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At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA Kindle Edition
In this candid memoir, George Tenet recounts his time at the Central Intelligence Agency in the dramatic years between 1997 and 2004. With unparalleled access to the highest echelons of government and raw intelligence from the field, he illuminates the CIA’s painstaking attempts to prepare the country against new and deadly threats, disentangles the interlocking events that led to 9/11, and reveals information on the deliberations and strategies that culminated in the invasion of Iraq.
Tenet unfolds momentous events as he experienced them: his declaration of war on al-Qa’ida; the CIA’s covert operations inside Afghanistan; the worldwide operational plan to fight terrorists; his warnings of imminent attacks against American interests to White House officials in the summer of 2001; and the plan for a coordinated and devastating counterattack against al-Qa’ida laid down just six days after the attacks.
Tenet’s compelling narrative then turns to the run-up to the Iraq War, including a firsthand account of the fallout from the inclusion of “sixteen words” in the president’s 2003 State of the Union address; the true context of Tenet’s own famous “slam dunk” comment regarding Saddam’s WMD program; and the CIA’s critical role in an administration predisposed to take the country to war. In doing so, he sets the record straight about CIA operations and shows that the truth is more complex than many believe.
Throughout, Tenet paints an unflinching self-portrait of a man caught between the warring forces of the administration’s decision-making process, the reams of frightening intelligence pouring in from around the world, and his own conscience—in a moving, revelatory profile of both an individual and a nation in crisis, and a revealing look at the inner workings of the world’s most important intelligence organization at an extraordinarily challenging time.
“Tenet does not shy away from acknowledging his own responsibility in controversies involving terrorism and the Iraq War, but he also takes several key political leaders to task for scapegoating the intelligence community in the wake of unpopular policy.” —Publishers Weekly
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarperCollins e-books
- Publication dateOctober 13, 2009
- File size1929 KB
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About the Author
George Tenet was the Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2004. He holds a BSFS from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and an MIA from the School of International Affairs at Columbia University. He was appointed to the faculty of Georgetown University in 2004 and lives outside Washington, D.C., with his wife, author Stephanie Glakas-Tenet, and their son.
From The Washington Post
In his remarkable, important and often unintentionally damning memoir, George Tenet, the former CIA chief, describes a meeting with Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, two months before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In much more vivid and emotional detail than previously reported, Tenet writes that he had received intelligence that day, July 10, 2001, about the threat from al-Qaeda that "literally made my hair stand on end."
According to At the Center of the Storm, Tenet picked up the phone, insisted on meeting with Rice about the threat from Al Qaeda, and raced to the White House with his counterterrorism deputy, Cofer Black, and a briefer known only as "Rich B."
"There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months," Rich B. told Rice, and the attack will be "spectacular." Black added , "This country needs to go on a war footing now." He said that President Bush should give the CIA new covert action authorities to go after Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. After the meeting, Tenet's briefer and deputy "congratulated each other," Tenet writes. "At last, they felt, we had gotten the full attention of the administration."
Though Tenet was meeting almost daily with President Bush to give him an intelligence briefing and an update on threat reports -- "extraordinary access," he labels it -- by his own account he did not take the request for action "now" directly to the president.
During a CBS "60 Minutes" television interview that aired April 29, correspondent Scott Pelley nailed the crucial question that Tenet leaves unanswered in his book "Why aren't you telling the president, 'Mr. President, this is terrifying. We have to do this now'? " Pelley asked Tenet.
"Because the United States government doesn't work that way," Tenet replied. "The president is not the action officer. You bring the action to the national security adviser and people who set the table for the president to decide on policies they're going to implement."
Whoa! That's a startling admission. I'm pretty certain that President Bush or any president, for that matter, would consider himself or herself the action officer when it comes to protecting the country from terrorism. I can already see the 2008 presidential candidates promising, "I will be your action officer on terrorism and security."
To be fair to Tenet and the CIA, they had been working their tails off for years, often successfully, to thwart terrorists around the globe. But Tenet should have been the instant messenger to the Oval Office in the summer of 2001. His lapse and apparent decision not to carry the request for action to the president himself doesn't mean that the 9/11 attacks might have been averted. But the failure does reveal Tenet's limitations. He was the president's intelligence officer, the top man responsible not only for providing information, but also for devising possible solutions to threats.
A dedicated, often innovative and strong leader beloved by many at the CIA, Tenet nevertheless was hampered by a bureaucrat's view of the world, hobbled by the traditional chain of command, convinced that the CIA director's "most important relationship with any administration official is generally with the national security adviser."
No. Your most important relationship is with the president.
How he rose to his position is telling. The staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, then the Clinton White House NSC intelligence director and then deputy CIA director, he became CIA Director in 1997 basically because President Clinton's first choices could not be confirmed. A strong people person, Tenet did much to improve CIA morale and lay out a rebuilding program, but in this memoir of his seven-year tenure as CIA director, he wonders whether he was up to the job. "No previous experience had prepared me to run a large organization," he writes. "I was no Jack Welch and I knew it."
Nonetheless, Tenet oversaw significant successes, most notably planning and executing the paramilitary assault to dislodge al-Qaeda from its Afghanistan sanctuary in the weeks and months after 9/11 -- essentially the action he had proposed to Rice in the meeting of July 10, 2001.
Full disclosure: In discussions with Tenet as a reporter for this paper, I many times urged him to write his memoir, and, after he resigned from the CIA, I even spent a day with him and his co-writer, Bill Harlow, in late 2005 to suggest questions he should try to address. Foremost, I hoped that he would provide intimate portraits of the two presidents he had served as CIA director -- George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Instead, he has adhered to the rule of CIA directors: protect the president at all costs.
That said, several chapters by themselves are worth the price of the book: Chapter 14, "They Want to Change History," lays out al-Qaeda's and other terrorist groups' persistent efforts to obtain strategic weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. Reading it is scary, and Tenet makes a compelling case that terrorism inside the United States is not over. Chapter 15, "The Merchant of Death and the Colonel," is an insider's chilling summary of the dismantling of the secret nuclear proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program.
Tenet is candid about how the CIA regularly dispensed money to assist in the capture of al-Qaeda figures. "We would show up in someone's office, offer our thanks, and we would leave behind a briefcase full of crisp one-hundred-dollar bills, sometimes totaling more than a million in a single transaction."
He also provides further documentation that the Bush national security team was dysfunctional and members didn't communicate among themselves very well or at all. This lack of communication becomes apparent in his own understanding of crucial decisions: "One of the great mysteries to me is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable," he writes. He doesn't know when Bush decided to go to war. But he writes that in September 2002, "there was no decision to go to war yet" and that by December 2002 the war "decision had already been made." He provides no evidence or statements to support these claims, and I think he is wrong about the latter date. (From my reporting and interviews with Bush and the other key players, I believe Bush finally decided to go to war in early January 2003.)
On Aug. 26, 2002, seven months before the invasion of Iraq, Tenet says he was totally surprised when Vice President Cheney said during a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction." Cheney was effectively issuing his own National Intelligence Estimate -- he was treading on Tenet's territory. "The speech also went well beyond what our analysis could support," Tenet writes, and he acknowledges that he should have privately told Cheney so.
In truth, Tenet should have raised hell on such a critical issue -- privately and publicly. He writes that his silence implied agreement. But five weeks later Tenet issued the famous 90-page National Intelligence Estimate that essentially reached the same wrong conclusion: "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons."
One of Tenet's most baffling fixations has to do with his assertion to the president and the administration's war cabinet on Saturday, Dec. 21, 2002 (three months before war), that Iraq's WMDs were "a slam dunk case." This was first reported in my 2004 book, Plan of Attack.
Tenet disputes the version I reported, acknowledging now that he said "slam dunk," but denying that he rose from the couch in the Oval Office and threw his arms in the air. The gathering was "essentially a marketing meeting," he writes, to decide what intelligence could be made public to prove Iraq had WMDs. He says my recounting "ignited a media bonfire, and I was the guy being burned at the stake."
Over the years, Tenet has been all over the lot on this "slam dunk" comment, first denying he ever said it, then later saying he did not recall it but would not dispute that it happened. In 2005, I participated in a public forum in Los Angeles with Tenet before an audience of 5,000 people. Asked about "slam dunk," he replied, "Those are the two dumbest words I ever said." He does not include that in his book.
Instead, he recounts how he called Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, and complained that the leak of the "slam dunk" story "made me look stupid, and I just want to tell you how furious I am about it. For someone in the administration to now hang this around my neck is about the most despicable thing I have ever seen in my life."
Tenet incorrectly suggests that I had one source for this report. There were at least four firsthand sources. When I interviewed President Bush in December 2003, he quoted the "slam dunk" phrase four times, and then in a fifth citation the president said, "And Tenet said, 'Don't worry, it's a slam dunk.' And that was very important." I provided this portion of the transcript to Tenet.
"I truly doubt President Bush had any better recollection of the comment than I did," Tenet writes in At the Center of the Storm, "Nor will I ever believe it shaped his view about either the legitimacy or timing of waging war." Tenet could be right about that, but he keeps trying to get himself off the hook for that comment. "In a way President Bush and I are much alike," he writes. "We sometimes say things from our gut, whether it's his 'bring 'em on' or my 'slam dunk.' I think he gets that about me, just as I get that about him."
But 10 weeks after the "slam dunk" comment, Tenet and the CIA provided Secretary of State Colin Powell with the intelligence he used in his famous Feb. 5, 2003, presentation to the United Nations and the world, arguing that Saddam had WMD. Tenet writes that he believed it was a "solid product." That, of course, is a less memorable and less colorful way of saying "slam dunk."
Of Powell's U.N. speech, Tenet writes, "It was a great presentation, but unfortunately the substance didn't hold up. One by one, the various pillars of the speech, particularly on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programs, began to buckle. The secretary of state was subsequently hung out to dry in front of the world, and our nation's credibility plummeted."
In truth, Powell blames Tenet for hanging him out to dry. Though Tenet takes some responsibility for his and his agency's mistakes, he often dodges it in his book. "Maybe it's just the way Washington works," he laments when he gets blamed for intelligence failures. Or maybe it's just accountability.
He spends nine pages dissecting how a senior CIA officer, Tyler Drumheller, and the German intelligence service didn't alert him to the fabrications of a source (code-named, appropriately enough, Curve Ball) who alleged that Iraq had mobile biological labs. This was a centerpiece of Powell's U.N. presentation, yet Tenet offers no apology to Powell.
But the other critical intelligence assessment he didn't carry to the Oval Office -- surely the most critical of his career -- was his misgivings about invading Iraq. As I reported in my third book on Bush, State of Denial, in the months before the invasion in the fall of 2002, Tenet confided to one of his top aides, John O. Brennan, that he thought it was not the right thing to do. "This is a mistake," Tenet told Brennan.
But he never said as much to the commander in chief. And he doesn't say it to readers of his memoir.
Copyright 2007, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.
From AudioFile
Product details
- ASIN : B000QUCNX6
- Publisher : HarperCollins e-books; Illustrated edition (October 13, 2009)
- Publication date : October 13, 2009
- Language : English
- File size : 1929 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 596 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #635,502 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- Customer Reviews:
About the authors

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more

Bill Harlow is a writer, consultant and public relations specialist. He spent seven years as the top spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency. He co-authored George Tenet's #1 New York Times bestseller At the Center of the Storm.
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Customers find the book interesting and helpful, giving unity to a series of tragic events. They also describe the reading experience as great and well written.
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Customers find the book interesting, helpful, and informative. They say it masterfully provides a first-hand account into the decision making process that two Presidents undertook. Readers also find the narrative entertaining and well-written. They mention the book provides excellent insight into the CIA and the government.
"...Bottom line: this a great narrative on how the CIA operated during some of its most challenging times...." Read more
"...The book masterfully provides a first hand account into the decision making process that two President used to combat terrorist: pre-911 and Post 9-..." Read more
"...Every chapter is a lesson in intelligence, analysis, and the tough work which must be done to protect America daily by this agency...." Read more
"...That being said, I thought the book offered many tidbits of insider information not found in the deluge of information already available on many of..." Read more
Customers find the book a great read, saying that the CIA did a good job with it. They also appreciate the honest assessment of the Agency's performance.
"...Mr. Tenet provides an amazingly honest assessment of the Agency’s performance. He accepts blame in those instances where the CIA truly fell short...." Read more
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Customers find the book well-written and enlightening.
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Mr. Tenet provides an amazingly honest assessment of the Agency’s performance. He accepts blame in those instances where the CIA truly fell short. That said, he also defends the Agency where it was incorrectly criticized. He does this by providing the rest of the story to specific events. For example, he effectively debunks the erroneous story that he claimed the justification for invading Iraq would be a “slam dunk.” By providing the back story, he is able to showcase the errors cited in other publications like Bob Woodward’s book on the Iraq war.
Bottom line: this a great narrative on how the CIA operated during some of its most challenging times. It provides a true insiders look at the how the Intelligence Community and the CIA in particular operated during 9/11 and the Iraq war. A fascinating read.
For example there is the on going issue of the al Qaeda movement and Usama bin Ladin or Osama bin Laden. In the wake of the al Qaeda inspired attacks against the U.S. Embassies in East Africa, Tenet tells the reader he was frustrated with the "quality and depth of our intelligence regarding al Qaeda and Bin (sic) Ladin." Apparently as a result of this frustration, the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) of CIA developed a so-called `operational plan' and the redoubtable CIA veteran Charlie Allen pushed the rest of the Intelligence Community, namely NSA and the NGA, to step up their collection and processing efforts to support that plan. Tenet was told that as a result the amount of data on al Qaeda and bin Ladin had `exploded' and many terrorists were identified and their linkages to other terrorists were documented. According to the head of the CTC of the plan had "damaged UBL's (sic) infrastructure and created doubt within al Qaeda...", although it is difficult to determine how he knew this. This of course was all prior to the events of 9/11. In point of fact, the result of all this effort was what one would get by kicking an ant hill and little substantive intelligence resulted from all the uproar. Indeed by 2004 CIA apparently was still uncertain if the al Qaeda movement should be treated as a transnational or geographic issue. After 9/11, the response by CIA to the Bush administration's interest in finding ties between al Qaeda and pre-invasion Iraq was a masterpiece of bureaucratic opaqueness. President Bush and Director Tenet both deserved better. The problem is that as Tenet stated in another context, "We are all prisoners of history" this could be the epitaph of his directorship and perhaps CIA itself.
Tenet never criticizes President Bush (43) explicitly. At times, he paints him as a man with good intentions. However, through much of Part III, Tenet implies that the President delegated (and abdicated) too much authority to his staff. Tenet vilifies Douglas Feith (undersecretary of defense for policy (2001-2005)) for promoting war with Iraq in advance of adequate supporting intelligence. He places Feith as a man who wielded a disproportionate amount of influence in the White House. It is left as an exercise for the reader to consider why President Bush was so willing to accept Feith's ideas in lieu of other credible viewpoints.
As articulated in the `Afterword' [p. 490-491, 499], Tenet constantly reminds the reader of the CIA's role in government:
"Often, at best, only 60 percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable... Intelligence alone should never drive the formulation of policy. Good intelligence is no substitute for common sense or curiosity on the part of policy makers in thinking through the consequences of their actions... Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum, but within a broader mandate of policies and governance."
Here are some other highlights of the book:
- The CIA told the White House that Iraq likely possessed WMD (Chapter 17), but it never established a link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (p.307).
- "In Afghanistan, we had started from the ground up, allowing the various political groups to legitimize themselves, then building to a central, representational government. In Iraq, the process couldn't have been more different... We were in charge, and by God, we knew what was best." (p.439)
- "Although CIA came to take everything we heard from [Ahmed] Chalabi with a healthy dose of skepticism, others, such as the vice president, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith, welcomed his views." (p. 397)
- "On one of his trips to Iraq, Wolfowitz told our senior [CIA] man there, 'You don't understand the policy of the U.S. government, and if you don't understand the policy, you are hardly in a position to collect the intelligence to help that policy succeed.'" (p. 430)
- The CIA suggested ways that the United States could establish peace in Iraq, but these suggestions were ignored (Chapter 23 and p. 441, 446).
- Brent Scowcroft was the only administration official who expressed public disapproval of the White House's plan to go to war with Iraq (p. 315).
- After the attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. "...Didn't need any additional excuses to go after UBL or his organization. But simply firing more cruise missiles into the desert wasn't going to accomplish anything. [The U.S.] needed to get into the Afghan sanctuary." (p. 128-131)
- "For years, it had been obvious that without the cooperation of the Pakistanis, it would be almost impossible to root out al-Qa'ida... The Pakistanis always knew more than they were telling us, and they had been singularly uncooperative in helping us run these guys down." (p. 139)
- Al-Qa'ida planned to attack the New York City subway in the fall of 2003. The attack was cancelled during the last stages of preparation "for something better". (p.260-261)
- "When I was with King Hussein, I always felt that I was in the presence of wisdom and history... I've often wondered what impact his wisdom would have had in helping all of us avert the mess we find ourselves in today." (p.71-72)
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