Achtung Panzer, one of the major works in Military Science was first published in 1937. The author, Heinz Guderian, has severely rebuked the skeptical and reactionary opponents of armor and placed it squarely in the forefront of military operations and plans.
The text has been divided into 10 chapters. In the opening chapters, he has explained how World War I descended into positional war. Trenches appeared everywhere as the western front congealed and petrified; battlefield mobility was lost. Therefore to break the stalemate tank was born. Guderian has shared his experiences of conflict and has provided an incisive analysis on what went wrong with Allied tank tactics.
Guderian went on to develop German tank doctrine which was governed by his experiences of fighting in the western front. He was driving force behind mechanization of German army with a caveat this would not have been possible without Hitler’s encouragement and support.
I don’t hold the view Guderian’s thinking on tank warfare was molded by British military thinkers: Fuller. Hobart, Martel, Liddell Hart. Unlike the British, he realized tanks cannot fight on its own. To fight effectively it needed the support and help of other arms: motorized infantry, artillery(Fliegerabwehrkannon called FLAK) anti-tank guns(Panzerabwehrkannon called PAK) airplane. This was the genesis of German Combined Arms Doctrine. A typical panzer division was a flexible all-arms unit. British doctrine on other hand was too tank-centric.
Some striking features of Guderian’s thinking:
Choice of the ground is essential before conducting tank offensive. Tanks need wide open spaces for maneuver. Tanks must not be used in built-in areas, terrain laced with waterbodies.
Armor should be massed against a carefully chosen sector of enemy’s defense. Schwerpunkt ( place of main effort) should not be where resistance was encountered. Enemy defenses cannot be uniformly strong. Massing strength against weakness is an important principle in strategy. During operation Case Yellow or Fall Gelb ( German attack on France and Low Countries) massed German armor ( 7 divisions) assaulted the weakest sector of Allied defenses.
After the enemy line is breached armor by following lines of least resistance would penetrate into rear areas spreading panic to strike at the ‘brain of command’. To ensure decisive operational success it was absolutely essential to maintain the momentum of advance, for under no circumstances enemy must be given any chance to stabilize the front. With the advance in progress, there must close co-operation of all arms in panzer division.
Luftwaffe served as flying artillery. Besides providing fire support it kept enemy rear areas under observation by reporting on forms of resistance which lay ahead.
Author has stressed the importance of ground reconnaissance, for no army can blindly thrust into enemy territory. Aerial reconnaissance has its limitations. There are so many unknowns. Information is required on road networks, rivers ( whether fordable) bridges ( whether it could support the movement of tanks) natural or man- made obstacles, equipment types, unit identities, forward area deployments, enemy outposts, main lines of resistance down to the subunit level.
Armored reconnaissance troops were called ‘ Aufklarungsabteilung’. Information gathered should be quickly made available to commanders. They report by sending dispatch riders, telephones, R/W ( radio wireless)
Installation of radios opened a new level of command. It became possible to control, co ordinate the movement of different units in the panzer division. Commander of the spearhead can constantly be in contact with Luftwaffe and request fire support if needed.
Equally important is the psychological dimension. Tanks restored battlefield mobility. Mobility, speed, surprise are interlinked and self-sustaining. Surprise is the outcome of speed made possible by mobility. Sudden appearance near an enemy line at a time and place of our choosing can paralyze an opponent.
So new German Wehrmacht launched an unprecedented revolution in warfare. World War I fighting methods became outdated forcing a revision in strategy and tactics. Conservative, hidebound French military establishment refused to appreciate the significance of this development. As a result, the Third Republic got consigned to the dustbin of history.
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