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War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Warfare in History) Hardcover – January 7, 2001

by Clifford J. Rogers (Author)

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Contemporaries considered Edward III of England "the wisest and shrewdest warrior in the world", but he has not fared so well in the estimation of modern historians, many of whom have argued that he was a fine tactician but a poorstrategist. This is despite the fact that by 1360 the English had become the foremost martial nation of Europe; that famous victories had been won at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Crécy, and Poitiers; and David II of Scotland and Jean II of France were Edward's prisoners, and the French, with the Treaty of Brétigny, had agreed to surrender a third of their kingdom to his sovereign rule in exchange for peace.
In War Cruel and Sharp, Professor Rogers offers a powerfully argued and thoroughly researched reassessment of the military and political strategies which Edward III and the Black Prince employed to achieve this astounding result. Using a narrative framework, he makes the case that the Plantagenets' ultimate success came from adapting the strategy which Robert Bruce had used to force the 'Shameful Peace' on England in 1328. Unlike previous historians, he argues that the quest for decisive battle underlay Edward's strategy in every campaign he undertook, though the English also utilized sieges and ferocious devastation of the countryside to advance their war efforts.

CLIFFORD J. ROGERS is Professor of History, United States Military Academy, West Point.

Print length

480 pages
Language

English
Publisher

Boydell Press
Publication date

January 7, 2001
Dimensions

6.14 x 1.06 x 9.21 inches
ISBN-10

0851158048
ISBN-13

978-0851158044
See all details

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Editorial Reviews

Review

This impressive work makes a major contribution to our understanding of late medieval warfare... Rogers is particularly good on the particularities of conflict and campaign. JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY Among the great medieval military leaders, Edward III may be the least studied. That is, until this excellent book... CHOICE A complete and convincing reassessment of Edward's strategic planning and execution... All subsequent historians of the Hundred Years' War will have to take account of (and in my opinion accept) Rogers' conclusions, and medieval military historians generally will have to explain the modification Rogers' study forces upon the standard battle-avoiding model of medieval strategy. This is, in short, a very important book. ALBION Exhilarating...persuasive...an impressive and compulsively readable book, illuminated by vivid citations from the sources and enlivened by a combative style. J. J. N. Palmer, HISTORY A worthy and distinguished contribution to scholarship on the early stages of the Hundred Years War. FRENCH HISTORY Has surely extended the scholarship in this area... essential reading as a core text on any reading list for a course on the Hundred Years War. TMR

From the Back Cover

Contemporaries considered Edward III of England 'the wisest and shrewdest warrior in the world'. He has not fared so well in the estimation of modern historians, many of whom have argued that he was a fine tactician but a poor strategist. Yet by 1360 the English, at the beginning of his reign considered 'inferior to the wretched Scots', had become the foremost martial nation of Europe. At Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Crecy, and Poitiers their armies had won famous victories against heavy odds. David II of Scotland and Jean II of France were Edward's prisoners, and the French, with the Treaty of Bretigny, had agreed to surrender a third of their kingdom to his sovereign rule in exchange for peace.

In War Cruel and Sharp, Dr Rogers offers a powerfully argued and thoroughly researched reassessment of the military and political strategies which Edward III and the Black Prince employed to achieve this astounding result. Using a narrative framework, he makes the case that the Plantagenets' ultimate success came from adapting the strategy which Robert Bruce had used to force the 'Shameful Peace' on England in 1328. Unlike previous historians, Rogers argues that the quest for decisive battle underlay Edward's strategy in every campaign he undertook, though the English also utilized sieges and devastation of the countryside to advance their war efforts.

Product details

Publisher ‏ : ‎ Boydell Press; First Edition (January 7, 2001)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 480 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0851158048
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0851158044
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 2.02 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.14 x 1.06 x 9.21 inches

Best Sellers Rank: #2,784,141 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #5,714 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #6,857 in England History
- #7,269 in French History (Books)

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Stephen Cooper

A TRIUMPH OF SCHOLARSHIP

Reviewed in the United States on December 1, 2011

The title of this book is taken from Sir John Fastolf's memorandum of 1435, concerning the war in France. Fastolf advised that the English should revert to the strategy adopted by Edward III and the Black Prince in the fourteenth century: they should mount armed raids (chevauchées), instead of continuing to rely on either the strategies of conquest or static defence; yet his advice was never followed. The days of the raid were over and, since nothing else worked, the English were driven from France in 1453. The highest watermark of English conquest proved to have been reached in 1360, not 1422.

Yet Professor Rogers's groundbreaking book, a triumph of scholarship, is not mainly concerned with Fastolf's strategy, but with battle. This is refreshing, because we have heard too much in recent years of the idea that `battles were few and far between in the Middle Ages'. There may be some truth in that, but it rather depends on what one means by a battle; and, however infrequent they were, battles were very important.

The main thesis is that Edward III was a `battle-seeking' general, one who deliberately sought to fight the French in set-piece battles, despite the fact that he could not be certain of victory. This is so contrary to the strategy advocated by the Roman Vegetius (in his `Art of War') that it would cause one to question whether that treatise was as widely read in the Middle Ages as we have come to think. In addition, is it really very likely that Edward III was deliberately seeking to `take on' the French in a major set-piece battle in 1346 (this being the classic case for study)? The circumstances would suggest that it was more likely that, like Henry V in 1415, his aim was to bring his army safely or home, or at least to Calais, and that he was trapped by the French (albeit that in each case the outcome was a triumphant victory). However, the book did give me cause to re-assess my assumptions. Professor Rogers has marshalled so much evidence that one has to doubt whether it is ever safe to rely on what one might think of as probability, even `inherent military probability'.

Stephen Cooper

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Curt Emanuel

A New Look at Medieval Warfare

Reviewed in the United States on August 27, 2005

It's been a while since I've enjoyed a book as much as this one.

Clifford Rogers provides a detailed analysis of Edward III's campaigns from 1327 through 1360, including his early campaigns in Scotland, through the first invasions of France in The Hundred Years War. He does so in an effort to show that, contrary to what other authors have said, Edward III's campaigns in France were not dominated by an effort to simply devastate the countryside and so undermine the authority of the Valois Kings in France, but rather that he actively sought battles with the French in order to bring about swifter, more decisive conclusions to their conflicts.

While Rogers does not use this work to attempt to dispel the more general thesis that Medieval Military Commanders sought to avoid War at all costs, it certainly invites a re-examination of other campaigns to see how well that theory holds up. And for those who continue to hold the outdated view that medieval warfare was without detailed strategy, and that military commanders of the time were without understanding of comprehensive military strategy, this serves as yet another nail in that particular coffin.

Keep in mind that this work discusses the campaigns as a whole - with less emphasis on individual battles. If you are looking for detailed battlefield accounts, other works would be more profitable.

I won't provide a blow-by-blow outline of Rogers' narrative here. Instead I will note the most positive aspects of this work. First and foremost is the reliance on contemporary and near-contemporary sources. This work is copiously footnoted (and the footnotes are important - take time to read them) with accounts of chroniclers that accompanied the various armies, providing frequent evidence that Edward was actively seeking battle and was extremely disappointed when he couldn't bring the French to one.

Second, Rogers goes into great detail covering the political aspects of these campaigns. He discusses the Franco-Scottish alliance, Phillip VI's confiscation of some of Edward's continental holdings when he was a minor, Edward's rights to the Kingship of France, the Papal efforts toward peace and the various alliances that were formed and broken throughout the 33-year period, and the implications of all of these for the War.

Third, he takes time to explain the historiography of the studies of Edward's political campaigns and goes on to refute the findings of other authors that Edward sought to avoid battle at all costs. I won't swear that he has proven his case as this is not the medieval period I am most familiar with - however he has provided a great deal of evidence in support of his view.

Fourth, he also goes into great detail regarding logistics. He discusses the difficulties Edward had in raising money for the early stages of these wars, the role that finding food and water, and foraging for these while on campaign, played in the various campaigns, and how the vagaries of the ability to supply his force and, most of all to secure lines of retreat, played in how aggressively he tried to bring the French to battle.

My quibbles with this book are few and not of great relevance to its overall aim. First, several times Rogers offers that "The first duty of a good lord was to defend his vassals ..." p13. I am not altogether certain this is true. Quite often the first requirement of a good lord was, IMO, to retain an effective fighting force and the loyalties of his nobles. Now these two are related, but not necessarily the same. Second, I found less evidence for his repeated assertions that Edward III sought battle largely through his faith in "the judgement of God" whereby the victor on the field placed his faith that the army held in God's favor would win. I'm not saying this wasn't a primary focus of Edward - just that I found it less fully proven. Personally I feel that Edward's willingness to seek battle with a numerically superior French army was more due to his possession of a more experienced force, his possession of longbow archers for which France had no good answer and, most of all, his faith in his own ability as a commander.

Beyond this, the book is well-written, IMO it is fairly fast-paced and provides a great deal of detailed information. It provides an excellent new look at the Wars of Edward III in particular, and of Medieval Military Warfare in general.

12 people found this helpful

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RJay

Strategy Revealed

Reviewed in the United States on September 8, 2017

Verified Purchase

This book covers a great deal of the strategy behind various battles of the 100 Years War. Good content and not too difficult for the amateur historian to read.

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