| ASIN | B000C4SXXA |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Public Affairs (September 30, 2004) |
| Language | English |
| Paperback | 220 pages |
| Item Weight | 10.4 ounces |
| Dimensions | 5.5 x 0.68 x 8.25 inches |
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Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire Paperback – Bargain Price, September 30, 2004
by
Wesley K. Clark
(Author)
| Wesley K. Clark (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
- Print length220 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPublic Affairs
- Publication dateSeptember 30, 2004
- Dimensions5.5 x 0.68 x 8.25 inches
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Hot Military General or Vice President? General Wesley Clark Explains The Middle East For All
Reviewed in the United States on October 10, 2015Verified Purchase
Wesley Clark is the master of logic and genius as he explains Iraq. Learn the inside mistakes. Wesley raises your level of understanding war games and war planning. This well rounded military genius and creative politician will show you the ropes of foreign policy and create a vision of America's path to success in the Middle East.
Reviewed in the United States on May 31, 2005
Verified Purchase
General Wesley Clark's opinion on current military matters and geostrategic situation is always important due to his vast professional experience and the extremely successful campaign he waged against Jugoslavia in 1999, as top commander of NATO forces. In this book he devotes 101 pages to the planning and the operational execution of the "Iraqi Freedom" (which is the best part of the book) supporting a thesis which I also had some weeks before the start of the operation, that US Army went into battle with inadequate forces, taking dangerous and unnecessary risks and creating many problems in the postwar Iraq. The next 60 pages are an analysis why the US engagement in Iraq was a flawed strategy which threatens to bog down and attrite the magnificent US Army and leave Al Qaeda free to regroup and mount its next deadly attack. Unfortunately the book was published shortly before the US 2004 elections, when Clark was a candidate for the Democrats and thus the last chapter which is labeled "Beyond Empire: A new America" covers 40 rather boring pages presenting a litany of the well known arguments about US moral superiority, the need for cooperation with the traditional European allies and a demonstration of financial knowledge which is a prerequisite for a presidential nominee. It would be far better if Clark had devoted these pages to his opinions about the US military transformation, recommending the best strategies regarding the problems with Iran and North Korea. If you want a short byt sound operational analysis of the war in Iraq, you'd better choose Thomas Donnelly's "Operatio Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment" despite its few shortcomings.
6 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on December 7, 2011
Verified Purchase
The book is on excellent conditions, so I recommend this seller. Thank you, because my husband is now reading it and he thinks that ir's an interesting book. The time it taked for arrive was very fast too.
Reviewed in the United States on October 13, 2003
Verified Purchase
Full of military directions and operations, most of which are dry and uninteresting. I wanted insight, I got none. Would he make a good president based upon his writing here? No!! He is a military man through and through and thinks the solution to problems can be solved with this type of narrow thinking. I was bored with the book after the first page, and it got worse as I read on. I do not recommend buying this book.
4 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on January 17, 2004
"Winning Modern Wars" is retired general and former Supreme Commander of NATO, Wesley Clark's examination of what constitutes modern wars and how to win them. Clark is also, of course, a former Democratic candidate for the presidency, but even if one assumes the worse about Clark's intentions in writing this book, his arguments are as powerfully relevant as they are intelligent and are worth examining in a neutral fashion.
Clark sets the stage for constructing his subsequent arguments by providing a detailed-and clearly loving-account of the American military's performance in Operation Iraqi Fiefdom. Those readers who are interested in military history and military science will find these pages extremely rewarding. In stark contrast to the abysmal, theme-driven war coverage provided by in-bed reporters, Clark provides an extremely lucid account of the successful Coalition military tactics and the reasoning behind them. Drawing on exponential technical advances and lessons learned since the First Gulf War, the American military was able to subdue Iraqi forces with far fewer troops and in considerably less time. Clark attributes this in large part to the "revolution in military affairs" that is essentially the product of several presidential administrations as well as an extremely flexible officer core that was able to rapidly adjust its tactics in the face of surprising new challenges on the battle field.
Having used the opening chapters to establish his own military credentials as well as his unquestionable support of American troops, Clark then prepares his epistolary attack against the Bush Regime by explaining how the War on Iraq was a needless diversion from America's arguably more important and certainly unfinished war on terrorism. In this section, Clark argues that Iraq has no significant connection to al Quaeda or to terrorist threats at home. Worse, yet, Clark argues, the war in Iraq, if anything is making the United States less stable and is providing a breeding ground for terrorism.
While readers might understandably treat these arguments with skepticism and wonder if they are part of Clark's presidential ambitions, they should consider the testimony of other experts. Under different circumstances both the CIA, and President Bush have publicly stated that Iraq had no significant relationship to al Quaeda and was not behind the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. (Bush subsequently reversed himself for political reasons by labeling Iraq the "central front of the war on terrorism" but he failed to explain this term in detail.) Furthermore, Visiting Professor Jeffery Record of the Army's prestigious War College wrote a report that criticized the war on Iraq as a flawed distraction from the more essential war on terror. Among other things, Record pointed out that rogue nations like Iraq-however dangerous they may be-can be subjected to deterrence because they are exposed to political and military retaliation, whereas because terrorist groups like al Quaeda are stateless, they are generally immune to military power. Finally, shortly after the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, leading terrorist expert, Jessica Stern stated that the war in Iraq had the dubious distinction of creating terrorists where none existed before. These experts and numerous others strongly reinforce Clark's argument that when seen in the context of the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of potentially catastrophic proportions.
Clark's next argument-really the heart of this book-is that modern wars require more than the obvious military success on the ground. In order to succeed, Clark argues, modern wars require detailed plans and funding for peace keeping operations long after the initial military phase ends. They also require international cooperation among powerful nations with shared security interests for two vital reasons: (1) to balance the staggering costs as the coalition did in the First Gulf War, and (2) to provide legitimacy. When a nation decides to "go it alone" as the Bush Regime opted to in the Iraq war, it risks bearing unsustainable costs and of becoming an international pariah. When even a nation as powerful as the United States becomes universally hated for its perceived imperial ambitions and arrogance, it becomes more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Clark concludes this book by arguing that there is a right way and a wrong way for the United States to operate as the dominant world power. Drawing on the works of thinkers like Joseph Nye Jr., Clark argues that prior to the disastrous foreign policy decisions of the Bush Regime, the United States operated very effectively as a "virtual empire". This means that the United States drew upon all of its reservoirs of strength including its economic leverage, its leadership role in universally respected institutions such as the United Nations, and the NATO military alliance, and its transparent but considerable "soft power" which includes the influences of its values, its institutions and its shared goals for universal public good in such areas as environmental preservation, the eradication of poverty, and global prosperity. In this context, Clark argues, military force is used exactly how every trained American officer knows it should be: as a last resort and with the full backing of as many allies as possible. By opting for an arguably flashy but more obsolete mode of traditional military imperial policy, Clark argues, the Bush Regime has essentially stripped the United States of many of the core components of its "virtual empire". In the process of doing this, it has considerably weakened the United States and rendered in less effective in prosecuting the war on terrorism or in meeting other global challenges.
Even if you are an ardent supporter of George W. Bush, you should read this book and seriously think about this guy's arguments. He's a decorated combat veteran with leadership experience and a clear understanding of the complex political and military web that constitutes modern war.
Of course it's easier to believe that Bush knows what he's doing when clearly he doesn't, but readers should overcome this primitive weakness and use their analytical capabilities even if it leads them to stark conclusions.
Perhaps it is for this reason that Clark concludes that the United States can meet its global challenges in the coming years-if it has the right leadership.
Clark sets the stage for constructing his subsequent arguments by providing a detailed-and clearly loving-account of the American military's performance in Operation Iraqi Fiefdom. Those readers who are interested in military history and military science will find these pages extremely rewarding. In stark contrast to the abysmal, theme-driven war coverage provided by in-bed reporters, Clark provides an extremely lucid account of the successful Coalition military tactics and the reasoning behind them. Drawing on exponential technical advances and lessons learned since the First Gulf War, the American military was able to subdue Iraqi forces with far fewer troops and in considerably less time. Clark attributes this in large part to the "revolution in military affairs" that is essentially the product of several presidential administrations as well as an extremely flexible officer core that was able to rapidly adjust its tactics in the face of surprising new challenges on the battle field.
Having used the opening chapters to establish his own military credentials as well as his unquestionable support of American troops, Clark then prepares his epistolary attack against the Bush Regime by explaining how the War on Iraq was a needless diversion from America's arguably more important and certainly unfinished war on terrorism. In this section, Clark argues that Iraq has no significant connection to al Quaeda or to terrorist threats at home. Worse, yet, Clark argues, the war in Iraq, if anything is making the United States less stable and is providing a breeding ground for terrorism.
While readers might understandably treat these arguments with skepticism and wonder if they are part of Clark's presidential ambitions, they should consider the testimony of other experts. Under different circumstances both the CIA, and President Bush have publicly stated that Iraq had no significant relationship to al Quaeda and was not behind the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. (Bush subsequently reversed himself for political reasons by labeling Iraq the "central front of the war on terrorism" but he failed to explain this term in detail.) Furthermore, Visiting Professor Jeffery Record of the Army's prestigious War College wrote a report that criticized the war on Iraq as a flawed distraction from the more essential war on terror. Among other things, Record pointed out that rogue nations like Iraq-however dangerous they may be-can be subjected to deterrence because they are exposed to political and military retaliation, whereas because terrorist groups like al Quaeda are stateless, they are generally immune to military power. Finally, shortly after the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, leading terrorist expert, Jessica Stern stated that the war in Iraq had the dubious distinction of creating terrorists where none existed before. These experts and numerous others strongly reinforce Clark's argument that when seen in the context of the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of potentially catastrophic proportions.
Clark's next argument-really the heart of this book-is that modern wars require more than the obvious military success on the ground. In order to succeed, Clark argues, modern wars require detailed plans and funding for peace keeping operations long after the initial military phase ends. They also require international cooperation among powerful nations with shared security interests for two vital reasons: (1) to balance the staggering costs as the coalition did in the First Gulf War, and (2) to provide legitimacy. When a nation decides to "go it alone" as the Bush Regime opted to in the Iraq war, it risks bearing unsustainable costs and of becoming an international pariah. When even a nation as powerful as the United States becomes universally hated for its perceived imperial ambitions and arrogance, it becomes more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Clark concludes this book by arguing that there is a right way and a wrong way for the United States to operate as the dominant world power. Drawing on the works of thinkers like Joseph Nye Jr., Clark argues that prior to the disastrous foreign policy decisions of the Bush Regime, the United States operated very effectively as a "virtual empire". This means that the United States drew upon all of its reservoirs of strength including its economic leverage, its leadership role in universally respected institutions such as the United Nations, and the NATO military alliance, and its transparent but considerable "soft power" which includes the influences of its values, its institutions and its shared goals for universal public good in such areas as environmental preservation, the eradication of poverty, and global prosperity. In this context, Clark argues, military force is used exactly how every trained American officer knows it should be: as a last resort and with the full backing of as many allies as possible. By opting for an arguably flashy but more obsolete mode of traditional military imperial policy, Clark argues, the Bush Regime has essentially stripped the United States of many of the core components of its "virtual empire". In the process of doing this, it has considerably weakened the United States and rendered in less effective in prosecuting the war on terrorism or in meeting other global challenges.
Even if you are an ardent supporter of George W. Bush, you should read this book and seriously think about this guy's arguments. He's a decorated combat veteran with leadership experience and a clear understanding of the complex political and military web that constitutes modern war.
Of course it's easier to believe that Bush knows what he's doing when clearly he doesn't, but readers should overcome this primitive weakness and use their analytical capabilities even if it leads them to stark conclusions.
Perhaps it is for this reason that Clark concludes that the United States can meet its global challenges in the coming years-if it has the right leadership.
4 people found this helpful
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