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Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform (Hoover Studies in Politics, Economics, and Society) Hardcover – March 23, 2006

4.2 4.2 out of 5 stars 4 ratings

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Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book

* exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services;
* analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism;
* presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency;
* incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina;
* exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks;
* critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President;
* emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes.

The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution
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  • Reviewed in the United States on May 30, 2006
    This book has a good deal to recommend it. Perhaps its highest virtue is that its author Judge Richard A. Posner is not an intelligence professional or even a groupie of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). As a result, Posner is unusually objective in his analysis of the IC and the two reports which have precipitated its so called reformation. Another commendable virtue of the book is that Posner writes in clear jargon free prose and expresses himself with great accuracy.

    He does a great service by providing the reader with a careful analysis of both the 9/11 Commission Report and the WMD Report which were the catalysts for the congressionally mandated reforms in the IC, particularly the creation of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI). Posner applies impressive logic to the task and reveals a host of short comings and failings in both reports. The center piece of this book, however, is his reiteration of an argument he made in a previous book, "Remaking Domestic Intelligence" in which he makes a strong case for a domestic intelligence agency independent of the FBI. This indeed is a book clear of the vague musings and fuzzy recommendations so often found in books on reforming the IC.

    Yet this reviewer must fault one of Posner's premises on which his argument is built, namely that, "intelligence is inherently and incurably mistake prone" (P. 208) and therefore the criticisms of IC found in both the (/11 and WMD reports are unfair and inappropriate. No one will dispute that producing accurate intelligence is a dicey business. It is nonetheless a leap of logic to extrapolate from this that the IC, and especially the CIA, is blameless in regards to the 9/11 catastrophe and the Iraqi WMD fiasco. In point of fact both these two events are simply the latest (that we know of) in a long series of badly executed intelligence projects. Sure intelligence by definition can only produce approximate truth, but that does not relieve the IC or CIA from the responsibility of doing a better job than they have over the last twenty years. It is often claimed that the while the failures of U.S. intelligence are widely known its successes must remain secret. To an extent this is true, but it should also be noted that the great bulk of its failures are also buried in secrecy and unknown to the public.
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  • Reviewed in the United States on January 20, 2021
    In the central theme for this book the author argues for a domestic intelligence agency independent of The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  • Reviewed in the United States on May 22, 2006
    Why can't there be more books like this one? This slim volume contains more insight than many books three times its size. "Uncertain Shield" is a follow-up to Posner's previous book "Surprise Attacks", and while either book can stand on its own, I recommend reading both. Surprise Attacks addressed the deficiencies in the 9/11 Commission's recommendation, and the resulting flaws in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In "Uncertain Shield," Posner extends his critique to include the recommendations of the WMD Commission.

    One of Posner's major arguments in "Uncertain Shield" is that that WMD Commission's recommendations actually contradicted its own observations. The intelligence community's inability to accurately determine Saddam Hussein's WMD capabilities was a problem of "groupthink" - always a potential problem in any intelligence system, but one exacerbated with greater centralization. Oddly, the WMD Commission, nevertheless, recommended even greater centralization.

    Posner argues that the approach for both the 9/11 and the WMD Commission was to assumed that intelligence was broken without determining the limitations inherit in the business of intelligence. He criticizes both commissions for rushing to recommend reorganization of the intelligence community without examining the unintended consequences of that reorganization. Drawing on established organizational theory, Posner shows us some of those consequences. For example, both commissions failed to distinguish coordination from command, advocating a top heavy organization, far removed from the subtle indicators that intelligence depends on for accurate prediction.

    Posner is critical of the WMD Commission for making recommendations base only on shallow analysis. For example, the commission recommended that advancement within the intelligence community should be based on merit. While in theory it's difficult to argue with that recommendation, in practice determining merit in the context of an intelligence organization (and government in general) is difficult. As both history and theory have shown, without having a clear measurement for merit, this can lead to waste and inefficiency. Should we reward the quantity of intelligence sources, or the quality of intelligence sources? Quantity is objective and easily measured, but with regards to intelligence, quantity and quality often have an inverse relationship. On the other hand, if we're going to insist on rewarding quality, then we need to know how to measure it objectively, otherwise, we risk replacing effectiveness with intra-office politicking. These are the types of issues the WMD Commission simply glossed over.

    Posner argues in favor of the creation of a domestic intelligence service- an American MI-5. He addresses both the security needs for, and the civil liberty concerns about such an organization. Applying organizational theory, Posner, shows that creation of an intelligence unit inside the FBI will fail, because of the incompatibility of a law enforcement culture and intelligence culture in the same organization. While the FBI measures success on the number of arrests leading to successful prosecution, intelligence work is less specific towards that goal, looking at trends and recruiting sources. Addressing the concerns of civil libertarians, Posner dispels the myth that the requirement of a "criminal hook" will somehow protect us from government abuses. History shows no evidence of this assertion. On the contrary, more likely, it will lead to the greater government coercion. An intelligence organization, with no law enforcement capability, would seek cooperation and be less inclined to alienate Muslim members of the population. As Posner points out, it was a historical abuse of coercive law enforcement in the name of security that led the Allies to insist that the German government after World War II divide its domestic intelligence (information) functions from its law enforcement (coercive) functions. Previously, these two functions had been united in the SS.

    Posner's does an excellent job throughout the book of pointing out the distorted incentives found in dysfunctional organization within intelligence. For example, no one in security was ever disciplined for not giving a risky candidate a security clearance. A candidate may have all the language and culture knowledge in the world, and he may be an indispensable asset to department seeking his employment, but security won't take the risk. Why should they? They will not benefit from his skills, and they will be blamed if he turns out to be a security breach. Posner suggests that it would be better to let security make an official recommendation, and let the department managers be responsible for determining the level of risk they are willing to accept - measuring the proper balance between mission accomplishment and security concerns. The managers would also be in a better the position to restrict the candidate from certain types of access within their department.

    I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in understanding the current upheavals in the intelligence community, and who wants to understand real issues apart from the partisan rhetoric. I would also recommend this book for anyone looking for good case studies in organizational theory. This book shows how theory can be applied in a useful, coherent, and common sense argument.
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