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The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today Hardcover – October 30, 2012

4.5 4.5 out of 5 stars 1,038 ratings

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From the #1 bestselling author of Fiasco and The Gamble, an epic history of the decline of American military leadership from World War II to Iraq

History has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—and less kind to the generals of the wars that followed. In
The Generals, Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In part it is the story of a widening gulf between performance and accountability. During the Second World War, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough. Today, as one American colonel said bitterly during the Iraq War, “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.”

In The Generals we meet great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and those who failed themselves and their soldiers. Marshall and Eisenhower cast long shadows over this story, as does the less familiar Marine General O. P. Smith, whose fighting retreat from the Chinese onslaught into Korea in the winter of 1950 snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of annihilation.

But Korea also showed the first signs of an army leadership culture that neither punished mediocrity nor particularly rewarded daring. In the Vietnam War, the problem grew worse until, finally, American military leadership bottomed out. The My Lai massacre, Ricks shows us, is the emblematic event of this dark chapter of our history. In the wake of Vietnam a battle for the soul of the U.S. Army was waged with impressive success. It became a transformed institution, reinvigorated from the bottom up. But if the body was highly toned, its head still suffered from familiar problems, resulting in tactically savvy but strategically obtuse leadership that would win battles but end wars badly from the first Iraq War of 1990 through to the present.

Ricks has made a close study of America’s military leaders for three decades, and in his hands this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails.

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4.5 out of 5 stars
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Customers say

Customers find the book informative and interesting. They describe it as an exciting and useful read. The writing quality is described as well-written and easy to understand. Many readers find the book revealing and insightful into leadership and command. However, opinions differ on the strategy, performance, and history.

AI-generated from the text of customer reviews

233 customers mention "Insight"229 positive4 negative

Customers appreciate the book's insights. They find it informative and interesting, covering all aspects of the subject. The book provides a good overview of American generalship since World War II. It is well-researched and well-written, providing food for thought on our current military at the Brigadier General level.

"...history, operational art, institutional management, and geo-strategic analysis. A really excellent publication and a valuable addition to the library!" Read more

"...Thomas Ricks brings up some very important points that need to be hashed out and debated. Ricks assessment of our military over-all is even handed...." Read more

"...Ricks book is an exciting read. He gives a vivid description of the generals examined and the stresses of their combat command...." Read more

"...It is a thought-provoking, insightful study of Army leadership that should generate serious debate and discussion among our military and political..." Read more

187 customers mention "Readability"187 positive0 negative

Customers find the book engaging and useful. They say it's an excellent read that holds their attention, and is essential reading for anyone interested in national security. Readers mention it flows well and provides intellectual vigor.

"...I found Thomas Ricks newest work The Generals to be a fascinating, well-written and well-researched book...." Read more

"...Accountability, intellectual vigor, combined with broad mindedness are what Rick thinks will improve the quality of our generals, not to mention the..." Read more

"...Ricks book is an exciting read. He gives a vivid description of the generals examined and the stresses of their combat command...." Read more

"...Great read!" Read more

97 customers mention "Writing quality"85 positive12 negative

Customers find the book well-written and easy to read. They appreciate the author's clear writing style without technical jargon. The book provides an overview of the history of the American Army in an accessible manner. Readers also mention the author is a skilled writer who expresses his thoughts clearly and concisely.

"...a journalist by training and not a professional historian, has superb writing and analytical skills. This 550+ page tome a fast read...." Read more

"...He is that rare bird who can express his thoughts in easy to read prose devoid of the kind of techno-jargon or Inside-the-Beltway arcana that one..." Read more

"...Deeply researched, the book is highly readable and written with straight-forward and -- a potential pitfall deftly avoided -- unemotional prose...." Read more

"...Although these arguments are well executed, it is evident from the style of Ricks' writing, and even more so from the superficial nature of his..." Read more

28 customers mention "Look"23 positive5 negative

Customers find the book insightful and well-written. They describe it as a revealing look at how America fights its wars. The book is well-organized and thoughtful, providing a clear and lucid analysis of what ails the generals.

"...sought to create a new class of Army generals who were energetic, thoughtful, strategically minded and team players...." Read more

"A clear-eyed, sobering look at the decline of a critically important part of the U.S. Army, The Generals: American Military Command from World War..." Read more

"...All in all, his book is a revealing picture of how America fights its wars, and who it marshals to run those enterprises...." Read more

"...Thoughtful and eminently readable, this is a book that should provoke a discussion about military leadership that our country needs to have." Read more

39 customers mention "Strategy"16 positive23 negative

Customers have differing views on the strategy. Some find generals good tacticians but not strategists. They appreciate the book's thesis that generalship is more than winning battles and a great dissertation on US command practices. Others feel leadership is failing them, with no real strategies, ineffective combat leaders, and lack of accountability. The book exposes incompetence and lack of command integrity.

"...Despite this, his insights throughout the book are cursory and empirical, focusing on sensational incidents such as a ferocious exchange between..." Read more

"...Ricks is, without doubt, a proficient and interesting professional writer...." Read more

"...argues, there are in our armed services martinet officers, ineffective combat leaders, and "politics" affecting advancement to the General officer..." Read more

"...its tactical competencies; it recruited and trained outstanding combined arm mechanized formations, special operation forces, and developed and..." Read more

27 customers mention "Performance"13 positive14 negative

Customers have different views on the book's performance. Some find it excellent and effective in improving generals' quality and performance. Others say it falls short of its goals and is a key reason for the under-performance of contemporary generals.

"...Third, this cultural change is the key reason for the under-performance of contemporary generals and the resulting poor results in Iraq and..." Read more

"...It has a sort of cross-over effect between military history, operational art, institutional management, and geo-strategic analysis...." Read more

"...This book isn't what it purports to be. It is not an unbiased study of the successes and failures of General officers during the past 60 years...." Read more

"...with broad mindedness are what Rick thinks will improve the quality of our generals, not to mention the performance of our military in the field...." Read more

24 customers mention "History"16 positive8 negative

Customers have different views on the book's history. Some find it informative and a great source for military enthusiasts, covering major American wars from WW1 to the present. Others feel it's too political and not objective, lacking objective reporting.

"...It has a sort of cross-over effect between military history, operational art, institutional management, and geo-strategic analysis...." Read more

"...Overall a good historical analysis just a little lacking in the complete story." Read more

"...There are somewhat lengthy (though fascinating) digressions into war fighting in Korea (at Chosin Reservoir) and Vietnam (the Tet Offensive) that..." Read more

"...He does an excellent job of covering World War II through Desert Storm, and I found his criticisms of Powell and Schwarzkopf to be an eminently..." Read more

16 customers mention "Generals content"5 positive11 negative

Customers have different views on the generals' content. Some find it informative and well-written, covering many generals and their personalities and capabilities. Others feel the book exposes some failings of the generals and reveals weaknesses in the military personnel system. They also want more details on generals and battles.

"...From Westmoreland to Abrams the generals were truly clueless...." Read more

"...from the Pentagon to the Department of State, the officer corps began to deteriorate and one soon begins to see why the U.S. has not won a war since...." Read more

"...He covers many generals thouroughly and the portraits are highly critical, but probably accurate and very interesting...." Read more

"...The usual whining about lack of support, poor caliber of recruits and political interference was addressed but in a fair, non-judgemental..." Read more

Top reviews from the United States

  • Reviewed in the United States on November 4, 2012
    Thomas Ricks' latest work The Generals follows his previous works "Fiasco" and "The Gamble". Both prior publications set the stage for this current work. Ricks poses this central question - why do senior ranking Army officers never face relief for unsatisfactory performance? Ricks then starts a long and complex study of senior Army officers begining with the ascent of General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff in 1939. Ricks is intimately familiar with today's military forces and possess a depth of institutional knowledge that very few current journalists possess. (Robert Kaplan is probably the sole exception.) Ricks, a journalist by training and not a professional historian, has superb writing and analytical skills. This 550+ page tome a fast read. I was able to blaze through all 550+ pages in three nights because of Ricks fast-paced and fluid writing style. Ricks is, without doubt, a proficient and interesting professional writer.

    Ricks begins to answer his own rhetorical question by an in-depth study of the character and composition of the legendary George C. Marshall. The Generals then flows in a fast-paced manner from WWII to Korea where, he states, the seeds of the Army's near destruction in Vietnam were sown by an officer management system that modeled itself on 'corporate America.' Then Ricks turns to the mid-1950's 'Pentomic Division' and later to the 'flexible response' of the early Kennedy administration. From that point on, the institutional mis-management of the U.S. Army by the Johnson administration is fully exposed. (H.R. McMaster's "Dereliction of Duty" is frequently cited by Ricks as the best work on that subject, and I would tend to agree. However, after reading Sorley's biography of General Harold K. Johnson - "Honorable Warrior" - Johnson was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff 1964-1968 - it may be that McMaster's somewhat harsh criticism of General Johnson is misplaced. It might also be noted that McMaster wrote his well-known publication as a major; now he is a major general. His criticism of senior level staff officers in "Dereliction of Duty" may reflect the brash assessment of mid-grade officer not facing the stress and strain of senior command as was Harold Johnson in 1964-68.)

    In Ricks assessment, no current or recent past general grade officer measures up to the person of George C. Marshall. That is frequent refrain throughout the book. Whether that assessment is accurate or not is debatable. I can speak with some small degree of authority as a product of the post-Vietnam Army that conformity and close-minded submission to the commander's higher intent was expected of all officers of that era. One "bad" officer efficiency report (being rated as "meets standards" was enough) was sufficient in itself to end one's career. Ricks is openly contemptuous of General Tommy Franks. Although I do not know General Franks, I expect that Franks was a product of the post-Vietnam era where conformity and leading the cheer for the current commander was the pathway to success.

    Ricks is openly critical of the lack of honest, open thinking in mid to upper grade Army officers. The fact is that 'non-conformity' is generally a career killer. Let's posit that you are a mid-grade major approaching next year's promotion board. When in any promotion cycle only one out of three lieutenant colonels will be advanced to colonel and only one out of five colonels advance to brigadier general, then the mathematical chances of success - general officer rank - is only one in fifteen for the newly promoted lieutenant colonel. It makes one cautious about advocating a course of action that does not fit the current commander's scheme of operations. Ricks suggests toward the end of the book that a "probationary" work period be instituted for all command positions from platoon leader through four star level. If the commander proves unsatisfactory, then relieve that person for cause and find that individual a staff or installation position where his or her skills can be utilized. General George C. Marshall had the luxuary of doing just that because the training base requirements and the communications zone of WWII required a large number of non-combatant general grade officers; today's Army does not have that same TO&E. If anything, in the next go-around of force reductions, there will be fewer general rank positions open for any individual.

    I found Thomas Ricks newest work The Generals to be a fascinating, well-written and well-researched book. It has a sort of cross-over effect between military history, operational art, institutional management, and geo-strategic analysis. A really excellent publication and a valuable addition to the library!
    19 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on January 13, 2015
    Usually before purchasing a new book on Amazon I go to the reviews and read the worst reviews first and then progress to the more positive ones. I am the kind of reader who wants to know ahead of time what thoughtful readers first have to say about a piece from a negative point of view. So when I went to read the negative reviews of Thomas Rick’s new book, The Generals, I was surprised that 86 of 103 reviews were either 5 or 4 stars (very positive). Only 10 review were negative, and of those 10 only 1 review could be considered “thoughtful”. A reviewer named Mark offered up a review that covered several paragraphs, and his critique used phrases like “seeing history through rose covered glasses”; Mark also questioned some of the sources of Ricks’ book. The positive reviews essentially agreed with Ricks’ assessment in that today’s generals are narrow minded officers who escape accountability. The Generals has been reviewed in many publications as diverse as the Wall St Journal, and the Atlantic. It certainly has gotten a lot of attention.

    Before going into my own review I should tell the potential reader that The Generals is a very easy book to read for the layman. Thomas Ricks, who has won the Pulitzer Prize, is a veteran reporter, and a student of the US military. He is that rare bird who can express his thoughts in easy to read prose devoid of the kind of techno-jargon or Inside-the-Beltway arcana that one often finds in most books of this genre. Any reader with just cursory knowledge of our military history circa 1939 to the present can read The Generals without constantly referring to their Encyclopedia or Wikipedia. Additionally, Mr. Ricks isn’t shy about arguing his points. His prose is in the active voice and it can be quite convincing. He isn’t afraid to be an iconoclast; and, Mr. Ricks’ assessment isn’t confined to officers who have long disappeared from the scene. Several living officers (such as Generals Franks and Sanchez) find themselves scorched by his pen.

    The theme of The Generals is simple. Our modern military, which began with the reign of our nation’s first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General George Marshall, has devolved from the military excellence of the Second World War. General George Marshall, in Rick’s estimation, was not only the finest General who served in the CJCS post, but his methodology of command and leadership was the pinnacle for all later officers to emulate. Ricks provides the reader with insights into Marshall’s command style; General Marshall was a ruthless leader who demanded that his own generals be just as ruthless in dealing with subordinates as he was. Sixteen out of 155 division commanders and 5 corps commanders were relieved with cause during the Second World War. Ricks gives the account of the 90th Infantry Division during the Normandy assault. In just 2 weeks the 90th suffered 100% casualties (more if you include replacements). During this period, General Bradley relieved 2 division commanders 2 assistant division commanders and a number of regimental and battalion commanders until he found the right mix of officers to pick up the pieces. The 90th would go on to be one of the Army’s finest performing divisions. But, Marshall’s methodology didn’t just focus on incompetence. Two of the Army’s finest combat officers, Generals George Patton and Terry Allen would be relieved of their respective commands at the height of their powers. Patton’s crime the abuse of enlisted men and the PR nightmare that ensued. Allen’s was not being a team player. But, Marshall and his subordinate, General Eisenhower, would rehabilitate both of these fine combat commanders. Patton would go on to fame as commander of 3rd Army, and Allen would do likewise as commander of the 104th Infantry Division. Marshall was ruthless with subordinates, but he was also flexible. Officers who failed once or even twice would not necessarily see their careers throttled if they possessed some type of redeeming military quality. Ricks points out that Marshall had a few fast rules for his commanders. First and foremost they must be team players. Additionally they must possess calm, ruthless leadership that demanded results of their subordinates. Marshall and his protégé, Eisenhower, didn’t expect his generals to be future Napoleons; but he did expect them to follow orders, execute those orders and deliver results. If his two and three star subordinates could not live up to these expectations they were gone. The end result was a command system in Europe that featured Eisenhower and his winning team of commanders, Generals Clark, Bradley, Simpson, Gerow, Patton, and Hodges. Eisenhower, who spent most of his career in administrative and training positions, earned the title of Supreme Allied Commander by virtue of keeping the Anglo-American alliance together through some very difficult times. Eisenhower performed his duties (mainly diplomatic, political, and administrative) with quiet yet ruthless efficiency. In just 2 years, by virtue of his tireless efforts, the US military in Europe quickly established ascendency over its British allies. By retiring or reassigning older and incompetent officers, Eisenhower allowed younger, more vigorous and efficient officers to rise to command positions. Officers like Westmoreland, Ridgeway, Depuy, Taylor, and Abrams got their start in the brutal battlefields of Europe. Ricks stresses accountability as the main virtue of the Marshall years. Officers who failed to live up to his standards were relieved of their commands.

    Another theme of Rick’s book is that of broadmindedness. General Marshall, Eisenhower, and Omar Bradley, were not outstanding tacticians; but, they were superb strategists and team players. As a matter of fact, Bradley’s track record from a tactical point of view was quite poor. His 12th Army Group failed to close the Falaise Pocket in August of 1944 until half or more of the trapped Germans escaped. Bradley also was responsible for the bloody offensive operations of in the Hurtgen Forest. And neither Eisenhower nor Bradley saw the German Ardennes offensive coming. Yet, their performances should be seen in light of the Allied victory. They won the war. These high level commanders rightly put their concerns to strategic and not tactical matters. Winning the war, even winning it ugly was preferable to not winning at all. Ricks assessment of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower reinforces Moltke’s and Clausewitz’s dictum that wars are won through the application of superior strategy. Patton was a superior tactician; but, it would have been a disaster if he and not Eisenhower commanded the Ally war effort.
    One other important area of the Marshal doctrine was politics. Or better put, Marshal strongly discouraged his officers from participating in them. General Patton almost lost his commission for forgetting this when he gave a wartime speech in the UK. FDR never had to worry about General Marshal or his subordinates using their position as means of promoting themselves or their agendas form a political point of view. The great exception was General Douglas McArthur. McArthur was the antithesis of Marshall. He openly supported Wendell Willkie in 1936, and some wondered if McArthur himself wasn’t eyeing the Oval Office. Ricks himself wonders if FDR and Marshall kept McArthur in Asia and awarded him the Congressional Medal of Honor (despite abandoning his forces in Corregidor) just keep him away from Washington DC. Truman himself later would allow one of America’s most decorated Generals to continue to serve after war just to keep the meddlesome general out of his hair. If this was in fact true, Rick argues the nation paid for these decisions for the next 25 years. For McArthur displayed exactly the wrong traits a General should possess. McArthur built himself a political and personal financial empire in Asia after the war that is unique in our history. And God help any President who attempted to relieve him. The Korean War was not just a foreign policy and military disaster. It was also, Ricks argues, a political disaster. The firing of General McArthur in the aftermath of the CHICOMs entry into the war created the kind of nightmares Presidents fear. The war cost Truman his presidency. It also set back civilian-military relations 3 decades. Ricks argues, for instance, that LBJ never trusted the Army, as he feared that every general was a potential McArthur. The united political-military relations that highlighted the FDR-Marshall team would be sorely lacking in coming decades. And this deficiency became disastrous in the 1960s. Marshall himself made it a point to keep his engagements with FDR to an absolute minimum. And when they did occur they were only to discuss high level military policy.
    Beginning with Maxwell Taylor and continuing to this day the Marshall rule has been constantly broken. But, it was Maxwell Taylor whose temptation to engage in politics that set the stages for the Vietnam Conflict. Ricks puts the blame for Vietnam on many people. But, he reserves his most bitter critiques for Taylor. This section of the narrative takes up a large portion of Rick’s story. And I will leave it to the reader to make his own judgments. Ricks rightfully mentions the institutional rot that set inside the Army after Korean War. After Korea the Army was managed and not led. Officers who failed to lead were simply reassigned. During Vietnam Westmoreland was “kicked upstairs” for his failures instead of being forced to retire in shame. Marshall’s system of relieving incompetent officers was discarded in favor of reassignment. More importantly, General Officers tended to focus on purely tactical doctrine and relegated the more abstract problems of strategy to the civilians. Ticket-punching became the norm, and a dry-rot set in which caused many bright and imaginative officers to leave the service. Mediocrity was not only allowed, it was encouraged. Ricks argues that this devolution set-in before Vietnam, and made a bad situation worse. It prevented the Army from realizing that the Vietnam conflict should have been approached from a counter-insurgency point of view and not a set piece campaign where firepower and operational maneuver were paramount. Add-in the almost criminal policy of the 12 month troop rotations, the rising civilian disgust of the war, not to mention the rising American casualty rates, it doesn’t take much for Ricks to convince the reader that the Army leadership hadn’t a clue to what it was doing. What the Army lacked, Ricks argues, was competent Generals who understood the finer points of counter-insurgencies, politics, and geo-strategy. From Westmoreland to Abrams the generals were truly clueless. The nadir for the Army came in 1970 with the My Lai Massacre and its cover-up, which Ricks covers in some detail.

    But Thomas Ricks wasn’t finished with his critique. The Post-War rebuilding of the US Army was only partially successful he argues. Yes, the All-Volunteer Army recovered its tactical competencies; it recruited and trained outstanding combined arm mechanized formations, special operation forces, and developed and deployed some of the finest weapons systems in history (The M1-A1 Abrams, the Patriot Missile System, and The Bradley Fighting Vehicle). However, it was at the higher levels of officer development where problems continued. However, during the period 1975-1990, there was a smaller clique of officers who attempted to set up schools for advanced education that covered the kind of skills that separate a Colonel commanding a regiment and a General commanding CENTCOM. Men like Colonel Wass de Czege wanted to establish a school for promotable officers that emphasized things like domestic security concerns, peacekeeping, advanced planning that took into account political and social issues as well as military concerns. Thus began the School of Advanced Military Studies. Those who advocated this kind of advanced military education ran up against those in the bureaucracy that stressed purely tactical excellence for Army commanders. Ricks stated that this dichotomy between a tactical perspective and a more intellectual or strategic one lay dormant for a number of years. But, it came into full public view during the period 2001- to the present. General Franks and Sanchez represented the tactical school of leadership, while Generals Patraeus and McMaster represented the more intellectual or strategic school. Both Patraeus and McMaster hold PhDs and are known whom Ricks dubs outlier officers. Franks and Sanchez, Ricks rightfully critiques for their failures in devising the correct strategy. As a matter of fact, Ricks says that Franks in particular commanded as if he was a company commander and not a four star general.

    And that is the underlying gist of Ricks’ book. He spends the remainder of his pages giving his advice as to how the Army can reform the education of its general corps. He combines the simple yet ruthless leadership principals of General Marshall with the ideas of Colonel Wass de Czege. Accountability, intellectual vigor, combined with broad mindedness are what Rick thinks will improve the quality of our generals, not to mention the performance of our military in the field. After-all, the US has not won a major combat operation in almost 70 years.

    I tend to disagree with those who say that Ricks sees the past through rose colored glasses. General Marshall brilliantly executed a global strategy that won the war. However, it should be stressed that in comparison, General Marshall was very fortunate. The political situation in 1939 was much simpler than in 1968 or 2004. FDR and the Democrats dominated Washington. And a pliant media showed a rather curious lack of curiosity when it came to FDR’s failings. Marshall had far less pressure from the media and the intellectual class than later generations of officers. Additionally, after 7 December 1941, the nation was completely united. Corporations deferred profits, workers deferred wage increases; and the citizens rationed about everything imaginable to win the war. The treasury opened its coffers up and money was never a problem. All Marshall had to do was win the war and bring the boys home. Not even in the dark year of 1942 did Marshall experience the kind of pressures that Abrams and Patraeus would suffer in coming years. This is not to say that Marshall had it easy. But at times I think that Ricks compares apples and oranges.

    Additionally, Ricks at times conflates terms like tactics, strategy and operations. The term military operation is an old Prussian term. The Germans during the period of 1850-1945 didn’t think of tactics and strategy; but, they saw combat in terms of military operations. The German General Staff looked at the “whole” of combat (political, logistics and industry, morale, firepower, and maneuver). Because of their unique geographical and political position within Europe they tended to see things differently. For one diplomatic misstep they could be facing 2 or more enemies. In this sense, Thomas Ricks, whether he realizes it or not, takes a very Prussian perspective on Generalship. That is, Ricks believes that modern generalship depends primarily upon the intellectual development of the officer’s faculties and not the martial ones. Yet, it is just this type of intellectual navel gazing that took the Germans down the destructive road they traveled. Yes, the Prussians developed cultured and broadminded military leaders of the highest caliber (Moltke the Elder, von Manstein, and von Hammerstein). But Germany also produced officers that were disastrous (von Bloomberg, Halder, and Ludendorff). As Prussia illustrated, one can take military intellectualism too far. And once it is established it is difficult to change course. Would Ricks be in favor of the US Army establishing a corps elite in the mold of what Prussian developed in the 19th Century?

    Finally, just as too many historians put too much blame on the political civilian leaders of this nation, Ricks does the same with the military. For, ultimately it is the civilian leadership that sets policy. The US was very fortunate from 1938-45 to have two men from each area (the political and military) who acted as one. General Marshall and FDR was a match made in heaven. And if history teaches us one thing, it is to not expect miracles to occur too often. The relationships of Lincoln and McClellan, or LBJ and Westmoreland seem to be the rule and not the exception. Yes, it is possible to pattern an officer corps as close to General Marshall’s ideas as possible. But there is no guarantee that the elected civilian leaders will measure up. Yes, a CJCS can resign. Heck, the entire JCS can resign en mass if they don’t agree with the President. But, that can also have a deleterious effect on morale on both the troops and the voters. Where that happy median resides in a democracy such as ours is anyone’s guess.
    Finally, I think Thomas Ricks misses another much deeper point. Our military, despite the impression he paints, is already overly educated. Retired General Wesley Clark was a Rhoades Scholar; most officers if they wish to attain high rank attend any number of advanced schools. Many are selected to attend Ivy League universities, not to mention the military colleges at Fort Leavenworth. And after reading the books that have come out in recent years it is not difficult to realize that most of our successful officers fall into what Charles Murray calls the Cognitive Class. Murray points out that members of the Cognitive Class are similar in social, political, and secular outlooks. They are all overachievers; they all possess advanced degrees, and they are all ambitious. Most of all, they are hold similar Progressive views. In recent years, the Pentagon has shown a proclivity to engage in the kind of political correct policies that plague civil society in general. Feminism, homosexual rights, and Multiculturalism are now firmly cemented into military policy. Ambitious Pentagon officers have happily implemented most of these policies with few reservations. The end result we find out is a kind of rapid moral decay from the bottom and the top of the military that we have witnessed during the last year. A general cannot instill a set of military ethics while he is engaging in adultery (see General Sinclair et als), or sinks into babbling multicultural nonsense after a military atrocity (see General Casey).

    Over-all, I strongly advise any reader interested in our military to read this book. Thomas Ricks brings up some very important points that need to be hashed out and debated. Ricks assessment of our military over-all is even handed. The years spent in the field and overseas give him a unique perspective amongst civilian writers. The reader will not be disappointed.
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Top reviews from other countries

  • VIKRAM
    5.0 out of 5 stars Insightful
    Reviewed in India on August 13, 2024
    The book gives a great insight into the evolution of the US Military and psyche of leaders. Must read for any military history student
  • Amazon Customer
    5.0 out of 5 stars A very interesting book
    Reviewed in Italy on September 25, 2021
    This book has a very informative title, being about what generalship should be and what it has been in the last hundred years, very informative and accurate and, most of all, practically up-to-date. However, its only deals with the US generalship and, given the size of the book, it's more a survey than an essay. It would be very interesting to compare the US generalship with other Countries'. Although the author is rather critical of US generals, I do not think they fared badly compared with their counterparts in other Nations.
  • Timothy Bates
    5.0 out of 5 stars Generals you get are a result of the generals you fire, or fail to fire when they fail
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on September 21, 2019
    Analyses what makes for great generalship from a much neglected perspective: how the generals themselves are managed. With studies of generals in different battles, wars, and epochs, the author concludes that the biggest factor is firing generals when they fail. Not with rancor, and with an open door to return, but with a very clear rule that, with high probability, command failure leads to removal from the role.
  • Kindle Customer
    5.0 out of 5 stars In desperate need of a second edition.
    Reviewed in Japan on November 29, 2022
    Excellent. Simply excellent.
    This book desperately needs a second addition to cover the events of the Afghanistan withdrawl.
  • jay
    4.0 out of 5 stars Four Stars
    Reviewed in India on August 18, 2015
    good