- Paperback: 280 pages
- Publisher: Oxford University Press; Reprint edition (September 1, 2015)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 0190231467
- ISBN-13: 978-0190231460
- Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 0.5 x 6.1 inches
- Shipping Weight: 12.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
- Average Customer Review: 15 customer reviews
- Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #592,291 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
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Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam Reprint Edition
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"Daddis's book will compel many scholars to revisit their histories of Vietnam."--Daniel P. Murphy, Journal of American Culture
"Westmoreland's War...both rehabilitates Westmoreland's image and plants a stake in the heart of the distorted specter of him that has long haunted Vietnam War historiography. ... Backed by copious endnotes, Daddis demonstrates that contrary to legend Westmoreland developed an intelligent and comprehensive military strategy that was consistent with U.S. national policy and President Lyndon B. Johnson's larger political agenda....By demonstrating that the Army did try (not always successfully) to apply counterinsurgency doctrine and that this doctrine was insufficient to produce victory, Westmoreland's War directly challenges the unrealistic faith that some people have placed in counterinsurgency and nation building."--Army History Magazine
"[A] seminal work."--Army Magazine
"Westmoreland's War is an important book, and Gregory Daddis has provided a new and sophisticated look at the man many have blamed for America's defeat."--The VVA Veteran
"Westmoreland's War is truly a remarkable achievement. Daddis has vividly captured the complexities of Westmoreland's Vietnam strategy and the difficulties the U.S. faced in trying to implement it. Exhaustive in its research and breathtaking in its analysis, Daddis' book is now the standard for understanding the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam."--Robert K. Brigham, Vassar College
"In Westmoreland's War, one of the best historians of the Vietnam conflict deftly challenges a deeply encrusted cliché-that the U.S. forces failed in Vietnam because of the narrow-mindedness and ineptitude of the man who commanded them in the war's most important years. This boldly argued and convincing work of revisionism deserves the attention of any serious student of America's most controversial war."--Mark Atwood Lawrence, author of The Vietnam War: A Concise International History
"Westmoreland's War asks a question that should not startle but does: is it possible to have a sound military strategy and still lose a war? This is the question Gregory Daddis poses in his splendid history of the Vietnam War as it was fought by General William Westmoreland. The standard story of Westmoreland's failure turns out to be wrong in almost every particular, and Daddis' analysis of why and how it is wrong has major implications not only for our understanding of Vietnam, but also for how we can understand current U.S. military engagements. This is a book that must be read by anyone interested in the past, present, and future of America's wars."--Marilyn B. Young, New York University
About the Author
Gregory Daddis is Associate Professor History at Chapman University.
Top customer reviews
The book is a book really for the military professional. It isn't a tale of company after company slugging their way across rice patties. The author analysis how Westmoreland's policy came about. This is an excellent angle. You see the system created the policy as much as Westmoreland. One example of this is in the late 50s as much as 20% of Army officers were serving as advisors. Then as the book develops you see how Westmoreland tried to do things right. However getting his ideas implemented was something else. The theory of the MACV conference room somehow did not make it out to the rice patty. That is what Westmoreland had to wrestle with. Issues like how you measure success, how do you make operational and tactical sense of the big picture strategic picture. Things like body counts slip into the lexicon as almost by accident. Other issues like Asian culture, South Vietnam corruption further complicates things.
This book will really only appeal to the die hard or the military professional. That is why I did not give it five stars. I think anyone who reads this will find the issues they wrestle with then are the same issues people wrestle with in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. His last chapter really makes that clear. You see the difficulty of using military means to solve in a counterinsurgency what is a political problem.
Most recent customer reviews
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