Israel and the Bomb (Historical Dictionaries of Cities of) 0th Edition
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Avner Cohen
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Avner Cohen
(Author)
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ISBN-13:
978-0231104821
ISBN-10:
0231104820
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Editorial Reviews
Review
A scholarly treatise that includes over 1,200 footnotes, yet reads like a novel.... [Cohen] analyzes in rich detail how this policy of 'nuclear opacity' evolved and what made it possible. -- Lawrence Kolb ― New York Times Book Review
Israel and the Bomb should be required reading for those interested in nuclear issues in general and in the complexities of the American-Israeli relationship in particular. For American decision makers, the book should serve as an invaluable case-study of how not to deal with future instances of nuclear proliferation -- Michael Rubner ― Middle East Policy
This important volume deserves the attention of Middle East scholars and students of foreign policy, nuclear proliferation, and Israeli politics. -- A.R. Norton ― Choice
Cohen's work will necessitate the rewriting of Israel's history, wars, international relations, domestic political crises, economy, psychology, national pride--everything will have to be viewed in a different light. -- Tom Segev ― Ha'aretz
For anyone interested in the never-ending struggles in the Middle East and life on the edge in the nuclear age, this book is a must-read. ― Miami Herald
A compelling and comprehensive account of the development of what he calls Israel's doctrine of 'nuclear opacity.' -- Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Cohen's book hits nations sensitivity. -- Dan Ephron ― Washington Times
... Avner Cohen's book stands in a class of its own. It is the first scholarly study of the history of this project, it is richly documented, and it unveils some of the major mysteries surrounding events by tapping a large body of previously untouched sources.... It can only be assumed that when this national mood of 'nuclear' ignorance changes, Cohen's book will serve as a solid foundation for this debate. -- Uri Bar-Joseph ― Jewish History
Cohen has produced another rich historical narrative that functions as a readily accessible page-turner. ― Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs
Israel and the Bomb should be required reading for those interested in nuclear issues in general and in the complexities of the American-Israeli relationship in particular. For American decision makers, the book should serve as an invaluable case-study of how not to deal with future instances of nuclear proliferation -- Michael Rubner ― Middle East Policy
This important volume deserves the attention of Middle East scholars and students of foreign policy, nuclear proliferation, and Israeli politics. -- A.R. Norton ― Choice
Cohen's work will necessitate the rewriting of Israel's history, wars, international relations, domestic political crises, economy, psychology, national pride--everything will have to be viewed in a different light. -- Tom Segev ― Ha'aretz
For anyone interested in the never-ending struggles in the Middle East and life on the edge in the nuclear age, this book is a must-read. ― Miami Herald
A compelling and comprehensive account of the development of what he calls Israel's doctrine of 'nuclear opacity.' -- Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Cohen's book hits nations sensitivity. -- Dan Ephron ― Washington Times
... Avner Cohen's book stands in a class of its own. It is the first scholarly study of the history of this project, it is richly documented, and it unveils some of the major mysteries surrounding events by tapping a large body of previously untouched sources.... It can only be assumed that when this national mood of 'nuclear' ignorance changes, Cohen's book will serve as a solid foundation for this debate. -- Uri Bar-Joseph ― Jewish History
Cohen has produced another rich historical narrative that functions as a readily accessible page-turner. ― Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs
About the Author
Avner Cohen is a senior research fellow at the National Security Archive at George Washington University. He has taught and researched in universities in Israel and the United States and has published numerous articles on subjects as diverse as skepticism, political theory, nuclear ethics, nuclear proliferation, and Israeli history. He is the coeditor of Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity and The Institution of Philosophy.
Product details
- Publisher : Columbia University Press; 0 edition (October 15, 1998)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 470 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0231104820
- ISBN-13 : 978-0231104821
- Lexile measure : 1550L
- Item Weight : 1.89 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 1.25 x 9 inches
-
Best Sellers Rank:
#432,619 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #107 in Arms Control (Books)
- #155 in Middle Eastern History (Books)
- #355 in Nuclear Weapons & Warfare History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
Customer reviews
4.2 out of 5 stars
4.2 out of 5
17 global ratings
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Top reviews from the United States
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Reviewed in the United States on October 31, 2016
Verified Purchase
I have not finished it yet, but so far it looks like a well written book that tells the story on how Israel built its nuclear inventory. I will add to this comment once I finish reading it.
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Reviewed in the United States on June 4, 2015
Verified Purchase
This book describes in detail how Israel developed the bomb with assistance from France. It also explains the U.S. NEED to defend Israel to prevent a new nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It does not discuss the Iranian nuclear program, but it can be inferred why they want their program.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 12, 2018
Verified Purchase
very good
Reviewed in the United States on June 25, 2014
Verified Purchase
Informative and interesting the book is covering a very significant period of Israel early years with quality research and insight
2 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on May 14, 2015
Verified Purchase
Just read the epilogue, the book is an endless run after your tail. It does not say anything new.
But, if you have insomnia, this book will put you to sleep!
But, if you have insomnia, this book will put you to sleep!
One person found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2013
Verified Purchase
When I received it, I was in hospital, which I leave yesterday.
My comments in an other two weeks
EF
My comments in an other two weeks
EF
Reviewed in the United States on May 7, 2004
A (long) waiting for the latest shipment of books from Amazon has an upside - I'm left to read books purchased in Israeli bookstores, often in Hebrew, and obviously, often about Israel or Israeli politics.
Avner Cohen's "Israel and the Bomb" is such a book, and, despite some structural flaws it is a well written one. The main focus is not really Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction, but Israel's nuclear policies, particularly vis a vis the United States. This is the story of Israel's responds to US pressure with two similar but distinct strategies, which Cohen designates "Ambiguity" and "Opacity".
In late 1960, the US government came to realize that Israel was constructing in Dimona a large scale nuclear reactor. The uncovering of that Israeli state secret led to various Israeli announcements that Israel had no intention of building Nuclear WMDs. On the 21st of December, 3 days after a New York Times front page story about Israel's Reactor in Dimona, David Ben Gurion made what is still the only Prime Ministerial speech in the Knesset (Israel's parliament) about its Nuclear Policies, stating that the Reactor is meant for peaceful uses only (p.128).
The Eisenhower administration seemed initially unwilling to pressure Israel about its nuclear facilities, but following the exposure it did demand answers about Israel's plans. In a meeting with US Ambassador Ogden R Reid, David Ben Gurion stated that the Plutonium from the reactor will be returned to the manufacturing country, that Israel will allow visits of scientists from friendly countries in the reactor, but not international inspections, and that Israel did not plan to construct a third nuclear reactor. He also denied any intentions to construct a nuclear bomb (pp. 130-133).
When John F. Kennedy became the 35th president of the United States, US policy became hostile to Nuclear Proliferation, and Kennedy started a drive that ended in the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, his policies towards Israel were meant to assure that Israel was not constructing Nuclear weapons. Since Israel was doing just that, the clashes were all but inevitable.
US Scientists started to inspect (the US's term; Israel preferred "visit") Dimona in 1961. Despite the US demand for 2 such visits per year, Israel's duck-and-weave policy never allowed more then one single day visit per year.
The US continued to pressure Israel, especially towards the end of Kennedy's administration. In April of 1963, Kennedy arranged an unplanned meeting with Shimon Peres, the architect of Israel's reactor in Dimona and then the deputy minister for defense, in which Peres first articulated (apparently spontaneously) Israel's formula about Nuclear weapons "Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the middle east" (p. 159). Towards the end of Ben Gurion's prime ministry, and Kennedy's presidency, the ground rules for the "ambiguity" policy of Israel were set: Israel stated that it had no intentions to construct nuclear weapons, and it allowed US visitors, albeit in a lesser frequency then the US desired. Ben Gurion's resignation and the assassination of Kennedy meant that their predecessors would have to continue, and refine, "ambiguity" as Israel's policy and US's response.
The main change in subsequent US-Israeli relationship was Israel's increased interest in purchasing conventional weapons from the US. Strangely, Israel and the US switched roles in these two dialogues. Regarding Nuclear weapons, the US kept pressuring Israel to allow more inspections, and to authorize the US to share its belief in Israel's peaceful intentions, while Israel evaded. In the weapons front, Israel kept asking to buy weapons, while the US tried to evade and delay. Neither side wanted to connect the subjects, because Israel was anxious not to disclose its intentions, while the US feared that pressuring Israel by withholding conventional weaponry would only further commit it to the nuclear option (p. 272). Unlike the Kennedy administration, Lyndon Johnson seems to have been willing to accept Israel's nuclear plans, as long as they were not public. Thus "ambiguity" started to give over to "opacity" (p. 276).
Chiefly, "Opacity" meant the acknowledgement of Israel as a de-facto Nuclear power, provided that Israel made few outspoken references to its nuclear capacities. Late in the Johnson administration, the President was unwilling to tie the sale of Phantom jets to Israel to Israel's signing the Non-Proliferation Treatment. Israel's then ambassador to the US, Yitzhak Rabin, defined Israel agreement not to "introduce" nuclear weapons to the Middle East as an agreement not to test it (p. 409). By then Israel clearly possessed nuclear weapons. Under Nixon, the US effectively gave up contesting that definition, and gave up the increasingly embarrassing inspections of the Dimona reactor. On the 18th of July, 1970, the New York Times announced that Israel was a nuclear power, and although both Israel's official spokespersons and the State Department denounced the article as "speculative" and "inaccurate", neither denied it (p. 434).
Avner Cohen's book tells the story of the creation of the Israeli bomb, and the relations between Israel and the US is just one part of this story. Yet it was the Israeli-American relationship that above all defined Israel's continued policy of Opacity, still intact almost 35 years after that New York Times news story. In the afterwards, Cohen calls for a reconsideration of Israel's nuclear policy, and is encouraged by the new openness of public discourse about it. Yet even if Israel's policy was chiefly designed in response to US pressure, the bomb was build because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that conflict, it often seems that the more things change, the more they stay the same.
Avner Cohen's "Israel and the Bomb" is such a book, and, despite some structural flaws it is a well written one. The main focus is not really Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction, but Israel's nuclear policies, particularly vis a vis the United States. This is the story of Israel's responds to US pressure with two similar but distinct strategies, which Cohen designates "Ambiguity" and "Opacity".
In late 1960, the US government came to realize that Israel was constructing in Dimona a large scale nuclear reactor. The uncovering of that Israeli state secret led to various Israeli announcements that Israel had no intention of building Nuclear WMDs. On the 21st of December, 3 days after a New York Times front page story about Israel's Reactor in Dimona, David Ben Gurion made what is still the only Prime Ministerial speech in the Knesset (Israel's parliament) about its Nuclear Policies, stating that the Reactor is meant for peaceful uses only (p.128).
The Eisenhower administration seemed initially unwilling to pressure Israel about its nuclear facilities, but following the exposure it did demand answers about Israel's plans. In a meeting with US Ambassador Ogden R Reid, David Ben Gurion stated that the Plutonium from the reactor will be returned to the manufacturing country, that Israel will allow visits of scientists from friendly countries in the reactor, but not international inspections, and that Israel did not plan to construct a third nuclear reactor. He also denied any intentions to construct a nuclear bomb (pp. 130-133).
When John F. Kennedy became the 35th president of the United States, US policy became hostile to Nuclear Proliferation, and Kennedy started a drive that ended in the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, his policies towards Israel were meant to assure that Israel was not constructing Nuclear weapons. Since Israel was doing just that, the clashes were all but inevitable.
US Scientists started to inspect (the US's term; Israel preferred "visit") Dimona in 1961. Despite the US demand for 2 such visits per year, Israel's duck-and-weave policy never allowed more then one single day visit per year.
The US continued to pressure Israel, especially towards the end of Kennedy's administration. In April of 1963, Kennedy arranged an unplanned meeting with Shimon Peres, the architect of Israel's reactor in Dimona and then the deputy minister for defense, in which Peres first articulated (apparently spontaneously) Israel's formula about Nuclear weapons "Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the middle east" (p. 159). Towards the end of Ben Gurion's prime ministry, and Kennedy's presidency, the ground rules for the "ambiguity" policy of Israel were set: Israel stated that it had no intentions to construct nuclear weapons, and it allowed US visitors, albeit in a lesser frequency then the US desired. Ben Gurion's resignation and the assassination of Kennedy meant that their predecessors would have to continue, and refine, "ambiguity" as Israel's policy and US's response.
The main change in subsequent US-Israeli relationship was Israel's increased interest in purchasing conventional weapons from the US. Strangely, Israel and the US switched roles in these two dialogues. Regarding Nuclear weapons, the US kept pressuring Israel to allow more inspections, and to authorize the US to share its belief in Israel's peaceful intentions, while Israel evaded. In the weapons front, Israel kept asking to buy weapons, while the US tried to evade and delay. Neither side wanted to connect the subjects, because Israel was anxious not to disclose its intentions, while the US feared that pressuring Israel by withholding conventional weaponry would only further commit it to the nuclear option (p. 272). Unlike the Kennedy administration, Lyndon Johnson seems to have been willing to accept Israel's nuclear plans, as long as they were not public. Thus "ambiguity" started to give over to "opacity" (p. 276).
Chiefly, "Opacity" meant the acknowledgement of Israel as a de-facto Nuclear power, provided that Israel made few outspoken references to its nuclear capacities. Late in the Johnson administration, the President was unwilling to tie the sale of Phantom jets to Israel to Israel's signing the Non-Proliferation Treatment. Israel's then ambassador to the US, Yitzhak Rabin, defined Israel agreement not to "introduce" nuclear weapons to the Middle East as an agreement not to test it (p. 409). By then Israel clearly possessed nuclear weapons. Under Nixon, the US effectively gave up contesting that definition, and gave up the increasingly embarrassing inspections of the Dimona reactor. On the 18th of July, 1970, the New York Times announced that Israel was a nuclear power, and although both Israel's official spokespersons and the State Department denounced the article as "speculative" and "inaccurate", neither denied it (p. 434).
Avner Cohen's book tells the story of the creation of the Israeli bomb, and the relations between Israel and the US is just one part of this story. Yet it was the Israeli-American relationship that above all defined Israel's continued policy of Opacity, still intact almost 35 years after that New York Times news story. In the afterwards, Cohen calls for a reconsideration of Israel's nuclear policy, and is encouraged by the new openness of public discourse about it. Yet even if Israel's policy was chiefly designed in response to US pressure, the bomb was build because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that conflict, it often seems that the more things change, the more they stay the same.
35 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on April 25, 2003
Interesting account of the secret development of the Israeli atomic bomb, starting in the fifties with the decision of Ben Gurion, and his persistence. One can hardly exempt Israel from the general charges against proliferation, but at least in this instance there is a certain discipline to the endeavor, and, so far, no mad bomber routines. To be sure, Israel is a special case, the factor of deterrence has surely been more than abstraction. And one can only cheer at the destruction of the Iraq reactor.
But this work is interesting for the description of the insidious tactics of 'opacity' in the public discourse of Israel on the subject, that is, the engineered lack of discourse. We invade Iraq to nix the nukes, while Israel simply slipped into half-invisible mode. That is changing now, and the author ponders the future here. Quo vadis?
But this work is interesting for the description of the insidious tactics of 'opacity' in the public discourse of Israel on the subject, that is, the engineered lack of discourse. We invade Iraq to nix the nukes, while Israel simply slipped into half-invisible mode. That is changing now, and the author ponders the future here. Quo vadis?
9 people found this helpful
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