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The Silk Roads: A New History of the World Hardcover – Deckle Edge, February 16, 2016
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The epic history of the crossroads of the world—the meeting place of East and West and the birthplace of civilization
It was on the Silk Roads that East and West first encountered each other through trade and conquest, leading to the spread of ideas, cultures and religions. From the rise and fall of empires to the spread of Buddhism and the advent of Christianity and Islam, right up to the great wars of the twentieth century—this book shows how the fate of the West has always been inextricably linked to the East.
Peter Frankopan realigns our understanding of the world, pointing us eastward. He vividly re-creates the emergence of the first cities in Mesopotamia and the birth of empires in Persia, Rome and Constantinople, as well as the depredations by the Mongols, the transmission of the Black Death and the violent struggles over Western imperialism. Throughout the millennia, it was the appetite for foreign goods that brought East and West together, driving economies and the growth of nations.
From the Middle East and its political instability to China and its economic rise, the vast region stretching eastward from the Balkans across the steppe and South Asia has been thrust into the global spotlight in recent years. Frankopan teaches us that to understand what is at stake for the cities and nations built on these intricate trade routes, we must first understand their astounding pasts. Far more than a history of the Silk Roads, this book is truly a revelatory new history of the world, promising to destabilize notions of where we come from and where we are headed next.
- Print length672 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherKnopf
- Publication dateFebruary 16, 2016
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.7 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-101101946326
- ISBN-13978-1101946329
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Editorial Reviews
Review
—The New Yorker
“In his new book, The Silk Roads, Frankopan has created something that forces us to sit up and reconsider the world and the way we've always thought about it… The book takes us by surprise right from the start.”
—Nishant Dahiya, NPR
“This is deeply researched popular history at its most invigorating, primed to dislodge routine preconceptions and to pour in other light. The freshness of… Frankopan’s sources is stimulating, and their sheer range can provoke surprising connections. He likes to administer passing electric shocks… The sheer abundance of Frankopan’s information can become an omnivorous pleasure, and its details add color and particularity to his text… He plunders data magnificently... A brave, subtly personal project of inspiring ambition and epic scope.”
—Colin Thubron, New York Review of Books
“Peter Frankopan… [is a] brilliant and fearlessly wide-ranging young Oxford historian… Frankopan marches briskly through the centuries, disguising his erudition with an enviable lightness of touch, enlivening his narrative with a beautifully constructed web of anecdotes and insights, backed up by an impressively wide-ranging scholarly apparatus of footnotes drawing on works in multiple languages... This is history on a grand scale, with a sweep and ambition that is rare… A remarkable book on many levels, a proper historical epic of dazzling range and achievement.”
—William Dalrymple, The Guardian
“One of Mr. Frankopan’s gifts as a storyteller is his ability to draw unusual connections across his vast canvas… [he] packs his tale with fascinating trivia… Frankopan has written a rare book that makes you question your assumptions about the world.”
—Sadanand Dhume, The Wall Street Journal
“Frankopan casts his net widely in this work of dizzying breadth and ambition… Those opening to any page will find fascinating insights that illuminate elusive connections across time and place… Frankopan approaches his craft with an acerbic wit, and his epochal perspective throws the foibles of the modern age into sharp relief”
—Publishers Weekly (starred review)
“A glorious read. The author, the prodigious director of Oxford University’s Centre for Byzantine Research, weaves into his narrative astonishing facts…Frankopan is an exhilarating companion for the journey along the routes which conveyed silk, slaves, ideas, religion, and disease, and around which today may hang the destiny of the world.”
—Henry Porter, Vanity Fair.
“In his new book, The Silk Roads, Frankopan has created something that forces us to sit up and reconsider the world and the way we've always thought about it… The book takes us by surprise right from the start.”
—Nishant Dahiya, NPR
“Superb… Peter Frankopan is an exceptional storyteller… The lands of the Silk Roads are of renewed importance, and Frankopan’s book will be indispensable to anyone who wants to make sense of this union of past and present.”
—Philip Seib, The Dallas Morning News
“Dazzlingly good ... [Frankopan blends] deep scholarly skill with a real literary talent”
—Dan Jones, Evening Standard (U.K.)
“A sweeping, fascinating chronicle of world history focused on trade—in silk, spices, furs, gold, silver, slaves, and religion—in a vast region from the Mediterranean's eastern shores to the Himalayas… Frankopan weaves together his many narrative strands with verve and impressive scholarship. A vastly rich historical tapestry that puts ongoing struggles in a new perspective.”
—Kirkus (starred review)
"The author's gift for vividness is reminiscent of Jan Morris, while his command of revealing facts or fancies is not far short of Gibbon's."
—Felipe Fernández Armesto, Literary Review (U.K.)
“A very well-written and wide-ranging study, founded on reading of staggering breadth and depth... Strikingly up to date. The author has used the most recent scholarship to impressive effect... And he is evidently constantly rethinking in the light of new scholarship... The book is full of fascinating insights... No one could read it without learning a great deal, or without having their conception of the course of history radically challenged.”
—The Times Literary Supplement (U.K.)
“Beautifully constructed, a terrific and exhilarating read and a new perspective on world history.”
—Averil Cameron, History Today
“This is, to put it mildly, an ambitious book… By spinning all these stories into a single thread, Peter Frankopan attempts something bold: A history of the world that shunts the centre of gravity eastward… Mr. Frankopan writes with clarity and memorable detail… Where other histories put the Mediterranean at the centre of the story, under Mr. Frankopan it is important as the western end of a transcontinental trade with Asia in silks, spices, slaves—and ideas.”
—The Economist
“The Silk Roads, which covers several continents and many centuries, is based on astonishingly wide and deep reading and in all areas draws on the latest research… It is full of vivid and recondite details.”
—Robert Irwin, The Independent (U.K)
“Why are we driven, physically, intellectually and emotionally, to reach out beyond the horizon toward the unknown; to explore, connect and communicate? That query motivate Peter Frankopan’s splendid study… Throughout he relies on economic analysis…Recognizing that the fringes of the cloth are as interesting as its fabric, Frankopan also spins off on to the threads of social history…Underlying the tightly researched history is a grander human truth. As a species, we are motivated by stories… This invigorating and profound book has enough storytelling to excite the reader and enough fresh scholarship to satisfy the intellect… Charismatic and essential.”
—Bettany Hughes, The Daily Telegraph (U.K)
“Timely... It deserves a place by the library fireplace.”
—Country Life (U.K.)
“What does history look like if we shift our focus eastward and give due prominence to those who traversed the Silk Roads? This is the question Frankopan answers in this immensely entertaining work. Many books have been written which claim to be “A New History of the World”. This one fully deserves the title… So ambitious, so detailed and so fascinating… The Silk Roads demonstrates why studying history is so important.”
—Gerard DeGroot, The Times (U.K.) “Book of the Week”
“It’s time we recognized the importance of the East to our history, insists this magnificent study… The breadth and ambition of this swashbuckling history by Peter Frankopan should come as no surprise… A book that roves as widely as the geography it describes, encompassing worlds as far removed as those of Herodotus and Saddam Hussein, Hammurabi and Hitler… It is a tribute to Frankopan’s scholarship and mastery of sources in multiple languages that he is as sure-footed on the ancient world as he is on the medieval and modern… Deftly constructed… The Silk Roads is a powerful corrective to parochialism.”
—Justin Marozzi, The Sunday Times (U.K.)
“An exhilarating tour of 2,000 years of history… There is plenty of bang for your buck as you journey through The Silk Roads. Frankopan upends the usual world-history narrative oriented around ancient Rome and Greece and the irrepressible rise of Europe… In a series of brisk chapters—The Road of Faiths, The Road of Furs and so on—studded with state-of-the-art research that is sourced from at least a dozen languages, the author brings wondrous history to vivid life… In The Silk Roads, Peter Frankopan has provided a bracing wake up call.”
—Matthew Price, The National (AE)
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
As a child, one of my most prized possessions was a large map of the world. It was pinned on the wall by my bed, and I would stare at it every night before I went to sleep. Before long, I had memorised the names and locations of all the countries, noting their capital cities, as well as the oceans and seas, and the rivers that flowed in to them; the names of major mountain ranges and deserts, written in urgent italics, thrilled with adventure and danger.
By the time I was a teenager, I had become uneasy about the relentlessly narrow geographic focus of my classes at school, which concentrated solely on western Europe and the United States and left most of the rest of the world untouched. We had been taught about the Romans in Britain; the Norman conquest of 1066; Henry VIII and the Tudors; the American War of Independence; Victorian industrialisation; the battle of the Somme; and the rise and fall of Nazi Germany. I would look up at my map and see huge regions of the world that had been passed over in silence.
For my fourteenth birthday my parents gave me a book by the anthropologist Eric Wolf, which really lit the tinder. The accepted and lazy history of civilisation, wrote Wolf, is one where “Ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the industrial revolution. Industry crossed with democracy in turn yielded the United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” I immediately recognised that this was exactly the story that I had been told: the mantra of the political, cultural and moral triumph of the west. But this account was flawed; there were alternative ways of looking at history—ones that did not involve looking at the past from the perspective of the winners of recent history.
I was hooked. It was suddenly obvious that the regions we were not being taught about had become lost, suffocated by the insistent story of the rise of Europe. I begged my father to take me to see the Hereford Mappa Mundi, which located Jerusalem as its focus and mid-point, with England and other western countries placed off to one side, all but irrelevancies. When I read about Arab geographers whose works were accompanied by charts that seemed upside down and put the Caspian Sea at its centre, I was transfixed—as I was when I found out about an important medieval Turkish map in Istanbul that had at its heart a city called Balāsāghūn, which I had never even heard of, which did not appear on any maps, and whose very location was uncertain until recently, and yet was once considered the centre of the world.
I wanted to know more about Russia and Central Asia, about Persia and Mesopotamia. I wanted to understand the origins of Christianity when viewed from Asia; and how the Crusades looked to those living in the great cities of the Middle Ages—Constantinople, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Cairo, for example; I wanted to learn about the great empires of the east, about the Mongols and their conquests; and to understand how two world wars looked when viewed not from Flanders or the eastern front, but from Afghanistan and India.
It was extraordinarily fortunate therefore that I was able to learn Russian at school, where I was taught by Dick Haddon, a brilliant man who had served in Naval Intelligence and believed that the way to understand the Russian language and dusha, or soul, was through its sparkling literature and its peasant music. I was even more fortunate when he offered to give Arabic lessons to those who were interested, introducing half a dozen of us to Islamic culture and history, and immersing us in the beauty of classical Arabic. These languages helped unlock a world waiting to be discovered, or, as I soon realised, to be rediscovered by those of us in the west.
Today, much attention is devoted to assessing the likely impact of rapid economic growth in China, where demand for luxury goods is forecast to quadruple in the next decade, or to considering social change in India, where more people have access to a mobile phone than to a flushing toilet. But neither offers the best vantage point to view the world’s past and its present. In fact, for millennia, it was the region lying between east and west, linking Europe with the Pacific Ocean, that was the axis on which the globe spun.
The halfway point between east and west, running broadly from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to the Himalayas, might seem an unpromising position from which to assess the world. This is a region that is now home to states that evoke the exotic and the peripheral, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the countries of the Caucasus; it is a region associated with regimes that are unstable, violent and a threat to international security, like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria, or ill versed in the best practices of democracy, like Russia and Azerbaijan. Overall, it appears to be a region that is home to a series of failed or failing states, led by dictators who win impossibly large majorities in national elections and whose families and friends control sprawling business interests, own vast assets and wield political power. They are places with poor records on human rights, where freedom of expression in matters of faith, conscience and sexuality is limited, and where control of the media dictates what does and what does not appear in the press.
While such countries may seem wild to us, these are no backwaters, no obscure wastelands. In fact the bridge between east and west is the very crossroads of civilisation. Far from being on the fringe of global affairs, these countries lie at its very centre—as they have done since the beginning of history. It was here that Civilisation was born, and where many believed Mankind had been created—in the Garden of Eden, “planted by the Lord God” with “every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food,” which was widely thought to be located in the rich fields between the Tigris and Euphrates.
It was in this bridge between east and west that great metropolises were established nearly 5,000 years ago, where the cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro in the Indus valley were wonders of the ancient world, with populations numbering in the tens of thousands and streets connecting into a sophisticated sewage system that would not be rivalled in Europe for thousands of years. Other great centres of civilisation such as Babylon, Nineveh, Uruk and Akkad in Mesopotamia were famed for their grandeur and architectural innovation. One Chinese geographer, meanwhile, writing more than two millennia ago, noted that the inhabitants of Bactria, centred on the Oxus river and now located in northern Afghanistan, were legendary negotiators and traders; its capital city was home to a market where a huge range of products were bought and sold, carried from far and wide.
This region is where the world’s great religions burst into life, where Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism jostled with each other. It is the cauldron where language groups competed, where Indo-European, Semitic and Sino-Tibetan tongues wagged alongside those speaking Altaic, Turkic and Caucasian. This is where great empires rose and fell, where the after-effects of clashes between cultures and rivals were felt thousands of miles away. Standing here opened up new ways to view the past and showed a world that was profoundly interconnected, where what happened on one continent had an impact on another, where the after-shocks of what happened on the steppes of Central Asia could be felt in North Africa, where events in Baghdad resonated in Scandinavia, where discoveries in the Americas altered the prices of goods in China and led to a surge in demand in the horse markets of northern India.
These tremors were carried along a network that fans out in every direction, routes along which pilgrims and warriors, nomads and merchants have travelled, goods and produce have been bought and sold, and ideas exchanged, adapted and refined. They have carried not only prosperity, but also death and violence, disease and disaster. In the late nineteenth century, this sprawling web of connections was given a name by an eminent German geologist, Ferdinand von Richthofen (uncle of the First World War flying ace the “Red Baron”) that has stuck ever since: “Seidenstraßen”—the Silk Roads.
These pathways serve as the world’s central nervous system, connecting peoples and places together, but lying beneath the skin, invisible to the naked eye. Just as anatomy explains how the body functions, understanding these connections allows us to understand how the world works. And yet, despite the importance of this part of the world, it has been forgotten by mainstream history. In part, this is because of what has been called “orientalism”—the strident and overwhelmingly negative view of the east as undeveloped and inferior to the west, and therefore unworthy of serious study. But it also stems from the fact that the narrative of the past has become so dominant and well established that there is no place for a region that has long been seen as peripheral to the story of the rise of Europe and of western society.
Today, Jalalabad and Herat in Afghanistan, Fallujah and Mosul in Iraq or Homs and Aleppo in Syria seem synonymous with religious fundamentalism and sectarian violence. The present has washed away the past: gone are the days when the name of Kabul conjured up images of the gardens planted and tended by the great Bābur, founder of the Mughal Empire in India. The Bagh-i-Wafa (“Garden of Fidelity”) included a pool surrounded by orange and pomegranate trees and a clover meadow—of which Bābur was extremely proud: “This is the best part of the garden, a most beautiful sight when the oranges take colour. Truly that garden is admirably situated!”
In the same way, modern impressions about Iran have obscured the glories of its more distant history when its Persian predecessor was a byword for good taste in everything, from the fruit served at dinner, to the stunning miniature portraits produced by its legendary artists, to the paper that scholars wrote on. A beautifully considered work written by Simi Nīshāpūrī, a librarian from Mashad in eastern Iran around 1400, records in careful detail the advice of a book lover who shared his passion. Anyone thinking of writing, he counsels solemnly, should be advised that the best paper for calligraphy is produced in Damascus, Baghdad or Samarkand. Paper from elsewhere “is generally rough, blotches and is impermanent.” Bear in mind, he cautions, that it is worth giving paper a slight tint before committing ink to it, “because white is hard on the eyes and the master calligraphic specimens that have been observed have all been on tinted paper.”
Places whose names are all but forgotten once dominated, such as Merv, described by one tenth-century geographer as a “delightful, fine, elegant, brilliant, extensive and pleasant city,” and “the mother of the world”; or Rayy, not far from modern Teheran, which to another writer around the same time was so glorious as to be considered “the bridegroom of the earth” and the world’s “most beautiful creation.” Dotted across the spine of Asia, these cities were strung like pearls, linking the Pacific to the Mediterranean.
Urban centres spurred each other on, with rivalry between rulers and elites prompting ever more ambitious architecture and spectacular monuments. Libraries, places of worship, churches and observatories of immense scale and cultural influence dotted the region, connecting Constantinople to Damascus, Isfahan, Samarkand, Kabul and Kashgar. Cities such as these became home to brilliant scholars who advanced the frontiers of their subjects. The names of only a small handful are familiar today—men like Ibn Sīnā, better known as Avicenna, al-Bīrūnī _and al-Khwārizmi—giants in the fields of astronomy and medicine; but there were many more besides. For centuries before the early modern era, the intellectual centres of excellence of the world, the Oxfords and Cambridges, the Harvards and Yales, were not located in Europe or the west, but in Baghdad and Balkh, Bukhara and Samarkand.
There was good reason why the cultures, cities and peoples who lived along the Silk Roads developed and advanced: as they traded and exchanged ideas, they learnt and borrowed from each other, stimulating further advances in philosophy, the sciences, language and religion. Progress was essential, as one of the rulers of the kingdom of Zhao in north-eastern China at one extremity of Asia more than 2,000 years ago knew all too well. “A talent for following the ways of yesterday,” declared King Wu-ling in 307 bc, “is not sufficient to improve the world of today.” Leaders in the past understood how important it was to keep up with the times.
The mantle of progress shifted, however, in the early modern period as a result of two great maritime expeditions that took place at the end of the fifteenth century. In the course of six years in the 1490s, the foundations were laid for a major disruption to the rhythm of long-established systems of exchange. First Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic, paving the way for two great land masses that were hitherto untouched to connect to Europe and beyond; then, just a few years later, Vasco da Gama successfully navigated the southern tip of Africa, sailing on to India, opening new sea routes in the process. The discoveries changed patterns of interaction and trade, and effected a remarkable change in the world’s political and economic centre of gravity. Suddenly, western Europe was transformed from its position as a regional backwater into the fulcrum of a sprawling communication, transportation and trading system: at a stroke, it became the new mid-point between east and west.
The rise of Europe sparked a fierce battle for power—and for control of the past. As rivals squared up to each other, history was reshaped to emphasise the events, themes and ideas that could be used in the ideological clashes that raged alongside the struggle for resources and for command of the sea lanes. Busts were made of leading politicians and generals wearing togas to make them look like Roman heroes of the past; magnificent new buildings were constructed in grand classical style that appropriated the glories of the ancient world as their own direct antecedents. History was twisted and manipulated to create an insistent narrative where the rise of the west was not only natural and inevitable, but a continuation of what had gone before.
Many stories set me on the path to looking at the world’s past in a different way. But one stood out in particular. Greek mythology had it that Zeus, father of the gods, released two eagles, one at each end of the earth, and commanded them to fly towards each other. A sacred stone, the omphalos—the navel of the world—was placed where they met, to enable communication with the divine. I learnt later that the concept of this stone has long been a source of fascination for philosophers and psychoanalysts.
I remember gazing at my map when I first heard this tale, wondering where the eagles would have met. I imagined them taking off from the shores of the western Atlantic and the Pacific coast of China and heading inland. The precise position changed, depending where I placed my fingers to start measuring equal distances from east and west. But I always ended up somewhere between the Black Sea and the Himalayas. I would lie awake at night, pondering the map on my bedroom wall, Zeus’ eagles and the history of a region that was never mentioned in the books that I read—and did not have a name.
Not so long ago, Europeans divided Asia into three broad zones—the Near, Middle and Far East. Yet whenever I heard or read about present-day problems as I was growing up, it seemed that the second of these, the Middle East, had shifted in meaning and even location, being used to refer to Israel, Palestine and the surrounding area, and occasionally to the Persian Gulf. And I could not understand why I kept being told of the importance of the Mediterranean as a cradle of civilisation, when it seemed so obvious that this was not where civilisation had really been forged. The real crucible, the “Mediterranean” in its literal meaning—the centre of the world—was not a sea separating Europe and North Africa, but right in the heart of Asia.
My hope is that I can embolden others to study peoples and places that have been ignored by scholars for generations by opening up new questions and new areas of research. I hope to prompt new questions to be asked about the past, and for truisms to be challenged and scrutinised. Above all, I hope to inspire those who read this book to look at history in a different way.
Worcester College, Oxford
April 2015
Product details
- Publisher : Knopf; Later prt. edition (February 16, 2016)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 672 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1101946326
- ISBN-13 : 978-1101946329
- Item Weight : 2.2 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 1.7 x 9.5 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,009,629 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #337 in Buddhist History (Books)
- #449 in Historical Geography
- #1,707 in History of Civilization & Culture
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This book is a feel-good history of central Asia. But it's also misleading, and consistently anti-western in its bias. It's pro-central Asia--wildly pro-central Asia, like what you'd expect from drunken football fans. I can't think of a reason I need a history that tells such a cleaned up one-sided tale. His narrative is so pro-central Asia that many of the events he includes can't be made sense of. He spends so many chapters explaining the daring architecture of central Asia, the incredible gardens, the breath-taking palaces (only once mentioning the slaves!) and keeps commenting on how backwards Europe was during this time (500's through 1500's). And then suddenly Europeans have the most advanced ocean-going ships in the world! How did that happen? He says it's because they fought so much. They fought their way to the best ships in the world. It doesn't make any sense.
History can't be objective. Selecting one fact over infinite others makes the presentation unavoidably biased. But one can have a clean bias, one can be upfront with their thesis. Frankopan fails to do this the whole way through. Instead of a thesis he has themes. Like the "unique violence of Europe," which he returns to many times. Or the assertion that Europe was uniquely greedy, and this explains its actions and outcomes. He doesn't seem to miss any opportunities to point out European excesses, violence, and greed. But always forgets to look for financial motives or mention the masscres, or the intolerance of Persia, or the Muslim caliphate.
I could write about Frankopan's bad theories on the unique violence of Europe. I could dissect his claim that Islam takes better care of women than Christian Europe does, in the area of inheritance. I could give a critique of his poor understanding of economics based on the outsized significance he places on trade and the absence of the role of private property, banking, capitalism, and a well-paid consumer class. I could argue against his dark age thesis after the fall of Rome. I could argue against his case that the Persian empire and the Muslim kingdoms were bastions of tolerance and learning. These were all terrible problems in his history that ruined this book as a useful source of information. But I'll keep my critique to 3 concrete problems with his text.
First the good. This is a very easy to read history book, compelling even; I always wanted to pick it up and find out what happened next. And he included some interesting details I had never heard about. The giant Buddhas of Bamiyan that stood in northern Afghanistan for 1500 years until the Taliban blew them up, that was interesting. He spoke of some remarkable scholarship carried out by middle easterners from the 800's to 1100's. I became curious and looked into it some more. One of the men he mentioned, just briefly, Ibn al-Haytham, actually put the finishing touch on the scientific method in Egypt in 1021 when he published a book on astronomy and optics and proposed that along with the Greek insights of observing nature and using reason, we should also conduct experiments to verify our theories. He didn't start a scientific revolution, but he seems to be the first person to publish and advocate for such an approach. I didn't know!
But where this book goes wrong seems to be everywhere else. There's no clear thesis. He sprinkles outrageous claims throughout the book without supporting them with any reasoning or evidence, and even sometimes contrary to the narrative he just finished laying out. To keep the flow moving along he is very sparing with his insertion of numbers. I started circling dates on the pages, because he'd go for pages without giving a date, just narrating events, and I'd page back trying to find where we were in the timeline again. There are very few other numbers. When Alexander the Great defeated a "vastly superior Persian army"(6), how many men did each side have? (Best estimates are: 100,000 Persians, 40,000 Greeks. Resulting in 40,000 dead on the Persian side, and only 500 dead Greeks. Wow!) You'll be glad wikipedia is more obliging than Frankopan.
Or this, the "1956 military action began against Egypt, with British and French forces moving to secure the canal zone..."(410). Frankopan suggests this intervention was due to Western greed and Imperial proclivities. He's bizarrely circumspect when it comes to the Suez canal, even though his whole book is purportedly about the trade linkages between east and west, of which the Suez is clearly the most important, after the European standardization of ocean-crossing trade. Again, thanks to the internet I was able to discover the real story. The French went to the administrator of the department of Egypt, Sa'id, and in 1856 signed a concession to build a canal, and operate it for 99 years from the time of the completion of the construction, which was in 1869. So the Suez canal company should have legally maintained operation until 1968. They raised money by selling shares in the company. Egypt bought 44% of the shares, but later sold them to the British when they got into some financial trouble. It took 10 years and $100 million to build. That's $2.7 billion in today's dollars. So when Egyptian president Gamal Nasser seized the canal and nationalized it, the French and British felt their legal and financial rights had been violated, because they had been. Nasser deprived the British and French of 12 years of proceeds legally due to them. Nasser said that it was unjust that Egypt wasn't earning anything from the canal, but that's what happens when you sell all your shares in an enterprise. Frankopan agrees with Nasser, while explaining none of the ways the British and French had funded, engineered, even invented the machinery necessary to do the task.
Frankopan does a biased curation of events to make either Christians or the West look like the bad guys. He cites some wrongs that can't be disputed. Britain seized control of Bengal. Britain forced the sale of opium to the Chinese despite the fierce objection of Chinese rulers. The French and British looting and burning of the Summer Palace in Beijing wasn't nice. Or the terrible act of a British destroyer ramming a Jewish refugee ship so it couldn't go to Palestine. And then returning the holocaust survivors to Germany, etc. etc. There are plenty of wrongs that the West is guilty of.
But I'm not sure how to understand a host of wrongs he blames the West for that the West wasn't guilty of. "The Mayan Empire had also been flourishing before the arrival of the Europeans"(231). What a bizarre thing to say! The Mayan empire fell due to a host of factors almost 600 years before the Europeans arrived. And I don't think I'd say they were flourishing exactly when they were in the midst of a self-created ecological collapse, an incredibly bloody civil war, and a drought. Is he saying things were generally better for people in the Americas before Europeans came?
Or he expresses his admiration for the Incan civilization and how the elites were required to work in the fields a certain number of days each year so as not to "affront the poor" (252). He describes these societies as "enlightened in comparison to the highly stratified societies" of Europe. As if the Incan and Aztec societies weren't highly stratified. As if it's better to have the elites do a couple days of pretend work than it is to have a much more wealthy and prosperous working class like Europe had.
Another strange passage "...its global significance [The D'Arcy oil concession from Iran] is on a par with Columbus' trans-Atlantic discovery of 1492. Then too, immense treasures and riches had been expropriated by the conquistadores and shipped back to Europe. The same thing happened again" (320). First, I wouldn't characterize what happened in the Americas this way. I guess the similarity is that in both cases European powers benefited? That's an incredibly thin similarity. Expropriated is a fancy way of saying "stolen." When Frankopan made the above statement he had just finished one of his more detailed accounts, filling 6 pages, explaining how Knox D'Arcy wasn't interested in this venture, he had to be recruited to it by a Persian agent. Then they spent an unknown amount of time greasing palms in Persia to get a contract (a concession) signed by the Shah. Both parties freely agreed to it. The Shah was paid 20,000 pounds up front, 20,000 pound in shares of the company, and 16% annual royalty on net profits. All he had to do was sign the paper. D'Arcy's oil company had to do all the work. After 3 years of drilling and getting nothing, and multiple rounds of seeking additional investors, they finally had their big strike right at the edge of bankruptcy. And once the oil started to flow, and the profits, suddenly elements in Persia became resentful, claiming the deal was unjust, and Frankopan seems to agree! I wish he'd clarify what the exact injustice is. Because despite his lengthy account, I can't see one. Is it injustice if European powers make a deal to use their greater expertise in a mutual deal in another country? Is it wrong if European nations benefit from enterprises they built, funded, and successfully operated? Why would these industrialists have taken these risks, made these huge financial outlays if there hadn't been favorable terms in the contract? All the resentment Frankopan notes of the Persians, seems better fitted to the British, who were constantly black mailed, had their work stopped by religious festivals, etc. And the Persians could have been happy that a valuable resource they literally didn't have the expertise to unlock, had finally been made accessible, and now there were new possibilities, and a new revenue stream, not to mention all the secondary revenue streams that come with major industry starting operation in your country. But no, they'd been swindled by the contract they'd freely signed. And according to Frankopan, the theft was of the same quantity and kind as all the gold and silver Europe got from the Americas. Except there was a legal contract. Except that the only reason oil was being pumped was because the Shah agreed that it was a good idea. There is no moral equivalency here.
Last example, "This is imperial policy in all but name" (453). Frankopan concludes that US president Jimmy Carter's stated policy that the US will act to protect our critical investments and resource and trade arrangements around the world, is a statement of Imperial intent. He makes another passing comment about how the US is an empire (pg 475 "...gift of the American empire..."). For an historian Frankopan seems shockingly fuzzy on key concepts like "Empire." The British had an empire, as did Russia, and Rome and Persia. What makes them empires is that one political unit took over others and ruled them, often against their will. Britain was its own self-contained nation. But then it went around the world picking up lands and peoples like a rock star at an after party. It directly ruled these places, like India, Australia, South Africa, etc. And all the other empires did this too. The US has never done this. As nations go, the USA is a superpower. It is the most militarily and economically powerful nation in the world right now. It pursues its interests like all nations do, but it can do that more effectively because it has so much power. When the US acts to protect its interests abroad, meaning allies, trade relations, key pieces of global infrastructure that we and many nations of the world benefit from, this is what every nation does that has the power to do so. Yes, sometimes the US invades a country. But it doesn't keep those countries, they don't become part of the USA. The US is always looking for more friendly governments to do business with. And it supports governments that it likes and undermines governments it does not like. Other countries do this too. If any of this activity makes the US an empire then we have to change the definition of empire, and make it apply to many countries. No empire in history matches this description.
I would give this book negative stars if I could. It is highly misleading, it doesn't help one understand why things happened, if anything it obscures the true causes. Yes, the author is a professor of history at the prestigious Oxford university. But don't let that fool you. This book is garbage. He has a thick section of citations, and I don't doubt any of them. I think he knows the Europeans didn't destroy the Mayan Empire. He knows the US is not an empire like Britain and Russia were. He knows that Europe was more scientifically and technologically advanced than any other place on earth by the 1400's, the 1500's, in the 1600's and on. He has good sources, he knows the facts of the matter, so why does he tell this twisted absurd history? It looks to me like the answer is ideology. He's committed to finding fault with Europe and over-praising the East. A trend that's popular these days. Using this tactic kind of proves the opposite though. If central Asia was as good as he claims it is, as progressive, innovative and important, then one wouldn't have to lie to convince people. But that's what this is. Leave out all the bad things they did, really focus in on the bad things the West did, "my doesn't central Asia look good now!" It's like central Asia is catfishing us. And then we go on a date and find out they're still pushing gay people off rooftops, there's no democracy or human rights, it's an extreme unrepentant patriarchy. The land is barren, people live mostly in poverty with very little education. And then you're like "Oh! This is a back water! The West may not be perfect, but it's WAAAAYY better than this!"
Frankopan has crafted a transparent misrepresentation. He can do that if he wants. But we don't have to fall for it, and we don't have to recommend his book. And I for one will be recommending a much better book of world history "How the West Won" by Rodney Stark.
Frankopan’s main thesis is that the region stretching from the Mediterranean to China, and particularly the region that is now Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, remains the crossroads of civilization and the center of global affairs. As such, we need to understand ancient history and historical development over more recent centuries, as well as the way history is perceived by those in the region.
The book proceeds chronologically. Chapter headings trace the many “silk roads” that have influenced global history, including the emergence and migration of major forms of religious faith, the rise and fall of empires at a time when Europe was an uncivilized backwater, and the role of trade as a conduit for the spread of ideas and wealth.
We learn, for example, that the early expansion of Islam was benign. Often the major religions coexisted peacefully. Mohammed and the Jews needed each other as both repudiated Jesus as the Messiah. In Damascus, churches were untouched even as Islam became the religion of the majority. Only after divisions began to develop in Islam did attitudes harden toward other religions, says the author.
Western Europe in the 600s and 700s was barbaric, while Baghdad was at the height of its wealth and academic achievement. Thus, traders and intellectuals along the Mediterranean were oriented toward the East, not Western Europe. Among conventional beliefs that Frankopan seeks to puncture is the notion that the Mongols were chaotic. Instead he says they were good bureaucrats and operated as a meritocracy. Terror was applied selectively but was broadcast broadly as a tool of coercion. The result was to control wealthy territories with a minimum of effort.
As Elizabethan England competed with Spain, says the author, there was an opportunistic alliance with the Muslim world against a common enemy. Both the English and the Moors engaged in piracy against the Spanish and Portuguese. The English freed Muslims who had been “galley slaves” and returned them home, and had Muslim support for the 1596 attack on Cadiz. Shakespeare portrays positively the Moor in Othello and Persia was also characterized favorably in English literature of the time.
By the late 18th and early 19th Century, however, the power relationship between rising Western European powers and Persia and neighboring countries had been reversed. India became a crown jewel in the British Empire and the British became preoccupied with fear of Russian expansion into Persia. Misunderstandings were rife. “The British cannot say what they mean and the Persians do not mean what they say,” noted one observer.
In the aftermath of World War I, the British created Iraq out of Mesopotamia, arbitrarily combining a hodgepodge of nationalities. As oil was discovered in Iraq and Iran, the British moved quickly to exploit these resources and minimize the royalties that were paid to the nations from which oil was extracted. Dissatisfaction with British oil companies resulted in a greater role for American oil companies, but the exploitation of the region changed little until OPEC was formed.
The final 40% of the book is devoted to British and American ignorance and arrogance in the 20th and 21st Centuries, resulting in the support of the Shah in Iran, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Ayub Khan in Pakistan among others. Frankopan characterizes British, then American strategy as “solving today’s problems without worrying too much about tomorrow’s problems.”
This is useful background for anyone trying to understand the resentment felt in Iraq and Iran toward the West today.
As Frankopan looks forward, there is little analysis of the potential role of China in the balance of power that could shape the region’s future or of India whose population and economy are among the world’s largest and fastest-growing.
Instead, with an emphasis on what was once known as Mesopotamia, the author asserts that, “the Silk Roads are rising up once more.” Events that appear chaotic instead are the “birthing pains of a region that once dominated the intellectual, cultural and economic landscape of the world…We are seeing the signs of the world’s centre of gravity shifting — back to where it lay for millennia.” This seems an optimistic analysis.
In sum, the value for many readers will be found in the first half of the book, as a balance to the history taught in the West. The resentments held in the region toward American and British influence are the result not just of recent decades but of exploitation taking place in the past 100 years. Oddly, though, the author’s contemporary assessment of the region seems viewed through the same Western lens that he criticizes as having warped our understanding of the past.
Top reviews from other countries
International trade has enriched us in the West and made the elites in other corners of the world very wealthy but with that wealth comes exploitation, inequality and the great games of empires who seek advantage at the expense of human lives.
There are no answers here but there are lessons. We are all connected, and interdependent .
The writing isn't quite as vivid as, say, Gibbon's "Rise and Fall". You're not quite there on the Silk Road the same way Gibbon put you in the Roman agora. But this book is important for a different reason. It's one of very, very few books from any culture that takes global trade as a whole, without being biased towards one culture or viewpoint, which makes it deeply admirable.
Frankopan has made a genuine effort to be even-handed across thousands of years of history, and does so very well. The rise of the West is seen in its proper context, as a fairly recent event coming after centuries of Asian dominance. It's in the early chapters that the book feels strongest, with the most vivid anecdotes and stories. At the halfway point it loses a lot of colour, so it's a struggle to finish.
But carry on - once done, you'll be pleased you did.
It would certainly get 5 stars, or 5+ if that were possible, but for one striking omission. Despite having several potentially very useful maps (possibly 9 or 10, all full-page or double-page) there is no index of maps. So unless you either have a superlative memory for page numbers, or maintain a written index as you go, the maps are virtually useless. This hugely detracts from the enjoyment of a book centred on a region most of us know little about, and where constant reference to maps would vastly enhance understanding. So small an omission, and yet so great.
He places central asia as the fountainhead of world history. Huns, Vandals, Turks, Seljuks, Moghals, Mongels come streaming out to east and west. Some of the later chapters, about the duplicity of the 'Great Powers' in middle-eastern affairs, make uncomfortable reading.
If I have a complaint, I would have liked an explanation of why the steppes of central asia are such a cradle of expansionist, violent hordes.





