Buying Options
| Digital List Price: | $19.99 |
| Print List Price: | $24.95 |
| Kindle Price: | $2.99 Save $21.96 (88%) |
Your Memberships & Subscriptions
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle Cloud Reader.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency Kindle Edition
In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda.
Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan.
“Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherThe New Press
- Publication dateMarch 3, 2015
- File size639 KB
![]() |
Customers who bought this item also bought
Editorial Reviews
Review
―Andrew J. Bacevich, author of Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country
"Colonel Gentile asks us to confront some blisteringly urgent questions. Have COIN tactics ever worked the military magic their proponents claim? Or have they merely provided cover for beating exits from wars that never should have been fought in the first place? . . . Wrong Turn deserves a wide readership by all who must make these supremely important strategy decisions―as well as those who will live with the consequences."
―David M. Kennedy, professor of history, Stanford University, and editor of The Modern American Military
"Counterinsurgency rises over and over again from the ashes of defeat. It is Gian Gentile's ambition to 'drive a stake through its heart,' and in Wrong Turn he has succeeded―brilliantly."
―Marilyn Young, professor of history, New York University
"A brilliant and persuasive book . . . offers by far the most convincing explanation extant of why America has not succeeded recently with COIN.”
―Sir Colin Gray, professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading
"A lively, provocative and readable book . . . never misses its mark."
―Hew Strachan
"Based on his personal experience in Baghdad as well as some fine historical scholarship, Colonel Gentile takes aim at America's current COIN doctrines and shows how ineffective they really are. An exceptionally courageous book, clearly and forcibly written."
―Martin van Creveld, author of The Transformation of War
"Gentile finds the common flaw in our failed strategy as evidenced in our last three military misadventures. . . . We did not lose the Vietnam War―it was never ours to win. Is Afghanistan becoming a repeat performance?"
―Volney Warner, General (Ret), U.S. Army
"How I wish we'd had this telling critique of counterinsurgency warfare before Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It would have been far harder to make those tragic mistakes. A must-read for our national security experts, and U.S. citizens."
―Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former columnist for the New York Times
--This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
About the Author
--This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
Product details
- ASIN : B00B6TZKCC
- Publisher : The New Press (March 3, 2015)
- Publication date : March 3, 2015
- Language : English
- File size : 639 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 207 pages
- Page numbers source ISBN : 1595588744
- Lending : Enabled
- Best Sellers Rank: #609,418 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #102 in Military Policy (Kindle Store)
- #161 in Afghan War History
- #328 in Military Policy (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonTop reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
His son ignored that, and his admin openly admitted they would create more terrorists in invading Iraq.
And of course, it was pointed out no one has lasted fighting in Afghanistan.
Low and behold, we ended up losing both wars as this book and at least one other point out.
In fact, we've essentially lost every war since WWII, unless you count Panama, Grenada or Haiti. Or unless you count the goal as creating failed states or more terrorism.
In any case, this book brings up the problems involved in trying to nation-building, some the Bush Sr admin admitted would take years if not decades.
It would be easy to dismiss this book as the personal axe ground by a combat commander in Iraq; certainly, Col. Gentile's experience had to have been formative and influential on his views. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the book are well supported by historical evidence. To be honest, I thought Gentile's approach was perhaps overly guarded against reliance on his personal experience. As a student of history myself, I would have appreciated greater depth from him as a primary source, but I understand his instincts in avoiding over-reliance on his personal experience.
The book reads, quite honestly, as an extended tribute to Santayana, noting in tragic prose our repeated failure to learn the lessons of history. For all the popular comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam, Gentile highlights the fact that the most obvious and important one is often overlooked - the "victory" narrative that confuses tactical with strategic victory. Of course our troops - in Vietnam and in Iraq - performed valiantly. But to what end?
Read this book for the history - you will learn a great deal. Apply it though, not only to your understanding of war, but to your view of politics. Too often, we subscribe to the "great man" view of history, warfare and politics. This oversimplification, a Col. Gentile demonstrates, can blind us to the truth that lies apparent before us.
This book is not an indictment or accusation towards anybody. It is history, unfiltered. Be open enough to learn from it.
It is an important book, especially now that we might see a return of American conventional, general purpose forces to the region formerly known as Syria and Iraq, all while still trudging along with the never-ending crisis of Afghanistan (in which the original motivation to send troops there seems to have been completely forgotten and replaced by a maniacal, cult-like embrace of nation-building).













