Further, Schadlow, indicates that the U.S. made the same mistakes yet again when we overthrew Qadaffi without a plan to stabilize Libya. Such judgments by Schadlow are not from 20/20 hindsight but follow detailed official Army assessments of prior experiences in our history and the importance of not repeating such mistakes. Of particular note is the report she references by COL Irwin L Hunt after WWI, “American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920,” in which he challenged the Army to develop competence in civilian administration among its officers in peacetime, and not wait until the responsibility was thrust upon it. As described in post WWII US Army history publications such as “The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946”, written by Dr. Earle Ziemke, senior military leaders took Hunt’s warnings to heart and began planning for post-war occupations of Italy, Germany and Japan in the spring of 1942, a full three years prior to the end of the wars in both theatres. Given the commitment by the Army to preparation for occupation and its allocation of people and resources, the radical transformation of Italy, Germany and Japan from totalitarian adversaries of the U.S. to stable allies stand as strong testaments to the competence of the U.S. Army to conduct such complex and essential operations.
Dr. Schadlow does not make the case that the U.S. must impose its system or always engage in elaborate state building. However, she argues that the use of military force, described by practitioners as “the management of violence”, removes and destroys but does not reconstruct. And, without reconstruction, the use of violence can perpetuate (or increase-my words, not hers) rather than reduce the national security threats the force was intended to eliminate. These are the hard but necessary evaluations that civilian and military leaders must make when considering the use of military force. Put simply by Dr. Schadlow, “It is an opprobrious waste of lives if nothing better results.”
Anyone, professional or amateur, who claims to have an interest or role in military strategy should read this book. In fact, before he came out of retirement into the SecDef role, James Mattis described Dr. Schadlow’s book on the back cover as a “must read before we enter another war,” where she “lays out the post-combat challenges no amount of denial will excuse, persuasively charting what history tells us is required for our military victories to achieve a better peace." Given the reputation Mattis has as a scholar with an extensive collection of books, I suspect that he had already read the Hunt Report and Ziemke’s book before he read “War and the Art of Governance.” My guess is that any officer or political leader who brings a plan into Secretary Mattis’ office that involves taking and holding land for any period of time will want to have read this book, committed to memory the five recommendations Dr. Schadlow sets forth in her conclusions, and have a detailed plan for the “day after” that addresses what, why, who, how and when.
As to the first, interpretative researchers years after historical events seek confirmation of their own world view. That's how Columbus can become an economic disaster, George Washington can be dismissed as merely another slave-holder, and Attila the Hun can be the Father of his Country. In today's book market, it sells. Specifically, with regard to Panama, most contemporary writers were chaffing over the effects of Goldwater-Nichols and the reorganization bringing non-Special Forces Army units, like Civil Affairs, into Special Operations. She makes little note that the original "plan" was to establish military government in Panama, al a, post-World War II Germany. This was a doctrinal template that would be gone by the end of 1990 and the senior CA leaders in the USAR knew it.. She also failed to show the real effects of needing to drag the U.S. Department of State through every phase of the operation. The simple fact is, we will fail at these efforts (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan), until we have a true "national policy," not just a DoD policy on matters related to Civil Affairs (and incidentally PSYOP, too). In today's world (I hate that term), service and joint doctrine and DoD policy pronouncements are not enough. International relations is truly an interagency endeavor. ALL of the functions of government must be fully engaged. That's why it's called WAR!
As to flawed research, if the establishment of the Military Support Group (MSG) in Panama was instrumental in what happened after Noriega was captured, wouldn't you think that the author would want to know and state who was that "senior civil affairs specialist" (p. 199) who was sent to evaluate and make recommendations on any post-conflict CA organization? How did that "specialist" come to offer a MSG to his hosts? Wouldn't you also think that any researcher may want to understand what that "specialist" faced within General Thurman's staff?
Further, even a mediocre writer and certainly a competent editor would see that it was highly unlikely that two officers with a rare surname of "Youmans" would be in Panama during this short period of time. Who was there, "Harry" (p.199, Fn.178) or "Harold" (p. 200, Fn. 186)? I was misidentified. This simple error raised the point: what other errors have crept into the book?
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