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A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (Yale Library of Military History) Hardcover – October 20, 2009
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An argument for a dramatically different approach to counterinsurgency, based on a reinterpretation of the nature of counterinsurgency warfare.
According to the prevailing view of counterinsurgency, the key to defeating insurgents is selecting methods that will win the people’s hearts and minds. The hearts-and-minds theory permeates not only most counterinsurgency books of the twenty-first century but the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the U.S. military’s foremost text on counterinsurgency. Mark Moyar assails this conventional wisdom, asserting that the key to counterinsurgency is selecting commanders who have superior leadership abilities. Whereas the hearts-and-minds school recommends allocating much labor and treasure to economic, social, and political reforms, Moyar advocates concentrating resources on security, civil administration, and leadership development.
Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency, from the Civil War and Reconstruction to Afghanistan and Iraq, that draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans, including top leaders in today’s armed forces. Through a series of case studies, Moyar identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been much more prevalent in some organizations than others. He explains how the U.S. military and America’s allies in Afghanistan and Iraq should revamp their personnel systems in order to elevate more individuals with those attributes.
A Question of Command will reshape the study and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. With counterinsurgency now one of the most pressing issues facing the United States, this book is a must-read for policymakers, military officers, and citizens.
- Print length368 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherYale University Press
- Publication dateOctober 20, 2009
- Dimensions6.13 x 1.06 x 9.25 inches
- ISBN-100300152760
- ISBN-13978-0300152760
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Editorial Reviews
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"In the burgeoning literature on counterinsurgency prompted by American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, this volume stands out. Moyar's argument, that the quality of leadership plays a far larger role in the outcome of such conflicts than is normally acknowledged, is surely correct; his graceful examination of conflicts spanning one hundred fifty years is convincing. A book that makes an important historical argument and, just as important, will be of use to leaders who will bear responsibility on the battlefields of the Long War."―Eliot A. Cohen, author of Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime -- Eliot A. Cohen
"One of the great mistakes we made after the Vietnam War was forgetting what we learned there. Mark Moyar has ensured that we don't forget what we learned in Iraq over the last seven years―and has also re-captured lessons from earlier conflicts."―Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 -- Thomas E. Ricks
"Mark Moyar convincingly demonstrates that small unit leaders win counterinsurgencies. His chapter on Afghanistan is especially disturbing; I hope someone in authority is listening."―Bing West, author of The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq -- Bing West
“A Question of Command stands out because it reaches back quite far, and to unexpected destinations.” ―Wilson Quarterly
― Wilson Quarterly Published On: 2009-09-01“Moyar's study of Vietnam--Triumph Forsaken--is becoming a classic in counterinsurgency circles. His new case studies--A Question of Command--are making it to the desks of top military decision makers.”--George Stephanopoulos, ABC News -- George Stephanopoulos ― ABC News
“Moyar is a true pioneer in a field whose importance for national security has been accepted only reluctantly and belatedly by the American public. . . . Now we have a vastly improved roadmap for guidance.”-- John Tierney, Books and Culture -- John Tierney ― Books and Culture
“Terrorism, uniquely horrifying as it is, doesn’t belong to an entirely separate and containable realm of human experience, like the one occupied by serial killers. Instead, it’s a tactic whose aims bleed into the larger, endless struggle of people to control land, set up governments, and exercise power. History is about managing that struggle.”--Nicholas Lemann, The New Yorker
-- Nicholas Lemann ― New Yorker Published On: 2010-04-26
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Yale University Press; 1st edition (October 20, 2009)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 368 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0300152760
- ISBN-13 : 978-0300152760
- Item Weight : 1.5 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.13 x 1.06 x 9.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #2,011,022 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #558 in Iraq History (Books)
- #1,492 in Iraq War History (Books)
- #4,049 in Military Strategy History (Books)
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Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonCustomers say
Customers find the book insightful and well-researched, offering insights into counterinsurgency efforts and military history. They appreciate the author's ability to intertwine case studies with the realities of fighting. The leadership style is described as measurable and observable. However, opinions differ on the writing style - some find it well-written and engaging, while others feel it lacks consistent organization and structure.
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Customers find the book insightful and well-written. They appreciate the author's in-depth research and intertwining case studies with the realities of fighting a war. The book provides enough background to understand the author's ideas and is a must-read for serious students of military history.
"...Finally, I think he opens a very credible, and new research stream for those interested in counter-insurgency, i.e. COIN leadership and elites...." Read more
"...Most of it is because of his general argument: Implementation of a counterinsurgency plan, no matter how well thought out on paper, requires a..." Read more
"...While it is fascinating military history, it is Dr. Moyar's deft presentation of that history that provides the persuasive case for his thesis..." Read more
"Mr. Moyar has done an excellent job of intertwining case studies with the realities of fighting a counterinsurgency...." Read more
Customers appreciate the leadership style. They mention the author has measurable and observable leadership attributes like judgement, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, and integrity.
"...and highly context dependent; but demonstrated there are leadership attributes, measurable and observable, that successful COIN operations have in..." Read more
"...is a leader-centric type of warfare and that without flexible, charismatic leaders who make de-centralized command structure their rule, making..." Read more
"...to leadership (ie- integrity, creativity, inginuity, etc.)Leaders at every level (and type -political/military/etc) need to be able to assess the..." Read more
"...book covering the history of counterinsurgent warfare and the leadership question...." Read more
Customers have mixed opinions about the writing style. Some find it well-written and insightful, while others mention issues with the organization and layout. They say there are no headings or consistent organization within the sections, and the book tends to ramble along without much structure.
"...This man does excellent, in-depth research is a good writer too...." Read more
"...The second flaw is the organization and layout of the book...." Read more
"...Parts are well written, some go on a bit...." Read more
"...It is artfully argued, well researched, and written in a manner that engages the reader from the preface to the final chapter. "..." Read more
Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on October 26, 2009"A Question of Command" is head and shoulders above its contemporaries when it comes to objectively distilling counterinsurgency theory. The first thing you will notice is that Moyar's treatment of competing theories is comprehensive and the book is extremely well documented and footnoted. Very professional.
The central theme of Moyar's work is the theory that counterinsurgency is "leader-centric" warfare, a contest between elites in which the elites with the superior leadership attributes usually win.
I was pre-disposed to discard this theory, but thought, "it may be an interesting book anyway." Well you can teach an old dog new tricks. His articulate and well documented arguments caused me to reconsider my biases and pre-conceived notions about the role of leadership in counter-insurgency warfare. You see, anybody can say "leadership is the key." But not everybody can get down in the weeds and spell out the specifics where both good and bad leadership made a substantive difference. This man does excellent, in-depth research is a good writer too.
Mr. Moyar's uses case studies, some of which are a bit remote from mainstream counterinsurgency literature, e.g. the Civil War, Reconstruction in the South (a major eye-opener for me), The Philippine Insurrection, The Huk Rebellion, Malaya, Vietnam, the Salvadoran Insurgency, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Vietnam was especially interesting. There is a prevailing logic as to how and why we "lost in Vietnam." I am not going to be a spoiler. I am a Vietnam "Era" Vet, and I encourage other Vets to read the book, especially this Chapter. I think it sets the record straight about a lot of half-truths and politically correct journalist accounts that were flat incorrect.
While Moyar forcefully puts forth his hypotheses on leadership as the key factor, he simultaneously castigates "ethnocentric" American civilian and military leaders that had little or no appreciation for Vietnamese culture and values (this hubris is not restricted to Vietnam, but is endemic to all counter-insurgency wars) Assumptions about the universal appeal of American political and cultural norms coupled with a lack of appreciation for the host country's culture was a formula for failure. Moyar's assessment of the Diem régime is most telling in this regard. My only complaint is that I cannot share his esteem for the leadership abilities of Gen. Creighton Abrams. I remember all too well how General Abrams encouraged the court martial of Col. Bob Rheault, then commander of 7th Special Forces,over the "termination" of a double-agent. I never thought Abrams, a straight-leg tanker, was a friend to special operations.
His chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan are also enlightening and credible. He had excellent access to a variety of Army and Marine leaders and leaves no doubt about sources and attributions. He also went "to the field" and saw those wars first hand. Those are not my wars; but Moyar gives me a true narrative of war seen through the eyes of men doing the fighting.
Finally, I think he opens a very credible, and new research stream for those interested in counter-insurgency, i.e. COIN leadership and elites. He readily admits that counterinsurgency operations are complex and highly context dependent; but demonstrated there are leadership attributes, measurable and observable, that successful COIN operations have in common from the American Civil War to our current conflicts.
Good job! I highly recommend the book.
- Reviewed in the United States on April 4, 2010Moyar's thesis makes sense: counter-insurgent strategies have only worked when implemented through engaged leadership. Moyar makes a very strong case that insurgencies, whether one hundred and fifty years ago or five years ago, consistently relied, and continue to rely, on a standard tool bag for success, and that successful counter-insurgencies had strong leaders with a consistent set of personality traits all tied to initiative, judgment, and empathy- in short, adaptability.
Is it a "must read"? Most of it is because of his general argument: Implementation of a counterinsurgency plan, no matter how well thought out on paper, requires a creative leader completely dialed into the complexity of counterinsurgency. My only criticism of the book is that the writing is not consistently succinct. Parts are well written, some go on a bit. Generally, if you're a serious student of the topic, you will want to at least read chapters "Leader-Centric Warfare", "Reconstruction in the South", "The Malayan Emergency", "The Vietnam War", and "How to Win". If he tightened up the book, I'd give it a 5.
In sum, I'm a predisposed fan of small unit leadership so Moyar's thinking tracks mine. Even if you disagree with Moyar, read parts of the book and debate it- test it. And by the way, while Moyar is obviously disposed toward the Marine Corp, he does not turn the book into a "marine way" over "the army way" argument. He treats both services objectively, contrasting the two for purely academic purposes.
- Reviewed in the United States on September 15, 2013Dr. Mark Moyar's most recent book, "A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq," is a must read for any serious student of military history, and, in particular, those who are interested in the realities of counterinsurgency. It is artfully argued, well researched, and written in a manner that engages the reader from the preface to the final chapter.
"A Question of Command" is an outstanding addition to the distinguished, and highly regarded, "Yale Library of Military History." While it is fascinating military history, it is Dr. Moyar's deft presentation of that history that provides the persuasive case for his thesis concerning the criticality of leadership, "Leader-Centric Warfare," to the success, or failure, of counterinsurgency efforts.
Effective leadership is crucial to the success of all human endeavors beyond those involving only individual accomplishment. While recognized as such in "conventional warfare," effective leadership has largely been downplayed, in favor of doctrine and process, in insurgency/counterinsurgency struggles, as well as other forms of irregular armed conflict, specifically, guerilla warfare and terrorism. Since the definitions of these types of conflict are often as varied as the authors that specialize in them, Dr. Moyar, wisely, sidesteps definitional squabbles by relying on the Department of Defense's Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms for authority.
As one who has taught leadership to military and law enforcement audiences for the past twenty years, as well as studied, and being intimately involved with, various forms of irregular armed conflict, over the past fifty years, I was particularly interested in Dr. Moyar's "Ten Attributes of Effective Counterinsurgency Leaders." While I might quibble with some terminology, I found myself in agreement with his, in my opinion unfortunately all too rare, "attributes."
While "A Question of Command" will have wide appeal to those followers of military history, those who who wish to gain insight into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and those intrigued by counterinsurgency, it will receive the most acclaim from experienced military personnel, especially those who have had first hand knowledge of the intricacies of counterinsurgency. However, I might add a word of caution to a very few potential readers.
As with Dr. Moyr's previous outstanding histories, "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam," (the later Bison Book edition with a new preface and chapter by the author); and "Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War 1954-1965," (an indispensable book that should be on the bookshelf of anyone with an earnest interest in that historic war); "A Question of Command" is a provocative book that challenges the prevailing orthodoxy with regard to counterinsurgency events. As such, Dr. Moyar's works may be unsettling to the intellectually immature who are easily shaken by arguments that threaten their long held, or recently acquired, cherished dogma.

