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Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Modern War Studies) Paperback – Illustrated, May 15, 1998
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Germany’s surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world’s largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.
Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West—including combat records of early engagements—David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns—and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov’s controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.
Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army’s command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war’s initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.
At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz’s book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union’s readiness—and willingness—to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.
- Print length392 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherUniversity Press of Kansas
- Publication dateMay 15, 1998
- Dimensions5.75 x 0.75 x 8.75 inches
- ISBN-103442246725
- ISBN-13978-0700617890
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- Reviewed in the United States on January 21, 2023COL Glantz's book highlight the gross lack of readiness that plagued the Red Army in the prelude to and during the First Period of War in the Second World War's Eastern Front. This is a must for modern war historians and military professionals to read as it does a superb job of highlighting the importance of many military nuances that history buffs and non-military background professionals take for granted, such as force readiness and design, training and education, command and staff roles and responsibilities, talent management, and war and operational planning to name a few. The Red Army under a totalitarian regime and ideology would learn from its mistakes in a rutless bloodletting that would scar its ranks throughout the entire conflict.
- Reviewed in the United States on December 28, 2016The maps of Corps/Armies deployments are worth their weight in gold. There is great detail on the make up of each Tank Division with level of training for the crews. You can't ask for a better book for status of the Red Army before Barbarrossa.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 2, 2022good book
- Reviewed in the United States on September 27, 2000Stumbling Colossus is a examination of the Red Army on the Eve of Operation Barbarossa. The books examines the Red Army and looks at the prepardeness for war and the prepartations being made for action against the Germans. The book looks at the largest army in the world and takes a pentrating look at the flaws in the system. We see why the Soviets were able to survive the disasters of the begining of the war and the causes behind some of these disasters.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 8, 2002In STUMBLING COLOSSUS, David Glantz captures a moment in time critical in understanding how the world wound up the way it did. From the time that Stalin became undisputed leader of the Soviet Union as First Secretary, his singular goal was the exportation of communism as the world's sole political system. During the late 1920's through the late 1930's Stalin built up a huge war machine that, as primitively equipped as it was, still had to be respected as the brute power he had intended it to be. With the emergence of Nazism, Hitler quickly and illegally rebuilt the German Army to the extent that year by year, Stalin came to be increasingly intimidated by it. As Glantz points out, Hitler was not the only cause for concern to Stalin. The Japanese were making threatening noises in Manchuria, and Stalin had somehow to factor in his paranoia this Japanese expansion into Soviet territory. To complicate matters from Stalin's perspective was his own paranoia. To put matters bluntly, Stalin did not trust his own military. Comrade First Secretary Stalin tended to see more snakes in his own garden than in Hitler's. He determined to remove any potential threat to his own iron grip on power. Glantz writes that "After the expulsion from the Soviet leadership of Commissar of War, L. D. Trotsky, who had been the principal defender of the 'military experts,' and the rise to power of I. V. Stalin, the cleansing of the army began."
This 'cleansing' began in 1937 and continued until the very day that German divisions rolled into Russia. The bag of officers purged was appallingly high. Any officer over the rank of colonel in the Red Army had a one in three chance of facing a firing squad or a tenure in one of Stalin's gulags. It did not take a rocket scientist for the survivors to figure out that their best chance to avoid the fate of their predecessors was to become spineless 'yes-men' who could advance in rank only by cringing before Stalin's bizarre refusal to face reality: that Hitler truly planned to take the Soviet Union as his own and to exterminate the greater mass of the Russian people.
It is here, on the point of deciding the culpability for Russia's poor intitial performance of the war, that scholars are divided. There are the mainstream historians who place the disgraceful state of readiness of the Red Army squarely on Stalin's unwillingness to antagonize the Wehrmacht before he had cleaned up his own messy situation both in Manchuria and in his recognizing that his military was not able to fend off,let alone launch a pre-emptive strike in 1941 or 1942. Reviewer Michael Petukhov insists that Glantz's book is less reliable than the ones written by fellow countryman Viktor Suvorov, whom Petukhov supports by writing in his own recent review that "Stalin was actively preparing the offensive against Nazi Germany sometime in July of 1941." I am not sure what criticism Petukhov intends toward Glantz's thesis that Stalin and Stalin alone was responsible for the near defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942. If Petukhov insists that Stalin's generals ought not to have worried due to the massive size of the Red Army, then perhaps the inner lesson of Glantz's book suddenly takes on a crystal clarity. When any army corps of generals has to look over its shoulders towards a leader who rewards creative thinking and constructive dissent with disgrace and death, then the stumbling of their military colossus takes on a reverberating of aftershocks that lingers even until today.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 22, 2013El producto llego rapido, la calidad del producto llego en perfectas condicionse. Estoy muy contenta del servicio y definitivamente volveria a usar el servicio...Gracias!!!
- Reviewed in the United States on December 14, 2022I have read Icebreaker (and Stalin's War of Annihilation), so I wanted to read the book that is considered the direct refutation of Icebreaker.
I have watched YouTube videos featuring Glantz, so I was expecting something meaty. Unfortunately, ask this book does is rehash the standard eastern front narrative. It doesn't address Icebreaker at all.
Glantz does do a great job (as always) with research. The maps and order of battle detail is exceptional.
Top reviews from other countries
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Cliente AmazonReviewed in Spain on September 28, 20225.0 out of 5 stars Bien en tiempo y forma
Todo fue Ok.
ReaderReviewed in the United Kingdom on January 7, 20225.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding Dissection of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of War
This book is indispensable to anyone who wants to understand the early stages of the Nazi-Soviet war. Normally David Glantz's books are hard work reading, aimed only at the serious military historian interested in the performance of military organisations at a collective level, but this book is highly readable and I found it difficult to put down. Glantz presents a mass of information and statistics as you would expect from him, in addition the presentation of numerous extracts from internal reports of the Red armed forces prove starkly revealing. The best feature of this book is that Glantz does attempt to evaluate the mass of information to analyse the problems of the Soviet military at the outbreak of war. What is shown is that not only were, as is widely covered in other books, the effects of political purges damaging to the command structure, but that the Red Army was in the middle of a rapid massive expansion, during which it was in a highly vulnerable state. It would seem that Nazi Germany attacked the USSR at just the right time to completely wrong foot a military which was in a state of flux in restructuring, re-equipping and training large numbers of inexperienced soldiers, pilots and officers. Knowing what is in this book it is easy to see why Stalin was treading on egg-shells with regard to doing anything to give the Germans an excuse to attack. Stalin gambled there would be no war before summer 1942 but got caught out.
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thaneReviewed in Germany on April 8, 20095.0 out of 5 stars brillant, faktenreich und differenziert
In einer Zeit, in der Geschichtsschreibung nicht selten benutzt wird, zur ideologischen Absicherung politischer Positionen, hebt sich die nüchterne, analytische und faktenreiche Darstellung "Stumbling Colossus" von D.Glantz sehr positiv ab.
Er beschreibt in diesem Buch die Ausgangssituation, in der sich die "Rote Armee" am Vorabend von "Barbarossa", der Planung für den Ostfeldzug, befunden hat. Er beschreibt, die Dislozieurung, die Organisation, die militärischen Paradigmen der damaligen Zeit und die Qualität der Ausbildung in der "Roten Armee".
Es entsteht ein detailreiches Bild einer Armee, die sich auf eine große kriegerische Auseinandersetzung vorbereitet hat, die aber nicht die Folgen der stalnistischen Säuberung und die Auswirkungen des zu schnellen Aufbauprozesses verkraftet hat.
Insgesamt wird durch das Buch deutlich, wieso die "Rote Armee", trotz ihrer imposanten quantitativen Aufrüstung vor 1941, dem Ansturm der "Wehrmacht" nicht standhalten konnte.
Wreck SmurfyReviewed in Canada on March 16, 20214.0 out of 5 stars An important work that debunks a myth
Since this was published in 1998 Col. David Glantz has become more well known for his narrative histories of the Soviet-German War, his Stalingrad Trilogy (in four volumes) being among his most-read works. I use his books extensively in my work on Wikipedia creating historical articles on Red Army rifle divisions during the war.
This book is more of a long essay in refutation of Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun's 1990 book "Icebreaker" (written under the pseudonym "Viktor Suvorov") which postulated that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was a preemptive strike against a Soviet state that was determined to overrun and destroy Germany in 1941. With almost no reference to Rezun, Glantz lays out the actual state of the Soviet armed forces at this time, and this book, along with several others that he cites, effectively destroys Rezun's case.
Glantz also provides evidence from both sides that Hitler and Stalin understood the importance of economic objectives in the conflict, particularly the oil of the Caucasus and Caspian regions. As he lays out the prewar planning it becomes clear that this was both the main objective for Nazi Germany and that Stalin was aware of it, thus guiding his focus on the defense of Ukraine before the fighting began.
I'd put off buying this book for a while because I knew Rezun had been debunked many years ago. However I will recommend it because it contains many details about Red Army units in the buildup to the Soviet-German War, with Glantz's well-known attention to detail.
vincent GUERARDReviewed in the United Kingdom on March 4, 20194.0 out of 5 stars Comprehensive study on pre-war soviet army
Glantz provides a very detailed and very comprehensive study and analysis of the red army evolution pre-world war two. It shows the Red Army would have been a tougher nuts to crack for the German if the war happened before 1941 as the soviet forces were caught in the middle of a complete restructuring and temporary weakening following the early mobilisation of massive untrained reserves. Wrong lessons were drawn from the Spanish civil war, which led the soviets to surrender the doctrinal advantage from the deep battle theory developped under Thukachevsky. It tooks two years for the Soviet army to get back on track… Very detailed (lots of table and statistics), sometimes too much, but a very good book for a topic which desserved more study Indeed. Professor Glantz demonstrates he is the leading expert on the topic.



