At first glance, “The Eurasian Century” by Hal Brands looks like a simple recap of history through the lens of geopolitics placing Eurasia (from the British Isles to the Japanese Island Chain) at the center of political gravity. The first sections read like a summary of WWI’s causes and actors; the second section a review of WWII’s Axis, Allies and global power politics. However, for those who keep current on contemporary great power politics, the reader cannot help but see Hal’s historical themes puncture into the 21st Century.
What at first might be considered mundane for its simplicity, then captures the mind for its prescient insight and tangible complexity. You could still be forgiven for wondering whether the centrality of Eurasia was a thesis too easily succumbed to confirmation bias. But the argument is thought provoking; all the more so when compared to today’s vastly diverse foreign policy-maker brainstorms.
Hal Brands’ book builds on the theories of geographer, Halford Mackinder, and geostrategist, Nicholas Spykman. From the Mackinder and Spykman foundation on the character cuts of Asian land masses and waterways, Brands brings in the contributions of military officers, diplomats and statesmen to describe how ideology manipulated grand strategy in a reoccurring theme of Eurasian conquest and tepid stability.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), or more accurately, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the obvious parallel to early 20th century Germany. The CCP and contemporary Russia also contain ideological DNA from the Cold War Soviet Union. But the CCP has learned from the past. If portions of its power-centric ideology remain, according to Hal Brands, the new autocracies have learned how to use cyber, artificial intelligence (AI) and Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS) to control for populations without resorting to mass atrocities and exterminations. The new form of autocracy also has means to re-write history, control narratives and hide its past mistakes. Autocracies of the 21st century are more productive, less visibly destructive versions of their 20th century systems (pg. 196).
The Eurasian Century teaches us that the Eurasian continent and its specific geography, when fueled by a powerful nation’s revisionist ideology, absent a trusted superpower mediator, will repeatedly spiral into tests of conquest. While Japan, China, Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain have been the key players in the biggest clashes, the Middle East has always added its unpredictable twist to the mix.
Hal Brands states that, perhaps unlike South America and Sub-Saharan Africa, “the Middle East is too valuable to be ignored” (pg. 192). Iran might be a “power-political pipsqueak” (193) but it has succeeded in sowing disorder. Brands gives a rare assessment of recent Middle East, Iran, foreign policy calling it, “a marvel of incoherence” (pg. 203). Middle East policy since 2003 in general has been a mess. During the 2025 World Economic Forum, Iran’s Vice President suggested to Fareed Zakaria that Trump’s second term could be different. The Iranian VP claimed to have had high hopes for the JCPOA nuclear deal. Eurasian politics is great power competition, but also a constant balance of deals, calls, raises and often, bluffs and subterfuge.
If the CCP autocracy has learned to expand power without mass atrocities, it has also learned how to keep its political hands looking clean while its partners like Iran, Russia and North Korea invest in low intensity conflict, invasions and nuclear missile programs. Leading up to WWII, the axis powers did not coordinate with each other. Is it the same today between Iran, Russia and China? Are there bonds of strategic coordination and transparency on operations or, like WWII, only an ad hoc tacit support with mutually agreed global goals: replacing the US-led international, rules-based system?
The key to US power was not just military and economic but also one of geography and ideology. According to Brands, the US was the accepted and trusted arbiter of Eurasian peace precisely because it had no geographic claim to the land mass. Second, US ideology was not one of superiority but of democracy and development. Hal Brands continues by arguing that in extending the US influence outward, the US was challenged to be better at home. It was difficult to preach democracy, development and inclusion abroad when one’s house was in disarray. The 1950s and 1960s were social adjustments internally that were catalyzed, Brands believed, by US external engagements. Global involvement was healthy for America internally.
To take the CCP analogy further, is the CCP’s south-south outreach, Global Security Initiative and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a learned behavior from the Cold War era’s US-led development investments? How long can the PRC be so involved globally without forcing the introspection at home? How important is geography and ideology to a country’s investment portfolio abroad and meeting of social needs at home? Sadly, as if to prevent introspection, the CCP is adamant about separating internal policies from foreign relations.
The first Cold War, in Brands’ analysis, was all about Eurasia while the rest of the world was a “non-vital” theater, both easy to ignore but uniquely important at the same time. To Hal Brands, good foreign policy is more than just balancing economic trade points or bringing more jobs and energy independence to one’s population. The Eurasian 3D chessboard requires a strategy that can form coalitions, make savvy use of all forms of statecraft and make difficult but calculating decisions to prevent what geography may not predestine but certainly corrupted ideology will attempt: autocratic expansion across the continent.
Not to be a spoiler on the final chapter conclusions and policy recommendations, Brands calls for a three-tiered approach to coalition building. The first tier is made up of advanced democracies. The second tier adds imperfectly aligned democracies (of which India is one) and the third tier: illiberal governments. The three-tiered coalition of nations all share at least a common enemy that unites their cause. If building a coalition with imperfectly aligned and illiberal governments is hard enough, it should go without saying that maintaining solid alliances and strong relationship with closest neighbors (Japan, Canada, Mexico, FVEYS, NATO) is a no brainer.
Hal Brands’ Eurasia and “the rest” are groups of nations bending to a realist world of power politics. There is barely a mention of a liberal internationalist ideal of a United Nations. And of course, no possibility of one with any influence or credibility, containing the neutral geography and acceptable ideology, and required power projection, to stabilize the continent. But Wilson’s fourteen points were an inspiration. Global institutions alone can be powerful inspirations but not effective instruments of world peace.
Finally, Hal Brands leaves his readers with plenty to ponder about the state and direction of current world affairs. The initial trajectory of the new US foreign policy doesn’t look anything close to what Brands recommends, even if the global description of colluding autocratic powers and the troubling Middle East are spot on. Just as cyber and AI are bringing surprise changes to autocratic-style governance, so also new media, shifts in ideology and trade-centric foreign policies are testing new boundaries of 20th century geopolitical axioms.
Are we living in the start of another Cold War, Brands asks, or is this the lead up to the next World War? Current events compared to historical precedent show us that either could be the case. Without a doubt, the next battle between autocracy and democracy will be a slog. Absent a trusted superpower like 20th century America, the current Cold War could convert to the next World War, especially if revisionist powers witness no resistance to each other’s’ expansionist agendas, as was the case with Italy, Germany and Japan prior to WWII.
For all the book’s detail, its conclusion, when compared to the current many and varied foreign policy gambits stemming from democratic nations, appears too straightforward. To some, it may even seem passé. As has often been the case with geopolitical challenges, there is consensus on the problem but no unity of effort towards a solution.
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