Buy new:
$39.14$39.14
Arrives:
Monday, July 24
Ships from: Amazon.com Sold by: Amazon.com
Buy used: $35.23
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
The Fall of the Celtic Tiger: Ireland and the Euro Debt Crisis Updated ed. Edition
| Price | New from | Used from |
Purchase options and add-ons
This book examines how the Celtic Tiger, a high growth performing economy, fell into a macroeconomic abyss. It is a story that shows how the Irish economy moved from a property market crisis to a banking crisis and fiscal crisis, and how these three crises produced a fourth crisis, the massive financial crisis of 2010. Against the backdrop of the newly created Eurozone, the book demonstrates the way in which a housing boom was transformed into a property market bubble through excessive credit creation. Accompanying the property market bubble buoyant property related taxes enabled a profligate government to over spend and under tax. Few, both in Ireland or Europe, recognised the danger signals because the prevailing economic ideology suggested that financial markets could self-regulate.
The book analyses the roles of banks, builders, developers, regulators (the EU, the ECB, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Irish Financial Regulator), economists, the media, and a property driven populace during the various unfolding stages of the downfall of the Celtic Tiger. It pays particular attention to the decisions to provide a highly controversial comprehensive guarantee for the covered Irish banks and the events that left the government with no alternative but to request a bail out. It considers throughout two questions: who or what was responsible for what happened and in what sense? Could actions have been taken at various stages to prevent the final recourse to the bail out? Finally, the book addresses the future of the Celtic Tiger and discusses the impact of measures to help resolve the current Euro debt crisis as well as the underlying lessons to be learned from this traumatic period in Ireland's economic and financial history.
- ISBN-100198719965
- ISBN-13978-0198719960
- EditionUpdated ed.
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Publication dateSeptember 10, 2014
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions9.1 x 0.6 x 6 inches
- Print length352 pages
Customers who bought this item also bought
Editorial Reviews
Review
"An excellent guide to the demise of the Celtic Tiger." --The Financial Times
"A fascinating book...an accessible, balanced and independent analysis." --Sunday Business Post
"Required reading." --Irish Independent
"Donovan and Murphy represent the strength and breadth of contemporary Irish economics. Donovan is an experienced technocrat, a veteran IMF staffer with scars from many financial crises to prove it. Murphy is a distinguished economic historian, as well as one of the world's leading authorities on the history of monetary thought. The great virtue of their book is that it does not flinch from asking the question that has been uppermost in the general public's mind from the start but that has proved mysteriously elusive inmost official discussion: who or what, at root, was responsible for the crisis? It is in addressing this crucial question that Donovan and Murphy make their most valuable contribution. The answer to what caused the Irish crisis, they argue, is to be found not at the level of vested interests but at the level of ideas." --The New Statesman
"...this book is the best so far on the Irish financial crisis of 2008." --Foreign Affairs
About the Author
Donal Donovan is a Member of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, Adjunct Professor at the University of Limerick, and Visiting Lecturer at Trinity College Dublin. He is a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund with considerable experience in the area of financial crises. He has advised in the preparation of two major reports on the Irish financial crisis. He is a member of the newly appointed Fiscal Advisory Council of Ireland.
Antoin E. Murphy is Professor Emeritus of Trinity College Dublin. He is the author of three books published by Oxford University Press. He is an expert in the area of the history of economic thought and has a deep historical knowledge on asset market bubbles and financial crises.
Product details
- Publisher : Oxford University Press; Updated ed. edition (September 10, 2014)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 352 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0198719965
- ISBN-13 : 978-0198719960
- Item Weight : 1.12 pounds
- Dimensions : 9.1 x 0.6 x 6 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #3,853,995 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #709 in Macroeconomics (Books)
- #2,208 in Business Finance
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Not everyone in Ireland will welcome this book, as it punctures a number of comfortable myths that would blame the disaster on "others", such as the foreigners who supposedly "forced money on" the country. But anyone with a serious interest in Ireland's political and economic future ought to read the book and think seriously about its critique of the way policy-making is done in Dublin.
Top reviews from other countries
Political and economic commentary on the economic crisis has been warped by the political point-scoring that is endemic to Irish politics and media practice. The Fine Gael and Labour parties, together with the mainstream media, have been content to blame Fianna Fáil and to suggest that it's all a result of a greedy nexus between builders, developers, bankers and politicians happy to turn a blind eye to their cronies' excesses.
Conveniently ignored in this analysis is the fact that the banks have always had a much closer relationship with Fine Gael. Indeed, AIB provided Fine Gael with two attorneys general, Dermot Gleeson and Peter Sutherland, and another AIB luminary, Lochlann Quinn is a brother of Labour minister Ruairí Quinn.
Fianna Fáil, for their part, while admitting generalised mistakes, have pointed to the global nature of the crisis, as if they were passive and helpless onlookers at someone else's traffic accident.
This book, then, by a former IMF official and a Trinity professor of economics is a welcome antidote to much of the blame-laden rubbish that passes for economic comment.
The book does not exonerate the politicians' culpability, but points out that the pressures on Fianna Fáil from Fine Gael and Labour during the Celtic Tiger years were for lower taxes and higher spending. And it also shows that the philosophy of light-touch regulation, which originated with Milton Friedman, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, indeed dominated the world's financial markets.
Given this emphasis it is somewhat surprising that there is no analysis of the Canadian situation where old-style financial regulation was maintained and whose banks largely escaped the crisis.
It is also surprising that in its analysis of the 2007 election, where the major parties vied with each other for lower taxes and higher spending it ignores the fact that Sinn Féin was the only party to buck the trend, though it eventually bottled out and dropped its call for higher taxes on the rich.
The book indeed, while fresh and evidence- rather than prejudice-based, accepts the major context of capitalist economics. There is, for the authors, no salvation outside the orthodox canon.
Perhaps this explains why Iceland's alternative - burning the bondholders and giving two fingers to the European Establishment - is not deemed worthy of discussion either.
And if the parameters of rational options are those of orthodox economics then the authors are right to argue that there was no rational alternative to the infamous bank guarantee, as the alternative would have been a collapse of the Irish, and by contagion European, banking systems.
But if Irish money had been poured into a state bank from the start, with an emphasis on lending to indigenous companies that could create employment, then, like Iceland, we would probably be out of the crisis, austerity would be an idea of the past, and we could have avoided the unemployment and emigration catastrophes to which we have been subjected.
Such an approach, of course, would have necessitated leaving the Euro - and might well have led to a complete break up of that system. This would have been bad news for the money men and women in Ireland and throughout Europe, but Donovan and Murphy don't bother to argue this point: they just accept it as beyond discussion.
This lack of discussion naturally leads to some very thin conclusions. Thus, while the book convincingly debunks the blame game theories of most commentators, it proposes no way forward whatever except a hope that the Euro system will get its act together and that perhaps a moderating of austerity might make life easier.
To this extent the book follows the growing concerns of the IMF itself that the European institutions have been too rigid in their approach to Europe's crisis, but the prescription of slightly moderating the approach while pushing full-steam ahead on further European integration lacks credibility.
Nevertheless, while the discerning reader will be left somewhat dissatisfied after reading this book, it is still refreshing to read a serious analysis that does not get bogged down in the stupidity that there is something unique about Ireland's "crony capitalism".
Business everywhere is done as much on the golf course as in the boardroom, and nothing in Ireland can compare to England's public school nexus.
Our problem is that our political leaders, and economic commentators, have been unable to think outside the box, and the authors of this book alas are no exception.
734 words
