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The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America Hardcover – June 1, 2004
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Stephen F. Hayes
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Print length224 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherHarper
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Publication dateJune 1, 2004
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Dimensions5.25 x 0.81 x 7.38 inches
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ISBN-100060746734
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ISBN-13978-0060746735
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
About the Author
Stephen F. Hayes is a senior writer for the Weekly Standard and the author of the New York Times bestseller The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America. He has been a commentator on many television and radio broadcasts, including the Today show, Meet the Press, the Diane Rehm Show, Fox News Sunday, the O'Reilly Factor, and CNN's Late Edition. His writing has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Wall Street Journal, The National Review, and the New York Post. He lives on the Chesapeake Bay with his wife and two children.
Product details
- Publisher : Harper; First Edition (June 1, 2004)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 224 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0060746734
- ISBN-13 : 978-0060746735
- Item Weight : 1 pounds
- Dimensions : 5.25 x 0.81 x 7.38 inches
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Best Sellers Rank:
#2,558,485 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #4,474 in Terrorism (Books)
- #13,488 in Political Leader Biographies
- #16,030 in History & Theory of Politics
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Not having the benefit of hindsight the connections cannot be ignored. There is not a lot of new material for people that have been interested in the story enough to stay current and read up on the subject but for the casual follower of the news, this book is a good source to refresh some of the key points of contention as to if a connection does exist.
Its revelations will shock and anger you, particularly because so much of it has been under-reported by a US media culture with a political agenda against the liberation of Iraq and against the Bush administration. Indeed, one of the most shocking chapters of the book is one which details the way the media has deep-sixed, been unduly dismissive of or misrepresented the evidence of Al Qaeda ties to Saddam's regime. Left unanswered however is the question as to why some Democrats and media types feel the need to play defense for Saddam.
Hayes is careful to avoid the claim that Saddam had a role in 9-11, even though he provides tantalizing evidence that Saddam may have at least had foreknowledge of the event. Recent media reports, citing an unnamed CIA source, try to cast doubts on one of Hayes' more compelling claims, that a Saddam Fedayeen officer was the same Iraqi who hosted the 9-11 hijackers at the terrorist summit in Malaysia in 2000 where experts be lieve 9-11 was planned. Is this the same CIA that missed clues for years that Al Qaeda was planning to attack the US and that cannot figure out what became of Saddam's WMD?
Even if not the same person, what was an Iraqi working under the direction of Iraqi intelligence agents out of Saddam's embassy in Malaysia doing helping the 9-11 hijackers? And why when later arrested in Jordan did Saddam's government put extraordinary pressure on the Jordanians to release him, then traveling back to Iraq under Saddam's protection? The point still stands that an Iraqi working for Saddam's govt., even if not the same officer in Saddam's Fedeyeen forces, helped facilitate a meeting between the 9-11 hijackers and other top Al Qaeda leaders.
Further, what of the continuing insistence by Czech interior and intelligence officials that Mohammad Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in the months prior to 9-11? Hayes points to the evidence indicating such a meeting did occur, including at least one eyewitness.
Hayes shows his integrity and the credibility of his book by neither drawing conclusions about such events nor claiming for certain that the Atta meeting did occur. He merely pieces together a fascinating chain of evidence.
More compelling are the many other ways Hayes details about how Saddam worked with Al Qaeda, using testimony by multiple witnesses, NSA intercepts, etc.
One example that refutes conventional wisdom that militant Islamists would never associate with a secularist like Saddam is the Al Qaeda affiliated Ansar Al Islam's collusion with Saddam. This includes the housing of Ansar's leader, top Bin Laden terrorist Al Zarqawi, in an elite Baghdad hospital reserved for top Saddam regime officials after Al Zarqawi was wounded in Afghanistan.
Further, Hayes points out that Al Zarqawi's group was co-commanded by a top Saddam intelligence officer, Abu Wael, and used to attack anti-Saddam Kurdish forces in the north. This blows away the myth that Ansar Al Islam was in territory beyond Saddam's control.
Additionally, Ansar Al Islam's bases housed hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives who fled Afghanistan after the US invasion. Their passports, subsequently found by US forces in Iraq, were stamped with Iraqi entrance visas indicating Saddam's regime welcomed them.
The book is full of many more such compelling pieces of evidence all of which taken together form a frightening mosaic of Saddam/Al Qaeda cooperation. It becomes clear that post 9-11, after the Taliban regime, Saddam's government was the second biggest state helper of Al Qaeda. That would tend to support President Bush's logic in making Iraq the second target in the war on terror. (Yes, Saddam apologists on the left will claim Saudi Arabia and Pakistan did more for Al Qaeda. While that was perhaps true prior to 9-11 they at least cut off dealings with Al Qaeda afterwards, even attacking them, unlike Saddam who celebrated the 9-11 attacks and deepened his relationship with Al Qaeda after 9-11 as the book shows.)
The only real negative about the book is that it tends to bog down slightly towards the middle when Hayes attempts to connect the Sudanese chemical/pharmaceutical plant destroyed by President Clinton in 1998 to both Iraq and Al Qaeda. While interesting, it is the weakest link in Hayes' case, which he is honest enough to admit by the way.
For those who might ignorantly dismiss this book as hopelessly biased keep in mind the book is published by Harper Collins, not some right wing publisher. Do not dismiss Hayes' efforts without first reading his book and seeing for yourself that he is both fair and reasonable, admitting where the case for Saddam having worked with Al Qaeda is weak, along with hard-hitting and credible evidence of such collusion. His book is thoroughly researched and will stand the scrutiny of even the most skeptical reader. Don't be swayed against this book by obviously partisan reviewers who, judging by their lack of any real detail or substantive objections, clearly have not read this book.
