War Library Binding – December 9, 1987

In the mid-80's, the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (CBC) presented a documentary on the nature of war. Hosted by Gwynne Dyer, my recollection (I was barely a teen at the time) is that it was an interesting and in-depth analysis on the nature of war. Dyer then proceeded to write a companion book, which has been out of print for some years. Now, there is this brand-new, updated version. Dyer has woven the events of the last 20 years into the fabric of the narrative, instead of tacking on an extra chapter at the end - thus it reads like a new book, not a money-grabbing enhancement of an old one. It has been out in Canada for a few months, and will make it's U.S. (re)debut in the spring.

In terms of timeline, this is the most comprehensive book on the roots of, and motivations for, war. Dyer uses archaeological evidence and combines it with analyses on the behaviours of our primate cousins (chimps, baboons, etc.) to build a description of the origin of organised society and the roots of warfare. He then proceeds through the ages, from Babylon and Egypt to the Cold War and the two U.S.-Iraq wars. In this way, he builds a complex but ultimately useful and compelling description of warfare as a human activity. He makes many of the same conclusions as John Keegan and others, but the sheer depth of the analysis is more complex than anything else out there, to my knowledge.

Granted, much of the material in this book has been covered before. For example, is war a natural condition of human societies? Is it inevitable that man will fight his peers? With his trademark wit and seemingly contradictory combination of optimism and sarcasm, Dyer convincingly builds his thesis. The prose is entertaining to read, and the liberal sprinkling of photographic illustrations makes this book eminently readable.

First, the pessimistic side: Humans (and most apes, for that matter) really DO mean to kill each other. However, the average person's chance to die by a violent death has remained mainly steady over the millenia. Certainly, the chances of dying in this century's World Wars was high, but those wars only took up 10% of the century's time. Thus, as battles increased in size and lethality, societies fought less and less frequently, so it all balanced out.

However, he is quite optimistic that humans really are moving in a pacifistic direction. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the next big war will be the last one. His chapters describing the Cold War might be controversial (especially to the U.S. Right) as he maintains Reagan's defense policy was basically invented by Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet Union was already done before Reagan came to power. Whatever your political leanings, though, he lucidly describes the training and mindset of the professionals tasked with maintaining and, if necessary, launching the ICBMs that WWIII would have been fought with.

That's not to say that Dyer is a pacifist per se. He has great respect for people in uniform, and those that follow his syndicated column will know he was in favour of Gulf War I and the destruction of the Taliban by the U.S.-led coalition. He does maintain, however, that modern warfare has turned into an all-or-nothing game where the loser is wiped out (at least the government, and often entire ethnic groups). This is not a sustainable situation in the nuclear era, and so we are in great danger. However, he points out that natural human tendency is to equal rights and democracy. As modern communications and universal literacy make it feasible, nations will naturally move towards more equitable solutions. Thus, in the final analysis, war may eventually become obsolete after all. As he says in the book, it will be good riddance.

When a tourist lodge opened about twenty years ago in Kenya, the alpha males of a nearby baboon troop helped themselves to the easy pickings at the garbage dump. In the time honored tradition of baboon despotism where status obsessed males strictly enforce the prevailing hierarchy, the top ranking males claimed the spoils for themselves, and drove away their lower ranking brother baboons. The alpha males then perished en masse when they become infected with bovine tuberculosis from the rotten meat they ate at the dump. Once the alpha males died and their terroristic bullying tactics with them, the survivors were suddenly able to relax and began treating each other more decently. A new more peaceful baboon society was born.

Gwynne Dyer recounts this incident in the last chapter of "WAR: The Lethal Custom" to summarize and exemplify one of his main arguments in this thought-provoking work -- that our species' penchant for violence, although it does have roots in our evolutionary past, does not mean it is inevitable. He argues that as sentient beings we do have and have shown the capacity for making peace, too. In what is a hopeful but realistic retelling of the founding of the League of Nations after WWI and the United Nations after WWII, Dyer suggests that through it these organizations human beings are attempting to deal with the very real possiblity of species annihilation. He argues that the reversal of despoliation of the world must begin in earnest now so as to prevent the international anarchy that will undoubtedly follow if nations choose not to cooperate and instead chase after and fight over diminishing resources.

Tracing the rise of war from our early ancestors to the present day, Dyer relates a convincing story of increasing technological efficiency in the art and machinery of death, where the technology of war comes to outstrip the capacity of most human societies to contain and direct it. Early on when our species lived in egalitarian societies of roughly thirty individuals to a band, killing one's neighbors was a rare occurrence. In a sparsely peopled world with few competitors for game or territory, it was rare that roving bands would skirmish or fight each other. War appeared as more constant and sustained human enterprise with the rise of agriculturalism with its settled communities ripe for plunder by marauding bands whose economic lives and assumptions about tactics were based on their experience as shepherds of livestock. Highly mobile, schooled in techniques of herding, these bands employed the same principles when facing armies of settlers, e.g., using speed, terror, bluff and deception to terrorize settled communities into giving up their treasures.

War figures heavily in explaining the rise and fall of civilizations and peoples throughout history. The Roman phalanx, for instance, an early "machine" of war which used men as its moving parts, remained effective for hundreds of years, until guns eventually rendered it passe. Walled cities and medieval castles too, were marvels of defensive engineering, until they met a similar fate. Then with the end of professional and mercenary armies with the levee en masse in the wake of the French Revolution, came the era of total war when civilian populations, the manufacturers of the materiel of war, became defined as combatants, too, ushering in totalitarian states, weapons of mass destruction and the possiblity of annihilation.

Dyer also does a particularly fine job on guerilla warfare, which acquired that name during the resistance to Napoleon's invasion and annexation of Spain. He questions the notion of a "War on Terror" as espoused by the current American regime as emblematic of its naivete. The idea of war implies an end, a truce, an armistice. Dyer suggests that the U.S., by declaring a "war" on terror fell into the trap laid by Osama Bid Laden. For it is not a war that can be won through warfare. "Police Action Against Terrorists," while not as compelling from a rhetorical or strategic standpoint, has been shown to be the more effective strategy over time.

A history of the humankind told through the changing techniques of warfare and the key confrontations marking these shifts, written with verve, psychological and anthropological acuity, WAR is a valuable exploration of this most uncivil custom. Dyer sees evidence of and movement toward the restoration on an international level of the cooperation of early egalitarian societies. He suggests the spread of cross-cultural communication, which is opening a field for international debate (as evidenced in the massive worldwide anti-war protests against the invasion of Iraq), is restoring the possiblity of dialogue and a democracy of the multitude.