Strategic intelligence in essence is knowledge derived from rigorous research and analysis processes that informs high level decision making and long term planning. In the U.S. the production of strategic intelligence until recently was the province of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of CIA. This book is a chronicle of the accomplishments and failures of CIA's strategic intelligence programs from the end of WWII until Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1980-1988).
Shortly after the end of WWII (1946), CIA's immediate predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group was formed to include a strategic intelligence production center the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE). With the creation of CIA in 1947, the ORE was folded into the Office of National Estimates (ONE). ONE was composed of CIA subject matter experts supplemented by academic and other outside experts. Like the ORE it was charged with producing in depth studies (estimates) that were designed to inform presidential decision making, policy formulation, and support National Security Council (NSC) deliberations. This arrangement one away with in 1973 by President Nixon who replaced ONE with a more politically pliable National Intelligence Council (NIC) and a system of National Intelligence Officers (NIO). Each NIO had specific geographic (e.g. Soviet Union) or subject matter (e.g. nuclear proliferation) responsibilities, but no permanent staff to assist them. The principal product of the NIC was and continues to be the National Intelligence Estimate. Most recently the NIC was moved from CIA to the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
This book provides a very good history of how the U.S. went about building a strategic intelligence capability in the wake of WWII that was largely driven by what came to be known as the Cold War. Perhaps the most interesting unintended consequence of this book, is the glaring fact that even when CIA through ONE actually was producing useful strategic intelligence it was largely ignored by Presidents and their National Security advisors in favor of their personal perceptions and agendas.
The author of this book, Willard Matthias, is uniquely qualified to write this book having served as a strategic analyst from 1946 to 1973 when he and a number of other experienced analyst and intelligence officers left CIA in protest over the Nixon administrations efforts to politically influence the process of intelligence production
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