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On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War Paperback – June 1, 1995
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- Print length240 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherRandom House Publishing Group
- Publication dateJune 1, 1995
- Dimensions5.38 x 0.55 x 8.25 inches
- ISBN-100891415637
- ISBN-13978-0891415633
- Lexile measure1440L
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Product details
- Publisher : Random House Publishing Group; Reissue edition (June 1, 1995)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 240 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0891415637
- ISBN-13 : 978-0891415633
- Lexile measure : 1440L
- Item Weight : 10.4 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.38 x 0.55 x 8.25 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #830,126 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #601 in Southeast Asia History
- #1,409 in Vietnam War History (Books)
- #1,626 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
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Customers find the book readable and insightful on the Vietnam War. They appreciate the analysis of facts and data, as well as the strategic examination based on classic principles of war. The book provides a synopsis and lessons learned from the war.
AI-generated from the text of customer reviews
Customers find the book an engaging read on a difficult subject. They describe it as an eye-opening and best-selling classic on Vietnam. The book provides a good summary and Clausewitz analysis of the mistakes made by the leaders.
"...Overall, it is a good book and I'm wondering why Goodreads gives it a low rating...." Read more
"...explain this to Congress and the president ( ie Pakistan). A great read that even deals with todays 2012 situation." Read more
"A good book, and an interesting way to analyze Vietnam." Read more
"...To much bickering and turf battles. Good book!" Read more
Customers find the book's analysis insightful and relevant to today. They appreciate the strategic examination based on the classic principles of war. The book provides a synopsis and lessons learned from the Vietnam War. Readers describe it as detailed and historical, providing an interesting way to analyze Vietnam.
"...This book is a synopsis and the lessons learned from the Vietnam War...." Read more
"A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional..." Read more
"Colonel Harry G Summers Jr has written a very important critique of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War...." Read more
"A good book, and an interesting way to analyze Vietnam." Read more
Customers find the book readable.
"A surprisingly readable analysis about what went wrong during the Vietnam war, with plenty of lessons to draw from in today's political climate." Read more
"Excellent book and analysis of the Vietnam war, it is surprisingly easy to read." Read more
"Great Read, Well Written..." Read more
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Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on July 20, 2024I never went to Vietnam, as I was born in 1976. While I've had my opinions about the war I never fought in, I've started to get more interested in the conflict and for the most part, some of the opinions have been abandoned and changed due to new information and the like. This book is a synopsis and the lessons learned from the Vietnam War. It goes over what went wrong, and how things could have gone better had some things had been done, as opposed to what happened. Overall, it is a good book and I'm wondering why Goodreads gives it a low rating. And having served in Iraq and Afghanistan, I hope to read a book about those wars too, even though I participated in them in my own small world. I would look at this book as a way to understand the war's failures, and what should be done to fix it for the next one. While reading this book, I realized that the issues we had with Afghanistan show that the Army didn't learn much from this book, even though it was originally published in 1982.
- Reviewed in the United States on January 11, 2008A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional superiority can exhaust itself against a militarily sophisticated third world country. Clausewitz's theory and Summers explanation of "friction"in war ..."how even the simplest of tasks become difficult as countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance"...is worth the read alone.
Summers makes clear there is no such thing as a "splendid little war," "a war fought on the cheap," or "a slam dunk war." Contrary to popular mythology, maintaining public support for a war is always a problem. It was problem during the American Revolutionary War, World War II and as it is now during the fifth year of the war in Iraq. The enemy always has havens, political sanctuaries and brutal responses in every war: Apache Indians skillfully used Mexican territory to avoid capture, the North Viennese used tunnels and neutral countries to move troops and supplies, the Taliban hides in remote mountain caves, Al Qaeda rules from the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and Iraqi insurgents use IED's and suicide bombers.
Arrogance, superpower status and wishful thinking don't win wars...even winning every encounter doesn't mean you will inflict your will on the enemy or cause the enemy to beg for peace. If you want to know how to use an army wisely and understand the need to manage political expectations, On Strategy will get you started.
- Reviewed in the United States on October 3, 2016I had purchased a hard bound first edition while I was at OBC. I thought less of it then as I was immersed in the tactical back then. As my perspective has grown wider, my appreciation for the book (now a paperback) has improved. Unfortunately, I don't see much appreciation for the lessons learned. About the only one that seems to ring true is the importance of keeping the home front involved and supportive of the war. Our approach to this has been to deny the public almost all knowledge about the conflicts we are involved in. I'm not sure that's an improvement. But the importance of unity of effort and a truly clear and militarily achievable objective seem to be lost on my peers who are now the divisional and brigade leaders. The lessons will be hard to re-learn.
- Reviewed in the United States on May 8, 2017Colonel Harry G Summers Jr has written a very important critique of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Written originally as a study of the war for the US Army War College Colonel Summers' work was an instant success in the military as well as with the general public.
First published in 1982 this book makes clear that the outcome of the war had nothing to do with the fighting ability of the US military. Colonel Summers says, “On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious. How could we have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably? That disturbing question was the reason for this book.” (p 1) The Army was attempting to come to terms with the defeat in Vietnam.
Early on in the book the author makes clear that the answer to the question is “a failure in strategic military doctrine.” (p 89) The entire book (the text, excluding the appendix, is only 194 pages) is a close examination of the principles of war and how the US Army failed to apply them. As a framework for the critical analysis of the war Colonel Summers uses the principles of war set down by Carl von Clausewitz. Colonel Summers also examines those principles as set down in the US Army field manuals, the texts used by the Army to craft strategy and tactics.
Colonel Summers’ central tenant is “We thought we were pursuing a new strategy called counterinsurgency, but actually we were pursuing a defensive strategy in pursuit of a negative aim [counterinsurgency].” (p 88) “Basic to the success of a strategic defensive in pursuit of the negative aim…is the assumption that time is on your side.” (p 89) But time was not on the side of the US. The clock would run out in 1968.
The author’s central argument is that the Communist insurgency was an economy of force tactic and not the main effort of the North Vietnamese. To support this Colonel Summers notes that after Tet the Viet Cong insurgency was all but destroyed yet the war continued. He also notes that of the three occasions when the North Vietnamese decided the time was ripe to finish the South Vietnamese Army and Government they relied on NVA formations. Of course only one of those efforts was successful, the one in 1975.
This is a very brief overview of what Colonel Summers has to say about the war. He has much more to offer and it is all extremely compelling and very readable. Anyone interested in what the hell happened in Vietnam should read this book. Although it is not necessary I think the reader would get the most form this book if the reader has a working knowledge of the War.
Top reviews from other countries
Paul MarksReviewed in the United Kingdom on August 17, 20175.0 out of 5 stars Clear philosophical thinking is essential (basic) to military victory.
What is the objective of war? The objective of a military campaign is VICTORY. By having no clear plan for victory (for not really thinking about the objective of victory) the American political leadership doomed the Vietnam War to defeat For in war one either wins or one loses - and if one is not even trying to win (has no real plan for victory) then defeat is certain. But the military leadership were not innocent - they went along with the political leadership (rather than resigning) and this means that the military leadership of the campaign (such as General Westmoreland) were also guilty.
As well having fought in Vietnam Colonel Summers has clearly read and thought deeply into the philosophy of war - and military commanders who think the word "philosophy" is unmilitary (not "macho" or whatever) are unfit for command.
Christopher MorrisReviewed in the United Kingdom on September 3, 20185.0 out of 5 stars Arrived on time and in the condition stated.
Arrived on time and in the condition stated.
Excellent text but his theories have been widely disproven by A. Krepinevich and J. Nagl.
Peter WhiteReviewed in the United Kingdom on March 28, 20141.0 out of 5 stars Very poor
Frankly, very poor. Starts with some interesting discussion around declaration of war and the initial failure to line up the United States behind the war, and how the US military had failed to think through the implications of limited war. Then really went downhill and became verbose, patronising and meaningless to the point where I gave up just over half way through.
There seem to be entire chapters relating things that could be stated in a couple of sentences; endless unhelpful attempts to sound meaningful by bringing in Clauswitz regardless of the relevance to the argument; and some deeply patronising statements about criticisms of the US human rights record that I found borderline offensive. The author is incredibly dismissive of arguments that the US military's conduct in the war was inapproporate. Maybe he's right (it's certainly a complicated subject open to reasoned debate), but he chooses not to just dismiss the critics as gullible fools who do not know that war is nasty.
