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The Russian Origins of the First World War Kindle Edition

4.5 4.5 out of 5 stars 131 ratings

In a major reinterpretation, Sean McMeekin rejects the standard notion of the war’s beginning as either a Germano-Austrian pre-emptive strike or a miscalculation. The key to the outbreak of violence, he argues, lies in St. Petersburg. Russian statesmen unleashed the war through policy decisions based on imperial ambitions in the Near East.
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Editorial Reviews

Review

“This book should forever change the ways we have understood the role of Russia in the First World War.”Michael S. Neiberg, author of Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I

The Russian Origins of the First World War is a polemic in the best sense. Written in a lively and engaging style, it should provoke a much-needed debate on Russia's role in the Great War.”Michael Reynolds, author of Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918

“Going against a century of received wisdom, Bilkent University professor McMeekin offers a dramatic new interpretation of WWI...Rifling the archives, analyzing battle plans, and sifting through the machinations of high diplomacy, McMeekin reveals the grand ambitions of czarist Russia, which wanted control of the Black Sea straits to guarantee all-weather access to foreign markets. Maneuvering France and England into a war against Germany presented the best chance to acquire this longed-for prize. No empire had more to gain from the coming conflict, and none pushed harder to ensure its arrival. Once unleashed, however, the conflagration leapt out of control, and imperial Russia herself ranked among its countless victims.”
Publishers Weekly

“A bold reinterpretation of the Russian Empire's entry into the First World War. McMeekin argues that Russia believed a European war to be in its interest, that it sought to humiliate Vienna, and that it hoped to conquer Constantinople and the Ottoman Straits.”
Mustafa Aksakal, author of The Ottoman Road to War in 1914

“Casting a contrarian eye on the first major conflict of the twentieth century, Sean McMeekin finds the roots of WWI inside Russia, whose leaders deliberately sought--for their own ends--to expand a brawl that the Germans wanted to keep local. The author tracks the fallout of these antique plots right down to the present geopolitical landscape.”
Barnes & Noble Review

“An entirely new take on the origins of World War I comes as a surprise. If war guilt is to be assigned, this book argues, it should go not only (or even primarily) to Germany--the long-accepted culprit--but also to Russia...Bold reading between the lines of history.”
Robert Legvold, Foreign Affairs

“The book is a refreshing challenge to longstanding assumptions and shifted perspectives are always good.”
Miriam Cosic, The Australian

“As Sean McMeekin argues in this bold and brilliant revisionist study, Russia was as much to blame as Germany for the outbreak of the war. Using a wide range of archival sources, including long-neglected tsarist documents, he argues that the Russians had ambitions of their own (the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, no less) and that they were ready for a war once they had secured a favorable alliance with the British and the French.”
Orlando Figes, Sunday Times

About the Author

Sean McMeekin is Assistant Professor of History at Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B0081YHYHO
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Harvard University Press; Reprint edition (December 12, 2011)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ December 12, 2011
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 4214 KB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Not enabled
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Sticky notes ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 344 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.5 4.5 out of 5 stars 131 ratings

About the author

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Sean McMeekin
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Sean McMeekin was born in Idaho, raised in Rochester NY, and educated at Stanford and UC Berkeley. He has been fascinated by modern history ever since playing Winston Churchill in a high school reenactment of the Yalta Conference. He pursued this interest to American and European and Middle Eastern battlefields, libraries, and archives, venturing as far east as Russia, before settling down to teach for some years in Turkey. Since 2014, he has taught at Bard College in the Hudson Valley. He is the author of eight award-winning books. McMeekin lives in Clermont, New York.

Customer reviews

4.5 out of 5 stars
4.5 out of 5
131 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Reviewed in the United States on December 1, 2011
In the arena of history of the First World War, Fritz Fischer has for decades stood above all other historians with his narrative, `Griff nach der Weltmacht' (or `Germany's Aims in the First World War' in English). This work, demonstrating a mastery of German and Austrian sources, for decades stood as THE overwhelming proof of Germany's bid to begin the Great War in order to secure its place as a world power. Numerous historians since its publication have delved into it and included it as an indispensible addition to the bibliographies of their own works.

But what if Fischer's research was incomplete? What if that fact led to mistakes that made nearly all his conclusions only partially correct-or worse yet-outright wrong? That is precisely the argument that Professor Sean McMeekin lays out in compelling fashion in his new narrative `The Russian Origins of the First World War'. In laying out the focus of this work he issues a broadside directed at the current state of the historiography of World War One. He writes, "Understanding of the First World War may be said to have regressed after the Fischer debate taught several generations of historians to pay serious attention only go Germany's war aims (3)". Thus, the focus on his current work is to rectify what he believes to be a serious deficiency in the historical record. In other words Russia's war aims must be examined every bit as exhaustively as those of Imperial Germany. McMeekin believes that "the current consensus about the First World War cannot survive serious scrutiny (5)".

Indeed, the scrutiny that the author applies to the existing documents and historical record is withering in regards to the preconceived views of so many past historians. Right away he goes to work explaining the Russian desire for control of Constantinople and the Black Sea straits the city commands as not romantic. With an admirable command of the primary sources, he goes to work proving that control of the city was anything but romantic. Instead, he argues that it was cold hard logic and the understanding of Russia's leaders of the threat to economic growth that lead to active war planning for the city's seizure as early as the last decade of the 19th century. These plans only developed and became more urgent as time went by and particularly with outbreak of regional wars during the early 20th century as well as ongoing improvements to the Ottoman navy. Indeed, McMeekin points out the purchase of Dreadnought class warships from Britain as a tipping point which solidified planning of an amphibious invasion. Russian military leaders knew that once these powerful Battleships were in Turkish possession, the balance of power in the Black Sea would swing inexorably to their favor, making any attempt at seizure of Constantinople a foolhardy venture.

Once McMeekin lays the groundwork demonstrating Russia's need for the seizure of Constantinople on clearly practical grounds, he goes on to demolish, once and for all, the myth of a diplomatically uninvolved Russia. His masterful use of the existing primary source documents clearly proves that leaders such as Sazanov and even the tsar were knowledgeable and cooperated with the entente in developing diplomatic and military responses. In short, the author proves that Russia was indeed a full member of the Entente and not merely led around by the nose or simply following the chain of events to their conclusion. Russia did indeed play a pivotal part in the initiation and escalation of hostilities, as well as the joint diplomatic planning for post war, such as Sykes Picot. They were, McMeekin argues most emphatically, not sitting along the sidelines unclear of their role.

In conclusion, `The Russian Origins of the First World War' is a gem of revisionist history. The author's command of the existing original sources is superb as is the analysis drawn from them throughout the pages of this narrative. His ability to draw the reader in with his writing skill is likewise excellent. Indeed, for me at least, this book was exciting and an absolute page turner with some quality maps to enhance the story. My only complaint with this book at all was that the 243 pages of text flew by far too rapidly. An additional hundred pages or so would have been thoroughly welcome! Bravo for this amazing work Dr. McMeekin. It clearly deserves 5 stars and I certainly look forward to many future ventures in history writing.
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Reviewed in the United States on November 27, 2011
Not knowing the author, Sean McMeekin, or any of his works, I took a chance on what appeared to be an interesting argument on the origins of the war. It is likely the greatest pleasant surprise of the year for me.
The author presents a solid case regarding the Russians and their duplicity in helping to start the war. While the Ottoman Empire was "the sick man of Europe" it is very interesting that their control of the Black Sea, and the geographical points in conjunction to it, were a tremendous threat to Russia. Russia's main Black Sea export was grain, to the tune of 20 million tons shipped in both 1911 and 1912. This financed the nation's economic development and was vital to Tsar Nicholas II and his rule of this vast nation. While much has been made about the Russian concern for the Serbs, their real concern was to keep open their warm water ports which were threatened by the Ottoman Empire.
Even before their entry into the war, Turkey had no less than five imported dreadnoughts on order. This would completely allow them control of the Black Sea. Russia was not able to launch a Black Sea dreadnought until the end of 1916!
To further frustrate the Russians, three of these were being built in England.
The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei D. Sazonov knew very well how important this area was to Russia, and the author skillfully shows his genius and deceit in making agreements highly beneficial to Russia at the expense of England and France. The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, is shown as not extremely effective with the Russians and Sazonov. Sazanov was able to extract large commitments from the British (and French)with giving up hardly anything. I always thought the British masters of negotiations and quid pro quo, but it appears, in this book, that they were more obsessed with Belgium and Flanders and willing to give Russia about anything in other areas, Sazanov was too clever not to take advantage of east concessions vital to Russia.
The Russians early on determined that the Ottoman Empire must be destroyed and Russia's warm water ports protected. Just days before the start of the war, two dreadnoughts scheduled to be delivered to Turkey, were retained in England. But two German warships from the Mediterranean Sea, the Goeben and Breslau were sent to the mouth of the Dardanelles on 10 August, 1914. These ships in effect would neutralize the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.
But Russia,largely through the work of Sazonov, greatly improved their position by proposing and getting an Allied commitment to launch an attack through the Dardanelles, and while it was a failure, Russia committed nothing to the effort but had the British and French singing from her book.
The author makes clear that Russia knew she could not control the Black Sea by herself and must have the help of the other members of the Entente, and when she entered the war, she hardly "fell on the sword for France", but was lightly committed against the Germans and more concentrated in the Balkans. She bungled her offensive into Prussia at the Mansurian Lakes, and while she had a vast population only about 30 per cent of her army was literate, while all of the German Army was.
The author covers the Russians in the Middle East, primarily Persia, the cruelty in Armenia and the massacres, the events of 1917, and the drawing up of the maps of the Middle East by the Allies.At the end of this book, you realize the forcefulness of the argument and how this book will challenge all interested parties to reevaluate previous beliefs about the start of this terrible war.
I am going to buy another copy of this first edition because I believe it will become an important and revealing work on the Great War, and I not only consider it an excellent presentation, but also a long term investment.
I would highly recommend this work.
61 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on August 24, 2014
"Cui bono?" - "Who profits from it?" This is the ultimate question one should ask when one wonders who brought about the First World War. Sean McMeekin gives the answer: the Russians. Indeed, it were the Russian politicians who hoped to gain profit from a war that, eventually, would finish off the ailing Austrian-Hungarian empire. Then, without Austrian-Hungarian interference, Russia could become the master of the Slavonic and Orthodox nations in the Balkan, conquer Constantinople, the spiritual capital of Orthodoxism, and gain control of the straits between Europe and Asia Minor, Russia's economic lifeline between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. But in order to get rid of decaying Austria-Hungary, the Russians had to wage war against the latter's allies, the Germans, too. Here they found a natural ally in France, that was all too eager to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine with the help of its Russians friends.

This book has added to my personal belief that, as far as the First World War is concerned, it is unfair to lay the blame at the Kaiser's door. The Germans would have been completely mad to have wanted a war against the three colonial superpowers of that time (Russia, France, Britain), by which they were encircled.

As for the British, I still don't understand what they were up to. Or, maybe, it is easy enough: in the nineteenth century the British government had waged so many wars everywere on earth - most of them unjust ones - that waging war had become a (bad) habit of Albion's upper class.
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Top reviews from other countries

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Elfrad
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent work
Reviewed in Canada on August 6, 2014
McMeekin belongs to a line of historians whose research challenges the view that the Germans bear the primary responsibility for WWI. He certainly makes a convincing case that the Russians greatly contributed. The work is well-written and researched but does not overwhelm the reader. I found it particularly interesting to read about the Russian plans in 1914 of partitioning Germany after their victory.
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Erik
5.0 out of 5 stars Magnificent.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 19, 2014
Magnificent read. A different view at long last on the origins of the Great War. Anyone interested in this period of our history should pick this one up. Well written and documented. Is this "revisionist" ? No, the author is doing what a historian is supposed to do. Try to understand and step away from well publicised views to get to a more accurate picture of our past. Will this be the final world on this painful episode of Europe's nations living together ? Definitely not. But it's a huge step forward in gaining a bit more of an insight.
2 people found this helpful
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C. Chorherr
5.0 out of 5 stars Ein interessanter Aspekt einer bereits gut recherchierten Zeit
Reviewed in Germany on April 16, 2013
Dieses Buch wurde mir von einer sehr vertrauenswürdigen Person empfohlen und ich habe es auch weiterempfohlen. Der erste Weltkrieg war schließlich ausschlaggebend für die Entwicklung des weiteren 20. Jahrhunderts und neue Aspekte und Sichten tragen dazu bei, dieses besser zu verstehen und damals gemachte Fehler vielleicht in Zukunft zu vermeiden.
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joe vick
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
Reviewed in Canada on November 5, 2014
All good thanks!
Pythagoras
5.0 out of 5 stars An eye-opener
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on November 11, 2012
It has to be admitted - Western efforts to understand the world wars have been strongly centered upon Western Europe, as if the actual conflict took place along the cultural fault of the river Rhine, everything else being just strategic spillovers, propagandistic pretexts or political chain reactions. This is understandable considering the fact that the Cold War created an urge in Western Germany, France, England and USA to heal the wounds of the destruction brought about by the wars and to overcome what was considered as the main cultural suicide of Europe in 1914-45.

But the Cold War is over and it is time to have a look beyond the concepts it once identified: otherwise, the Western beholder has no legitimate excuse to complain about the incomprehensibility of the post-1989 global conflicts. Timothy Snyder ("Bloodlands") has recently struggled to take attention away from the battlefields of Normandie, instead focusing upon the fact that the most horrifying tragedies of the 20th century - for which there was never set any "happy end" the kind of which becomes the topic of Hollywood movies - took place in the borderland between Hitler's and Stalin's reigns of terror.

In a similar vein, Sean McMeekin has presented us with two publications - "Berlin-Baghdad Express" and "The Russian Origins of the First World War" - in which the real epicenter of the First World War appears to be, in fact, the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East.

This is important for two reasons. First, it shows that the "Middle East" is not a periphery that has strangely jumped into the center of attention in 2001, as the bewilderment of many Western beholders still seems to imply. The "Middle East" has existed there, precisely in the middle of the picture, all the time, and when the European war broke out in 1914 it was a spillover of the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1908-22 - not the opposite.

Secondly, shifting focus from the post-colonial and nowadays rather tedious "Orientalism" narrative, according to which the Middle East was chopped up by the greedy colonialists in England and France after 1917 and as suddenly as unwittingly became the passive victim of foreign interests, McMeekin points out the fact that already before 1914 two main political contenders used the Middle East as a battlefield for their own interest, and these were Germany and Russia.

The main goal of Russia since Catherine the Great had been to take control over "the Straits", the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and Constantinople / Istanbul and so secure its all-year-round access to the sea. It had tried to use different players for its own purposes, under the pretext of defending Christians and Slavs in the Ottoman Empire, but remained anxious that the price could be claimed by someone else. Besides, England kept a guarding eye on its moves, knowing Russian imperial ambitions in Persia.

Instantly upon the access of emperor Wilhelm II in 1889 - and contrary to the warnings of Bismarck - Germany threw itself headlong into this brewing conflict by courting the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamit II. The ambitious plan for a rail line running from Berlin and Vienna to Constantinople (the Orient express) and further on through Anatolia to Syria and Iraq, would have put a wedge straight through, not only Britain's road to India, but also through the heart of Russia's ambitions.

One aspect of the German plans was the promotion of pan-Islamism on a large and hitherto unheard-of scale. The young Turks who had taken power in the Ottoman Empire after 1908 played along and in 1914 global jihad was declared against the entente. Whereas the strategic gains of the jihad policies proved to be dubious and often laughable on the battlefield, they stirred up xenophobic feelings and sectarian violence among the civil society, the echoes of which are still resounding.

Russia, on the other hand, was hoping to get Georgians and Armenians to destabilize the Ottoman state and cynically undermined the confidence among the populations south of the Caucasus, only to prove unable to help their hopeful allies when the full-scale deportations started in 1915. The result was a tragedy which is today becoming obscured by political debates on what it should be named.

Russia was also responsible for the main eviction and extinction of the Jews along its Western border, and long before the Balfour declaration Wilhelm II was toying with the thought of gaining Jewish sympathies to strengthen his position against Russia.

McMeekin manages to navigate his narrative through this historical minefield - and one fully realizes how unexplored it still is, as he comes by one unexploded ordnance after another - with the use of sober realism and bitter humor, which are the only tools that are truly becoming for a historian of the 20th century tragedies.

The titles of both books might sound a bit like topics of conspiracy theories, but they are both free from any naïve efforts to see evil-minded master plans in the turn of events. Rather, they seem to show how naïvety itself tends to be the source of the greatest evils in a world where the consequences of our actions lie beyond the scope of human prediction.
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