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The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State Kindle Edition
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Shane Harris
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherPenguin Books
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Publication dateJanuary 22, 2010
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Reading age18 years and up
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File size1340 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
-Booklist
"Harris displays an exquisite understanding of the intricacies of his topic and a remarkable sensitivity to the genuine concerns of the watchers and their critics.... A sharply written, wise analysis of the complex mashup of electronic sleuthing, law, policy and culture."
-Kirkus Reviews
"The Watchers reads like a thriller, and the story is sadly on the mark in describing our limited oversight of the government's surveillance powers. The nation needs to do better, and Harris' book is rich background to that task."
-Gregory F. Treverton, Director, Center for Global Risk and Security, RAND Corporation
"This is an astonishingly detailed, well-researched narrative. It tells the story of how, over the past two decades, U.S. officials developed the capability to put together massive amounts of information about any individual they choose to watch."
-James Mann, author of Rise of the Vulcans --This text refers to the paperback edition.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
This is a mistake, Erik Kleinsmith told himself as he stared at his computer screen. He’d been agonizing over his orders. He considered disobeying them. He could make copies of all the data, send them off in the mail before anyone knew what had happened. He could still delete all the copies on his hard drive, but the backups would be safe. No one could say they hadn’t tried, that they hadn’t warned people.
The earnest thirty-five-year-old army major had drawn attention to himself as the leader of an innovative, some said renegade, band of intelligence analysts. Working under the code name Able Danger, Kleinsmith’s team had compiled an enormous digital dossier on a terrorist outfit called Al Qaeda. By the spring of 2000, it totaled two and a half terabytes, equal to about one tenth of all printed pages in the Library of Congress. This was priceless information, but also an alarm—the intelligence showed that Al Qaeda had established a presence inside the United States, and signs pointed to an imminent attack.
While the graybeards of intelligence at the CIA and in the Pentagon had come up empty handed, the army wanted to find Al Qaeda’s leaders, to capture or kill them. Kleinsmith believed he could show them how. That’s where he ran into his present troubles. Rather than rely on classified intelligence databases, which were often scant on details and hopelessly fragmentary, Kleinsmith created his Al Qaeda map with data drawn from the Internet, home to a bounty of chatter and observations about terrorists and holy war. Few outside Kleinsmith’s chain of command knew what he had discovered about terrorists in America, what secrets he and his analysts had stored in their data banks. They also didn’t know that the team had collected information on thousands of American citizens—including prominent government officials and politicians— during their massive data sweeps. On the Internet, intelligence about enemies mingled with the names of innocents. Good guys and bad were all in the same mix, and there was as yet no good way to sort it all out.
Army lawyers had put him on notice: Under military regulations, Kleinsmith could store his intelligence only for ninety days. It contained references to U.S. persons, and so all of it had to go. Even the inadvertent capture of such information amounted to domestic spying. Kleinsmith could go to jail.
As he stared at his computer terminal, Kleinsmith’s stomach flipflopped at the thought of what he was about to do. This is terrible. He pulled up the relevant files on his hard drive and hit the delete key. The blueprint of global terrorism vanished into the ether.
--This text refers to the paperback edition.About the Author
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
From Booklist
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Product details
- ASIN : B0035IIBFA
- Publisher : Penguin Books (January 22, 2010)
- Publication date : January 22, 2010
- Language : English
- File size : 1340 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 430 pages
- Lending : Not Enabled
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- #95 in 1945 - Present History of the U.S.
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Top reviews from the United States
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The book begins with events in the Reagan Administration such as the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. These represented failings of both intelligence and policy. Although the various intelligence gathering agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and military agencies had acquired the raw intelligence that would be adequate to explain in retrospect how the authorities should have known about the impending disaster, they lacked the ability to coordinate their intelligence to put together a comprehensive picture and, most important, to act on what they knew.
Harris alludes only briefly to the history before Reagan. Briefly, Richard Nixon used government agencies to gather information to use against his enemies. These included the IRS, the FBI, and the CIA. There is a permanent interest group, centered on the political left and anchored by the ACLU, which believes that every citizen has the right to privacy, at best perfect anonymity, and the right to a lawyer under every circumstance. This group was led in the Senate by Frank Church of Idaho, not named in the book. Nixon's excesses provided them the opportunity to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 which confined the CIA to gathering intelligence only overseas, and only on noncitizens. This same leftish sentiment led the Senate to curtail funding for CIA operations in support of anti-Communist factions throughout the world, including those who fought against the USSR backed Sandinistas in Nicaragua. In brief, the majority in the U.S. Congress believe that right-wing oppressors such as the generals in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and elsewhere were more of a threat and less to be loved than left-wing oppressors such as the Sandinistas. The Cold War gave us our paradigm for assessing foreign threats, and within that paradigm the Senate majority felt comfortable reducing our capabilities.
The terrorist threat is of a different nature than the Cold War threat. Terrorism is a matter of small cells of people using conventional materials to wreak havoc on Western targets, often within Western societies. It required different techniques, especially data mining, to discern suspicious patterns among millions of transactions such as telephone calls, money transfers, credit card transactions and the like. It also required a generational change in outlook on privacy. Any reader of this review knows that a Google search is likely to reveal a vast amount of personal information. As "The Watchers" documents, before 9/11, collecting any such data gathered on a citizen, even though it came from public sources, was taboo unless surveillance of that person had been authorized by a judge under something like a wiretap order. In one specific instance in this book, in the year before 9/11 the Army was ordered to destroy a huge database on Al Qaeda because it might compromise the privacy of American citizens. Harris' interviews wonder often if they might have connected the dots to prevent 9/11.
The book does a good job of chronicling the evolution of the surveillance and analysis technology since 9/11 as well as our attitude toward surveillance. The conclusion is that we have moved toward the British position, which is that surveillance is a necessary evil, preferable to being blindsided by terrorist attacks. The book gives the British credit for quickly deducing who was responsible for the London subway bombings, and primary credit for identifying the group of terrorists who intended to bring down tens of airliners simultaneously over the Atlantic with bombs fashioned from carry-on liquids. British immigrants, rather than universally appreciating their adopted country, often feel it to be oppressive sometimes loathe it enough that they are willing to blow it up. In a similar fashion, the Irish Republican Army used terror over the decades to make their points. The British citizen does not terribly mind being watched so long as the troublemakers are being equally watched. Americans are adopting this attitude.
Poindexter, Harris' hero, advocated composing a database in which personal data were encrypted in such a way that they would remain invisible until needed. In other words, you could ask a vast computer system to identify suspicious patterns of transactions, and only then, and only under some supervision, possibly even a court order, identify the individuals associated with those transactions. Harris is willing to leave this as an open question. Granted the need for widespread surveillance, why don't we impose a blind over it in order to protect individual privacy? Harris appears to think this is a good idea. I will offer an opinion as a database guy that doing something like this would primarily result in an unmanageable tangle. It would make it difficult to make associations that only people can intuitively make, such as between the Russian and Ukrainian or Arabic and Persian rendering of a name, or the knowledge that my telephone prefix 279 puts me in central Kiev. If the NSA were to attempt such a privacy filter, it would add to their data processing load, detract from their efficiency, and result in a large bureaucracy to administer the many exceptions. It is better to be honest and say that it can't be done, which brings up the second point, watching the watchers.
It is possible and desirable to watch the watchers. To use the same sort of intelligence gathering to determine how every person authorized to use the system is in fact using the system. The same sort of analytical tools can be used to determine whether an analyst is stalking a woman, showing inordinate interest in somebody's bank account, or doing something else untoward. What Harris suggests, though not in those words, is a kind of auditability. It is impossible for a stockholder or any federal agency to audit every transaction in a business. Audits are what keeps them honest. An auditor looks for suspicious patterns and tracks them, but also chooses totally unsuspicious transactions at random and investigates them thoroughly to make sure that they are legitimate. The government already has such an agency: the Government Accountability Office, or GAO. It would make sense to establish a similar sort of accounting office, with all the levels of security and compartmentalization required by this mission, to prevent Nixonian style abuses of power and freelance abuses by authorized users even as our intelligence organizations do the necessary work of keeping us safe.
Harris' conclusion does not leave much suspense. Both Bush and Obama come out looking pretty good. His take is that once they understood the issues, they did not have much choice but to leave the professionals to do their job. Bush took a lot of criticism from the old left for allowing the expansion of the surveillance state, but Obama has disappointed those who expected a change in policy. Harris' conclusion would be that the old views of privacy and anonymity are simply no longer tenable.
I will conclude in saying that this is a delightfully readable book. It is set in the form of a story, John Poindexter story, against the backdrop of the rising terrorist threat since the 1980s. Harris is certainly aware of the topics I raise here in the review, but probably chose to limit the material in his book in order that it might follow a storyline narrative. It does that well. It is both highly informative and easy to read. I look forward very much to his next book.
When it comes to the age-old debate between security and privacy, author Harris clearly leans to the latter. But give him credit for spinning a well-balanced book that focuses on the facts, avoiding obvious temptations to allow politics - on either side of the aisle - while laying out the challenges, obstacles, personalities, and stakes involved as the convoluted maze of US agencies and bureaus run over themselves in trying to prevent another 9/11 - or worse. I don't think I was reading too much between the lines to guess that Harris started out wanting to dislike Poindexter, but ended up respecting and even liking the man - the tragically flawed hero who has dedicated his life, in private and public endeavors, to keeping America safe - a mission he continues today. Along with Poindexter, the wide supporting cast is well drawn and unvarnished in their accomplishments and foibles while trying to find the bad guys and keep US citizens' privacy mostly intact.
Despite the bits and bytes of subject matter that could lead to a sleep-inducing yawner of a book, Harris tells a dramatic - even suspenseful - tale, spinning his narrative with rare insight into infamous events including the Achille Lauro hijacking, the Kobar Towers bombing, and of course 9/11. Going back to 1983 and Beruit, the theme is constant: lots of ability to collect "data," but when it comes to recognizing patterns and connecting the dots, technology deployed by the alphabet soup of supposed defense agencies is widely inadequate. Making matters worse, maddening bureaucracies of influential people - of both noble and ignoble intent - continually hamper serious attempts to upgrade our nation's defenses to state-of-the-art electronic surveillance, detection, and analysis.
In short, put this one on my "must read" list - the rare non-fiction book that takes a complex and difficult subject and makes it understandable and, despite the serious content, entertaining. It is a great primer in the utter inefficiencies and intolerable rivalries between competing federal bureaucracies, a terrific character study, and a highly illuminating history of spies and spy craft in the era beyond James Bond. A well written and timely book - highly recommended.
Top reviews from other countries
Wer aktuell die deutsche Presse verfolgt, und dann auf dieses Buch stößt, erwartet vielleicht eine extrem kritische oder gar anklagende Beschreibung des amerikanischen Überwachungsstaats. Das ist dieses Buch nicht. Das ist wichtig zu wissen. Es ist vielmehr eine geschichtliche Beschreibung und Erklärung, wie sich die Dinge seit der Iran Contra Affäre entwickelt haben. Diese Beschreibung ist neutral/kritisch würde ich sagen. Und sie ist sehr stark geprägt vom Blickwinkel Poindexters, für den der Autor eine gewisse Bewunderung verspürt.
Eine Empfehlung ist es in meinen Augen doch. Es zeigt sehr schön, wie es dazu kommen kann, dass ein solcher Überwachungsstaat entsteht. Und es zeigt auch, wie viele Kämpfe dabei ständig ausgefochten wurden.
In Summe muss ich sagen: Wer damals, also etwa 2010, dieses Buch gelesen hat, den können eigentlich die aktuellen Enthüllungen durch Edward Snowden nicht wirklich überraschen. Es war schon erstaunlich viel bekannt damals und auch kontrovers öffentlich in den USA diskutiert. Und das zeigt dieses Buch sehr schön.
Übrigens: sehr angenehm geschrieben!
Ouvrage très bien écrit et sérieux.







