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All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis Kindle Edition
As soon as the financial crisis erupted, the finger-pointing began. Should the blame fall on Wall Street, Main Street, or Pennsylvania Avenue? On greedy traders, misguided regulators, sleazy subprime companies, cowardly legislators, or clueless home buyers?
According to Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, two of America's most acclaimed business journalists, many devils helped bring hell to the economy. All the Devils Are Here goes back several decades to weave the hidden history of the financial crisis in a way no previous book has done. It explores the motivations of everyone from famous CEOs, cabinet secretaries, and politicians to anonymous lenders, borrowers, analysts, and Wall Street traders. It delves into the powerful American mythology of homeownership. And it proves that the crisis ultimately wasn't about finance at all; it was about human nature.
Just as McLean's The Smartest Guys in the Room was hailed as the best Enron book on a crowded shelf, so will All the Devils Are Here be remembered for finally making sense of the financial meltdown and its consequences.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPortfolio
- Publication dateAugust 30, 2011
- Reading age18 years and up
- File size2589 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Hard-hitting reporting and fluent writing bring the utter devastation of the Great Recession to life—with John Cassidy's How Markets Fail (2009) an essential aid to understanding where all the money went, and who benefited. - Kirkus Reviews
Unlike many of the quickie books on the crisis, All the Devils Are Here is tightly written, methodical and unsensationalistic…it's very much worth reading for its damning conclusions and its craftsmanship. –Washington Post
About the Author
Product details
- ASIN : B005DIAUN6
- Publisher : Portfolio; Reprint edition (August 30, 2011)
- Publication date : August 30, 2011
- Language : English
- File size : 2589 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 616 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #235,392 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #42 in Banks & Banking (Kindle Store)
- #118 in Company Histories
- #130 in Economic History (Kindle Store)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Bethany McLean is a well-known journalist. Her March 2001 article in Fortune, "Is Enron Overpriced?," was the first in a national publication to openly question the company’s dealings.
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I knew Bethany McLean's work previously from reading "The Smartest Guy in the Room". It's the same deal, great story, written in a compelling manner. In this book there are 22 chapters of narrative written in 358 pages. Here are just a handful of the colorful characters you will meet and learn considerably about.
* Stan O'Neal - CEO of Merrill Lynch
He's aloof, suspicious, completely envious of competitor Goldman Sachs, and personally is very insecure. He could not stand having people of superior intellect around him, and in a corporation that is precisely what you need.
* Franklin Raines - Head of Fannie Mae
You talk about screwing up, the American taxpayer may have to lend Fannie Mae a hundred billion dollars before it's over, and somehow Raines still got a severance package.
* Brian Clarkson - CEO of Moody's the rating service
Only in America could Clarkson have come up with the concept that you could take third tier bonds, and if you put enough of them together, they could be triple AAA rated. The concept would plow the country deep into the financial crisis.
* Hank Greenberg- The modern founder of AIG
In the end, Greenberg developed a company with so many layers of intertwining intrigue, that only he knew how all the pieces fit together. It was a house of cards.
* Angelo Mozilo - CEO of Countrywide, the loan people
He wanted homeownership for everyone, and in the process of actualizing the myth, helped to bring on the financial crisis which would also destroy his career, and independence of his company.
There are many more players and their stories. The above are just the key players, but you will also get to know Alan Greenspan, Jimmy Cayne (Bear Stearns), Alan Greenspan, Lloyd Blankfein (Goldman Sachs), and more. If you think you understand Wall Street, think again. Reading the newspapers won't help you. You need to hear it from a master storyteller, and that's what you get with McLean and Nocera. In page after page, they put it all together for you. They take the disparate parts, and weave a mosaic that allows you to finally understand how did we allow ourselves into this mess? Who did it? Could it have been avoided? Finally, are we out of the hole yet, or are we digging further in?
You will learn about how Stan O'Neal schemed, and plotted his way to the top of Merrill Lynch, forcing previous CEO David Komansky out of his job earlier than expected. O'Neal proceeds to gut the firm of its enormous talent base, and brings in a bunch of yes men, to assuage his ego. He fires the head of risk management, only to have to rehire him later on. O'Neal practically collapses when he's told that the firm owns tens of billions of dollars of unsalable bonds. O'Neal was ultimately fired. I had the pleasure of seeing him on a Jet Blue flight to Florida recently. Gone is the Gulfstream jet he used for a play toy. I must admit to taking pleasure by yelling, "Hey O'Neal, how do you like Jet Blue." I'm a taxpayer too.
You'll learn how Goldman Sachs went from putting the client first to a firm now better known for its proprietary trading desk, and private equity group. O'Neal may have envied Goldman, but Goldman knew how to manage risk. They would elevate their risk management group to the same level as other groups in the firm; giving them independence to sniff around and tell the CEO what they really thought was happening. Only Goldman managed to survive the financial crisis unscathed, while everyone else was writing off tens of billions of dollars.
The story of Moody's was especially interesting. Warren Buffett bought 15% of the company because of its impregnable market position, coupled with steady, reliable, and huge cash flow. In one year, Moody's went from 35% of the mortgage backed securities market to a 59% market share. How did they do it? They blew up their standards, shifted their analysts around in order to make them ask fewer questions, and started charging millions every time an investment bank wanted to do a 100 million dollar collateralized bond obligation.
Moody's believed and promised the unthinkable. You could take poor bonds, but by putting them together and bundling them, you could make them triple AAA rated. As a rule, institutional buyers do not look beyond the triple AAA rating. They simply rely on the integrity of the rating agency. Moody's thought the laws of economics had been repealed. What is amazing is that to this day, Moody's has never been punished for their actions.
If you want exciting, if you want compelling, then you must get your hands on this book. It will make you angry, even furious at how the regulators looked the other way. You will never trust Wall Street again and why should you? It becomes apparent that many people in financial services are paid four, five, six times what people make for the same function in other professions, and industries, and yet they required an $800 billion bailout from mom and pop America.
There have been upwards of 50 books written about the financial crisis. As of this date, "All The Devils Are here", is the best of them. It is the most interesting, and it is laid out in easy to read language with no axes to grind, no hidden agendas. It will give you clarity, as to the interplay between government, Wall Street, and the banks. I give this book five stars, and thank you for reading this review.
Richard C. Stoyeck
(1) Buried in Ch. 8 is, "A rating had become mandatory for issuers." What? Who mandated that? The "mandate" should've been to use the Consumer Reports rating rules - producers and sellers cannot pay for ratings and cannot even use ratings in their advertisements.
(2) Ch. 8 continues, "To prevent a proliferation of fly-by-night bond raters, the SEC decreed that Moody's, S&P and Fitch were Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, or NRSROs." Oh, please! What an addle-brained decree. The whole runaway crisis was fueled in part by the subsequent unwarranted AAA ratings.
(3) Pressure from Washington to quickly increase homeownership and crush local efforts to halt the mania was covered pretty well in places like Chapters 1, 10 & 12. The description in Ch. 22 of a June 2007 dinner meeting was particularly interesting. Hank Paulson had dinner "with a handful of Wall Street chieftains, including Jamie Dimon of J.P. Morgan, Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, and Chuck Prince the CEO of Citigroup." Their concern was excessive risk-taking and erosion of underwriting standards, and one gently asked if the runaway risk-taking could be prohibited. No indication how Paulson replied, but I can only imagine the desire to increase homeownership was on their minds. And, how many informal discussions with the CEO's to increase homeownership happened in earlier years? Could that have been a factor in the removal of the risk whistle-blowers all over Wall Street described throughout the book?
(4) In Ch. 3 there is one tiny mention of the Community Reinvestment Act. Too tiny. In 2005 I refi'ed a rental condo at BofA, and besides being pleasantly surprised at how few documentation requirements I had to do, and getting a $50K cash-out, I noticed a "CRA" block on the forms. The lending officer told me it related to loans to minorities, and I presumed she would've preferred that I was a "CRA". Did BofA grease the skids even better for "CRA" people?
I was glad to see the book covered "moral hazard" in a few places in the book, although the bailouts mentioned in Ch. 22 & Epilogue indicate that the "hazard" is no longer merely a "hazard" - the bailouts expanded the general U.S. policy to deal with financial problems affecting society: Take from the successful and productive and give to the unsuccessful and unproductive (isn't that a wonderful incentive to be self-sufficient?).
Another topic that would've been good to discuss was the role of housing supply & demand in the housing bubble. If the ramping up of mortgages had been a lot slower, like waiting till way after a lot of the teaser rates expired, things like housing construction and foreclosure rates might have been kept more in balance to avoid runaway appraisals.
I hope there will be a "2nd Edition" to cover topics like that, including more so-far-untouched devils.






