
Amazon Prime Free Trial
FREE Delivery is available to Prime members. To join, select "Try Amazon Prime and start saving today with FREE Delivery" below the Add to Cart button and confirm your Prime free trial.
Amazon Prime members enjoy:- Cardmembers earn 5% Back at Amazon.com with a Prime Credit Card.
- Unlimited FREE Prime delivery
- Streaming of thousands of movies and TV shows with limited ads on Prime Video.
- A Kindle book to borrow for free each month - with no due dates
- Listen to over 2 million songs and hundreds of playlists
Important: Your credit card will NOT be charged when you start your free trial or if you cancel during the trial period. If you're happy with Amazon Prime, do nothing. At the end of the free trial, your membership will automatically upgrade to a monthly membership.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
On What Matters (2 Volume Set) 1st Edition
Purchase options and add-ons
- ISBN-100199265925
- ISBN-13978-0199265923
- Edition1st
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateJune 20, 2011
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions9.5 x 6.6 x 4.5 inches
- Print length1440 pages
Frequently bought together

Similar items that ship from close to you
Editorial Reviews
Review
Book Description
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Oxford University Press; 1st edition (June 20, 2011)
- Language : English
- Product Bundle : 1440 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0199265925
- ISBN-13 : 978-0199265923
- Item Weight : 4.9 pounds
- Dimensions : 9.5 x 6.6 x 4.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,487,523 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #498 in Ethics
- #957 in History of Philosophy
- #5,348 in Philosophy of Ethics & Morality
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read book recommendations and more.
Customer reviews
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star5 star78%10%11%0%0%78%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star4 star78%10%11%0%0%10%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star3 star78%10%11%0%0%11%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star2 star78%10%11%0%0%0%
- 5 star4 star3 star2 star1 star1 star78%10%11%0%0%0%
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonTop reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
- Reviewed in the United States on May 16, 2015I have now finished reading both volumes of this work from cover to cover. While the overall thesis concerning the confluence of rule consequentialism, Kantianism, and Contractualism is what seems to strike many commentators most strongly (both those whose commentary is included within the book and those who have commented elsewhere), I don't think that's even Parfit's most important achievement. Parfit's arguments in favor of normative objectivity, together with his extensive arguments against subjectivism, seem to me more important. This book is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in ethics. Although very clearly written, this is not a book for beginners. Some knowledge of analytic moral philosophy and the history of ethics since Kant is necessary if you want to follow his arguments closely and appreciate the magnitude of his result. (It's worth mentioning that the binding, while it does not seem to be sewn, has held up extremely well through my slow reading and marking of the entire book over several months.)
- Reviewed in the United States on February 12, 2013A very important book. Parfit's work is rightly very influential in modern philosophical studies of the nature of reasons for action and the nature of moral reasoning. The kindle version is an amazing bargain
- Reviewed in the United States on October 6, 2014extremely satisfied with everything, especially Amazon.com's new way of international shipping
- Reviewed in the United States on February 13, 2012In my opinion, both volumes are full of lucid, creative and well-reasoned arguments. If you're more interested in normative ethics than meta-ethics, then I highly recommend the first volume. There I believe Parfit successfully synthesizes the most plausible versions of Kantianism, Social Contract Theory and Consequentialism. According to this "Triple Theory", we should follow the principles that everyone could rationally will to be universally accepted, which would make things go best.
As in "Reasons and Persons", Parfit uses some imaginative thought-experiments to support his theory. However, I think that some of these scenarios are too far-fetched and under-described, rendering our intuitions about them unreliable. For example, in a case called Bridge: "your only way to save five [strangers] would be to open, by remote control, the trap-door on which I am standing, so that I would fall in front of the [runaway] train, thereby triggering its automatic brake." (Vol.1, p. 218) Allen Wood goes on a rant against philosophers' use of "Trolley Problems" like this in his memorable commentary in Volume 2.
In both volumes, Parfit raises several objections to Subjectivism about reasons. Its most prominent form says you only have a reason to do X if you would desire to do X after informed deliberation (knowing all the relevant facts). On the contrary, Parfit argues you have reasons to do some things, such as avoid agony, even if you wouldn't want to after such deliberation. Furthermore, unless our desires are grounded in some reason(s), they cannot in turn give us reasons to do things. So "Subjective theories are built on sand", he says. (Vol 1, p. 91) However, his Objective theory rests on an indefinable notion of a reason, as he admits on the first page.
On Parfit's view, reasons are provided to us by natural facts but are not identical to them. That is, they can't be reduced to natural properties the way that water is reduced to H2O, for example. Now you might be wondering: how can reasons and moral properties exist or be discovered if they are intangible and have no observable physical effects? Parfit answers these questions successfully, I believe, in the last third of Volume 2. Here's a gist of one argument by analogy: Just as there are intangible logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens), there are intangible moral rules, such as it's wrong to torture innocent children for fun. The latter should seem no more mysterious than the former.
All in all, I think Parfit presents his views with great clarity, ingenuity and determination. His arguments for the Triple Theory and Ethical Non-Naturalism have certainly grown on me. I found both volumes long but never tedious to read.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 13, 2016I had to order this twice to get it. The first time I did not get it and was not able to convince your system I was short changed.
It was a gift that cost me twice as much.
- Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 2015The quick review: If you want to join the debate over moral non-naturalism, you have to read On What Matters. At least, you have to read part one of the first volume and the naturalism chapter in Volume Two.
The long review: This is a work of staggering ambition and obsessive focus by a leading philosopher -- a tome that had the attention of ethicists long before it hit the shelves.
But should you buy it?
If you do moral philosophy for a living, yes. Duh. You don't need me to tell you that OWM touches on (and sometimes improves on) debates all across ethics, even where you might not expect it to. It's also reasonably priced and surprisingly fun to read. As Mark Schroeder writes in his review, there are gems scattered throughout the whole thing.
(But there are also plenty of lumps of coal—his view on the relation between reasons and rationality, his interpretation of Sidgwick's dualism, and his insistence that some things exist "in a non-ontological sense" are unfortunate, in my view. There's no room here to defend these potshots, but if you're interested you might check out Kiesewetter's "A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Rationality," Tom Hurka's book British Ethical Theorists From Sidgwick to Ewing, and [if you're feeling brave] Kit Fine's "The Question of Ontology.")
Still, Parfit has a knack for helpfully reframing debates; here's an example. Contractualists think that right actions are right because they fall under the principles that we would all agree to follow. But in what circumstances are we supposed to imagine this agreement taking place? Well, probably not any actual ones! If people in the real world all had to decide what principles to follow (supposing that no one gets to break them once they're chosen!), the decision process would be unfair: the game would be rigged in favor of the wealthy and powerful, who hold all of the bargaining chips and often aren't afraid to use them. (Imagine a kid and parent selfishly debating what principle to use to determine bedtime.)
So, contractualists have to imagine some hypothetical bargaining situation where the chips are more evenly distributed among everyone at the table. Parfit makes a nice point here: we want our method of distribution to be elegant. Yet some existing contractualist theories, like John Rawls's theory, aren't as elegant as they could be. Rawls (who was really only writing about principles of justice, not all moral principles) effectively says that we should imagine what principles we'd agree on if we didn't know who we are in certain respects, but were selfish and rational. To decide on the principles of charity, imagine what we'd all agree to if we didn't know how needy we are. To dedice principles of racial justice, imagine what we'd agree to if we didn't know our own races. This would make principles like "Let the rich do what they want" and "Judge MLK's children according to the color of their skin" unlikely to make the cut. After all, what kind of rational egoist would agree to a racist system without first making sure he or she's not a member of the mistreated race!
Here's Parfit's en passant insight: while Rawls gets the right results, his method looks artificial rather than elegant. We're asking a question--What principles would we all agree on?--that only works if we pretend that we're more ignorant than we really are, and that we're egoists rather than occasional altruists. We're gerrymandering the context where we answer the question instead of picking a question that gets us to the right results all by itself.
Parfit's "Kantian" Contractualism is supposed to give us such a question: what principles could we be okay with everyone following, if we were thinking reasonably? (Or in Parfit-speak: what are the principles whose universal acceptance we could all rationally will?) I don't agree with Parfit that this Kantian contractualism is the supreme principle of morality; I also disagree with much of his defense of it. But I thought the comparison between Kantian and Rawlsian contractualisms was fascinating, and it's just one incidental move in a grandmaster game.
That's a lot of smoke I'm blowing up this book's rear spine. Does that mean you should buy it even if you're not professionally obligated to? The answer is: probably, if you're okay with slogging through or skipping around a few parts.
In my opinion, Parfit's arguments are fairly charitable, his ideas always deep, and his prose clear and engaging--sometimes even moving. But there are large swatches of OWM that hardly anyone outside of academic ethics is going to want to slog through. Are you itching to know whether Bernard Williams had the concept of a normative reason? Does the debate about state-given vs. object-given reasons tickle your fancy? Do you find yourself ruminating late at night on whether the evidence-relative, belief-relative, and moral-belief-relative senses of "ought" can be defined in terms of the fact-relative sense?
You get the point.
Still, if you're interested in what moral philosophers are buzzing about these days, and you have some basic familiarity with the subject, you'll find plenty in here to reward the time you spend on it. The whole thing's meticulously organized, lovingly designed, and laboriously polished--it's no wonder he had an amnesia-inducing panic attack right before submitting the last draft. Fortunately, you don't have to read it as obsessively as Parfit wrote it. There are many self-contained discussions throughout, allowing you to dip into mini-essays on the golden rule, Kant's Groundwork, Sidgwick's practical dualism, and the origin of the universe, all at your leisure. It helps that you can take on any section of the book once you've read the first part, which covers reasons, rationality, and objectivity.
The bottom line: On What Matters is an deep, broad treatise on the questions that Parfit truly cares about. There are problems with the project, no doubt: the parts on rationality and senses of ought, as well as much of the metaethics, are facing trenchant resistance in philosophy departments worldwide (including mine!), and some feel like the project rests too heavily on its assumptions about normativity and rationality. Yet there's something amazing about this book. It's the product of so much heart and gray matter, I can never put it down without taking something away. If you want to know more about what matters and why, and don't mind a little slogging, my guess is that you'll get plenty out of On What Matters, too.
Top reviews from other countries
PropowspeReviewed in the United Kingdom on January 23, 20153.0 out of 5 stars Three Stars
haven't read it yet - will keep you updated.....
-
Philipp LeitoReviewed in Germany on November 13, 20125.0 out of 5 stars Nichts für Anfänger
Als allerstes, musss ich zugeben das ich noch nicht ganz durch bin, denn:
Dieses Werk ist wircklich nicht einfach zu verstehen, zu erstmal ist es keine einfache Sprache, und das sag nicht nur ich als jemand dessen Muttersprache nicht Englisch ist sondern auch viele Rezensionen von .com und .co.uk. Zweites Hinderniss ist das zumindest für mich Philosophie (noch) nur ein Hobby ist und einige Begriffe bedeuten in der (Englischen)Philosophie nunmal was anderes als uns (gewöhnliche) Übersetzungs Hilfen Weismachen wollen.
Trozdem halte ich das Buch für ziemlich Genial in seiner komplexen Argumentation, auch wenn man vielleicht nicht seiner Meinung ist so sollte man sich, sofern ein das Thema interessiert und man nicht all zu große Schwächen mit der Englischen Sprache hat, dieses Opus aufjedenfall anschaffen, UND LESEN auch wenn so ein dicker Wäzer vieleicht ganz gut im Regal aussieht so ist sein inhalt so vielmehr Wert.
Dieses Buch hat ein bisschen was von dem Spiel Demon/Dark Souls, man stolpert und fällt ein paar mal(oder auch ein paar mal öfter)aber schlussendlich ist es das doch Wert.
danialReviewed in Japan on February 15, 20143.0 out of 5 stars Not Fit to Keep Par with Kant and Sidgewick
I came into reading this book with high expectations that it was to be one of the most important statements on ethical theory since Sidgewick. Disappointingly, it never delivered. Parfit examines ethical theory by throwing example after example of moral situations at the reader. It's easy for the reader to get lost in these examples and lose sight of their relevance on the structure of a viable ethical theory. A more theoretical investigation of ethics would have been appreciated with examples used to illustrate or clarify theoretical claims would have been appreciated.
The conclusion that Parfit arrives at is also rather lame: the premier ethical theory is one that combines a hodgepodge of Kantian, Utilitarian and Contractarian elements. For the length of the book, I was expecting a bolder and more radical proposition for a viable ethical theory.





