The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy Reprint Edition

The devil is in the details, but the "angels" call the shots (and in this story the "angels" are no angels). This is the short version of Strobe Talbott's exhaustive, intimate memoir of the transformation of US-Russian relations during the tumultuous 1990s. Bereft of the old adversarial structures of the cold war, and lacking any type of transitional plan, the diplomatic establishments of Washington and Moscow were compelled to feel their way through a stubborn morass of suspicion and ignorance and emerge with something like a policy of institutionalized cooperation.

By this account and many others it was a tough row to hoe. The meat of the book covers the period of Clinton/Yeltsin diplomacy between 1992 and 2000, a time when the Russian nation was reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the social upheaval brought on by free market economic "shock treatment." National pride had suffered a series of body blows as the Soviet Empire fell apart and lost its coveted place as the "other" major power on the international stage.

In 1992, while publicly basking in cold war "victory", the US political establishment was inwardly wringing its hands over how to handle its volatile, battered, erstwhile enemy. Internally in Russia political wars continued to rage among nationalists, communists, and liberal market reformers, and it was nowhere near apparent that the nation might not suffer a political hijacking or economic meltdown which would lead the nation back down a path of despotism and isolation. This was a moment of limitless opportunity and unfathomable risk for the US and the world. The stakes were huge, and the outcome unknowable.

Enter the diplomats. Under the direction and tutelage of Mr. Talbott in this country and Yuri Mamedov in Russia, the two little armies of bureaucrats started the decade long brainstorm over nuclear arms, NATO enlargement, the worrying linkages between Russia and Iran, the disposition of Soviet era debt, and myriad other potentially explosive issues. It was no easy business, and progress was halting.

Time and again Talbott's team ran into roadblocks and obfuscation from their Russian counterparts. Some of it was related to the long Russian predisosition to hiding behind opaque bureaucacry; some had more to do with national pride. Most often, though, US Russian progress was stymied by forces inside the Russian establishment with a vested interest in arresting diplomatic progress where it took hold.

Bill Clinton understood all this. And more importantly, he understood Boris Yeltsin. More than once Talbott invokes the importance of the personal relationship between the two men, both by turns rogues, charmers, and vulgarians, with a singular optimism and clarity of vision both for their respective nations and for the future of world security. With some funny and incisive anecdotes Talbott demonstrates again and again the power of the personal in the political process, as Clinton and Yeltsin transcend the turf wars going on among their minions below to hammer out compromises and agreements that start to assume real political and economic coherence.

Not that there weren't bumps along the way. Yeltsin, though Talbott declines a formal diagnoses, comes across as a classic manic depressive, high energy and visionary when his back is to the wall, despondent and alcoholic when he feels his enemies smothering him. Clinton, though keenly attuned to the constraints on his counterpart from the factional strife in the Russian military and the obstreperous Duma, had his hands full when Yeltsin came to the bargaining table in a blustery or drunken temper. Talbott is masterful in recounting the tensions in these encounters, especially in Helsinki in the early part of the adminstration.

In the end, this is the story of two flawed, great men who left their world a better place for having worked together. Talbott leaves no doubt that all the rest, the quibbling and arguing and messy details of diplomacy, were inconsenquential in the face Clinton and Yeltsin's determination to not just preside over the death of an old era but to define a new one. It's somewhat poignant to go back to the beginning of the book, when Clinton, in the twilight of his term, meets the rising star Putin for the first time and senses a new, more stringent and controlled era settling over the Russian nation and the face it shows the world. There's just no chemistry between the bumptious American and the cautious new leader. Talbott leads us to believe that it wasn't just chemistry, but a genuine personal friendship that put the final stake in the heart of the cold war and all the bad that came of it.

I am only seventeen and I have a Russian significant other. I didn't know anything about the country itself and wanted to learn more. This book was certainly a behind-the-scenes look at the U.S. and the new Russian Federation. It was not boring. You always were waiting for something to happen, whether it be bad or good. The writer had an incredibly positive perspective on Russia, which was good to see. They did leave out that Russia is still known for its mafia corruption and violence. But I didn't care about the Russian mafia - I was only interested in the future of Russia and what government leaders were doing to rebuild this great nation. The other is that this book was written from the point of view of a democratic administration. Being from a republican "lineage" this made no difference to me, as the book is not party aligned even though it talks about mostly Clinton. We must remember, though, Clinton was leading our country during this very touchy time. Clinton at times was indecisive of which was easier - being a president during the cold war era or during the post-cold war era. Overall a great book.

Good insight as to what goes on in a politician's mind in Russia. Easy to follow even without a deep knowledge of Russia or the Soviet Union

This book is dated, which is exactly why it is worth reading--particularly for a "Russia Hand Wanna-Be" like myself. What is evident is that our current problems with Russia predate Vladimir Putin and are the result in large part of the belief of many Russians that the United States has not accorded them the respect to which they are due.

Talbott discusses and defends the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. I am not convinced. He mentions that many people, including George Kennan, the architect of the containment of the Soviet Union, thought NATO expansion was a horrible idea. Talbott quotes Fritz Stern (whose memoir I read last month) as saying, “why did not the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians deserve security and consideration every bit as much as Russia.” The same can be said for any country-including South Vietnam. It doesn’t mean that we should risk war with Russia or contribute to Russian paranoia by actions that can only be interpreted as hostile by the Russians. We need their cooperation in much more important things than the control of Eastern Europe, their backyard, not ours. The Finns have figured out ways to accommodate Russians sensitivities and the Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, etc. would be well advised to do so as well.

From the book, it is clear how much progress in U.S. - Russian relations in the 1990s was a product of the unpredictable whims of Boris Yeltsin. It is also clear that there has been a backlash from the concessions that he made and that Putin’s latent hostility towards us is consistent with that of most Russians. They believe that we played them for a sap.

The book also makes clear that many of issues between us and the Russians predate Putin—particularly their selling the means to Iran to make nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, an expansionist Russia is not the Soviet Union. The Russians of today have no interest in fomenting world-wide revolution. At worst they seek to recapture the glory of Catherine the Great and control the lands which she controlled.