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Beyond Repair: The Decline And Fall Of The Cia Hardcover – October 8, 2009
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An insider's account of why the CIA is ill-prepared to protect America, and why it must be replaced without delay
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Once upon a time, the CIA took the risks necessary to protect America. “If you fall,” went its mantra, “fall forward.” In Beyond Repair, one of the agency's most respected former operatives mounts a scathing critique of the preparedness of today's CIA―and, specifically, the Directorate of Operations at its core―to defend America against the dizzying dangers of the twenty-first century. In a compelling blend of analysis and fascinating true-life stories, Charles S. Faddis argues that the CIA has devolved into a low-risk or, often, no-risk bureaucracy of careerists whose mantra might be summed up thus: “Don't fall.”
“Every senior officer I know in the CIA carries personal liability insurance,” writes Faddis, “because of the fear of being sued for actions taken in the line of duty.” And, he notes, no operatives who commanded CIA teams in Afghanistan have been promoted to key positions. Why? Because they operate within a system that is no longer built to encourage and reward the risk-taking and creativity they excelled at.
Faddis discusses the birth of the CIA, how the agency works from the inside out, why things have gone awry―and how to go about building a new entity that will maintain the midnight watch, so Americans can sleep well at night.
- Print length192 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherLyons Press
- Publication dateOctober 8, 2009
- Dimensions6 x 0.5 x 9 inches
- ISBN-101599218518
- ISBN-13978-1599218519
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Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonCustomers say
Customers find the book informative and insightful, providing a well-thought-out thesis on human intelligence collection and covert action. They describe it as an interesting, provocative historical record.
AI-generated from the text of customer reviews
Customers find the book informative and well-written. It provides insightful analysis and real-world examples of human intelligence collection and covert action. They find it a valuable resource for all citizens, covering more than just the CIA. The examples are astounding, which keeps them engaged.
"...A very valuable book for all citizens covering more than just the CIA. On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, by Robert Steele...." Read more
"...a novel solution to restore the ability of the U.S. to collect human intelligence and to conduct covert actions...." Read more
"...An interesting and informative read...." Read more
"Sam Faddis is a true patriot. He knows his stuff. Great info in the book. !" Read more
Customers find the book interesting and engaging, providing a compelling account of important stories from our time. They describe it as an important historical record.
"This book is extremely interesting for a number of reasons...." Read more
"...since its days as the OSS and on through today; providing a most interesting, provocative and important historical record...." Read more
"This is one of the most important stories of our time...." Read more
"Compelling accounts, great analysis tool..." Read more
Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on October 15, 2009This is probably the most important book to come out this year. The author synthesizes all of the books about the CIA and its problems into one little book that everyone can understand. Not only that, he PRESENTS A SOLUTION. Unfortunately, I doubt if Obama or anyone in Washington has the moxie to implement author Faddis's solution.
The author argues with a great deal of archane information that the CIA is a broken agency, needs to be closed and another Agency built from the ground up. If his litany of horror stories seem unbelievable, consider this -- there are probably a thousand ex-case officers (ones who really ran operations (including me)) that can each tell a minimum of ten horror stories like the author, each one more unbelievable than the last. The bloated, time-serving, risk-adverse bureaucracy that the CIA has become must be extirpated and replaced by a mission-oriented, flatly-organized, and relatively small and nimble organization devoted to obtaining human intelligence quickly and have the ability to interpret it even more rapidly for policy makers. The author's case is simply overwhelming to anyone other than the federal bureaucracy.
As a side point, the author's remarks concerning military intelligence agencies (and DIA) may be true now, but it was not always that way. Once (during the 40s, 50s, and until Kennedy gutted those units in favor of putting their personnel back into uniforms) military intelligence was streamlined and capable, producing thousands of intelligence reports without layers of staff bureaucracies and tons of paperwork. Even the Soviets found that the GRU and the KGB were both necessary, and in many cases the GRU (Army Intelligence) actually produced better intelligence. But I will concede the author his point at this time. Likewise, the FBI is simply too bound by bureaucratic procedures to be effective in gathering intelligence, so yes, an OSS-type agency is sorely needed if the U.S. is to survive the NEXT TWENTY YEARS. The author makes a superlative case for this, although it may already be too late and beyond our political capabilities to implement.
The author's assertion that good case officers do not necessarily make good managers is absolutely correct and there needs to be a career path for case officers "in the Cold" to remain there and still have a rewarding career. Case officers need to be imaginative, mission-oriented, aggressive, maybe a little crazy to take the necessary risks (of being tortured and killed), able to work extremely long hours, have excellent linguistic skills, and be flexible and able to make snap decisions. Those attributes do not describe a manager or bureaucrat (usually.)
The author makes the point that foreign language capability is necessary to make a good case officer. I would like to second that and go farther. If an individual does not fluently speak, read and passable write in the language of the host country and/or the target country, then he cannot be an effective case officer, and indeed, should never be considered as a case officer. For example, if Valarie Plame was not fluent in the language spoken in her host African country while she supposedly was a case officer in non-official cover, then simply put, she was a square peg in a round hole and should have been given the title of case officer.
Inter-agency coordination requirements need to be minimized in order to be effective. As in the art of computer programming; if one programmer can do the job in one day, two programmers will take a week, and three programmers will never be able to get the job done. So it is in intelligence. The case officer and his agents/sources generally get the job done by themselves, and as far as the rest is concerned, the CO only needs his back protected and support for his accomplishing the mission ALL THE WAY UP THE LINE TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT. After all, he's the one risking his life to safeguard the rest of us.
I simply cannot recommend this book too highly. Purchase it, read it, and write your Congressman and Senator to make them read it. Otherwise, we can easily disappear in a mushroom cloud in the coming decades, be unable to drink our poisoned water, or die from breathing the deadly spores in our air.
Other books you might read include (all with my reviews on Amazon):
Chief Of Station, by Larry Devlin. An excellent book by an operative under offical cover.
Why Spy? Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty, by Frederick Hitz. This book clearly shows the problem, unfortunately it is the author and others with his lawyer-first, maximum control approach.
The Great Game: The Myths and Reality of Espionage, by Frederick Hitz. Like above, this adds valuable insight to espionage from a bureaucrat's viewpoint of view -- clearly the bureaucrat can't do or manage espionage.
The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, by Ishmael Jones. Read and believe -- probably the best book out there on the nitty-gritty.
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political, by Robert Steele. A very valuable book for all citizens covering more than just the CIA.
On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, by Robert Steele. Extremely valuable work outlining American intelligence failures, how and why they occurred, and what is needed as reform.
- Reviewed in the United States on November 9, 2009This book is extremely interesting for a number of reasons. It not only describes the effective destruction of the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine service (Directorate of Operations (DO)), but offers a novel solution to restore the ability of the U.S. to collect human intelligence and to conduct covert actions. Perhaps more interestingly it offers a window into the thinking of a recently retired and undoubtedly successful CIA Operations Officer. Finally it provides a much needed and friendly view of some the accomplishments of the WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
The account that Faddis provides of the demise of DO mirrors the conclusions made by other former CIA officers such as Robert Bear and the pseudonymous Ishmael Jones. His solution to restoring DO however is unique. He proposes doing away with CIA as an institution and replacing it by a 21st Century version of OSS. His proposals actually make a good deal of sense including the concepts of keeping the reborn OSS small, diverse, and agile. He would introduce an actual "flat management" system that would push decision making and responsibility down to the lowest levels. And of course the new OSS operatives would operate far from the debilitating official cover offered by the U.S. embassies. All this seems worth considering.
Yet Faddis is perhaps too DO centric. In his introductory pages he describes DO as "core of CIA" and generally ignores the role of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Yet when CIA was charted it was precisely to be a clearing house and analytic center, "to connect the dots" in the current intelligence cliché. Because of the culture established by the many OSS officers who moved into the newly created CIA and the desires of most presidential administrations to have their own operational arm, DO gradually subsumed the DI. In a like manner in the OSS although because of the daring do of their dangerous and often important overseas missions it is forgotten that OSS also had a very effective intelligence analysis arm that included such icon analysts as Sherman Kent.. (See "Creating the Secret State", 2000 University of Kansas).
Faddis's criticism of the scandalous state of CIA and especially its DO certainly appears justified. Yet it is only one part of the story. The collection of HUMINT is just as dependent on analytic support as is SIGINT collection. Further no matter how good the collection service, somebody still has to transform raw information into something that can actually be used by decision makers. Analysis and collection are two sides of a single coin. Both need major reformation if they are to support U.S. National Security.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 24, 2016Good book.

