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The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Zenith Military Classics) Paperback – February 17, 2006
Purchase options and add-ons
- Print length336 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherZenith Press
- Publication dateFebruary 17, 2006
- Dimensions6.25 x 0.75 x 9.13 inches
- ISBN-109780760324073
- ISBN-13978-0760324073
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Learn more how customers reviews work on AmazonCustomers say
Customers find the book an essential guide to current events. They describe it as a page-turner with insightful case studies and important ideas. The book provides a comprehensive overview of warfare history and evolution, shedding light on recent conflicts.
AI-generated from the text of customer reviews
Customers find the book easy to read and engaging. They describe it as a great guide to current events, well-written, and worth their time. Readers appreciate the good explanations of terrorist motivations and strategies. Overall, they consider it a worthwhile read that provides valuable knowledge.
"...I strongly recommend this book for how much knowledge it provides not only in military strategy but in the recent history of the most intractable..." Read more
"...He provides a useful background of he various "generations" of war or the evolutions that war has made as economy and cultures have changed, moves..." Read more
"...It's a good primer on insurgency and counterinsurgency as well, and even starts to get into the neofunctionalist approach to nation building...." Read more
"...is the most enlightening book I have read in a decade and it is a great read for anyone trying to make sense of current hostilities, including..." Read more
Customers find the book insightful and helpful for understanding the history and evolution of warfare. They appreciate the case studies in the middle chapters. The book provides an enhanced perspective on world affairs and a thoughtful look ahead.
"...But, reading this lucid, analytical, visionary, and incredibly insightful book will convince you that it is not...." Read more
"...of Fourth Generation warfare (4GW) and then provides detailed examples including present date...." Read more
"...in the way the author uses history and a consistent perspective to generate social scientific insights, and in that sense, it is traditional, but..." Read more
"...This book goes a long way towards explaining the more recent conflicts that have killed soldiers of every nationality, frustrated the American armed..." Read more
Reviews with images
Very good very interesting if you like this kind of stuff
Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on December 28, 2004This is a fascinating book that exposed me to a different type of author: the military intellectual. For many civilians this may represent an oxymoron. But, reading this lucid, analytical, visionary, and incredibly insightful book will convince you that it is not. There is intelligence in the military after all.
Sadly enough, the material of the book was mainly derived from two long internal essays the author generated within the military back in 1988 and 1994. So, the concepts that seemed new to me as a civilian at the end of 2004 were known within the military for over a decade. Thus, even though the author proposed a framework for restructuring the Department of Defense based around human skills able to deal with insurgent warfare instead of solely technological capabilities aimed at outdated State-to-State warfare, the DOD under Rumsfeld and his predecessors chose to go in exactly the wrong direction.
The author develops his analytical framework around its main theme: fourth generation warfare (4GW) in 17 very clearly written and sequentially developed short chapters. Near the beginning of the book, he gives his concept a broadbased historical foundation by suggesting that warfare evolves in parallel to society in general. So, just as our civilization has evolved from various disaggregated stages including: nomadic, agricultural, industrial, and finally information based; warfare has now also reached its fourth stage centered also on information and the dissemination of ideas.
Counterintuitively, the author demonstrates brilliantly that the U.S. DOD is at a huge disadvantage in this new information based warfare style. Yes, we have superior technology, we have the best weapons. But, because of our uncreative hierarchical monopolistic centralized organization we are totally incapable of exploiting our technology in a timely manner. The author takes the example of generating a surveillance request within the DOD. The turnaround for this information to be authorized and processed will be about a week. On the other hand, a terrorist group simply watching CNN and using cheap commercially available surveillance technology will have information on many of the enemies positions almost live.
The more perplexing challenge is that the U.S. with all its wealth and infrastructure and military personnel represents a huge set of targets. The insurgents in whatever shape or form are totally stealthy, mixed in within civilian populations, and often use explicitly civilians as either shields or supporting system for their warfare.
Another challenge is the battle of ideas. The 4GW combatants use the media effectively to wear down the political resolve of their enemies. This entails showing bloody civilian casualties as any result of U.S. offensive. This is also done by orchestrating spectacularly shocking beheadings of innocent civilians whose only crime were collaborating with the U.S.
The author proposes many detailed solutions to all the above challenges. They appear somewhat Herculean in the changes that the DOD will have to undertake to spend its $500 billion effectively so as to fight today's wars instead of yesterday's. The author makes an interesting comparison between IBM in the pre PC world and today. IBM was focused on mainframes where it had an unrivaled advantage. It did so for too long until mainframes became almost irrelevant. Today, the technology industry is more flexible, creative, and fast paced moving than IBM was capable of handling. But, the author feels that the DOD's obsession with developing superior but irrelevant technology at the detriment of developing the smart human skills necessary to deal with 4GW effectively is just as ineffective as IBM's former mainframe based strategy. What good is superior technology if it takes you five days to turnaround a surveillance request.
The most fascinating part of the book is his analysis of Vietnam and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts (chapters 6 and 8) using his 4GW framework. These are the most insightful writings I have read on the subject.
I strongly recommend this book for how much knowledge it provides not only in military strategy but in the recent history of the most intractable conflicts. If you are interested in this subject, I also recommend Wesley Clark's "Winning Modern Wars"; Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" and van Crevald's "The Transformation of War." All these books outline the changes of warfare, and complement nicely this book. But, this book serves as the core of the knowledge base regarding the evolution of warfare from a State-to-State phenomena to something completely different the DOD is ill equipped to deal with organizationally.
- Reviewed in the United States on August 31, 2006Col. Hammes has taken the original thesis of "we make war the way we make money" presented by the Toffler's in "War and Anti-War" and fleshed it out with real examples. He provides a useful background of he various "generations" of war or the evolutions that war has made as economy and cultures have changed, moves on to a description of Fourth Generation warfare (4GW) and then provides detailed examples including present date. It's important to understand that although this book is about 4GW or insurgency warfare, it is also about the direction warfare is taking. The United States must be ready for conflicts that span the spectrum from 2GW to what will become 5GW. 4GW is like any insurgency...it requires lots of human skill, good communications, and interagency support...and something that Americans are not known for....patience. If you are a soldier interested in insurgency and how it is evolving this is a MUST READ book. If you are a civilian you'd better read this book if you want to understand how the world is unfolding around you. This book gets Mike Barr's 6 Star Rating.
- Reviewed in the United States on July 11, 2005War evolves, rather than transforms, is the central thesis of this book. The author should not be taken to task for over-emphasizing Fourth Generation warfare so much. The way I took it is that the author was rightly proud of his championing certain concepts, so the overemphasis was not excessive. It's a good primer on insurgency and counterinsurgency as well, and even starts to get into the neofunctionalist approach to nation building. Better works can indeed be found, such as Chaplin's in-depth Mao's Legacy and surely on Vietnam, but the book really starts picking up with the chapters on al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Overall, all the case studies in the middle chapters are enlightening. The last five chapters also contain some relatively good ideas for military reform, but the focus is too much on personnel issues, such as 360-degree job evaluations and the ideas in Vandergriff's Revolution in Human Affairs. Although the personnel focus is understandable given the author's brief coverage of CONUS and Homeland Security issues, the strength of this book lies not in the critique of bureaucracy it tries to provide, but in the way the author uses history and a consistent perspective to generate social scientific insights, and in that sense, it is traditional, but also innovative and suggestive in some places.
Top reviews from other countries
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ChristianReviewed in Germany on January 16, 20225.0 out of 5 stars Auch wenn schon fast 20 Jahre her- Mit Blick auf das Generationenmodell must read
Auch wenn der aktuelle, z.T. konventionelle Wettstreit mit den Kompetitoren RUS und CHN sich nur schwer in die Argumentation dieses Buches einordnen lässt, entwickelt das Buch mit Blick auf ein Generationenmodell der Kriegsführung nachvollziehbare Ansätze. Einige Schlussfolgerungen sind noch heute gültig, andere sind hinzugekommen.
Amazon CustomerReviewed in Canada on May 25, 20175.0 out of 5 stars huge insight
this gentleman should be read throughout the U.S. military. This explains the U..S cannot win any recent wars
NMWBReviewed in the United Kingdom on March 3, 20155.0 out of 5 stars This book is excellent - its a slow burner
This book is excellent - its a slow burner. I have found myself coming back to the concepts within this book many times over the years. If you want to understand the actions of Russia, as it seeks to destabilise the current world order and cast a new one, then this book is a must read. Especially the latter half about 4th Generation Warfare, the concept of war in the information age makes it essential reading to today's policy makers.
AdornoReviewed in the United Kingdom on December 4, 20063.0 out of 5 stars Marketing Military Reform
Reading this I reminded of how twenty years ago Senator Gary Hart (remember him?) led the military reform movement in the US. In the diagnosis of the reformers the Pentagon and the US armed forces in general were overly bureaucratic, conservative wedded to hugely expensive and irrelevant weapons systems, outdated personnel policies and backward in their thinking about war. Their solution - a turn to the ideas of John Boyd and other proponents of manoeuvre warfare. However much the Pentagon bought into Boyd the characteristics of the organization remain the same.
Thomas Hammes is a recently retired US Marine Colonel his argument is that war has entered the fourth generation (4GW) and the US has failed to prepare for it even though it has already been defeated by 4GW opponents three times in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia (this edition has a 2006 publication date but the text is unchanged from the 2004 initial publication) and is facing defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of learning how to deal with insurgent networks the Pentagon has invested in the high tech systems necessary to defeat a non-existent Warsaw Pact enemy.
Much of what Hammes has to say is sensible but trying to fit the whole story into four generations of warfare seems implausible. 1st generation is Napoleonic tactics, 2GW is First World War firepower based conflict, 3GW is blitzkrieg and 4GW is what comes after this. He argues that the transition is driven by changes in the broader social context of warfare. This doesn't work for me because the first of his case studies is Maoist People's War - if the level of development of the society drives innovation in warfare how can the China of the 1930s be more advanced...? I suspect that 4GW works more a marketing concept to sell his ideas in the military community.
My take on what Hammes sees as 4GW is essentially networked protracted war. Clausewitz realized that a stronger opponent could be defeated by protracted warfare provided that the weaker side could survive for long enough to build strength and/or transform the political situation. This insight lies at the heart of the Chinese/Vietnamese concept of protracted war. Hammes sees that in the contemporary world new civilian communications and transport systems provide new opportunities for the weak to challenge the strong while at the same time creating new vulnerabilities for their opponents.
If we look at the conflicts that the US has actually engaged in apart from Desert Storm and the March/April 2003 phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom Hammes is right. He seems on much weaker ground in putting forward ideas about how the US can actually prevail - can western democracies actually fight decades long wars in the current media environment? Here what he really needs is a more concrete analysis of current global politics.



