This is altogether an extraordinary book by an extraordinary author. It is nothing less than the history of the evolution of U.S. policy towards Vietnam from the end of WWII to the conquest of South Vietnam by the Vietnamese Communists as observed by a professional intelligence analyst. The insights this book provides are not just on U.S. involvement in Vietnam (and by extension Laos and Cambodia), but on how U.S. National Security Policy toward South East Asia was formulated over a twenty year period. The comments about the value of a systematic process of formulating national security policy by integrating military, intelligence, and policy considerations are alone worth the price of the book.
If this were all the book did it would be a remarkable achievement. But George W. Allen does considerably more than this. Allen was from the beginning of his long career (some fifty years total) first and foremost a working intelligence analyst. As such he focused on Vietnam for some 18 years and developed in that time the increasingly rare quality of detailed knowledge of his target. Reading this book should provide any attentive reader with an excellent understanding of how the process of intelligence analysis actually works when executed by a real professional.
Although a personal account, Allen's book has an authentic feel to it. This reviewer found much of his account hauntingly familiar although we never met or worked together. Certainly his inability on several occasions to perform truly all source analysis due to ill-conceived compartmentalization is quite familiar. The same is true for his encounters with senior military leaders and civilian policy makers who considered any intelligence that did support their views almost a personal affront.
The Washington D.C. area is fairly awash with former `intelligence officers' claiming to be intelligence or counter-terrorism `experts' based on often rather dubious experiences in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). It is refreshing then when a real intelligence professional is actually willing to share his thoughts with general public. Towards the end of this book, Allen, identifies himself as a "professional intelligence analyst" which he truly was. The U.S. could use a lot more like him.
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Actually, it was the best we could do.
I had a passing interest in Vietnam, but was always far from the Saigon scene and missed what they were up to. This book gave me some views that I missed. Perhaps my difference with the author is that he expected the USA to react faster to information. Nations are slow to change and it took a while to learn that Hanoi was willing to spend more than we were for a "victory." Really Hanoi could have gained more by surrendering and letting us leave. The critics of the war have to remember that in a muddled effort it is always more important to work toward a solution than to give up to a disaster. But we did persevere and when it was clear there was nothing to gain we left. Slow, to be sure. But the right decision. I have only one question for all the Vietnam experts. How many Vietnamese do you still know and talk to?I suggest the Deforest book, since I worked for him from 72 to 75 in Bien Hoa.
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- Reviewed in the United States on February 8, 2015
- Reviewed in the United States on December 10, 2016
Actually, it was the best we could do.I had a passing interest in Vietnam, but was always far from the Saigon scene and missed what they were up to. This book gave me some views that I missed. Perhaps my difference with the author is that he expected the USA to react faster to information. Nations are slow to change and it took a while to learn that Hanoi was willing to spend more than we were for a "victory." Really Hanoi could have gained more by surrendering and letting us leave. The critics of the war have to remember that in a muddled effort it is always more important to work toward a solution than to give up to a disaster. But we did persevere and when it was clear there was nothing to gain we left. Slow, to be sure. But the right decision. I have only one question for all the Vietnam experts. How many Vietnamese do you still know and talk to?
Reviewed in the United States on December 10, 2016
I suggest the Deforest book, since I worked for him from 72 to 75 in Bien Hoa.
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- Reviewed in the United States on November 8, 2001
