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On the Psychology of Military Incompetence Paperback – January 1, 1976

4.5 4.5 out of 5 stars 443 ratings

A study of military blunder.
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4.5 out of 5 stars
443 global ratings

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Customers say

Customers find the book engaging and useful. They appreciate its insights into leadership development at the highest level in the military. The book offers examples of specific traits and how they helped some great military commanders. However, some readers find the writing style overly wordy and dry.

AI-generated from the text of customer reviews

15 customers mention "Readability"15 positive0 negative

Customers find the book engaging and useful. They recommend it as a good read for military personnel. The author's arguments are compelling and well-presented.

"...It's a tough read at times but definitely insightful into some of the quirky "Whys" of the military." Read more

"...The book is worth reading for those examples alone, so you could just skim over the psychology if you wish...." Read more

"This is one of the best books I've read. Don't limit your thinking to military incompetence though this hits in corporate America as well." Read more

"...for a British military audience nearly a century ago, the lessons remain painfully apt. One could argue that we have gotten even worse since then." Read more

5 customers mention "Leadership"5 positive0 negative

Customers find the book provides excellent insights into how leadership at the highest level in the military developed. They say it's essential reading for aspiring leaders, as it offers examples of specific traits and how they helped some. The book looks at psychological traits that are common to both men and women, and confirms why great military commanders in history were great.

"...in 1976 its message remains relevant and essential reading for aspiring leaders of men and women, perhaps in more than just the military industry...." Read more

"This book, first published fifty years ago, looks at the psychological traits that are common to both failure and success in senior military leaders...." Read more

"...Seriously, great window into what makes a bad leader." Read more

"...leadership, he also takes the time to confirm why the great military commanders in history, were great. An engaging read." Read more

6 customers mention "Word quality"0 positive6 negative

Customers find the book's writing style difficult to read, with excessive words and poor typesetting. They also mention it's a bit dry and hard to understand.

"...It's a tough read at times but definitely insightful into some of the quirky "Whys" of the military." Read more

"...Another is that there's some just plain bad typesetting in here - occasional words or phrases seem to have been dropped, some quotes are opened but..." Read more

"Information presented is informative and eye opening if written in an overly wordy style (known to English authors). Worth the price." Read more

"...First, it is a bit of a dry read- it is a scholarly book, after all. Second, it does seem a bit out-of-date...." Read more

Top reviews from the United States

  • Reviewed in the United States on May 11, 2023
    Very, very interesting book - I heard about it on the Jocko podcast so I was intrigued. It's a tough read at times but definitely insightful into some of the quirky "Whys" of the military.
    2 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on June 24, 2017
    I purchased this reference text because it seemed to have relevance to my research about how 130 Australian soldiers were made scapegoats by military incompetence in WW1. Norman Dixon's psychological assessment of incompetence in the military it clearly has relevance to the military in all nations and in all eras. Dixon's psychological analysis of good and bad military leaders shows they belong to 'authoritarian organizations who are past masters at deflecting blame. The do so by denial, by rationalization, by making scapegoats, or by some mixture of the three'. The metaphorical 'little' officer is typically 'conditioned to please, not challenge, their superiors'.
    The strength of Dixon's argument rests upon defects of character which he says has its origins in the leader's childhood experience. Also, that it has its authoritarian basis in Victorian/Edwardian class division by blood, private schools and university elites. Such aristocratic rights were well illustrated by wasted foot-soldiers in WW1. The incompetent commanders in that war could not or would not embrace the fact that war was not a 'normal' war anymore. Their inability to adjust to dynamic warring and to make wise decisions was a product of their neurotic disabilities. He states that the failings in some military commanders is not due to a lack of intelligence but to the rejection of common sense and humanity.
    Although this book was first published in 1976 its message remains relevant and essential reading for aspiring leaders of men and women, perhaps in more than just the military industry. The authoritarian military is unlikely to appreciate his unzipping of the psychology of good and bad leadership styles. - Des Lambley
    14 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on April 20, 2021
    This book, first published fifty years ago, looks at the psychological traits that are common to both failure and success in senior military leaders. Dixon makes a good case both for the specific traits and why the incompetent officers somehow make it into senior positions. He is careful not to make overly specific diagnoses in his examples, but the surface examples are pretty convincing.

    Psychology has changed a lot since the book was written, and Dixon's use of Freudian analysis occasionally jars. But he provides enough description of the traits and how they affect leadership capabilities that the lay reader can tell what he considers important and why.

    As a side benefit, Dixon offers lot of examples of specific traits and how they "helped" some senior leaders go astay. The book is worth reading for those examples alone, so you could just skim over the psychology if you wish.

    I gave it four stars rather than five for several reasons. One is that the book definitely needs an update to early 21st century psychology. Another is that there's some just plain bad typesetting in here - occasional words or phrases seem to have been dropped, some quotes are opened but never closed or vice-versa, and some extensive block quotes aren't indicated as such.

    Normally any good non-fiction book has me marking up the bibliography for other materiel to read. Unfortunately it contains many books which look fascinating but are long out of print and unavailable. I didn't mark it down for that, but that, in combination with the aging psychology, really makes me with for an overall update. I didn't take away points for that, but wanted to note it for those who do the same.
    10 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on April 27, 2022
    This is one of the best books I've read. Don't limit your thinking to military incompetence though this hits in corporate America as well.
  • Reviewed in the United States on August 7, 2014
    For military officers, this book is one that inspires soul searching and deep reflection on the profession of arms. The first time I read the book four years it was really disturbing and changed my view of my self and my work. The second time, I felt much more at peace with the concepts of the book and felt better positioned emotionally. My only critique is that he probably attacks General Haig unfairly because he discounts General Haig's embrace of tanks in his analysis.
    4 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on July 30, 2019
    For those people in the military that question leadership decisions, this book will put your mind at ease that the military often made similar poor decisions - just don't let your peers see you reading it while in uniform.
    4 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on July 23, 2023
    Many officers who read this book may shiver and think: "I hope I never get this way--good thing I attended x, y, z professional military education school and did my time as a platoon commander." The enlisted quietly whisper "You already have."

    If you have ever served in the military, you are familiar with the particular breed of uniquely incompetent leaders who somehow manage to outlive their better peers, underperforming so consistently that it would not be hard to mistake their failures as deliberate acts. However, these bad leaders are not intelligent enough to carry out such elaborate plans, let alone much simpler ones like bringing enough water on a convoy, withdrawing when overwhelmed, or avoiding direct assaults.

    Dixon playfully profiles many of the more high-profile cases from generals in the last few centuries of European conventional warfare, leading the reader to sometimes laugh and sometimes cry while thinking of the numerous disasters that could have been avoided. Although this book was written for a British military audience nearly a century ago, the lessons remain painfully apt. One could argue that we have gotten even worse since then.
    3 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on October 25, 2018
    If your a cog in the machine. Or the guy responsible for what the machine does. Or just meat for it, I can’t recommend this book more. Seriously, great window into what makes a bad leader.
    One person found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries

  • Jody
    5.0 out of 5 stars Value
    Reviewed in Canada on October 24, 2021
    A great read and great point of view. I would suggest reading this book.
  • David Montgomery
    5.0 out of 5 stars Adds a new insight into military history that official accounts have ignored.
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 21, 2024
    The book provides contradictory insight into otherwise common historical accounts of glorious victories and inglorious defeats - and the thinking of the incompetent leaderships. A must read for followers of historical military enthusiasts.
  • Appyfizz4
    5.0 out of 5 stars A must read for every person in uniform
    Reviewed in India on June 26, 2024
    The book is relevant even today and is bang on with all it's hypothesis. A truly must read for all military minds.
  • Kindle Customer
    2.0 out of 5 stars Dated - some interesting content with lots of Freduian nonsense
    Reviewed in Australia on January 3, 2019
    My historical knowledge of the earlier examples used in this book is insufficient in itself for me to dissent with the authors description, however I wouldn't trust them too much as the latter examples have numerous factual inaccuracies which completely undermine the authors use of them. These inaccuracies are combined with the omission of important factors that weighed on the leaders being studied - instead their behaviour and decision making is explained through the lens of fraudulent Freudian theories such as "anal-obsessive personality".

    To cite a few examples from the book:
    Atlantic Convoys - The author asserts that the reluctance of the British to use convoys to reduce losses to their merchant shipping early in WW2 stemmed from this tactic being considered too effeminate; In reality it was mainly because of concerns that modern naval weaponry would inflict greater slaughter if a convoy was intercepted vs picking off single ships (this proved unfounded) combined with the fact that convoy operations caused significant problems and inefficiency at the loading/unloading stage because the ports would be hit by a great number of ships at once instead of a staggered flow.

    The Fall of Singapore - This book asserts that the British had not conceived that the Japanese could attack from the Malayan peninsula and did not fortify Singapore/the Malayan peninsula because it would be effeminate; this is false - a landing on the Malayan peninsula had long been considered the most likely method for an attack on Singapore - before Percival returned as OC Singapore the British already had a plan in place (Madator) which involved pre-emptively occupying the identified likely landing zones in Thailand and fighting/destroying the Japanese on the beaches, due to the offensive nature of the plan defensive positions were not built at Singapore/the Malayan Peninsula. Unwise as this may have been this decision was not driven by some masculinity crisis, unfortunately for the allies the implementation was fumbled (war with Japan was not desired so by the time they were sure of Japanese intentions the required lead time to implement Madator had passed) and they were forced to convert to a defensive plan at the last moment.

    Market Garden - The book plays up the fact that Monty continued the op despite his Intelligence officer informing him that "2 SS Panzer Divisions" were at Arnhem, infact these "divisions" were refitting and had few personnel or tanks - the fact is that almost all the German armour that participated during the Arnhem battle came from elsewhere - this was simply a function of the Germans reacting quickly and aggressively as they usually did. There were many mistakes in planning the op but considering that the lead time was 1 week this is unsurprising. Market Garden was high risk/high reward and the trouble with high level of risk is that you don't always win, however comparing it to the siege of Kut is unjustifiable as the risk could be rationally considered to be worth taking at the time considering the disarray the Germans were in and the potential gains from the op.

    Overall I gave this work 2 stars because some of the background descriptions for the battles the book uses in its case studies are well written; however as an analysis of the cause of military incompetence it has little worth, the sections containing Freudian theory are an especially tedious and unproductive read.
  • Ernst Niedermeier
    5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant and Courageous Analysis of Military Organisations
    Reviewed in Germany on March 2, 2002
    Norman Dixon does an excellent job in reviewing and analysing spectacular military failures over a time span of several hundred years, covering such a big variety of military leaders as Hitler, Napoleon, Montgomery and Lawrence of Arabia. His conclusion is quite off the beaten track of political discussion, but very convincingly presented: unsuccessful generals suffer from a frustrating and damagingly restrictive upbringing, a fact that at the same time attracts them to military organisations, in kind of continuation of the childhood situation. These people share a certain number of personal characteristics that are indicative for failure. These are among others: extreme concern with a domination-submission relationship, ethnocentrism, underestimation of the enemy, always attacking the enemy at his strongest point, focus of attention on the obviously unimportant, insensibility for the well-being of the “human material”.
    Dixon shows us, on the other hand, that successful military leaders are open-minded, individualistic, creative, un-conventional and show a great sense of responsibility for and interest in the troop that are entrusted to them. And that they had a happy childhood.
    The author’s refreshingly clear view of the facts and sometimes ironical writing stile make for a pleasant reading and characterise him against his self-assessment as a non authoritarian personality.
    Dixon, himself a member of a military organisation for a considerable time of his life, deserves great respect for the courage he displayed in profoundly criticising such a highly esteemed organisation as the army. It can only be guessed how much undeserved hostility it may have brought to him. May his work contribute to reduce casualties in further wars, or even much better, help to completely avoid wars in the future.