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Sherard Cowper-Coles
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Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign Paperback – January 1, 2011

by Sherard Cowper-Coles (Author)
4.2 4.2 out of 5 stars 84 ratings
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A frank and honest memoir by Britain's former ambassador to Kabul which provides a unique, high-level insight into Western policy in Afghanistan.
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  1. Print length
    352 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Publisher
    HarperCollins Publishers
  4. Publication date
    January 1, 2011
  5. Dimensions
    6.02 x 1.06 x 9.21 inches
  6. ISBN-10
    9780007432028
  7. ISBN-13
    978-0007432028
  8. See all details
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4.2 out of 5 stars
84 global ratings

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Top reviews from the United States

  • Olikul
    5.0 out of 5 stars Honest account - deserves to be widely read
    Reviewed in the United States on April 8, 2012
    Verified Purchase
    This is a great book for anyone interested in the current Afghanistan war. It's an insider's account from the UK Ambassador in Kabul. I found the book well written, mixing strategic thoughts about the conflict, the situation and the possible solutions with anecdotes from the Ambassador's life in Kabul. It is also a frustrating tale, showing how the US is dictating terms, without (always) listening to its coalition partners. For someone who hasn't read a lot about this topic, this book is highly recommended together with The 9/11 Wars by Jason Burke, which is a broader account of the same story and puts Cables from Kabul in a perspective.
    2 people found this helpful
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  • Allan M. Lees
    4.0 out of 5 stars Remains of the Daze
    Reviewed in the United States on October 1, 2011
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    Cables from Kabul contains the account by the man who was first Britain's Ambassador to Afghanistan and then its Special Representative to the same place. The book covers half a decade of activity in which the author must have covered hundreds of thousands of miles in the air and attended countless meetings. It's all very honest and very earnest, but also rather other-worldly. Always, at the margin, one senses the author is uncomfortably aware at the periphery of his consciousness of the fact that his entire professional life - and particularly his association with Afghanistan - has been a complete and utter waste of time, money and effort. I couldn't help, as I read through this book, but be reminded again and again of the butler in Ishiguro's novel Remains of the Day. In that book the story is told through the butler's eyes: he imagines he has played an important supporting role in shaping world events. The crisply starched collar, the place-settings perfectly arranged, the wine served attentively, the guests provided with suitable bedrooms and, when necessary, formal evening wear. But at the end of the book we understand that in fact everything was pointless, a complete waste of a life and irrelevant to what was happening in reality on the world stage.

    I don't say this to denigrate Mr Cowper-Coles. He is to be applauded for providing such an honest and frank account of the utter futility of his activities, and for providing glimpses into the characters who stride across the stage with such self-importance. The book is endlessly horrifying in its stark portrayal of the powerful and clueless who make a complete mess of everything because they are driven by internal agendas rather than by adequate understanding of what's really going on in the benighted country they are supposed to be "helping." It's all much more of a total shambles than we'd believe if we stuck to more traditional narratives. But in the end the reader is left with a feeling that it would all be more or less the same if thousands of people and hundreds of millions of pounds, dollars, and euros had been left undisturbed or put to better use elsewhere. For all the self-aggrandizement of the international community and its designated representatives, for all the pomp and ceremony, for all the endless conferences and expensive dinners, nothing of any value is ever actually achieved. It's all hollow form without substance. The entire diplomatic community is a pointless charade. In the end the reader is left feeling that Mr Cowper-Coles, like Ishiguro's butler, has used up his life to no meaningful end whatsoever.
    9 people found this helpful
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  • Papoo Tech
    5.0 out of 5 stars Interesting Read
    Reviewed in the United States on November 23, 2011
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    I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It is well written and given the subject matter surprisingly readable, maintaining a decent pace throughout and finishing with some interesting thoughts. It is a depressing subject and the author does not try and hide his disappointment at the way things have gone and are going. But, as a book which follows a key player through some very interesting times in Afghanistan, it is a very good read. The author makes his points, backs them up with examples and a few anecdotes and then stops.
    One person found this helpful
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  • John D.
    5.0 out of 5 stars Also it is easy to read
    Reviewed in the United States on October 10, 2017
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    It clearly sheds pertinent light on an otherwise murky situation. Also it is easy to read.
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  • Frank Avocado
    3.0 out of 5 stars Lurching from canape to crisis
    Reviewed in the United States on November 3, 2012
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    This is a book about the limits of diplomacy. It's not so much the inside story of the west's campaign as the inside story of the inside of an embassy somewhere on the fringes of the west's (i.e. America's) campaign. And the inside story of an embassy tends to boil down to one thing: parties. There are parties, conferences, dinners, and social gatherings galore here, all underpinned with the constant refrain 'But why is nothing getting done?' At the outset, Coles admits the possibility that keeping the whole social whirl going may indeed be end in itself and one suspects that he might well be having his cake and eating it here - both indulging in the merry-go-round and complaining about its ineffectiveness in actually changing much. Being a good diplomat, Coles tends not to go too far in any direction opinion-wise, and so the whole narrative tends to drag with boredom. It is only in the final chapter that he redeems things somewhat, engaging in a relatively convincing polemic about the need for proper political control in Afghanistan.
    3 people found this helpful
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  • Mary M. DeLuca
    4.0 out of 5 stars Interesting insight into the conflict in Afghanistan
    Reviewed in the United States on December 24, 2011
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    This book is a very interesting account of the conflict in Afghanistan. It makes it even more interesting that is from the experience of a high ranking British diplomat. I think that he offers several ideas and solutions that are interesting, but this account sort of glazes over several problems and happenings in Afghanistan. Regardless, an interesting account of his time in Afghanistan.
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  • JGR
    5.0 out of 5 stars No howling dogs here
    Reviewed in the United States on August 15, 2013
    The title needs an explanation:- In his hilarious review of the execrable official biography of Comrade Leonid Brehznev, Clive James cautions against reading it out loud 'lest dogs start howling or birds drop out of the sky'.

    In marked contrast to that book, Sir Sherrard writes superbly and compellingly of his time in Afghanistan.

    My own experience of Afghanistan is limited to a fleeting deployment but much of what he says rings true.

    You can certainly read it for pleasure, but one hopes it will be read for more than that. Just read it.
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  • Footplate
    4.0 out of 5 stars Cables from Kabul
    Reviewed in the United States on September 21, 2012
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    Well written in a style only a good civil servant can use, I found the book fascinating. Although I visited Kabul about the time the writer was finishing, we didn't meet. I have found the book one of a small number of books of value to people interested in this country and region.

    Recommended
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Top reviews from other countries

  • Professor Magellan
    5.0 out of 5 stars Stunning. At last we know about Afghanistan. THE non-fiction book of 2011.
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on June 2, 2011
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    For the first time an insider, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, has blown the lid.
    And what an insider.
    Not only does Sir Sherard speak Pashtun (yes, really) and know all the key player personally, his stints in embassies in the USA, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere (a meteoric Foreign Office career by any standard) give him a world view that even many senior diplomats never get to experience. And, armed with a first in classics from Oxford, he writes beautifully and precisely with enormous sensitivity and insight.
    Britain has now been at war in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. The cost to the British taxpayer is apparently £6 billion a year(at least 3p on income tax to put that number in context). More importantly, brave British soldiers are risking their lives daily. And far too many have already tragically lost lives and limbs.
    And for what?
    We know that Afghanistan is a graveyard for empires. Britain had no luck in the 19th century when it was the world's superpower. Even the Red Army - which crushed the Wermacht and held the whole of Eastern Europe in an iron grip for nearly half a century - could not handle the Afghans.
    Britain went into Afghanistan with the Americans to destroy Al Qaeda but the terrorists are present in Pakistan, in Yemen and elsewhere. So do we invade those countries too? Presumably yes - if you follow the doctrine of liberal interventionism so beloved of Tony Blair and now David Cameron.
    What exactly is the end-game?
    Sir Sherard's thesis is that, despite the skill and huge courage of the troops on the ground, the military solution is not the answer. An accord will have to be made with the Taliban.
    Horrible thought: but then having Martin McGuinness or Gerry Adams in positions of authority did not have many of us dancing for joy. But that much under-rated Prime Minister John Major realized that, to end an insurgency, you do need to talk to your enemies and achieve compromise. The result: peace in Northern Ireland.
    In Afghanistan however, crazed generals (Sir Sherard puts this very tactfully and of course would not use the word 'crazed') shower bombs and rockets like they were auditioning for Dr Strangelove. He is very specific about General Petraeus's use of increased violence. "Such a military-focused approach risks making Afghanistan safe not for better governance, but for the warlords and narco-mafias...the poor Afghan people...could be the losers" (P288-289).
    One British General (apparently) wanted to deploy troops in Afghanistan only because that was a way of preserving the defence budget which threatened troop reductions.
    The politicians (mostly) come across as a supine bunch with only the faintest comprehension of the history and tribal complexity of Afghanistan.
    Despite all the tragedy, there is humour in the book as Sir Sherard struggled (not always successfully) to convey the British viewpoint to the prickly Hamid Karzai in the torrid conditions of Kabul under siege. Endlessly Sir Sherard had to escort London-based generals and politicans to the front line. There are shades of Graham Greene in his well-drawn descriptions.
    On just about every page, it is clear there are parallels with another very similar war which was fought and lost, also with politicans and generals saying in unison: 'We are winning'. That war was Vietnam - and it cost the USA 50,000 lives.
    The horrid Harold Wilson had the good sense to keep the UK out of that one.
    I am surprised that the Foreign Office allowed such a frank expose to be published. Perhaps the mandarins know that the game is up.
    As for Sir Sherard, he is clearly an extraordinarily brave and gifted public servant with much more to offer to his country. The book is already a best-seller and will be the non-fiction triumph of 2011.
    If I have one criticism, it would be that I would like to have had more analysis by Sir Sherard of the situation across the border in Pakistan.
    A postscript: apparently the New Labour Government was seriously considering a £100 million (sic) new embassy in Kabul. But happily for the British taxpayer (and unusually for New Labour) this Dome-style extravagance was not to be. The British Embassy is in fact a modest affair. Not so the (taxpayer-funded) British Council Kabul HQ whose opulent lawns Sir Sherard had to requisition for a function too large for the Embassy!
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  • carlquist harris
    1.0 out of 5 stars The title's the best part
    Reviewed in Japan on March 12, 2013
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    Intellectual that I am, the first thing I do when I get a new book is check out the pictures. I can't check the exact figures right now because this book went into the trash a long time ago but, as I remember, 18 of the 20 pictures were of the author himself. ( Hello! I bet that's him on the cover, too. ) Unfortunately, this turned out to be an all too accurate foretaste of what the entire book was going to be like. If you've enjoyed the drunks who've sat next to you on long transoceanic flights, you'll love this book.
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  • Allan Kelly
    4.0 out of 5 stars Interesting, insightful, informative
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on February 12, 2013
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    Perhaps not as analytical as I was expecting but then 400 pages of analysis would not have been much fun to read. Analysis is largely - until the end - woven into a narrative of the author's time in Kabul and working on Afghanistan. Some of the anecdotes seem trivial but they do help paint a picture of diplomats, soldiers, generals and politicians as ordinary people.

    I am glad I read this book and feel I understand this war and what is happening much more than I did before.
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  • Amazon Customer
    5.0 out of 5 stars A view from the commanding heights
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 4, 2011
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    It is all too easy for the patriotic 'right thinking' loyal subject to assume that the top people in the government and the military know what they are doing and why. It would be wrong not to applaud every apparent tactical gain and to regret each and every fallen hero.

    Cowper-Coles makes plain that such sentiments for the war in Afghanistan are futile. After three and a half years as the British Ambassador in Kabul, and taking full account of the American and Coalition engagement since 2001, he can only lament that the present descent into abysmal failure is far worse than the beginning.

    His account chronicles a disjunct series of military and political follies. Witness the more recent American military surge in Kandahar, with total disregard of what should come after: a clear example of the end being worse than the beginning.

    The implicit conclusion of Cables from Kabul would seem, to me, to be that our 'British' fourth Afghan war can only end in ignominy as the previous ones did. The best that can be said about our 10-year endeavour is that we did what we thought was necessary but bungled and misconstrued the nature of the mess we got into by believing that a template of 'Western Style' democracy could be laid over Afghanistan and made to work. No amount of blood and money can make this happen by force of arms, foreign occupation or futile attempts at nation building.

    We are not wanted there by the heterogeneous local populations : occupying armies are despised as much as the Taliban and disparate warlords. We are only wanted there by a self-serving Kabul based oligarchy who require more of our money and military support to protect their interests.

    How long can we as a nation of diminishing resources continue to offer sacrifice to the insatiable Moloch of Afghan futility? Since Sir Sherrard Cowper-Coles returned from Kabul he has left the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in dismay. John Simpson is right: those who wish to know about Afghanistan must read this book.
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  • Graham Jefferies
    5.0 out of 5 stars Cables from Kabul
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on August 13, 2011
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    This is a really excellent book that adds so much more to the conflict in Afganistan. The wider picture helps to show the complications of working with people who have very different views than the official British view. We have made mistakes in Afganistan and it is good to reflect on why. Of particular interest is the way intelligence is handled by both the military and the civilian organisations. The book handles particularly well and with humour the official reports that we are given. The reports that always suggest that "we are on the brink of solving the problem but there is still much hard work ahead". The fact that both the Americans and the British intend to withdraw troops this year it would be interesting to have a trully honest opinion as to whether the Afgan army/police are really up to the task of taking over. There can be few people better qualified to speak on this subject than the author.
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