Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics First Edition Edition

by Dominic D. P. Johnson Alistair Buchan Professor of International Relations Department of Politics and International Relations (Author), Dominic Tierney (Author)

4 customer reviews

ISBN-13: 978-0674023246

ISBN-10: 0674023242

Why is ISBN important?

Have one to sell? Sell on Amazon

Added to

Unable to add item to List. Please try again.

Condition: Used - Very Good

In Stock. Sold by Jenson Books Inc, Fulfilled by Amazon

Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items.

23 Used from $13.47

FREE Shipping on orders over $25.

Deliver to

Turn on 1-Click ordering

Only 1 left in stock - order soon.

Ships from and sold by COLOSSAL BOOKS.

This item does not ship to France. Please check other sellers who may ship internationally.

List Price: $37.00
Save: $10.74 (29%)

12 New from $29.95

Deliver to

$26.26

Turn on 1-Click ordering

More Buying Choices

12 New from $29.95 23 Used from $13.47

35 used & new from $13.47

See All Buying Options

Free%20Two-Day%20Shipping%20for%20College%20Students%20with%20Amazon%20Student

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality.

To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1

This shopping feature will continue to load items. In order to navigate out of this carousel please use your heading shortcut key to navigate to the next or previous heading.

Dominic Tierney

20

Hardcover
$20.33

Customers who bought this item also bought

Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1

This shopping feature will continue to load items. In order to navigate out of this carousel please use your heading shortcut key to navigate to the next or previous heading.

Thomas J. Christensen

30

Hardcover
$18.08

Editorial Reviews

Review

This is one of those books that leads the reader to ask why it had not been done before. I am amazed that both academics and members of the interested public had generally assumed that in most cases it was self-evident who had won or lost an encounter. The authors show that this is simply not the case, and in doing so have put this important question on our agenda. (Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University)

About the Author

Dominic Johnson is Alistair Buchan Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Hardcover: 360 pages
Publisher: Harvard University Press; First Edition edition (October 30, 2006)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0674023242
ISBN-13: 978-0674023246
Product Dimensions: 6.2 x 1.2 x 9.5 inches
Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
Average Customer Review: 4 customer reviews
Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,691,421 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #4852 in Books > Textbooks > Social Sciences > Political Science > Political History
- #5668 in Books > Textbooks > Social Sciences > Political Science > International Relations
- #7666 in Books > Textbooks > Humanities > History > Military

Would you like to tell us about a lower price?
If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support?

Be the first video

Your name here

Customer reviews

3.9 out of 5 stars

5 star

4 star (0%)

3 star (0%)

2 star (0%)

1 star

Write a customer review

See all 4 customer reviews

Top customer reviews

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

H. Campbell

Outstanding Analysis of Victory vs Defeat

September 1, 2018

This is an important book for a lot of reasons. Perception is nine tenths of reality, as the saying goes. Perception defines and molds what people think of outcomes and results, whether good or bad. In this case, perception creates a "reality" of victory or defeat in terms of wars and crises. The author posits two frameworks for this; 1) score keeping and 2) match fixing. The former is supposedly based on objectively assessed material gains, whereas the latter is a subjective rendering of three factors, a) salient events, b) social pressures and c) mindsets. A good example of the former is WW2; clearly Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were defeated because their countries were occupied by the victors. But the book is really about match fixing, the very human tendency to let preconceived ideas, ideological biases, media distortion and cherrypicking and certain discrete but psychologically enduring imagery to tilt our evaluations of success or failure. The author evaluates five case studies for demonstration, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 1) the North Vietnam/Viet Cong Tet offensive of 1968 3) The Yom Kippur War of 1973 4) The US Somalian Intervention of 1993 and 5) The Ongoing War on Terror and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. His case is really made in the first study, where the USSR was widely perceived, including in that country itself, as the loser in the supposed showdown over nuclear weapons being installed in Cuba. I myself, having read copious tracts on the crisis, came to the same conclusion long ago; that the Soviets actually "won" the showdown, in that they gained concessions that they would not have obtained otherwise from the US while themselves accepting the status quo ante, i.e., a no nuke Cuba. By getting Kennedy to verbally pledge never to invade Cuba and secretly promising to remove the NATO missiles from Turkey (and ultimately Italy) , Khruschev lost nothing in terms of the USSR's strategic stature before the crisis. But from a match fixing perspective, which is tantamount to a PR campaign between Khruschev and JFK, the loser was the former by a country mile. Of course, the Soviet Premier was up against a master in terms of manipulating perception and distorting reality. By framing the crisis in terms of withdrawing the missiles from Cuba, and minimizing or hiding the horse trading that actually occurred, JFK maneuvared his clumsy opponent into making tactical blunders, such as turning Soviet ships away for the US "quarantine line". By conceding to Soviet desires to preserve the Cuban revolution, JFK gave Khruschev what he most wanted anyway but cleverly was able to make that seem like an irrelevant sop to the Premier's battered ego. Supposedly the US had "no intention" of invading Cuba but frankly that assertion is, in my opinion, like most of the post-assassination hagiographic attempts to whitewash the slain president's image, unconvincing in the extreme. The other cases studied offer varying levels of persuasion; strong with Tet and Yom Kippur, less so with Somalia and the War on Terror/Iraq. Perhaps this is because in the last two cases the author extensively uses poll results to bolster his analyses, an approach fraught with pitfalls, which the author to some extent acknowledges. Whereas Tet and Yom Kippur are classic examples of hubris and unrealistic expectations being instantly transformed into disillusion and panic, the latter two are muddier and more ambiguous. Somalia was a "humanitarian intervention" conducted in two phases, the first unquestionably successful and the second marred by the battle of Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces. The entire Somalia affair is worthy of a full length study in itself as it demonstrates so many of the delusions Americans cherish about themselves; their "humanity", their desire to use their power for international good and their tendency to reduce all conflicts in Manichaean terms. The War on Terror already has its own cottage industry of yearly tomes and will doubtless continue indefinitely, since its continuation is a boon to the military-industrial-intelligence-political complex. Precisely because it is so nebulous a conflict, with shadow enemies and secret covert wars going on in the night, no one can put a figure on what constitutes victory or defeat. It benefits many to continue that miasma of doubt. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in international politics, political history, group psychology and the media's role in collective perceptions.

One person found this helpful

Helpful

Comment

Outstanding work on the complex subject of evaluating the victor in war

November 8, 2006

There was a time in the Post- Second War period, when the economies of Japan and Germany were booming, and that of the 'United States' foundering. For the first time certain people began to talk about 'who really won' the Second War.
Recently the enormously talented historian Niall Ferguson has reconsidered the First World War and argued it might have been better for all concerned had Germany won that War, as it might have meant that the Second World War would not have occurred.
These two cases point out not simply the fickleness of human opinion, but rather how judgment of 'who won the war' is complex dependent upon changing historical realities.
In this highly original work Johnson and Tierney try to shake us out of our most often misleading and simple perceptions of victory and show that determining the 'victor' in a war is a more complicated business than we imagine.
After engaging in a quite academic discussion of the military and political standards for determining who has won the war, they get down in chapter five of the work to specific cases. This is what Carlin Romano in his review in 'The Philadelphia Inquirer' has to say about their analysis.
of " the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Tet Offensive (a U.S. victory, they say, that went down as a defeat), the Yom Kippur War (an Israeli victory, they say, misunderstood as a defeat), the U.S. intervention in Somalia, and the current "war against terror" (a mixed picture in their view.)

In those chapters, Johnson and Tierney provide a huge public service by showing how perceptions of victory depend on such factors as divergent assumptions about goals, and about "before" and "after" points by which to judge progress."

The authors also are interested in stressing the importance of 'perception of victory or defeat' in regard to a Democracy's willingness to sustain a long war.
This is a work which will provide much material for thought for all those interested in the world and human situation. This unfortunately especially so as the West is presently engaged, or partly engaged in a worldwide campaign against Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism , a campaign which to this point gives no sign of clear and final victory, and promises to continue for generations.

8 people found this helpful9 people found this helpful

Helpful

Comment

Norah Charles

Original and groundbreaking

February 22, 2007

This is a highly original, ground-breaking book, which I recommend to anyone interested in American foreign policy or military affairs. Johnson and Tierney tackle a new and vital question: how do we decide which country won in a war or crisis? After all, support for Bush and the War in Iraq hinges on public perceptions of how the war is going - so where do these perceptions come from? The authors provide a model for how we should judge the outcome, and then show how public perceptions deviate from this model due to psychological biases, expectation effects, and media and elite spin. Throughout history, from the War of 1812, to Dunkirk, Tet and Somalia, people have repeatedly judged defeats as victories and victories as defeats.

3 people found this helpful4 people found this helpful

Helpful

Comment

chitatel

Failing to explain

March 7, 2007

A good idea, poorly executed: the analytical framework is superficial and treatment of cases shallow. The authors conclude that "leaders today... may be able to draw a political victory from the jaws of military defeat by highlighting illusory achievements." (p. 290) Yeah, sure. Just declare Mission Accomplished. The role of perceptions is indeed crucial, but cannot be reduced to Machiavellianism Lite. This is precisely the kind of thinking that leads to disaster.

3 people found this helpful4 people found this helpful

Helpful

Comment

Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics First Edition Edition

Turn on 1-Click ordering

Turn on 1-Click ordering

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Customers who bought this item also bought

Editorial Reviews

Review

About the Author

Product details

Related Video Shorts (0)

Be the first video

Customer reviews

Top customer reviews

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics First Edition Edition

Sorry, there was a problem.

Sorry, there was a problem.

Buy used On clicking this link, a new layer will be open $13.47 On clicking this link, a new layer will be open

Turn on 1-Click ordering

Buy new On clicking this link, a new layer will be open $26.26 On clicking this link, a new layer will be open

Turn on 1-Click ordering

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Customers who bought this item also bought

Editorial Reviews

Review

About the Author

Product details

Related Video Shorts (0)

Be the first video

Customer reviews

Top customer reviews

There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.

Buy used On clicking this link, a new layer will be open

$13.47 On clicking this link, a new layer will be open

Buy new On clicking this link, a new layer will be open

$26.26 On clicking this link, a new layer will be open