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World Order Paperback – September 1, 2015
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Henry Kissinger
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Print length432 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherPenguin Books
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Publication dateSeptember 1, 2015
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Reading age18 years and up
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Dimensions1 x 5.4 x 8.4 inches
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ISBN-100143127713
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ISBN-13978-0143127710
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Henry Kissinger’s new book, World Order, could not be more timely . . . the book puts the problems of today’s world and America’s role in that increasingly interconnected and increasingly riven world into useful—and often illuminating—context . . . Mr. Kissinger, now 91, strides briskly from century to century, continent to continent, examining the alliances and divisions that have defined Europe over the centuries, the fallout from the disintegration of nation-states like Syria and Iraq, and China’s developing relationship with the rest of Asia and the West. At its best, his writing functions like a powerful zoom lens, opening out to give us a panoramic appreciation of larger historical trends and patterns, then zeroing in on small details and anecdotes that vividly illustrate his theories." —Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times
“Kissinger’s conclusion deserves to be read and understood by all candidates ahead of the 2016 presidential election. World order depends on it.” —The Financial Times
“If you think America is doing just fine, then skip ahead to the poetry reviews. If, however, you worry about a globe spinning out of control, then World Order is for you. It brings together history, geography, modern politics and no small amount of passion. Yes, passion, for this is a cri de Coeur, from a famous skeptic, a warning to future generations from an old man steeped in the past . . . it is a book that every member of Congress should be locked in a room with—and forced to read before taking the oath of office." —John Micklethwait, The New York Times Book Review
"Recent years have not been kind to those who believe in America's missionary role abroad. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001 upended our sense of the world, the United States has been governed by a conservative idealist who tried to impose American values on the Middle East, and failed calamitously, and a liberal idealist who invited America's adversaries to re-engage with us on the basis of a new humility and mutual respect, and found his hopes dashed. It is, in short, a moment for Henry Kissinger . . . The fact that he has written yet another book, the succinctly titled World Order, is impressive in itself. What is more remarkable is that it effectively carries on his campaign to undermine the romantic pieties of left and right that have shaped so much of American foreign policy over the past century. Mr. Kissinger bids fair to outlast many of the people who hate him and make others forget why they hated him in the first place." —James Traub, The Wall Street Journal
“Kissinger’s book takes us on a dazzling and instructive global tour of the quest for order. . . . The key to Kissinger’s foreign policy realism, and the theme at the heart of his magisterial new book, is that such humility is important not just for people but also for nations, even the U.S. Making progress toward a world order based on 'individual dignity and participatory governance' is a lofty ideal, he notes. 'But progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of intermediate stages.'” —Walter Isaacson, Time
"Kissinger's geopolitical analysis of our global challenges is compelling . . . Mark Twain, who was known more for his sense of humor than his diplomatic skills, once said, 'History does not repeat itself. But it rhymes.' Kissinger's advice is not nearly as glib, but much more valuable to a country that right now seems to want the rest of the world to just go away." —The Los Angeles Times
"Kissinger . . . demonstrates why he remains such a courted adviser to American presidents and foreign leaders alike. . . . [World Order is] a guide for the perplexed, a manifesto for reordering America’s approach to the rest of the globe. Kissinger’s vision could help to shape a more tranquil era than the one that has emerged so far.” —Jacob Heilbrunn, The National Interest
"An astute analysis that illuminates many of today's critical international issues." —Kirkus Reviews
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Question of World Order
IN 1961, as a young academic, I called on President Harry S. Truman when I found myself in Kansas City delivering a speech. To the question of what in his presidency had made him most proud, Truman replied, “That we totally defeated our enemies and then brought them back to the community of nations. I would like to think that only America would have done this.” Conscious of America’s vast power, Truman took pride above all in its humane and democratic values. He wanted to be remembered not so much for America’s victories as for its conciliations.
All of Truman’s successors have followed some version of this narrative and have taken pride in similar attributes of the American experience. And for most of this period, the community of nations that they aimed to uphold reflected an American consensus—an inexorably expanding cooperative order of states observing common rules and norms, embracing liberal economic systems, forswearing territorial conquest, respecting national sovereignty, and adopting participatory and democratic systems of governance. American presidents of both parties have continued to urge other governments, often with great vehemence and eloquence, to embrace the preservation and enhancement of human rights. In many instances, the defense of these values by the United States and its allies has ushered in important changes in the human condition.
Yet today this “rules-based” system faces challenges. The frequent exhortations for countries to “do their fair share,” play by “twenty-first-century rules,” or be “responsible stakeholders” in a common system reflect the fact that there is no shared definition of the system or understanding of what a “fair” contribution would be. Outside the Western world, regions that have played a minimal role in these rules’ original formulation question their validity in their present form and have made clear that they would work to modify them. Thus while “the international community” is invoked perhaps more insistently now than in any other era, it presents no clear or agreed set of goals, methods, or limits.
Our age is insistently, at times almost desperately, in pursuit of a concept of world order. Chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented interdependence: in the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the disintegration of states, the impact of environmental depredations, the persistence of genocidal practices, and the spread of new technologies threatening to drive conflict beyond human control or comprehension. New methods of accessing and communicating information unite regions as never before and project events globally—but in a manner that inhibits reflection, demanding of leaders that they register instantaneous reactions in a form expressible in slogans. Are we facing a period in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the future?
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Product details
- Publisher : Penguin Books; Reprint edition (September 1, 2015)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 432 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0143127713
- ISBN-13 : 978-0143127710
- Reading age : 18 years and up
- Item Weight : 12.8 ounces
- Dimensions : 1 x 5.4 x 8.4 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#82,916 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #52 in Chinese Biographies
- #126 in National & International Security (Books)
- #573 in History & Theory of Politics
- Customer Reviews:
Customer reviews
Top reviews from the United States
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Kissinger is no historian, yet he skips happily through major historical events while missing all the nuances and subtleties, apparently to prove his thesis. Cherry-picking a few facts here and there might be ok for political rhetoric, but it is unacceptable as real scholarship. I would NEVER assign this book to my students.
Without being too long, the book surveys the history of historical political orders in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South America and Europe both Eastern and Western. He pays particular attention to the European "Peace of Westphalia" following the 30-years war in 1648. There is a theme here. Though there have been many European wars (and revolutions) since the 17th century they all occurred in a Westphalian context. Sometimes the context is respected, and sometimes violated, but even in the latter case, the peace process following the wars has either returned to a Wesphalian context and been, at least for a substantial time, successful in preserving the peace, or it ignored and violated that context leading rapidly to another war. The Marshall Plan following WWII an example of a return to Westphalian principles also the preservation of the French State after the depredations of Napoleon. By contrast, in contravention of those principles, French and English retribution against Germany following WWI resulted rather rapidly in WWII.
Kissinger's focus on Westphalia sets up the problems he sees with Europe's and America's relation to the rest of the world. From the Western vantage point we look out on a world of nation-states and think to ourselves that as different as Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa might be, they all, in the end, want to preserve their statehood in relation to other states. One of Kissinger's observations is that this is not at all the case. China for example sees itself as the premier culture on Earth and lives within the present Westphalian system of nations for reasons of practical accommodation. The Middle East, and by extension the whole of the Islamic World, sees itself as the only legitimate and righteous inheritor of the entire world order!
In Islam the Westphalian matrix is the most jumbled with nations like Saudi Arabia and Iran accommodating it for practical reasons, while others, particularly non-state actors, try actively to undermine it leaving thousands dead in their wake. Sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa) is yet another story. The nations there are the result of recently (20th century) abandoned colonialism and though nominally nations, are riddled with leadership interested in little more than their own personal aggrandizement. Failed or failing states cannot participate coherently in such world order as presently exists let alone contribute to something better.
Kissinger's first main point is that it is a mistake to continue treating with these nations AS IF they implicitly accepted the Westphalian context of nation states all "getting along". This doesn't mean we can stop working with these nations, but we have to be smarter about it and stop assuming they want merely to be like the Western world. Kissinger's other main point is that technology, the global issues it has already wrought (climate change for example), and the issues that have yet to fully manifest (mostly related to computers and biology), are stressing the existing system to a degree unparalleled in history. One is left with the impression that it is already too late. The existing "world order" has already become too inflexible, its momentum too great, to apply, and ENFORCE, global solutions to global issues. Kissinger doesn't say disaster is inevitable, but I do not see how any other conclusion is possible.
In roughly the middle of the book Kissinger spends some time on the global effect of U.S. foreign policy from Theodore Roosevelt to Barrack Obama. He makes a number of observations here about the difference between the historical U.S. approach to foreign policy versus European statecraft, and notes of course that the foreign policy pendulum in the United States has shifted from episodic engagement to continuous engagement following the second world war. The force of U.S. engagement is derived from both economic and military power and importantly our willingness to use the latter now and then, though as it turns out mostly with inconclusive results.
I notice he elides his own personal involvement in what might be termed "nations behaving badly" back in the 1970s and 1980s, but aside from this lacuna his point, his final point in the whole book, is that whatever else it does, the United States cannot now withdraw from the world order, even such as it is, without destabilizing everything! This book was written in 2014 the middle of Obama's second term. I wonder what he thinks now?
Top reviews from other countries
The orientation of the book is centred at the US. All the materials included are to understand the context of the US role in the world scene and its dilemma. Therefore the book does give a good introduction to as well as summary of the political situations in different regions. The author’s knowledge is broad, no doubt from the vintage of the position he served at the US government.
Historical events may be objective but the politics perhaps is not. As I closed the book, I was left with a strong sense that this is the US perspective. Viewing from countries of totally different background and position, the reading of the same events would be very different. The US participation in the world order in the 20th century has been portrayed as selfless based on principles and idealism. The glimpse of the Federalist Papers that it provides is refreshing. The political rhetoric coming out of the Trump administration seems to have departed from the US idealism and turned to national interests as the basis of foreign policy? The chapter on modern technology in changing politics surely stretches our minds and heightens our alertness of its potential sway on our politics. Sadly the direction of its influence is not encouraging and it is likely that we end up with much poorer leadership and statesmanship to our shared loss.
One must write from a perspective, so I guess the US-centric perspective is not a fault. Accepting that, the book lands us in a good grip of the evolution of the US foreign policy and the challenges it faces. As the US is a dominant player in the world scene, it is still a significant part of the story, even though at the back of our minds we may doubt if the actions really matched the motives they proclaimed.
It is very current as well, including the situations unfolding in the middle east up until the time of publication, with prescient comments and analysis.
The main negative, especially if trying to use the book as a reference work, is the unusual configuration of the notes; they are all at the back of the book, with no indication in the text that there is a note relevant to it. Most odd, and surely a failing of Penguin to let it out like this?
America begins to flex its muscles on the world stage in the 20th century and, at least in Kissinger's view, attempts to bias world affairs in the direction of disinterested human rights, freedom from tyranny etc. The US world vision set itself above the pragmatic power politics which had disastrously characterised recent European history.
After WWII, world domination fell to the USA and Russia. The book relates how the modern American presidents, super-statesmen to a man in the text, managed to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt with the SALT treaty and also succeeded in ruining the Russian economy by devising ever more expensive defence projects.
The growth of China, Israel's problems and the lack of stability in the Middle East all get in-depth analysis while Islam also gets a whole chapter, tracing its opportunist and expansionist history back to its sixth century origin. The effects of computer and internet technology and cyber-warfare on world stability form the final chapters of the book. Kissinger thinks that international treaties are needed to curb their, as yet barely understood, influences.
Not a particularly easy read due to the amount of factual information but consistently fluent and an attempt to bring some transparency and even predictability to an otherwise rather random catalogue of world events.(such as lesser historians sometimes churn out). It worked for me anyway.
For seasoned scholars of International Relations, World Order offers little new, however, it does synergise all the contemporary issues of today's world into one very readable volume.
Dr Kissinger begins with an explanation of the Peace of Westphalia, which forms the backbone of the book. Also examined are the Islamist challenge to the Westphalian world order, an examination of the current issues regarding Iran, contemporary perspectives from China, and the impact of technology.
Overall, a very readable work, and a decent introduction to international relations for the uninitiated, and a decent refresher for those already familiar with the field.















