White-Collar Government

The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making

The University of Chicago

Contents

CHAPTER 1

White-Collar Government

In 1971, a house painter from Providence named Edward Beard was electedto the Rhode Island state legislature. Beard's political prospects initiallyseemed uncertain: he had never held a public office before, and to makeends meet he had to continue working full time as a painter while servingin the state legislature. However, Beard was a determined politician, andhis down-to-earth style quickly earned him a loyal following in his largelyworking-class district. In 1974, he stunned the state's political establishmentby running for Congress and defeating an incumbent from his ownparty in a campaign that cost Beard just $900 and, in his words, "a hell ofa lot of work" (Siddon 1977, 2). The following January, Edward Beard quithis house painting job and was sworn into the United States Congress.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Congressman Beard—who had "never earnedmore than $9,800 a year [the equivalent of roughly $35,000 today] beforedrawing his congressional salary" (Stuart 1977)—spent much of his time inWashington promoting causes that he saw as important to the interests ofworking-class Americans. He consistently voted in support of prolabor legislation;during his first term, the AFL-CIO gave him a perfect score in its annualranking of legislators' voting records. By his second term, he had beenappointed chair of the House Committee on Education and Labor's Subcommitteeon Labor Standards. And in 1977, Beard founded the House'sfirst Blue Collar Caucus "to let people know that blue collar workers canbe in Congress ... [, that] Congress is not just for lawyers and professionalpeople" (Siddon 1977, 2).

The connection between Beard's humble background and his energeticpopulism was not lost on political observers, or on Beard himself. He kepta small paintbrush in his coat pocket and on the door of his congressionaloffice as a "symbol of who I am and where I'm from—the working people"(Associated Press 1980, J8). When asked why he founded the Blue CollarCaucus, Beard explained that "many of us experienced unemployment.Many of us know, from first-hand experience, what public works jobs mean.I shined shoes in Providence. I was a recipient of The Providence JournalSanta Claus Fund" (Tolchin 1977, 13A). Beard was also outspoken aboutthe importance of encouraging working-class Americans to play more of arole in government. "It is a real shame," he often told reporters, "that onlytwo percent of the members of Congress come from the majority of the voters"(Siddon 1977, 2).

Scholars have long recognized that people like Beard—people fromwhat we might call the working class—are rare in American political institutions,especially compared to their numbers in the nation as a whole. AsDonald R. Matthews (1985, 18) observed more than a quarter century ago,"almost everywhere legislators are better educated, possess higher-statusoccupations, and have more privileged backgrounds than the people they'represent.'" Whether this enduring feature of our political process has realconsequences, however, remains an open question. Although political observers,philosophers, and policy makers have expressed concerns about thesocial class makeup of our political institutions since the Founding, politicalscientists have done little more than speculate about the links betweenpolicy makers' class backgrounds—their past and present positions in oursociety's economic or status structures—and the conduct of government.Class-based differences in ordinary Americans' political views are well documented.So, too, are the connections between policy makers' choices andother personal characteristics such as their races and genders. For the pasthalf century, however, scholars of US politics have acted as though the socialclass divisions that we observe in political opinion surveys, in electionresults, and in everyday life somehow disappear in our policy-making institutions.

This book provides a long-overdue look at how inequalities in the socialclass makeup of American political institutions affect public policy in theUnited States. Using data on US legislatures, I explore how lawmakers fromdifferent classes make decisions about the economic issues that have historicallydivided Americans along social class lines, issues like taxes, businessregulations, and the social safety net. My analyses focus both on how legislatorsfrom different classes differ in office and on how these individual-leveldifferences influence collective outcomes—how the shortage of peoplefrom the working class and the sharp overrepresentation of white-collarprofessionals affect the economic policies our government enacts.

The findings reported in this book provide the first evidence that the unequalsocial class makeup of our political institutions affects who wins andwho loses in the policy-making process. Like ordinary Americans, lawmakersfrom different classes tend to think, vote, and advocate differently oneconomic issues. The numerical underrepresentation of the working classin our legislatures consequently skews economic policy making toward outcomesthat are more in line with what more privileged Americans want.

These long-standing realities of American political life have serious implicationsboth for contemporary debates about the government's role ineconomic affairs and for larger questions about policy making, representation,and political equality in the United States. Scholars, political observers,and those interested in reforming our system of government cannotafford to continue ignoring the fact that the working class is vastly underrepresentedin public office, that policies that affect Americans from all walksof life are made by a white-collar government.

What Is Class?

Societies tend to be organized or stratified along widely accepted economicand status dimensions. Some people are well off and well regarded. Othersare not. And most observers agree about which people are which. Scholarsrefer to groups of people who occupy comparable positions on these dimensionsas social classes. People in a given class tend to have similar interestsbecause of their similar places in society. Some recognize these commonbonds and consciously identify with their class. Others are driven by theirsocial endowments to adopt certain habits without giving much thought tohow their place in society influences their views and choices.

The dividing lines between social classes in most societies revolve aroundthe labor market, that is, how people earn a living. Broad divisions—likethose between the owner of a factory and her employees—are plainly apparent.Finer distinctions are, too. The CEO and the middle manager at alarge firm are both part of management, but they fall in different placeswithin that category. The foreman in a factory and the line worker he supervisesare both workers, but most observers would say that the line workerbelongs to a different (and slightly lower) rank or class. Occupations canbe categorized in many ways: by how much money they pay, how mucheducation they require, the amount of authority over others they entail, theamount of accountability to supervisors they demand, how prestigious theyare, or—perhaps most famously—their relationship to the means of production.Each of these attributes affects the people in a given line of work insome way (and may affect which people choose a given line of work). Eachtherefore has the potential to create the shared interests that make classes animportant feature of how societies work.

Of course, occupational differences are by no means the only dividinglines between social classes. A person's class is reflected in how she speaksand dresses, the kind of home she lives in, the kinds of recreational activitiesshe pursues, and a wide range of other characteristics. These attitudesand behaviors are an important part of the way class distinctions manifestin everyday life. In general, however, they are strongly associated with howpeople earn a living. People in similar lines of work lead similar kinds oflives.

Although Americans often dislike talking about class, social class divisionscolor many aspects of our lives. In the United States, a person's classis one of the best predictors of a variety of behaviors ranging from mattersof taste such as entertainment, art, and consumption (Holt 1998) to decisionsabout where to live (Lott 2002), whom to invite into our social circles(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), how to speak (Lamont 1992),and how to raise our children (Anyon 1996). Class predicts significant differencesin health outcomes (Carpiano, Link, and Phelan 2008) and incarcerationrates (Western and Pettit 2010). It creates material interests thatpit people from different classes against one another in a variety of settings(Wright 1997). And it affects how involved people are in civic life (Verba,Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 7), how they think about a wide range ofpolitical issues (Campbell et al. 1960, chap. 13; Hout 2008), and how theyvote on election day (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Hout, Manza,and Brooks 1995). We may not like talking about class, but it permeates justabout everything we do.

Including holding public office.

The Unequal Social Class Makeup of AmericanPolitical Institutions

By virtually any measure of class or social attainment, the average policymaker in the United States is vastly better off than the average citizen.The size of the social gap between citizens and their representatives variessomewhat across different political institutions and depends in part onhow exactly we measure class. In general, however, politicians tend to bedrawn overwhelmingly from the top strata of American society. Accordingto the 2000 census, roughly 65 percent of Americans were raised in familiesheaded by blue-collar workers (manual laborers or service industry workers),54 percent worked in blue-collar jobs themselves, and 73 percent ofpeople over age twenty-five did not have college degrees (Ruggles et al.2009). The latest Federal Reserve estimates suggest that the median networth of American families was $77,300 in 2010 (Bricker et al. 2012). Oneach of these measures, politicians in every level and branch of Americangovernment are considerably better off than the citizens they represent.

Historically, our presidents have been our most privileged leaders (Pessen1984). At least since the start of the twentieth century, no blue-collarworker has ever become president; every chief executive has been a formerbusiness owner, farm owner, lawyer, or skilled professional (CQ Press2008). Three-quarters of all presidents have had college degrees, and onlyone president in the last century (Harry Truman) did not. At least eightof the twelve postwar presidents have had a net worth equivalent to$1 million or more today when they took office (McIntyre, Sauter, and Allen2010). And although many of our presidents grew up in families of modestmeans—five of the twelve postwar presidents were raised by low-incomeor working-class parents—even by this measure, presidents significantlyoutrank ordinary Americans.

The story is essentially the same in the other branches of the federal government.Every seat on the Supreme Court is filled by a lawyer who graduatedfrom Harvard or Yale (Turley 2010). Millionaires currently make up a5–4 majority (New York Times 2010, A11), and only two justices (ClarenceThomas and Sonia Sotomayor) were raised by blue-collar workers.

Even members of Congress—the branch of the federal government oftentouted as most closely reflecting the nation's diversity—are vastly better offthan the people who elect them. Lawyers and business owners, who makeup approximately 10 percent of the population, comprise at least half ofboth chambers, whereas legislators from working-class jobs make up lessthan 2 percent of Congress. Almost every member today is a college graduate.Only 20 percent grew up in working-class homes. And the median networth of members of Congress is approximately $1.5 million (Center forResponsive Politics 2012), roughly nineteen times the median net worth ofAmerican families.

State and local officials tend to be slightly less privileged, but even inthese jurisdictions, most policy makers are considerably better off than thecitizens they represent. According to the most recent data available, blue-collarworkers make up just 3 percent of the average state legislature (NationalConference of State Legislatures 2011) and 9 percent of the averagecity council (International City/County Management Association 2001).Almost 75 percent of state lawmakers (Chronicle of Higher Education 2011)and 68 percent of city council members (ICMA 1991) have college degrees,fewer than in Congress but still far more than among the general public.There are no nationwide surveys of the financial resources and family backgroundsof state and local legislators, but there are signs that these measuresare likely skewed toward privilege as well: the median net worth of statelawmakers in Florida in 2008, for instance, was more than $700,000 (Kamand Smith 2008)—just shy of Congress's median net worth at that time.

These inequalities in the makeup of our political representatives evencross party lines. Between 1999 and 2008, the average Republican in Congresshad spent about 1 percent of his precongressional career in blue-collarjobs, and the average Democrat had spent about 2 percent, a statisticallynegligible difference. On some class measures, Democrats are closer thanRepublicans to the typical American: in the early 2000s, the average congressionalDemocrat had a significantly lower net worth (approximately$640,000) than the average Republican (just under $1 million). However,even on measures like this one, congressional Democrats are still closer totheir colleagues in the GOP than they are to the typical American family(which had a net worth of approximately $120,000 in the early 2000s).Republican politicians may be slightly more privileged, but both parties are,in a descriptive sense, the party of the well off.

Figure 1.1 summarizes how presidents, Supreme Court justices, membersof Congress, state legislators, city council members, and ordinary Americansrank on four common measures of social class: occupation (measured asthe percentage of individuals who worked in manual labor or service industryjobs), educational attainment (the percentage without college degrees),financial resources (the percentage who were not millionaires), and familybackground (the percentage who were raised by poor or working-classfamilies). Viewed this way, it is easy to see how the gap between politiciansand citizens varies across different class indicators and different politicalinstitutions. The most striking feature of figure 1.1, however, is how consistentlypolitical decision makers outrank ordinary Americans. Comparedto the average citizen, the average politician in each set of institutions wasat least 20 percentage points more likely to come from a white-collar (thatis, non-working-class) family and at least 40 percentage points more likelyto have a college degree, to come from a white-collar occupation, and tobe a millionaire. At every point in the policy-making process, people withsignificant social and economic advantages are running the show.

These imbalances are by no means recent developments. They havepersisted, moreover, even as other underrepresented groups have begun tobreak through the glass ceiling. Figure 1.2 plots the percentage of membersof Congress who served between 1901 and 1996 who were women, racialor ethnic minorities, and who were from the working class (that is, wholast worked as manual laborers, service industry workers, or union officialsbefore entering politics). Although women and minorities were still underrepresentedat the end of the twentieth century, both groups gained considerableground during the postwar period. In sharp contrast, working-classAmericans—who have made up more than 50 percent of the labor force forat least the last hundred years—have never made up more than 2 percentof Congress.

This long-standing feature of American political life isn't going anywhereany time soon, either. Data on the makeup of state and local legislatures—whichtend to foreshadow demographic changes in national offices—suggestthat, if anything, working-class representation may decline evenfurther in the short term. In state legislatures, for instance, women's representationskyrocketed from 8 percent to 24 percent between 1976 and2007, and the share of lawmakers who were black or Latino grew from 9 percentto 11 percent. During the same period, the share of state legislatorsfrom blue-collar jobs fell from 5 percent to 3 percent. The path to politicaloffice has always been difficult for the working class, and it doesn't seem tobe getting any easier.
(Continues...)Excerpted from White-Collar Government by NICHOLAS CARNES. Copyright © 2013 The University of Chicago. Excerpted by permission of The University of Chicago.
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