Robert Rubin provides invaluable insights into the workings of the Treasury and the White House. Recollections of the conversations that he had with Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers are particularly revealing. Here are a series of quotes that every financial official or every central banker should use as a reference:

- On central bank independence: "As the longest-serving Federal Reserve chairman in history, William McChesney Martin, famously said, the Fed chairman is the fellow who takes the punch bowl away just when the party is getting going. That's why the chairman should have a fixed term, which he does, rather than serving at the pleasure of the President. This helps insulate him from political pressure."

- On democratic accountability and the mastery with which Alan Greenspan testified before Congress: "That's an interesting observation you make, Senator, about the earth being flat," Alan would say. "If I might, let me rephrase the question." Alan would then ask himself a completely different question and answer it with such complexity and finely calibrated nuance that the questioner faced a choice between nodding intelligently and acknowledging his own confusion. Alan would then ask the House member or senator, "Does that respond to your question?" And the interrogator would invariably say, "Yes, it does."

- On exchange rate policy: "My substantive view was that economic fundamentals determine exchange rate levels over time, and that we should focus our attention on strengthening U.S. economic policy and performance, not on influencing the level of the currency (...) I was skeptical about the efficacy of currency 'interventions' per se--that is, of governments trying to influence the exchange rate of a currency by buying and selling large quantities in the open market. My experience with foreign exchange markets at Goldman Sachs led me to believe that trading flows were simply too vast for such interventions to have more than a momentary effect, except in very unusual circumstances."

- On using calculated ambiguity when commenting on market trends: "For example, my saying 'A strong dollar is in our national interest, and we have a strong dollar for some time now' created great excitement at a press briefing, as it was construed to mean that we wouldn't mind seeing the dollar remain strong but soften somewhat."

- On financial innovation and systemic risk: "Larry Summers characterized my concerns about derivatives as a preference for playing tennis with wooden rackets--as opposed to the more powerful graphite and titanium ones used today. Perhaps, but I would still reduce the leverage allowed on derivatives substantially."

Rubin has the most humble and sincere narrative. As an introvert myself, I immensely resonate with a lot of his view points and decisions. The first three chapters of this book offer a lot of genuine advice to intellectually driven yet professionally aspiring people. However, while that kind of narrative is refreshing for the first 100 pages, it gets tiring as one reads on. After all, most people buy this book to gain insights of what happened in the boom and bust of the 90s to 00s, not a prolonged self-analysis on strengths and weaknesses. I actually could not finish the book, as it drags on and on about who did this and who said that, but it always misses the key points of the stories. I think this book should not be read as a history recount, but an unrefined diary that still considers Rubin as the only reader.

As someone who's had the chance to walk through the storied trading floors of the arbitrage division of Goldman Sachs in Manhattan, I was excited to read this book about someone who began his amazing career there. Anyone interested in investing, domestic and international finance and economics, and politics should read this book. Why?
Mr. Rubin was vital in the formation of Clintonomics--a set of policies that stressed the importance of deficit reduction. Although politically vilified for "raising taxes," Mr. Rubin's platform of deficit reduction was associated with remarkable productivity and economic growth in the 1990's. Mr. Rubin's account is especially timely and thought provoking considering the recent deficits incurred by the U.S. government, the historically low interest rates that are nevertheless present in America, and the 12 billion dollar bet on foreigns currencies recently placed by Berkshire Hathaway.
As someone who has visited and invested (with very mixed results!) in developing countries, I was also interested in Mr. Rubin's accounts of how and why he, Clinton, and others at institutions like the IMF created multi-billion dollar rescue loans to these nations. The conflicts of interest between investors, the borrowers, and the loaners is fascinating to contemplate. It is also instructive to consider why some rescue packages (designed for Indonesia) failed while others (designed for Mexico) succeeded. While recounting these stories Mr. Rubin does an admirable job explaining why lowering tarrifs and expanding global trade with emerging markets is a win-win situation for all parties involved.
For an even better explanation of the underlying principles of international finance read "Economics in One Easy Lesson" by Hazlett. It sounds like a children's book, but the clarity of explanation of complex ideas in this book is amazing.