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Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea Hardcover – March 13, 2006
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Jeffrey T. Richelson
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Jeffrey T. Richelson
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Print length704 pages
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LanguageEnglish
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PublisherW. W. Norton
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Publication dateMarch 13, 2006
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Dimensions6.5 x 2 x 9.5 inches
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ISBN-100393053830
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ISBN-13978-0393053838
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archive and author of several books on American intelligence including The Wizards of Langley, has written an authoritative and definitive account of U.S. nuclear espionage from the earliest days of atomic research in WWII to the present. Drawing on prodigious research—including newly declassified material—Richelson details the efforts of the U.S. intelligence community to track the nuclear activities of other states. The results of all this spy craft were at best uneven. With abundant technology—aerial reconnaissance, signals intercepts, seismic detection—but few human intelligence resources (HUMINT), the U.S. was consistently surprised by nuclear events in the Soviet Union, China, India and elsewhere. And we're still getting it wrong. Richelson analyzes how American intelligence first underestimated Iraq's nuclear program in the 1980s and then overestimated it in 2003. It's instructive that after 1998, the U.S. did not have "a single HUMINT source" in Iraq. Considering the intelligence community's "mixed record" and the continuing nuclear ambitions of rogue states like North Korea and Iran, Richelson concludes chillingly, "Trouble Is Waiting to Happen." More than a comprehensive and often compelling history of nuclear espionage, this is an important contribution to the debate regarding American intelligence that began on 9/11. (Mar.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
From Booklist
Richelson traces the evolution of U.S. nuclear intelligence efforts--both successes and failures--from the early days of World War II to the twenty-first century. The book's focus, as the author indicates early on, is primarily placed on the early nuclear programs of 15 nations and the U.S. effort to determine if they were trying to acquire nuclear weapons, how far they had gotten, and their attempts to improve those capabilities. Thus, the book examines the work of the CIA and other intelligence agencies in identifying and providing the details about those nuclear programs as well as the agencies' efforts to monitor and evaluate nuclear testing--rather than their efforts to gather information on the nuclear arsenals. Each of the 14 chapters focuses on the nuclear activities of one or a small number of nations, Richelson drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with scientists and spies involved in nuclear espionage. This searching and informed analysis of our nation's nuclear espionage includes spy-satellite photographs from the national archives. George Cohen
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
About the Author
Jeffrey T. Richelson is a senior fellow at the National Security Archive and author of The Wizards of Langley, The U.S. Intelligence Community, A Century of Spies, and America's Secret Eyes in Space. He lives in Los Angeles, California.
Product details
- Publisher : W. W. Norton (March 13, 2006)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 704 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0393053830
- ISBN-13 : 978-0393053838
- Item Weight : 2.44 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 2 x 9.5 inches
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Reviewed in the United States on June 1, 2021
Verified Purchase
No complaints about the writing or content. But as a serious academic work, it should have an index that works. On this Kindle version, never mind hoping for hotlinks that will take you directly to the referenced item in the index, it doesn't even have page or location numbers!!! So the "index" is an alphabetical listing of all the names, locations and organizations mentioned in the book, with no indication of where to find them. Bottom line, if you can't do it right, don't do it at all. Stick to paper books if that is your only area of expertise.
Reviewed in the United States on July 27, 2008
Verified Purchase
At first blush, the events of September 11th ushered in a fundamental paradigm shift in the core mission of the US intelligence community. The focus of national intelligence efforts quickly shifted from a sprawling conventional superpower to a relatively miniscule network of extremists operating independently in some of the most remote and culturally inaccessible parts of the planet. A half-century of hard-earned operational experience and countless billions of dollars in technology were quickly rendered irrelevant. Or so it seemed.
Over the past couple of years a mission as old as the modern intelligence community itself has re-emerged as a critical national priority - the monitoring and accurate assessment of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions. Indeed, Iranian president Ahmadinejad and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il capture more headlines today than does Osama bin Laden and the intelligence community is more hard-pressed to explain the WMD debacle in Iraq than the failures that led to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
As if on cue, distinguished intelligence historian Jeffery Richelson has delivered Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea, a comprehensive history of US nuclear intelligence efforts.
Richelson breaks the material into essentially stand-alone case studies, which is an effective approach given the enormous scope of the subject he has undertaken. The first third of the book focuses on the earliest days of American intelligence efforts against Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and Communist China along with the development of a global network of sensors and collection assets to monitor testing activities and weapons stockpile growth. The final two-thirds of the book is a mix of chapters on the pariah nations of Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, India and Pakistan and the rogue nations of Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya. The author also provides extensive reviews of US intelligence collection operations against the French and detailed analysis of two specific nuclear test incidents: the 1979 "double-flash" in the South Atlantic and the surprise Indian underground tests at Pokhran in 1998.
On one level, Spying on the Bomb is a notable success. It is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the full sweep of the US nuclear intelligence experience, from the earliest days of the Cold War to the present international crisis with Iran. Richelson's primary research is exhaustive and impressive. He employs a broad mix of sources in building each case study, using de-classified (or leaked) government documents, Congressional testimony, private interviews and public technical documents. Because the author avoids any unifying narrative device, each chapter can easily be read in isolation and can therefore serve as an excellent open-source reference manual on American intelligence efforts against a dozen countries. Moreover, the author keeps each case study engaging with the use of cloak-and-dagger anecdotes, such as the proposed December 1944 assassination of prominent Germany physicist Werner Heisenberg at a conference in Zurich by former professional baseball player-turned-spy Moe Berg or the Mossad's use of a femme fatale to lure and capture Dimona reactor turncoat Mordechai Vanunu in Rome in 1985.
That said, there are two aspects of Richelson's style and approach that will make Spying on the Bomb tough going for many would-be readers. First, the author assumes a significant pre-existing knowledge of nuclear weapon technology, such as the enrichment process for uranium, the production of plutonium, and the various methods of device design. Any reader new to the topic will find many sections difficult to comprehend. Second, each chapter is so densely packed with foreign names, places, and organizations that it can easily overwhelm even the most widely read reader. For example, the book lists the names of over 800 people in the index, many of them only being referenced once.
On another level, Spying on the Bomb is something of a disappointment. Richelson is a leading intelligence scholar with an enviably deep understanding of the intelligence process, supporting technologies and component agencies. Yet, he simply refuses to offer any assessments or lessons learned from the half-century American engagement in nuclear espionage. In the preface, Richelson blandly notes that "There is no simple explanation for success or failure in [U.S. nuclear intelligence efforts]" and is evidently content to leave it at that, which is a shame given that several themes emerge from his research that bear emphasis and consideration on a broader level.
First, with one very notable exception (Iraq in 2003), the US intelligence community has consistently and often grossly underestimated the capabilities of foreign nuclear weapons programs. The Soviet Union, China, Israel, South Africa and Iraq (in the 1980s) were all years ahead of where the consensus opinion in the intelligence community thought possible. Although Richelson does not say so explicitly, the thrust of his work certainly suggests that the US intelligence community's record on assessing nuclear weapons capabilities consists of varying degrees of failure. It remains to be seen how the intelligence catastrophe on Iraqi WMD will impact the intelligence community in the years ahead. Will it instill a new rigor in analysis and promote inter-agency cooperation that avoids the pitfalls of Iraq? Or is it likely to produce a crisis of confidence that constrains intelligence organizations from making actionable assessments of foreign nuclear intentions and capabilities based on limited information, thus removing them as players in the national security decision-making? Richelson does not conjecture either way.
Second, nearly all of Richelson's case studies demonstrate the important role allies and international organizations have played in thwarting the nuclear ambitions of rogue states and in operating a sophisticated global web of monitoring equipment to enforce treaties and confirm testing activities. The IAEA and other international bodies have certainly failed in their duties several times in the past (which the author does not hesitate to point out) but he also maintains that such bodies play an important role in the non-proliferation regime and are often quite effective in complicating illicit uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon design programs. Unfortunately, Richelson does not explore how the international community and the non-proliferation regime can best be leveraged in the global struggle against extremists that clearly covet a bomb of any kind or effectively stifle the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.
Third, Richelson demonstrates that bureaucratic infighting, overlapping missions, and organizational rivalry have burdened US nuclear intelligence activities since their inception, and he expresses little hope that the shortcomings of the past will be ameliorated anytime soon. He places specific emphasis on the mutual animosity between the competing foreign intelligence cells at the national nuclear labs - Lawrence Livermore's Z Division and Los Alamos' Intelligence and Research team. Rather than maintaining separate areas of focus or serving as Red Team/Blue Team cells for independent analysis and thoughtful, professional disagreement, the two units are portrayed more like bitter corporate rivals battling in a zero-sum game for marketshare. Again, possible reform initiatives or organizational realignment to combat these consistent failings are left up to the reader to imagine.
Finally, Richelson's case studies make it abundantly clear that there is no substitute for good human intelligence, a discipline that has never been the métier of the US intelligence community. The few examples of bona fide intelligence coups in the nuclear weapon arena came from well placed and well groomed inside sources, such as Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, who was deputy director of Taiwan's nuclear energy research institute and a critical supplier of intelligence before defecting to the US in the late 1980s. Presumably recent efforts to boost the HUMIT capabilities at CIA and DIA will address this critical shortcoming; unfortunately, Richelson does not provide any thoughts on how this might best be achieved or how long it will take for the investment to make substantial returns.
In closing, Jeffery Richelson's latest piece is an outstanding factual overview on the US intelligence community's fifty-year history in tracking the nuclear activities and intentions of over a dozen nation states. However, any insights into what it all means and how that long experience may be exploited to improve our ability in meeting similar intelligence challenges of the 21st century is left to the reader alone to ponder.
Over the past couple of years a mission as old as the modern intelligence community itself has re-emerged as a critical national priority - the monitoring and accurate assessment of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions. Indeed, Iranian president Ahmadinejad and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il capture more headlines today than does Osama bin Laden and the intelligence community is more hard-pressed to explain the WMD debacle in Iraq than the failures that led to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
As if on cue, distinguished intelligence historian Jeffery Richelson has delivered Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea, a comprehensive history of US nuclear intelligence efforts.
Richelson breaks the material into essentially stand-alone case studies, which is an effective approach given the enormous scope of the subject he has undertaken. The first third of the book focuses on the earliest days of American intelligence efforts against Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and Communist China along with the development of a global network of sensors and collection assets to monitor testing activities and weapons stockpile growth. The final two-thirds of the book is a mix of chapters on the pariah nations of Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, India and Pakistan and the rogue nations of Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya. The author also provides extensive reviews of US intelligence collection operations against the French and detailed analysis of two specific nuclear test incidents: the 1979 "double-flash" in the South Atlantic and the surprise Indian underground tests at Pokhran in 1998.
On one level, Spying on the Bomb is a notable success. It is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the full sweep of the US nuclear intelligence experience, from the earliest days of the Cold War to the present international crisis with Iran. Richelson's primary research is exhaustive and impressive. He employs a broad mix of sources in building each case study, using de-classified (or leaked) government documents, Congressional testimony, private interviews and public technical documents. Because the author avoids any unifying narrative device, each chapter can easily be read in isolation and can therefore serve as an excellent open-source reference manual on American intelligence efforts against a dozen countries. Moreover, the author keeps each case study engaging with the use of cloak-and-dagger anecdotes, such as the proposed December 1944 assassination of prominent Germany physicist Werner Heisenberg at a conference in Zurich by former professional baseball player-turned-spy Moe Berg or the Mossad's use of a femme fatale to lure and capture Dimona reactor turncoat Mordechai Vanunu in Rome in 1985.
That said, there are two aspects of Richelson's style and approach that will make Spying on the Bomb tough going for many would-be readers. First, the author assumes a significant pre-existing knowledge of nuclear weapon technology, such as the enrichment process for uranium, the production of plutonium, and the various methods of device design. Any reader new to the topic will find many sections difficult to comprehend. Second, each chapter is so densely packed with foreign names, places, and organizations that it can easily overwhelm even the most widely read reader. For example, the book lists the names of over 800 people in the index, many of them only being referenced once.
On another level, Spying on the Bomb is something of a disappointment. Richelson is a leading intelligence scholar with an enviably deep understanding of the intelligence process, supporting technologies and component agencies. Yet, he simply refuses to offer any assessments or lessons learned from the half-century American engagement in nuclear espionage. In the preface, Richelson blandly notes that "There is no simple explanation for success or failure in [U.S. nuclear intelligence efforts]" and is evidently content to leave it at that, which is a shame given that several themes emerge from his research that bear emphasis and consideration on a broader level.
First, with one very notable exception (Iraq in 2003), the US intelligence community has consistently and often grossly underestimated the capabilities of foreign nuclear weapons programs. The Soviet Union, China, Israel, South Africa and Iraq (in the 1980s) were all years ahead of where the consensus opinion in the intelligence community thought possible. Although Richelson does not say so explicitly, the thrust of his work certainly suggests that the US intelligence community's record on assessing nuclear weapons capabilities consists of varying degrees of failure. It remains to be seen how the intelligence catastrophe on Iraqi WMD will impact the intelligence community in the years ahead. Will it instill a new rigor in analysis and promote inter-agency cooperation that avoids the pitfalls of Iraq? Or is it likely to produce a crisis of confidence that constrains intelligence organizations from making actionable assessments of foreign nuclear intentions and capabilities based on limited information, thus removing them as players in the national security decision-making? Richelson does not conjecture either way.
Second, nearly all of Richelson's case studies demonstrate the important role allies and international organizations have played in thwarting the nuclear ambitions of rogue states and in operating a sophisticated global web of monitoring equipment to enforce treaties and confirm testing activities. The IAEA and other international bodies have certainly failed in their duties several times in the past (which the author does not hesitate to point out) but he also maintains that such bodies play an important role in the non-proliferation regime and are often quite effective in complicating illicit uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon design programs. Unfortunately, Richelson does not explore how the international community and the non-proliferation regime can best be leveraged in the global struggle against extremists that clearly covet a bomb of any kind or effectively stifle the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.
Third, Richelson demonstrates that bureaucratic infighting, overlapping missions, and organizational rivalry have burdened US nuclear intelligence activities since their inception, and he expresses little hope that the shortcomings of the past will be ameliorated anytime soon. He places specific emphasis on the mutual animosity between the competing foreign intelligence cells at the national nuclear labs - Lawrence Livermore's Z Division and Los Alamos' Intelligence and Research team. Rather than maintaining separate areas of focus or serving as Red Team/Blue Team cells for independent analysis and thoughtful, professional disagreement, the two units are portrayed more like bitter corporate rivals battling in a zero-sum game for marketshare. Again, possible reform initiatives or organizational realignment to combat these consistent failings are left up to the reader to imagine.
Finally, Richelson's case studies make it abundantly clear that there is no substitute for good human intelligence, a discipline that has never been the métier of the US intelligence community. The few examples of bona fide intelligence coups in the nuclear weapon arena came from well placed and well groomed inside sources, such as Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, who was deputy director of Taiwan's nuclear energy research institute and a critical supplier of intelligence before defecting to the US in the late 1980s. Presumably recent efforts to boost the HUMIT capabilities at CIA and DIA will address this critical shortcoming; unfortunately, Richelson does not provide any thoughts on how this might best be achieved or how long it will take for the investment to make substantial returns.
In closing, Jeffery Richelson's latest piece is an outstanding factual overview on the US intelligence community's fifty-year history in tracking the nuclear activities and intentions of over a dozen nation states. However, any insights into what it all means and how that long experience may be exploited to improve our ability in meeting similar intelligence challenges of the 21st century is left to the reader alone to ponder.
8 people found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on December 18, 2007
Verified Purchase
Jeffrey Richelson's "Spying On The Bomb" is an exhaustive unclassified account of the American Intelligence Community's effort to track the development of nuclear weapons by other countries. This effort began with fears that Nazi Germany might acquire the atomic bomb ahead of the Allies, transferred its attention to the Soviet Union after World War II, and afterward concerned itself with nations such as China, France, India, South Africa, and Libya. Most recently, and perhaps most notoriously, the U.S. Intelligence Community has attempted to track the nuclear ambitions of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Richelson has accomplished an impressive amount of research, based on public information, declassified sources, and a variety of personal interviews. The book represents perhaps the most coherent account possible at present without access to classified data.
Out of this research comes a number of salient points. First, the U.S. record in tracking nuclear weapons development by other countries is a mixed bag of partial successes and some outright failures. Second, nuclear weapons development is an extremely hard target. No other target sets in these countries were and are so closely guarded by layered security, deception, lies, and espionage. Third, the U.S. effort has often been hamstrung as much by rivalries between intelligence agencies and indeed between individual analysts as by inadequacies in collection.
Richelson doesn't formally summarize the U.S. intelligence effort at the end of his book. It may be that any fifty year campaign against multiple countries under vastly different circumstances lacks common threads beyond the nature of the target. With respect to the programs of some countries, no definitive determination of their status and hence no grade for the U.S. effort is yet possible
What Richelson does achieve is a straightforward account for the student of the intelligence community. For example, his narrative of the multiple failures to get right the Iraq nuclear threat is as accessible and as even-handed as any in print. The material on the lesser known nuclear programs, and on incidents such as the 1979 "flash of light" near South Africa, is fascinating.
This book is highly recommended as an excellent resource for students of the intelligence community and of nuclear weapons development as policy.
Richelson has accomplished an impressive amount of research, based on public information, declassified sources, and a variety of personal interviews. The book represents perhaps the most coherent account possible at present without access to classified data.
Out of this research comes a number of salient points. First, the U.S. record in tracking nuclear weapons development by other countries is a mixed bag of partial successes and some outright failures. Second, nuclear weapons development is an extremely hard target. No other target sets in these countries were and are so closely guarded by layered security, deception, lies, and espionage. Third, the U.S. effort has often been hamstrung as much by rivalries between intelligence agencies and indeed between individual analysts as by inadequacies in collection.
Richelson doesn't formally summarize the U.S. intelligence effort at the end of his book. It may be that any fifty year campaign against multiple countries under vastly different circumstances lacks common threads beyond the nature of the target. With respect to the programs of some countries, no definitive determination of their status and hence no grade for the U.S. effort is yet possible
What Richelson does achieve is a straightforward account for the student of the intelligence community. For example, his narrative of the multiple failures to get right the Iraq nuclear threat is as accessible and as even-handed as any in print. The material on the lesser known nuclear programs, and on incidents such as the 1979 "flash of light" near South Africa, is fascinating.
This book is highly recommended as an excellent resource for students of the intelligence community and of nuclear weapons development as policy.
One person found this helpful
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Reviewed in the United States on March 21, 2007
Verified Purchase
I confess that I think the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. To make a nuclear bomb all you need is 1940s technology. In time more and more nations will get them. At best, the US can try to slow down the growth. To do that they need accurate intelligence. What is critical is before they get the bomb as later it is much harder to stop it. Reading this book I did not feel confident the US intelligence was that successful in finding out this information. Partly it is asking too much of an intelligence agency for example it is clear from the book that few in the countries that are trying to make bombs know or even suspect it. The cost is not that high. It appears the local intelligence is these countries is adequate in security. It does not take that much time to make one if a country wants too. It is also clear for all the technological marvels available to the US they do not have enough. Although it does appear the US often knows a bomb has gone off after it has gone off.
What I did not like is the book lacks an overall assessment at the end of each section. So I felt like we are going from story to story with no real theme.
However it is a good study and if your interested in this subject it is a must read.
What I did not like is the book lacks an overall assessment at the end of each section. So I felt like we are going from story to story with no real theme.
However it is a good study and if your interested in this subject it is a must read.
5 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries
George
4.0 out of 5 stars
Full of information but got boring after a while
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 10, 2013Verified Purchase
This is an excellent effort and the information included is amazing. But I felt that, after a while, the author's capacity to write out ideas and information on paper just wasn't enough. It's a perfect effort to collect data but it become tiresome at the end.
One person found this helpful
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Eric OD Green
5.0 out of 5 stars
Un ouvrage remarquable du grand Jeffrey Richelson : à lire absolument
Reviewed in France on January 19, 2020Verified Purchase
Voici un ouvrage paru, si ma mémoire est bonne en 2004/2005, et qui était un travail de recherche du grand Jeffrey Richelson un spécialiste majeur de l'exploitation des archives déclassifiées des programmes d'espionnages américains. Les ouvrages de Richelson, notamment sur la NSA et le fameux traité UK/USA de 1947 qui créé le système Echelon, ont baigné ma jeunesse lorsque j'écrivais ma seconde thèse. Malheureusement, Richelson est décédé et il est incertain que l'on retrouve un auteur de son niveau.
Cet ouvrage est d'une richesse incroyable avec l'exposé de l'ensemble des programmes d'espionnages des programmes nucléaires militaires étrangers, depuis le programme uranium des nazies jusqu'à des éléments documentaires sur l'Irak et Téhéran en passant par la Corée du Nord. Pour le lecteur francophone une des surprises majeures est de découvrir une activité de renseignement puissante et structuré concernant la France et son programme nucléaire : comme quoi comme l'indique Spinoza dans son traité du Politique," les États n'ont pas d'amis mais seulement des alliés". Je vous recommande vivement l'achat et la lecture de ce livre si vous avez une bonne maîtrise de l'anglais universitaire.
Cet ouvrage est d'une richesse incroyable avec l'exposé de l'ensemble des programmes d'espionnages des programmes nucléaires militaires étrangers, depuis le programme uranium des nazies jusqu'à des éléments documentaires sur l'Irak et Téhéran en passant par la Corée du Nord. Pour le lecteur francophone une des surprises majeures est de découvrir une activité de renseignement puissante et structuré concernant la France et son programme nucléaire : comme quoi comme l'indique Spinoza dans son traité du Politique," les États n'ont pas d'amis mais seulement des alliés". Je vous recommande vivement l'achat et la lecture de ce livre si vous avez une bonne maîtrise de l'anglais universitaire.
Hercules9966
5.0 out of 5 stars
Exzellente Zusammenfassung
Reviewed in Germany on April 7, 2018Verified Purchase
Eine dicht gepackte Zusammenfassungseit seit den ersten Tagen der Kernwaffenforschung durch Heisenberg und von Weizsäcker in ihrem verzweifelten Bemühen Hitler die Bombe zu liefern. Gefolgt von detailierten Beschreibungen der ersten unabhängigen Schritte des geheimen Sowjet-Programs in Tomsk und Swerdlovsks. Auch die Forschungsprogramme Südafrikas, Israels und natürlich Chinas, sowie der vergebliche Versuch John F. Kennedys sie zu stoppen werden minutiös dargestellt mit hochkarätigen Originalquellen.
Das berühmte Lockheed U2 Flugzeug kommt ebenso wie das sateliten-basierte Vela Überwachungsprogramm nicht zu kurz. Ein von einem alternden Vela Satelit am 22. September 1979 detektiertes ("Vela 6911") Ereignis über dem Südatlantik wird ausführlich diskutiert: auch wenn die Möglichkeit einer atmosphärischen Detonation durch eine unbekannte Organisation nicht ausgeschlossen wird, so wird sie seriös abgewogen unter Einbeziehung der öffentlich bekannten Quellen.
Ein hochaktuelles Buch über die vielleicht wichtigste Form der Aufklärung: die nukleare Spionage mit dem Ziel der Kontrolle dieser gefährlichen Waffentechnologie. Leider auch eine Geschichte der Misserfolge, die bis heute anhält. Insofern auch ein Weckruf an die Politik des Westens diese wichtige Geheimdiensttätigkeit besser zu finanzieren im Interesse auch zukünftiger Generationen. Es ist traurig, daß wir die Namen vieler Akteure in dieser Mission nie erfahren werden. Sie dienen als stille Helden der Zukunft der Menschheit.
Das berühmte Lockheed U2 Flugzeug kommt ebenso wie das sateliten-basierte Vela Überwachungsprogramm nicht zu kurz. Ein von einem alternden Vela Satelit am 22. September 1979 detektiertes ("Vela 6911") Ereignis über dem Südatlantik wird ausführlich diskutiert: auch wenn die Möglichkeit einer atmosphärischen Detonation durch eine unbekannte Organisation nicht ausgeschlossen wird, so wird sie seriös abgewogen unter Einbeziehung der öffentlich bekannten Quellen.
Ein hochaktuelles Buch über die vielleicht wichtigste Form der Aufklärung: die nukleare Spionage mit dem Ziel der Kontrolle dieser gefährlichen Waffentechnologie. Leider auch eine Geschichte der Misserfolge, die bis heute anhält. Insofern auch ein Weckruf an die Politik des Westens diese wichtige Geheimdiensttätigkeit besser zu finanzieren im Interesse auch zukünftiger Generationen. Es ist traurig, daß wir die Namen vieler Akteure in dieser Mission nie erfahren werden. Sie dienen als stille Helden der Zukunft der Menschheit.
Amazon Guy2003
4.0 out of 5 stars
Four Stars
Reviewed in Canada on December 24, 2016Verified Purchase
Kind of long and rambling, but very informative and worth having, if you are into history of this nature.

