| Digital List Price: | $17.36 |
| Print List Price: | $21.95 |
| Kindle Price: | $14.09 Save $7.86 (36%) |
| includes VAT* | |
| Sold by: | Amazon.com Services LLC |
Your Memberships & Subscriptions
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series) Kindle Edition
| Price | New from | Used from |
|
Audible Audiobook, Unabridged
"Please retry" |
$0.00
| Free with your Audible trial | |
|
MP3 CD, Audiobook, MP3 Audio, Unabridged
"Please retry" |
—
| $11.35 | — |
Named a Financial Times Best Book of 2018
“Idealists as well as realists need to read this systematic tour de force.”—Robert D. Kaplan, author of The Return of Marco Polo’s World
It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build international institutions. The policy of remaking the world in America’s image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has become a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home.
In this major statement, the renowned international-relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony—the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the Cold War ended—is doomed to fail. It makes far more sense, he maintains, for Washington to adopt a more restrained foreign policy based on a sound understanding of how nationalism and realism constrain great powers abroad. The Great Delusion is a lucid and compelling work of the first importance for scholars, policymakers, and everyone interested in the future of American foreign policy.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherYale University Press
- Publication dateSeptember 25, 2018
- File size1013 KB
-
Next 3 for you in this series
$50.55 -
All 8 for you in this series
$150.22
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Political liberalism, in my lexicon, is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights.Highlighted by 547 Kindle readers
Liberal states have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to restrain.Highlighted by 409 Kindle readers
My argument, stated briefly, is that nationalism and realism almost always trump liberalism.Highlighted by 399 Kindle readers
Editorial Reviews
About the Author
Review
“[An] accessible treatise . . . a disquieting critique.”—Publishers Weekly
"Mearsheimer has been especially powerful, including in this new book, in pointing out that too many liberal internationalists have failed to contend with the enduring power of nationalism and identity. Recent history has proved him more right and the American foreign policy community more wrong.”—Jake Sullivan, Foreign Affairs
“A dagger pointed at the heart of America’s governing philosophy.”—Robert W. Merry, The American Conservative
“A closely-reasoned case for the virtues of restraint.”—David Warsh, Economic Principals newsletter
“A . . . radical critique of the liberal foreign policy paradigm as a whole.”—Murtaza Hussain, The Intercept
“Mearsheimer believes that it is folly for a nation-state to try and remake and socially engineer a different nation-state in its own image. . . . [He} opts for clarity over ornate prose: he defines his terms, constructs tight arguments, anticipates and responds to counterarguments.”—Daniel Kishi, American Conservative
"Even dissenters of Mearsheimer's approach to an explanation of world politics and American foreign policy will find this book worthy of their attention and consideration as a comprehensive theoretical statement deserving of praise."—S. R. Silverburg, Choice
“Accessible and yet rigorous, The Great Delusion deserves to be read by policymakers, scholars and the public alike. . . . The case against liberal hegemony as a grand strategy for the United States that Mearsheimer offers is compelling.”—Michael Lind, National Interest
Winner of the the James Madison Award, sponsored by the American Political Science Association
"This is the best of the many books that seek to explain how and why American foreign policy has gone so disastrously wrong. Mearsheimer hits the sweet spot where theory meets the chaos of today's world."—Stephen Kinzer, author of The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War
"John Mearsheimer’s The Great Delusion is policy-relevant scholarship at its best: a summation of a leading scholar’s accumulated thinking about international relations theory and American foreign policy."—Christopher Layne, University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, Texas A&M University
"Liberal states have many virtues, but The Great Delusion explains, with rigorous logic and admirable clarity, why their efforts to spread their values are usually doomed to fail. Both liberal crusaders and unrepentant realists have much to learn from this compelling book.”—Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
"Idealists as well as realists need to read this systematic tour de force. Even if you don't agree, it will discipline your own thinking."—Robert D. Kaplan, author of The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Product details
- ASIN : B07H3XRPQS
- Publisher : Yale University Press (September 25, 2018)
- Publication date : September 25, 2018
- Language : English
- File size : 1013 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 328 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #148,068 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year, he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally. He has published six books: Conventional Deterrence (1983), which won the Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Book Award; Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001, 2014), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize and has been translated into eight different languages; The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), which made the New York Times best seller list and has been translated into twenty-four different languages; Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (2011), which has been translated into twelve different languages; and The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018).
He has also written many articles that have appeared in academic journals like International Security, and popular magazines like Foreign Affairs and the London Review of Books. Furthermore he has written a number of op-ed pieces for the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times dealing with topics like Bosnia, nuclear proliferation, American policy towards India, the failure of Arab-Israeli peace efforts, the folly of invading Iraq, and the causes of the Ukrainian crisis.
Finally, Professor Mearsheimer has won a number of teaching awards. He received the Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching when he was a graduate student at Cornell in 1977, and he won the Quantrell Award for Distinguished Teaching at the University of Chicago in 1985. In addition, he was selected as a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar for the 1993-1994 academic year. In that capacity, he gave a series of talks at eight colleges and universities. In 2003, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Customer reviews
Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon-
Top reviews
Top reviews from the United States
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Mearsheimer argues that the U.S. pursued “liberal hegemony” after the Cold War, and this has been a terrible mistake. Internationally, this has resulted in never-ending wars. He argues that ‘liberal states have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to restrain.’ Liberalism prizes the concept of inalienable or natural rights, committed liberals are ‘deeply concerned about the rights of virtually every individual on the planet.’ This universalist logic leads liberal states to fight endless wars, and to ‘collide with nationalism, which inevitably wins.'
The main aim of liberal hegemonists has been to remake the world in America’s image. It was assumed that the U.S. had an almost divine right to run the world because it was smarter and better than everybody else. The strategy had three components: 1. Spread liberal democracy across the planet. 2. Integrate more and more countries into the open international economy. 3. Integrate more and more countries into international institutions. This strategy has often failed. Although China joined the WTO it never aspired to become a democracy. America's focus on military might and the pursuit of primacy to spread its values has embroiled us in costly, unwise and unwinnable wars.
Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony has failed miserably. It was assumed that the Muslim world could be Americanized. Non-democratic or hostile regimes, like Iran, Syria and North Korea that were opposed to American influence, could be sanctioned and threatened with force. When tougher measures were required, the U.S. could use its powerful military to remove despotic regimes and impose democracy. For decades the U.S. has forcibly overthrown regimes it considers hostile to its interests, usually in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Unfortunately, regime change using military force has not gone well in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Nation-building in the Muslim world has proved expensive in terms of blood and treasure.
Americans are very patriotic, but in recent years US policymakers have not always understood that other countries are also patriotic. They don't want to be occupied by foreigners, even if they mean well. American nationalism has also supplied an unhealthy dose of hubris to the equation. He blames people like Madeleine Albright and others who promoted American exceptionalism. Albright believed that the U.S. is "the indispensable nation" and nobody else has the required wisdom and expertise to lead. If America wasn’t running the show the jungle would grow back and bad people, like ISIS and Putin, would take over. They believe the American president is the leader of the free world and operates like a good shepherd protecting the Western flock.
Mearsheimer argues that aside from the family, the most important group in today’s world is the nation-state. Apart from the EU countries, sovereignty and self-determination are important to most independent nations. They usually resist foreign interference. After WW1, President Woodrow Wilson made self-determination an important aspect of American foreign policy. China and Russia are also fiercely patriotic and nationalistic as we have seen in the South China Sea and Crimea. Mearsheimer believes that nationalism and realism will always trump liberalism. He also believes that great powers dominate the international system, and they constantly engage in security competition with each other, which sometimes leads to war. China and Russia don't aspire to be like the US, they don't want to be part of an American led world order, but they are too powerful to invade and occupy.
Mearsheimer examines liberal hegemony’s track record. Firstly, the Bush Doctrine & the greater Middle East. which was a plan to turn the Middle East into a sea of democracies. The result was a total disaster, it created several failed states instead. Secondly, the Ukraine Crisis and U.S.-Russia Relations. He blames the awful relations between the US and Russia and the Ukraine crisis on NATO expansion. Pushing up to Russia’s borders was a mistake. George Kennan, who advised Harry Truman on containing the Soviet Union, told Clinton he was making a mistake in 1997, and his actions would lead to a new Cold War. Clinton had Albright advising him and she did not seem to understand Russian patriotism or its fear of invasion. Thirdly, he blames the failure of “engagement” with China. Mearsheimer criticizes the way the US has engaged with China, helping it grow quicker while naively thinking that it would eventually become a liberal democracy.
The costs of liberal hegemony begin with the endless wars a liberal state ends up fighting to protect human rights and spread liberal democracy around the world. Once unleashed, he argues that a liberal unipolar power soon becomes addicted to war. The US has spent over $2.3 trillion fighting the war in Afghanistan. Mearsheimer argues that “the idea that the US can go around the world trying to establish democracies and doing social engineering is a prescription for trouble.” Countries will resist foreign interference. Also, in many parts of the world, people prefer security over liberal democracy, even if that security is provided by soft authoritarianism. The Libyans and Iraqis were probably happier under Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. If they stayed out of politics, people could live a relatively normal life. The Christians in Iraq had been protected by the government, after the war they were persecuted. I once met the so-called ‘Vicar of Baghdad’ an Anglican pastor. He received death threats from Islamists and required several bodyguards. Eventually, it became too dangerous for him to stay in Iraq. Russians remember the chaos and anarchy of the Yeltsin years and they don’t want that to return. Putin may be an authoritarian leader but he offers stability.
Mearsheimer argues that problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decision-making authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders are porous. Furthermore, the hyper globalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. The liberal international order is possible only in a unipolar world.
Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony is finished. The US now needs to worry about the growing military power of rivals like China and Russia. The collapse of the Afghan army in the space of just a few weeks will prompt the military and Washington’s policymakers to reflect on their policy failures over the course of the last twenty years. The US seems to have ignored Afghan culture, politics, and history. Whatever they have tried in Afghanistan has not worked. The US probably has too many international obligations, and we meddle too much in other country's affairs. We should forget about being the world’s policeman and focus more on solving our own domestic problems. We should spend more money fixing the homeland.
The spread of liberal democracy once seemed inevitable, but China will never become a democracy. Russians seem happy with a strong man like Putin as their leader. As Lieutenant General Dan Bolger pointed out in his book 'Why We Lost' about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American army is not good at fighting insurgencies. By the time the book was published in 2018, democracy was in retreat in many places and under considerable strain in the U.S. itself.
He breaks foreign policy strategies into three key categories: realism, nationalism and liberal hegemony. By identifying these categories, he is able to address each one independently and argue convincingly that realism and nationalism always win out over liberal hegemony.
There were very few points in the book where I could see Mearsheimer was clearly overlooking a simple truth or counterclaim. This meant that as a reader, counterarguments came slowly and only as a result of considerable thought on my part. That's what I like! and what I think we need as a country: well-considered discourse on these subjects that matter for our national security and ability to flourish as a nation. I bet you will find the same. I highly recommend the book.
Mearsheimer makes clear that we in the U.S. can be our own worst enemy because of our idealism and desire to improve the human condition through ideals centered on individual rights. This is deeply ingrained in our psyche and has led to our relative success as a nation-state. It seems natural then, that we would want to export our model of governance to others so they may share in our prosperity and, to simplify, make the World a better place for all of us. This belief has driven the U.S. to pursue policies from a liberal hegemonic standpoint that has led, unfortunately, to more involvement of the U.S. in military conflict. While the U.S. is not necessarily alone in this foreign policy perspective, shared to some degree with fellow Western liberal democracies, our history with individual rights differs from some of our European partners who went through a relatively long imperialist phase that colors their traditions and beliefs to some extent. Mearsheimer's early chapters cover this somewhat to set the stage for his views on exporting liberal ideals.
With the rise of China as a Great Power competitor, Mearsheimer believes we should reassess and recalibrate our approach to avoid the pitfalls of trying to force liberalist ideals on nationalist and realist schools of thought that are likelier to have larger influence on human behavior in most countries. Perhaps this is a sensible thing to do as the competition for influence increases. Mearsheimer warns, however, that should the U.S. find itself as a lone superpower again in the future, liberal hegemony is bound to failure and cautions a return to this strategy.
Top reviews from other countries
Mearsheimer argues that with the rise of China and Russia, the world is now not unipolar but the liberal elites have been slow to catch up to that fact. Liberal Hegemony he says cannot succeed in a bipolar or multipolar world. He also says that liberal policies abroad lead to illiberal policies at home.
I found this book riveting since it explains the delusional mindset of liberal elites and their quest for a world government based on Liberal values. Given the rise of Russia as a nuclear power and the inability of the West to contain it, it undermines Fukuyama’s assertion that there will no longer be wars and that mankind’s greatest problem might be boredom. Mearsheimer takes us back to the role of Realism or Realpolitik or peace through strength. In having downplayed the role of Nationalism or Populism, the Liberal mindset has been caught up in a delusion of ‘Love, Peace and Dope’.





