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Martin C. Libicki
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Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

by Martin C. Libicki (Author)
3.6 3.6 out of 5 stars 19 ratings
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Cyberspace, where information―and hence serious value―is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack.
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  1. ISBN-10
    0833047345
  2. ISBN-13
    978-0833047342
  3. Publisher
    RAND Corporation
  4. Publication date
    November 16, 2009
  5. Language
    English
  6. Dimensions
    6.1 x 0.57 x 9.15 inches
  7. Print length
    244 pages
  8. See all details
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Editorial Reviews

Review

While it is certainly tempting to want to hit back and zap the sources of the constant cyber probes and occasional breakthroughs that hit federal and major contractor networks, that might not always be the wisest policy. Libicki points out that it is difficult to know the other side's vulnerabilities and ability to withstand a counter attack. And in some cases--for example, China or Russia with whom the U.S. has deep relationships on other strategic fronts--counteroffensive might be more costly than just accepting espionage as a fact of life.
"Federal Security Spotlight," Federal News Radio, November 12, 2009


Martin Libicki is among the coterie of analysts and experts that have been pioneering the strategic study of cyber warfare at the RAND Corporation since the early 1990s, and is today one of the main researchers in this field. His book Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, as one of the first systematic attempts to apply the notion of deterrence to cyberspace, is groundbreaking in many respects.... A major challenge for twenty-first-century strategists is to gauge how much and how far theoretical concepts and legal regimes that were invented for a different era and different fields will be applicable to cyber and outer space. [This book is] a useful starting point for this task.
Survival, August-September 2010

From the Inside Flap

In wrestling with how to defend a nation's information infrastructure in what appears to be a new medium of warfare, it is tempting to apply the historic tenets of deterrence and defense--but doing so is quite misleading.

Product details

  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ RAND Corporation (November 16, 2009)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Paperback ‏ : ‎ 244 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0833047345
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0833047342
  • Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 13.6 ounces
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.1 x 0.57 x 9.15 inches
  • Customer Reviews:
    3.6 3.6 out of 5 stars 19 ratings

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Martin C. Libicki

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3.6 out of 5 stars
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Top reviews from the United States

  • Jay
    5.0 out of 5 stars Great reference material for new Cybersecurity students
    Reviewed in the United States on October 17, 2015
    Verified Purchase
    As a non-cyber expert, I like how this book highlights main talking points & concerns on the topic of Cybersecurity. This report has excellent references and definitions for entry-level students (or self-study employees). I cannot verify if the conclusions are "correct" or the research is "accurate," but it does attempt to address the questions surrounding cybersecurity and how the nation/DoD/gov't should approach the topic.
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  • Paul Huber
    3.0 out of 5 stars Too old for this topic
    Reviewed in the United States on March 28, 2013
    Verified Purchase
    The book is good from a historical perspective, but this area has moved ahead dramatically and this is only history. Current situation is very different and very high risk
    One person found this helpful
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  • Brad C
    1.0 out of 5 stars One Star
    Reviewed in the United States on November 17, 2014
    Verified Purchase
    The audio book is difficult to start and stop because the tracks don't correlate to the chapters.
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  • Frenchsimmer
    5.0 out of 5 stars Interesting
    Reviewed in the United States on January 20, 2013
    Verified Purchase
    Doing the association between cyberwar and deterrence is interesting.

    You should read it in order to understand cyberwar through another lens.
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  • Richard Stiennon
    4.0 out of 5 stars Voice of sanity in cyber offense debate
    Reviewed in the United States on December 6, 2009
    This is the first cogent look at the efficacy of waging strategic cyber war and I hope will serve to slow the rhetoric coming from the US Defense community about acquiring cyber offensive capability. I wrote before about the National Resource Council's report, "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities". That report explored many of the same difficulties addressed by Libicki but came to different conclusions.

    An introductory statement from Libicki:

    All this might lead to a belief that the historic constructs of war--force, offense, defense, deterrence--can be applied to cyberspace with little modification.
    Not so. Instead, cyberspace must be understood in its own terms, and
    policy decisions being made for these and other new commands must
    reflect such understanding. Attempts to transfer policy constructs from
    other forms of warfare will not only fail but also hinder policy and
    planning.

    And:

    As long as nations rely on computer networks as a foundation for military
    and economic power and as long as such computer networks are
    accessible to the outside, they are at risk. Hackers can steal information,
    issue phony commands to information systems to cause them to
    malfunction, and inject phony information to lead men and machines
    to reach false conclusions and make bad (or no) decisions.

    Continuing:

    Yet system vulnerabilities do not result from immutable physical
    laws. They occur because of a gap between theory and practice. In
    theory, a system should do only what its designers and operators want it
    to. In practice, it does exactly what its code (and settings) tells it to. The
    difference exists because systems are complex and growing more so.
    In all this lies a saving grace. Errors can be corrected, especially
    if cyberattacks expose vulnerabilities that need attention. The degree
    to which and the terms by which computer networks can be accessed
    from the outside (where almost all adversaries are) can also be specified.
    There is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace. Whoever
    gets in enters through pathways produced by the system itself.1 It is
    only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to
    cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of
    warfare can such a statement be made.

    Elaborating:

    The salient characteristics of cyberattacks--temporary effects and
    the way attacks impel countermeasures--suggest that they be used
    sparingly and precisely. They are better suited to one-shot strikes (e.g.,
    to silence a surface-to-air missile system and allow aircraft to destroy
    a nuclear facility under construction) than to long campaigns (e.g., to
    put constant pressure on a nation's capital). Attempting a cyberattack
    in the hopes that success will facilitate a combat operation may be prudent;
    betting the operation's success on a particular set of results may
    not be.

    Questioning:

    But can strategic cyberwar induce political
    compliance the way, say, strategic airpower would? Airpower tends to
    succeed when societies are convinced that matters will only get worse.
    With cyberattacks, the opposite is more likely. As systems are attacked,
    vulnerabilities are revealed and repaired or routed around. As systems
    become more hardened, societies become less vulnerable and are likely
    to become more, rather than less, resistant to further coercion.

    Answering:

    Can cyberattacks disarm cyberattackers? In a world of cheap
    computing, ubiquitous networking, and hackers who could be anywhere,
    the answer is no.

    Warning:

    Can escalation be avoided? Even if retaliation is in kind, counterretaliation
    may not be. A fight that begins in cyberspace may spill
    over into the real world with grievous consequences.

    And concluding:

    The United States and, by extension, the U.S. Air Force, should not
    make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area. Strategic cyberwar,
    by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary. Any adversary that
    merits a strategic cyberwar campaign to be subdued also likely possesses
    the capability to strike back in ways that may be more than
    annoying.

    Lubicki is cafeful to make the distinction between espionage (CNE) and cyberattack which seeks to disrupt or corrupt.He also makes the point that attack is cheaper than defense. Thus deterrence could save money neeeded for defense but goes on to say:

    The better one's defenses, the
    less likely it is that an attack will succeed and so the less often a cyberdeterrence
    policy will be tested. The longer such a policy goes untested,
    the more credibility it acquires, if only through precedent.

    Another good point:

    ...a good defense adds credibility to the threat to retaliate,
    much in the way Herman Kahn argued that having bomb shelters
    made nuclear deterrence more credible.

    Libibki is not omniscient though.

    Footnote 20 on page 11:

    A fiendish variant is to attack computers that control manufacturing processes to retard the production of, ruin, or render dangerous the products of the processes. Such an attack could have nasty echoes. It is not clear, however, why any manufacturing process should be exposed to the outside world without very high levels of network protection.

    From my discussions with manufacturers they have done little to segregate their production

    environments from the Internet. They have even deployed Windows system down to the machine cell for management and reporting. Systems that do not lend themselves to frequent patching/rebooting schedules. Manufacturing is very vulnerable to these "fiendish variants".

    Moving on, Libicki's conclusion from chapter 6:

    It is thus hard to argue
    that the ability to wage strategic cyberwar should be a priority area for
    U.S. investment and, by extension, for U.S. Air Force investment. It
    is not even clear whether there should be an intelligence effort of the
    intensity required to enable strategic cyberwar.

    And I cannot resist lauding a final conclusion that I have oft said:

    This investigation suggests that, in this medium, the best defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense. -Excerpted from [...]
    One person found this helpful
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  • Amazon Customer
    5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
    Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2015
    Verified Purchase
    Wonderful.
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  • Danimal
    1.0 out of 5 stars Was considering reading, but now I'm worried, thanks Richard
    Reviewed in the United States on January 21, 2010
    I haven't read the book, but these reviews helped me realize, with all the other choices of where to spend my time, this isn't it.

    If this quote is accurate:

    "Yet system vulnerabilities do not result from immutable physical
    laws. They occur because of a gap between theory and practice. In
    theory, a system should do only what its designers and operators want it
    to. In practice, it does exactly what its code (and settings) tells it to. The
    difference exists because systems are complex and growing more so.
    In all this lies a saving grace. Errors can be corrected, especially
    if cyberattacks expose vulnerabilities that need attention. The degree
    to which and the terms by which computer networks can be accessed
    from the outside (where almost all adversaries are) can also be specified.
    There is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace. Whoever
    gets in enters through pathways produced by the system itself.1 It is
    only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to
    cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of
    warfare can such a statement be made. "

    ...then Mr. Libicki, with all due respect, is living in another universe.

    The quote is not informative (worth republishing), nor alarmingly wrong through...

    "Yet system vulnerabilities do not result from immutable physical
    laws. They occur because of a gap between theory and practice. In
    theory, a system should do only what its designers and operators want it
    to. In practice, it does exactly what its code (and settings) tells it to. The
    difference exists because systems are complex and growing more so.
    In all this lies a saving grace. Errors can be corrected, especially
    if cyberattacks expose vulnerabilities that need attention."

    Although these errors can be corrected, it is incredibly childish analysis to leave it at that! The concept essentially follows: I'll figure out my weaknesses as my adversary attacks them, I'll then fix them, then go to bed. To not addresses the conditions which lead to these errors, or to anticipate that these "errors" will be vanquised is IMHO ridiculous. To not consider a counter attack (which may or not be cyber based) is irresponsible leadership.

    But where I feel compelled to join Richard in considering this book (even if it is by this paragraph alone) potentially "harmful" is...

    "The degree to which and the terms by which computer networks can be accessed
    from the outside (where almost all adversaries are) can also be specified.
    There is, in the end, no forced entry in cyberspace. Whoever
    gets in enters through pathways produced by the system itself.1 It is
    only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to
    cyberattack only to the extent they want to be. In no other domain of
    warfare can such a statement be made."

    I've read this at least 8 times now and cannot conceive that I'm misinterpreting it....
    The utter lack of experience, rigor in analysis, and general operational ignorance demonstrated by this passage is ASTOUNDING! The ONLY way this statement could have any relevance is in a Information Security market where defenders have perfect information and infinite resources...reference, "Mr. Libicki, with all due respect, is living in another universe".
    2 people found this helpful
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  • A. Student
    4.0 out of 5 stars Worth Reading
    Reviewed in the United States on August 31, 2010
    Well, this book has certainly stirred up some emotion. If you're on the fence about reading this book, you can get the PDF at the RAND web site and make up your mind about whether it belongs in your library (it is in mine).

    This is a good book on a timely topic and adds quite a bit to the debate about the utility of the principle of deterrence through cyberweapons. Keep this focus in mind as this is not a general book about information/network security or even cyber warfare and its conclusions should not be taken out of context (which I humbly suggest Bejtlich did).

    So, if you're interested in whether it makes real sense for the US to develop cyberweapons in the hope that our ability to do unto others will deter them from doing unto us, then do read this book as its conclusions may surprise you.
    2 people found this helpful
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