This book argues that human abstract thinking is built upon sensory-motor and concrete thinking, which form the universal foundations of human cognitive activity, and that all abstract thinking is comprised of metaphors for these foundations. The writers presume that since the early development of human intelligence takes place within the context of our bodies and our interactions with the physical environment the cognitive mechanisms for abstract thinking are based on neurological layers built above the sensory motor modes on to which they are mapped. These are not new ideas, of course. The developmental stages of Piaget provide a parallel perspective on human cognitive ontology. Contemporary research in artificial intelligence presuppose the same. Lakoff and Johnson, while presuming the same, are not concerned with marshalling the evidence to justify this position. It becomes the ideological foundation of their broadside against the entire body of western thought.
The evidence presented by Lakoff and Johnson for their hypothesis is entirely comprised of a linguistic analyses of the metaphors we use when talking about abstract ideas. They argue that since we are usually not aware of the sensory- motor and concrete origins of our abstract thinking the borrowed logic of the metaphors prevent us from engaging in true abstract thinking. Neither we nor any of the great philosophical forefathers of Western thought are or were aware of that. We cannot think what we think when we are are thinking, and neither could they. The entire body of Western philosophy can be reduced to a collection of metaphors for the embodied sensory-motor mind.
The broadest criticism of Lakoff and Johnson must refer to the negative self reference inherent in their main argument. Their deconstruction of human thinking and all of Western philosophy is itself abstract. If their method gives us a valid critical method that leads to knowledge about the function of human minds and its habits of thinking, then Western philosophy too must preserve its claim to yield valid arguments and true knowledge.
Despite this, however, these authors do make a valid point. Much of our language about abstract concepts is metaphorical. This insight is not new. Besides the usual favorites of postmodern writers such as Neitzche and Freud who both discussed (besides using) metaphor, the issues is not new to philosophical debate. Even Aristotle, the linguistic essentialist par excellence, talked about the use of metaphor. Besides the evidence offered by Lakoff and Johnson, there is a large body of evidence from evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology and the study of artificial intelligence which contribute to the view of human intelligence, broadly speaking, as having been shaped by embodied sensory motor mechanisms and experiences. Unfortunately, very little of this evidence was marshaled by these authors. Lakoff and Johnson's chief conclusion does not follow from the data they present.
Metaphorical thinking may be a barrier to pure abstract thinking but at another level it may be the bridge which enables us to grapple with concepts outside the sensory-motor and concrete operations of everyday life. Why it should not be possible to meaningfully map systems of abstract ideas onto the metaphors is not explained by Lakoff and Johnson. Simply to point out that the language of abstract thinking is metaphorical does not prevent it from being the language of abstract thinking. Lakoff and Johnson's rather cavalier dismissal of the entire body of Western philosophy is not convincing. The corpus of Kant's work, for example, cannot be reduced to the "strict father" metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson claim to find underlying almost everything he said; a description which in any case is dubious at best. Where these metaphors can be found, they do not invalidate Kant's systematic and monumental works, which have their own meaning. In some places, the metaphors seem to be found more strongly in Lakoff and Johnson's presentation than in the original works. Kant was mistaken in some central aspects of epistemology. His synthetic a priori judgments, which he took to be certain and necessary truths, became shaky with the development of electrodynamic theory in the 19th Century and lost all credibility after general relativity was discovered in the early part of the 20th. But Western thought moved on. Einstein freely used spatial metaphors to describe the formalism of relativity but these in no way invalidate his theory. It is interesting to note that the most abstract of contemporary theories of matter employ terms such as "spin", "color" and "charm" to designate formal entities which we know can have no such physical meaning; they are merely terms in equations describing properties of quantum waves. The use of these metaphors, as distinct from calling them "particle a", "particle b" and so one, has no impact on the truth or validity of quantum formalism.
Where Lakoff and Johnson are able to demonstrate that philosophers have systematically used metaphors in their language, they have failed to demonstrate that the logic of the metaphors is carried over to the thinking of the philosophers in question to such a degree that their works are invalidated. Perhaps this happens some times - but not all the time to everyone. Lakoff and Johnson's arguments are often forced and not convincing. They are indubitably post-modern critics of traditional philosophy and need to be taken with a large pinch of salt (metaphor intended).
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Loading your book clubs
There was a problem loading your book clubs. Please try again.
Not in a club? Learn more
Join or create book clubs
Choose books together
Track your books
Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free.
![Philosophy In The Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought by [George Lakoff]](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/5161dylO32L._SX260_.jpg)
Follow the Author
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
Top reviews from other countries
nicholas hargreaves
Cognitive Science Meets Philosophy
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 17, 2013Amazon Customer
Importante leitura
Reviewed in Brazil on October 14, 2022
Amazon Customer
Reviewed in Brazil on October 14, 2022
Images in this review
Abdullah ^evki YURTVERMEZ
VERY USEFUL BOOK FOR PHILOSOPHY LOVERS....
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on December 10, 2013Wies.
This book is amazingly thought provoking
Reviewed in Germany on December 10, 2022
